# A return to Kristeva: reconstructing female voice in contemporary consumer society

by

ATHENA VANESSA BOUWER-NIRENSTEIN

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# Abstract

There has been considerable debate amongst feminist scholars as to whether the normalization of cosmetic surgery positively impacts women, empowers women by promoting agency and choice (Gimlin 2002, Kuczynski 2006), or oppresses women by propagating patriarchal ideologies that confine women's bodies and consequently inhibit their voice (Blum 2003, Blood 2005, Heinricy 2006, Clarke and Griffin 2007, Tait, 2007). Rather than entering this debate my argument proceeds from a premise that the normalization of cosmetic surgery is a form of implicit and exclusive violence. Using a selection of post-structuralist, feminist, and psychoanalytic theories, I analyze the manner in which this form of violence confines women's bodies and structures the psyche. Using Jacques Lacan, Judith Butler, and Michel Foucault's argument on pastoral power, I deconstruct the formation of the normalized self, the conscience, and the act of confession as it translates in the context of the cosmetic surgical body itself. Furthermore, I highlight liberal feminism's role in this form of oppression. In so doing, I theoretically show the continual and effective functioning of pastoral power in the context of an individualization technique that oppresses women in the second decade of the twenty-first century. I argue that the normalization of cosmetic surgery provokes a silencing of woman's voices, an exploitation and oppression of the individual's psyche, and an invalidation of the living body by a less visible, less explicit, mode of incarceration that is concealed by an aesthetic and moral veil.

It is in this context that I present a counter discourse to the oppression that underlies the normalizing discourses promoted by the cosmetic surgical industry, a destabilization of patriarchal norms embedded within cosmetic surgical discourses, and a theoretical reconstruction that involves an inscription of what I refer to as an authentic feminist voice in contemporary consumer culture – a mode of intimate unconscious insurgence.

I advocate a return to Julia Kristeva's theory and the intimate revolt promoted by her ethical approach. Furthermore, I present a voice that demonstrates an intimate revolt – a voice that challenges patriarchal norms and is not exclusively confined by the mechanisms of normalization that shape the twenty-first century woman with emphasis on the cosmetic surgical

industry and its superincumbent discourses – the South African poet Antjie Krog. It is Krog's skillfully structured poetic texts that facilitate my theoretical reconstruction.

Applying Kristeva's theory on semanalysis, I theoretically show that Krog's work fabricates an excess to the confines of the law of the Father and the mechanisms of normalization itself. In addition, I present an "originary attachment" as an adaption of Kristeva's argument on the *chora* and my proposal of an "originary ideal" challenges Kristeva's emphasis on phonetic grams in the context of that which underlies the realm of the paternal metaphor.

Using Louise Viljoen's analysis of Krog's work and Bridget Garnham's research on emerging designer cosmetic surgical discourses as support, I then present Krog's poetic texts as a counter discourse to the "moral" cosmetic surgical discourses that exploit the ageing individual in the second decade of the twenty-first century. In addition, applying Kristeva's theory on paragrams to Krog's poetic text(s), I present a destabilization of the patriarchal norms implicit within cosmetic surgical discourses. Furthermore, I extend Kristeva's theory on the principle of negativity to present a re-translation of the act-of-confession in Krog's poetic text(s), an extension of Foucault's pastoral power and Butler's argument on the exclusivity of normalization, and a reclamation of her ageing body in *Verweersrkrif/Body Bereft* (Krog 2006).

**Key words:**

Julia Kristeva; Antjie Krog; Michel Foucault; Jacques Lacan; Judith Butler; Louise Viljoen; Feminist theory; Psychoanalytic theory; Pastoral power; Semanalysis; Semiotic drives

**OPSOMMING**

Feministiese geleerdes voer al geruime tyd 'n warm debat oor die kwessie of die normalisering van kosmetiese chirurgie vroue positief beïnvloed, vroue bemagtig deurdat dit volmag en keuse vir hulle in die hand werk (Gimlin 2002; Kuczynski 2006), of vroue onderdruk deurdat dit patriargale ideologieë voorstaan wat die vroueliggaam inperk en gevolglik die vrou inhibeer om haar stem te laat hoor (Blood 2005; Blum 2005; Clarke en Griffin 2007; Heinricy 2006; Tait 2007). In plaas daarvan om by hierdie debat betrokke te raak, gaan ek van die veronderstelling uit dat die normalisering van kosmetiese chirurgie 'n vorm van implisiete en eksklusiewe geweld is.

Aan die hand van post-strukturalistiese, feministiese en psigoanalitiese teorieë ontleed ek die manier waarop hierdie vorm van geweld vroue se liggaam onderwerp en hul psige vorm. Ek dekonstrueer die vorming van die genormaliseerde self, die bewussyn en die daad van belydenis, soos dit in die konteks oorgebring word, aan die hand van Jacques Lacan, Judith Butler en Michel Foucault se beskouings van herderlike oftewel pastorale mag. Hierbenewens onderstreep ek die rol wat liberale feminisme in hierdie vorm van onderwerping speel. Sodoende demonstreer ek teoreties hoe die voortdurende en effektiewe funksionering van pastorale mag in die konteks van ’n individualiseringstegniek vroue in die tweede dekade van die een-en-twintigste eeu onderdruk. Ek maak die aanname dat die normalisering van kosmetiese chirurgie daartoe bydra dat vroue die swye opgelê word, die individu se psige uitgebuit en onderdruk word en die lewende liggaam ontkragtig word deur middel van ’n inkerkering wat minder sigbaar en minder eksplisiet is en agter ’n estetiese en morele sluier verdoesel word.

In hierdie konteks bied ek ’n teendiskoers aan vir die onderwerping wat onderliggend is aan die normaliseringsdiskoerse wat die kosmetiesechirurgiebedryf ondersteun, en ek bepleit dat die patriargale norme wat in diskoerse oor kosmetiese chirurgie vassit, gedestabiliseer word. Ek demonstreer verder ’n teoretiese rekonstruksie wat ’n inskripsie insluit van wat ek ’n geloofwaardige feministiese stem in die eietydse verbruikerskultuur noem – ’n modus van intieme, onbewuste opstandigheid.

Ek bepleit 'n terugkeer na Julia Kristeva se teorie en die intieme oproer wat deur haar etiese benadering voorgestaan word. Afgesien hiervan stel ek ’n stem voor wat ’n intieme

opstand demonstreer – ’n stem wat patriargale norme uitdaag en nie uitsluitlik onderdruk word deur die normaliseringsmeganismes wat vorm gee aan die vrou van die een-en-twintigste eeu nie, waar die klem op die kosmetiesechirurgiebedryf en die boliggende diskoerse daarvan val – Antjie Krog, Suid-Afrikaanse digter. Dit is juis Krog se kunstig gestruktureerde digterlike tekste wat my teoretiese rekonstruksie fasiliteer.

Aan die hand van Kristeva se teorie oor semanalise toon ek teoreties dat Krog se werk ’n ruimte daarstel wat "uitstyg" bo die grense wat die wet van die Vader en die normaliseringsmeganismes stel. Hierbenewens stel ek ’n "originêre gehegtheid" as aanpassing van Kristeva se beskouing van die *chora* voor, en my voorstel van ’n "originêre ideaal" daag Kristeva se opvating oor paragramme uit in die konteks van dit wat ten grondslag lê aan die gebied van die paternalistiese metafoor.

Op grond van Louise Viljoen se ontleding van Krog se werk en Bridget Garnham se navorsing oor opkomende diskoerse oor ontwerpers- kosmetiese chirurgie bied ek Krog se digterlike tekste aan as ’n teendiskoers vir die "morele" diskoerse oor kosmetiese chirurgie wat die verouderende individu in die tweede dekade van die een-en-twintigste eeu uitbuit. Daarby, deur Kristeva se teorie oor paragramme op Krog se digterlike teks(te) toe te pas, demonstreer ek 'n destabilisering van die patriargale norme wat implisiet in diskoerse oor kosmetiese chirurgie teenwoordig is. Hierbenewens brei ek Kristeva se teorie oor die negatiwiteitsbeginsel uit deur middel van ’n heroorsetting van die belydenisdaad in Krog se digwerk(e), ’n uitbreiding van Foucault se pastorale mag en Butler se opvatting oor die eksklusiwiteit van normalisering, en ’n opeising van Krog se verouderende liggaam in *Verweerskrif/Body Bereft* (Krog 2006).

Sekubekhona izingxoxo-mpikiswano eziningi kwizifundiswa zama-feminist ukuthi ngabe ukwenza isurgery yohlinzo olungajulile ukuzishintsha ukubukeka ngokwemvelo (cosmetic plastic surgery) kunomphumela omuhle yini kwabesimame, ngabe kuhlinzeka ngamandla kwabesimame ngokuphakamisela phezulu ukuthi umuntu azenzele akufunayo kanye nokuzikhethela (Grimlin 2002, Kuczynski 2006) noma kuyinto ecindezela abesimame ngokuqhubela phambili indlela nama-idiyoloji abekwa ngabesilisa ukuthi imizimba yabesimame kumele ibukeke kanjani, kanti lokhu kucindezela izwi labesimame (Blum 2003, Blood 2005, Heinricy 2006, Clarke and Griffin 2007, Tait, 2007). Kunokuthi iphuzu nami ngingenele kule ngxoxo-mpikiswano, elami iphuzu lona liqhubeka ukusukela kwisimo sokuthi ukwamukela uhlujzo olungajulile lokuzitshintsha ukubukeka kwabesimame (cosmetic surgery) kuyindlela yodlame olungaqondile ngqo kanye nolukhipha inyumbazane abesimame. Ngokusebenzisa amathiyori epost-structuralist, awe-feminist kanye nawe-psychoanalytical, ngihlaziya indlela le nhlobo yalolu dlame ecindezela ngayo imizimba yabesimame kanye nokuhlela indlela okumele bacabange nokuzibona ngayo. Ngokusebenzisa iphuzu likaJacques Lacan, Judith Buttle kanye noMichel Foucault lamandla okukhokhela ngokomoya, ngiqhaqha indlela okubumbeka ngayo isithombe sokuzibona, unembeza kanye nomoya wokuhlambulula ngokuzidalula (confession) lapho kubhekwa izinto ngaphansi kwesimo somzimba wokuhlinzwa okungajulile ukuzishintsha ukubukeka ngokwakho. Nangaphezu kwalokho, ngigqamisa indima ye-liberal feminism ngokwayo kule nhlobo yencindezelo. Ngokwenza lokho, ngikhombisa ngokwethiyori ukuqhubeka nokusebenza kwamandla esikhokhelo ngokomoya ngaphansi kwethekniki yokuzazi komuntu eyedwa okucindezela abesimame kwiminyaka elishumi yesibili, yesenshuri yamashumi amabili nanye . Ngiqhubela phambili iphuzu lokuthi ukwenziwa kohlinzo olungajulile lokuzishintsha ukubukeka kuqala umoya wokucindezela izwi labesimame, ukuxhashazwa kwabo, kanye nendlela umuntu azibona ngayo ngokwengqondo, kanye nokucindezela umzimba ophilayo ngezindlela ezingazibonakalisi obala, ezifihlekile, indlela yokubopha efihlwa yindlela yokubukeka kanye nokwembozwa umoya.

Kungaphansi kwalesi simo lapho ngethula khona i-discourse yencindezelo eyenza ukuthi imboni yohlinzo olungajulile ukuzishintsha ukubukeka kwabesimame kube yinto ephakanyiswayo nokubonwa iyinhle, ukuphazamiseka kwama-norm endlela yengcindezi

yabesilisa, ngaphansi kwama-discourse okuhlinzwa okungajulile ukushintsha ukubukeka, kanye nokwakha ithiyori ebandakanya ukubona izinto ngendlela ethize, engikuchaza njengezwi okuyilo elifanele le-feminism, kwisimo sosiko esiphila ngaphansi kwaso samanje - okuyindlela abantu abazibuka ngayo ezingqondweni ngendlela engekho obala.

Ngigcizelela ukubuyela kwithiyori kaKristeva, kanye nokuthi abantu babhoke indlobana ngezindlela eziphansi, okuyinto ayiphakamisayo yenkambiso yokwazi okulungile nokungalunganga (ethical approach). Naphezu kwalokho, ngiveza izwi elibonisa ukubhoka indlobana kwabesimame ngendlela engekho sobala - izwi elifaka inselele kuma-norm okubhozomelwa ngumqondo wokulawula kwabesilisa, kanti futhi leli zwi aligcinanga nje kuphela umumo wabesimame ngendlela ejwayelekile njengowesimame wesenshuri yamashumi amabili-nanye ngokugcizelela kwimboni yohlinzo olungajulile lokuzishintsha ukubukeka, kanye nendlela lokhu okuyisihibe ngayo – ngokusho kukasonkondlo waseNingizimu Afrika, u-Antjie Krog. Imibhalo yezinkondlo zikaKrog ezinobungcweti yiyo eyenze ukwakha kwami kabusha ithiyori.

Ngokusebenzisa ithiyori kaKristeva ye-semanalysis, ngibonisa ngokwethiyori ukuthi umsebenzi kaKrog uqambe okweqele ngaleya kwizihibe zomthetho kubaba kanye nezindlela zokwenza izinto zibukeke ngendlela evamile noma zingavamile. Nangaphezu kwalokho, ngifakela i-"originary attachment" njengokwenza ukuthi kube kwesinye isimo, iphuzu likaKristeva ku-chora kanti isiphakamiso sami se-"originary ideal" sifaka inselele kusigcizelelo sikaKristeva ngamagremu efonethiki ngaphansi kwesimo esigcizelela umfanekiso ngasohlangothini lobaba.

Ngokusebenzisa ukuhlaziya kukaLouise Viljoen kumsebenzi kaKrog kanye nocwaningo lukaBridget Garnham ngokuvela kwama-discourse ohlinzo olungajulile ukuzishintsha ukubukeka njengesisekelo, ngase ngethula imibhalo yezinkondlo zikaKrog njenge-discourse yokuphikisa ama-discourse e-"moral" yama-discourse ohlinzo olungajulile lokuzishintsha ukubukeka, elixhaphaza abantu abagugayo ngeminyaka eyishumi yesibili kwisenshuri yamashumi amabili-nanye. Naphezu kwalokho, ngisebenzise ithiyori kaKristeva kumapharagramu kwimibhalo yezinkondlo zikaKrog, ngaphazamisa imibono yokuphatha kwabesilisa equkethwe kuma-discourse ohlinzo ulungajulile ukuzishintsha ukubukeka. Ukuqhubekela phambili, nginwebe ithiyori kaKristeva ngesimiso se-negativity ukwethula ukuhumusha kabusha umoya wokuzihlambulula ngokuzidalula otholakala kwizinkondlo

zikaKrog, ukuwukunweba amandla umbono kaFaucault wamandla okuthi abantu bazibone ngenye indlela kanye nephuzu likaButler wlkuthi into engavamile engaphandle ibonwe njengento efanele, kanye nokwamukela umzimba ogugayo kwinkondlo ye-Verweerskrif/Body Bereft (Krog 2006).

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# Chapter 1: Introduction

*Revolt then as a return/turning back/displacement/change, constitutes the profound logic of a culture I would like to revive here and whose acuity seems quite threatened these days. What makes sense today is not the future (as providential religions claimed) but revolt; that is, the questioning and displacement of the past. The future, if it exists, depends on it.*

*-Kristeva, Introduction to Intimate Revolt, 2002[1997]*

In *New Maladies of the Soul* Julia Kristeva draws attention to the alienation and desensitization of the individual in the context of consumer society (Kristeva 1997 [1993]). She claims that the constant bombardment of media-images in conjunction with materialistic ideals greatly impact the individual. She emphasizes that this process of bombardment promotes the loss of an affective and psychological dimension of the self. Although Kristeva does not elaborate on the process of normalization as such she does suggest that it is a process that adversely impacts the psyche and in so doing constructs a "false self" (Kristeva 1997 [1993]: 7-10). In "Women's Time" she proposes a challenge to modes of oppression that translates as a personal morality or individualized responsibility which incorporates aesthetics in the form of a literary response (Kristeva 1981). She critiques modes of feminism that promote essentialist definitions and social or political activism that provoke counter discourses to oppression which she suggests further support the very patriarchal ideologies they supposedly subvert (Kristeva 1981). In *Intimate Revolt* she validates her critique of emerging modes of feminism by claiming that modern forms of revolt have been tainted by the media – the oppressive ideologies embedded within media driven discourses – and incorporate new strategies that have essentially "forgotten" the adverse impact dominant ideologies promote (Kristeva 2002 [1997]: 6). She proposes that revolt should incorporate a retrospective questioning of society's structure to expose underlying oppression (Kristeva 2002 [1997]: 6). Kristeva then calls for a mode of feminism that incorporates an expression of a psychic subversion. She writes: "The universe of women moreover allows me to suggest an alternative to the robotizing and spectacular society that is damaging the culture of revolt: this alternative is, quite simply, sensory intimacy" (Kristeva

2002 [1997]: 5). Rather than elaborating on revolt in the form of a strategy that involves social or political activism, she sanctions revolt in the form of a personal disclosure, or what she terms an "intimate revolt" – "intimate" being translated in the context of an individual's psychological and emotional response that, she emphasizes, incorporates "a questioning and displacement of the past" (Kristeva 2002 [1997]: 5). An "intimate revolt" is then translated as the incorporation of an individual's unconscious psychic past – a re-connection to unconscious drives that have been displaced by media-driven consumer society (Kristeva 2002 [1997], 1997 [1993]). She underscores the urgency of revolt by claiming that the "future, if it exists, depends on it" (Kristeva 2002 [1997]: 5).

A contextualization of what Kristeva suggests is an "act" of revolt, in the above-mentioned discussion, involves an analysis of oppression that shaped the past and a mode of psychic expression, an implicit provocation, which incorporates theoretical and literary modes of response rather than an explicit response that indicates a strategy or form of activism in a political or social manner. As a psychoanalytic theorist, Kristeva uses a theoretical approach that incorporates psychoanalytic theory and literature with emphasis on modern male poets in her analyses, arguments, proposals, extensions, and demonstrations of modes or "acts" of intimate revolt (Kristeva 1980a [1977] 1980b [1977], 1981, 1982 [1980], 1984 [1974], 1987a, 1987b, 1997 [1993], 1998a, 1998b, 2002 [1997]).

My thesis is a response to Kristeva's proposals and therefore involves a theoretical approach that incorporates psychoanalytic theory, literature, and post-structural and feminist theory and does not involve or promote a strategy or activism in a social or political context. Furthermore, I adopt a feminist response to Kristeva's theory, a theoretical and metaphorical return to her work, with emphasis on her proposals on an intimate revolt, the "false self," and methods of poetry analysis. Additionally, I aim to position Kristeva's theory in a twenty-first century consumer cultural context and, with emphasis on her methods of poetry analysis, in a feminist context.

A contextualization of my thesis as a feminist "act" in relation to Kristeva's proposals would then firstly involve an analysis of modes of oppression – a theoretical deconstruction of

the past in relation to modes of oppression with emphasis on normalization and its functioning. This includes a deconstruction of the underlying and unconscious workings of that which shapes the individual's psyche, or what Kristeva might term the "false self." Furthermore, I then place emphasis on analyzing the "false self" in relation to current consumer cultural exploitation. Secondly, its focus, in the context of a deconstruction, involves an analysis of the confinement of women, however, with emphasis on its translation, its transcription, as a mode of oppression that confines the psyche – an invisible, and therefore seemingly abstract, imposition on the unconscious itself.

I then initiate a feminist "act" in the context of a theoretical response to underlying oppression that involves what I call "a reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice". However, as it is not a political or social strategy, an activism as such, it is an abstract act: my thesis proposes a psychic *excess* that is "outside of" the mechanisms of normalization; and therefore is "outside of" the paternal, the Law of the Father and its consequent patriarchal oppression. This psychic excess corresponds to Kristeva's argument on the maternal realm, semiotic drives, and the *chora.* However, additionally, I modify Kristeva's proposal on the *chora* and semiotic drives to include the affect or primary emotion of love. Secondly, my thesis theoretically asserts a component of psychic authenticity – I argue that the moment of the subject-as-infant's initiation *at* the Mirror Stage, the inaugural moment, is itself underlined by a component of unconscious choice. Furthermore, I apply Kristeva' theory on poetry analysis to a selection of Antjie Krog's poetic texts and present a virtual demonstration to "show" that underlying psychic exploitation is an *excess* that escapes psychic confinement. This psychic excess, in response to Kristeva's proposal, in turn presents a mode of intimate revolt – a literary and psychic response that suggests a feminist act as a mode of unconscious provocation. I then translate this "feminist act" by applying Kristeva's theory on semanalysis, paragrammatic networks, and the principle of negativity to illustrate, to "show" or "make visible," a structuration and fabrication of this psychic, unconscious, form of revolt within the fabric of Krog's poetic texts and an expression of this form of intimate revolt. In addition, I extend Kristeva's theory on methods of poetry analysis and present her techniques in au courant and feminist context. This proposal is clarified in the discussions that follow.

My thesis relies explicitly and implicitly on established theoretical support as that which provides an underlying framework from which my promotion of Kristeva's theory (I argue against established theorists' arguments and claim as a means to theoretically reinforce my return to her theory), feminist response, and extension of Kristeva's proposals are structured and developed. As my theoretical deconstruction and reconstruction involve an extensive selection of theories this chapter provides essentially an outline that clarifies my approach: I explain, clarify, and briefly highlight a selection of terms in relation to my arguments, extensions, adoptions, and modifications of established theories. I clarify the reason for my addressing patriarchal psychic oppression and the manner in which I address this problem and present a theoretical reconstruction of what I refer to as an authentic feminist voice in contemporary consumer culture.

## Thesis Statement

My thesis advocates a return to Kristeva's theory. It responds to Kristeva's proposal on a "false self," her endorsement of an "intimate revolt" (Kristeva 2002, 1997 [1993]), and, with my extensions of her arguments, positions her theory, with emphasis on methods of poetry analysis, in au courant and feminist context. Furthermore, I present a voice that is not exclusively confined within the normalization processes that shape the twenty-first century woman with emphasis on contemporary consumer cultural discourses and the continuously expanding cosmetic surgical industry: my thesis aims to theoretically challenge the patriarchal norms that shape what Kristeva might refer to as the "false self" (Kristeva 1997 [1993]) and to present a theoretical reconstruction – an inscription of an authentic feminist voice in the context of contemporary consumer culture with emphasis on a woman's voice from the twenty-first century, the South African poet, Antjie Krog (Krog 2006).

Before commencing with my argument, I should define the parameters of what I refer to as an authentic feminist voice. An authentic feminist voice is further discussed in "The Outline of the Argument" where I outline my response to Kristeva's proposal in the context of the "false self," normalization in the second decade of the twenty-first century with emphasis on the

cosmetic surgical industry, and an intimate revolt. The "Overview of the Argument" further clarifies my arguments and proposes my contribution in relation to Kristevean theory, feminist theory, and poetics. "Background to the Problem" situates my thesis in relation to recent research in the field of feminist theory with emphasis on the normalization of the cosmetic surgical industry. This is followed by a brief discussion on recent research in the field of Foucauldian theory in relation to pastoral power and psychoanalytic theory in relation to Butler where I highlight a lack of research in these fields. "Methodology" discusses Kristeva's methods of poetry analysis and my application of her theory to a selection of poetic texts by Antjie Krog (Krog 2006). "Theoretical Framework and Review of the Literature" categorizes theoretical approaches that support my argument and highlights a selection of arguments that are used, challenged, and extended to provide and position the theoretical framework for my thesis.

Firstly, I use the term authentic in the context of "belonging to" an individual in that it is prior to normalization – "outside of" the Mirror Stage and the initiation of the normalized self, or what Kristeva might term the "false self."

According to Lacan, in "The Mirror Stage as Formative of The I Function," the Mirror Stage is a stage during infancy that takes place between six to eighteen months (Lacan 2002 [1949]: 20). It marks the infant's initiation into the realm of the narcissistic self, or, what I refer to, the normalized self, where the infant-as-subject remains for the rest of her life. Lacan underscores the necessity of "this step" into the Imaginary Order as a prerequisite for the infant's entrance into the realm of the paternal, the Law of the Father, the Symbolic Order.[1] Upon seeing her image in the mirror the infant then renounces her affectively chaotic body in exchange for this ideal image she sees in the mirror – the fantasy body-image reflected in the mirror which she perceives as her "self" (Lacan 2002 [1949]).

Lacan's theory on chaotic pre-Mirror Stage affects are discussed in relation to Kristeva's theory on unconscious drives which play a key role in my theoretical reconstruction – I argue that

[1] The Symbolic Order as the realm of language in the context of society's laws, norms, conventions and social interactions.

it is through a reconnection to these previously excluded and blocked pre-Mirror Stage affects and drives that a *space* for an authentic feminist voice (re)emerges.

Secondly, this voice is feminist in the context of it being connected to this *space* that is prior to, according to Lacan, the subject's inauguration into the realm of the paternal and consequently the Law of The Father that follows the Mirror Stage – a space that is not exclusively confined by paternal or patriarchal norms and ideologies. Lacan's theory on the Mirror Stage, the role of the paternal, the Law of the Father, the Super-ego, the conscience, the ideal image, and the speaking subject are pivotal to my thesis and are discussed in Chapter 2 which is an elaboration of my theoretical framework. Chapter 2 outlines the realm of the paternal and its role in the production of the speaking subject according to Lacan and Freud; this is followed by my challenge to Lacan and Freud where I argue that an underlying maternal component plays a relevant role in the context of the speaking subject or voice. Diana Fuss and recent research on infant development provides the theoretical support for my argument in this context.

Thirdly, an authentic feminist voice is in "excess" of normalization in the context of being a boundlessness, unconfined by the realm of the paternal – this *space* extends, it *exceed*s linear time. In "Women's Time" Kristeva writes of an archaic maternal space or *chora*[2] that supports a "fluid" feminism in that it suggests a realm that is unconfined by linear time[3] and therefore in excess of the confinement promoted by paternal or patriarchal oppression (Kristeva 1981). In

[2] Kristeva uses the term "chora" in relation to Plato's ideas on a receptacle or "khora" in *Timaeus* (Plato 360BC). However, Kristeva uses it in the context of a maternal realm – a container for semiotic drives. In addition, Kristeva suggests that the chora (and the semiotic drives) is prior to The Mirror Stage and therefore prior to the Paternal Realm. I should also mention that Kristeva's ideas seem to corroborate Georges Bataille's ideas on continuous and discontinuous being in *Theory of Religion* (Bataille 1973).

[3] Linear time refers to the idea that the normalized self "moves in a straight line" towards the future, in a linear fashion, or teleologically. A series of "now" moments. It relates to G. W. F. Hegel's argument on linear time and the formation of the self (Hegel 2009 [1807]). I reference this here as Lacan, Butler and Kristeva use, challenge and extend Hegel's theory in the context of the normalized "self." My reading of Kristeva's theory on intimate revolt suggests that the self's "return to" the past is a destabilization of the teleologically structured normalized self– a return to the excluded space, "excess," prior to normalization – and therefore promotes a possibility for a reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice.

*Powers of Horrors*, Kristeva refers to the paternal realm as the "One" and the "Law of The Father" and in the context of absolutes suggesting that the paternal realm is oppressive. She refers to the maternal realm in the context of a *chora* in that it is prior to the Mirror Stage, exceeds linear or teleological time, and expands towards, what Kristeva terms, a "veiled infinity" (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 9). My term "authentic feminist voice" relates to Kristeva's theory on the *chora* in the context of not being exclusively confined by patriarchal oppression, not trapped within teleological definitions.

Lastly, an authentic feminist voice is feminist in the context of subverting the cosmetic surgical industry – it promotes a counter discourse to the dominant patriarchal ideologies and norms implicit in contemporary consumer culture with emphasis on the cosmetic surgical industry as prevails in the second decade of the twenty -first century.[4]

## Outline of the Argument

The following discussion briefly outlines my response to Kristeva's proposals in *New Maladies of the Soul*, "Women's Time," and *Intimate Revolt* (Kristeva 1997 [1993], 1981, 2002 [1997]). In so doing, it highlights my thesis in the context of a return to Kristeva's theory and my extensions of her proposals. In addition, it highlights my contribution in the context of Kristevean theory, feminism, and poetics. The "Overview of the Problem" further elaborates on this discussion.

1) I begin with a response to Kristeva's argument in relation to consumer society's desensitization of the "false self" (Kristeva 1997 [1993]) by theoretically situating the "false self" in a current social context – in the context of the twenty-first century and the normalization of the cosmetic surgical industry.
2) As Kristeva does not elaborate on normalization as such, I analyze the normalization of the "false self." Firstly, in a social context. Secondly, on an intimate level – I

[4] The prevalence and global impact of the cosmetic surgical industry in the second decade of the twenty - first century is discussed in Meeta Jha's work (Jha 2016).

analyze the underlying and unconscious mechanisms of normalization. I adopt, apply, and extend a selection of established feminist, post-structuralist, and psychoanalytic theories in relation to normalization processes, practices, mechanisms, and the confinement of the self with emphasis on the shaping of the psyche.

3) I then delineate a premise from which to initiate a theoretical "intimate revolt."
4) This *space* that underlies normalization itself is elaborated on.
5) I both utilize and modify Kristeva's theory on the maternal realm or *chora* and unconscious drives. I briefly highlight my contribution in this context in the "Overview of the Argument" that follows this outline.
6) I theoretically assert a mode of psychic and unconscious choice in the context of the inaugural moment.[5] In so doing, I include a component of authenticity, which provides additional support in the context of my presentation of an authentic feminist voice.
7) I discuss revolt in the context of writing – or what Kristeva suggests is the ethical *practice t*hat is writing.
8) I discuss Louise Viljoen's work on Antjie Krog's poetry and the ageing body (Viljoen 2014). Using Viljoen's work as support for my argument, I then highlight a selection of Krog's poetic texts as counter discourses to the normalization of the cosmetic surgical industry (Krog 2006). In addition, applying Kristeva's methods on poetry analysis I illustrate that Krog's text(s) destabilizes the patriarchal norms embedded within cosmetic surgical discourses.
9) In the context of an "intimate revolt," Kristeva uses exclusively male writers' work. Using skillfully written poetic texts by a woman writer, Antjie Krog, I will show an inscription of an authentic feminist voice, an intimate revolt, in the twenty-first

[5] My thesis refers to the inaugural moment in the context of Lacan's argument on the initiation of the self, or what I refer to as the normalized self, at the Mirror Stage. It is a paradoxical and conflicting moment when the infant rejects the maternal representation – rather than emphasizing the father's presence and participation as Lacan suggests – for the ideal image of her self in the mirror. It is the first step into the realm of the paternal, and consequently the realm of normalization that oppresses the subject. I argue that the infant herself, "chooses" to make this first step and therefore this suggests a degree of authenticity, which further supports my argument for an authentic feminist voice.

century. In so doing, I respond to Kristeva's proposals in a feminist context, positions Krog's work as feminist, and positions Kristeva's theory, with emphasis on her methods of poetry analysis, in a current and feminist context.

10) I extend Kristeva's methods of poetry analysis thereby specifying my main contribution.

## Overview of the Argument

My thesis advocates a return to Kristeva's theory. In the brief discussion that follows, I clarify my response to Kristeva's proposals in *New Maladies of the Soul,* "Women's Time," and *Intimate Revolt* (Kristeva 1997 [1993], 1981, 2002 [1997]); and I discuss my contribution in relation to Kristevean theory, feminism, and poetics – I elaborate on the outline provided in the "Outline of the Argument."

1) My initial response to Kristeva's proposals in the context of the desensitization and alienation of the "false self" by consumer culture and normalization is theoretically to situate the "false self" in the context of that which exemplifies the impact of normalization in a current and contemporary context. A clear indicator of the impact of normalization in the second decade of the twenty-first century is the progressively expanding cosmetic surgical industry.

Cosmetic surgical statistics clearly indicate the mainstreaming and normalization of cosmetic surgery in contemporary consumer culture. The American cosmetic surgical statistics from 2007 until 2017 underscore a monumental growth in cosmetic surgical procedures in the United States alone. The American Society for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery states that by the end of 2015 there had been 15.9 million surgical procedures compared to the 11.7 million in 2007 (The American Society for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery, Inc [USA]: Procedural Statistics 2017 and The American Society of Plastic Surgeons: Press Release, February 25, 2016). In March 2017 the American Society for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery wrote of the "record breaking" event as "Americans spend more than 15 billion on Aesthetic procedures for the first time" (The American Society for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery: Statistics and Surveys 2017). The growing demand for

cosmetic surgical procedures has reached a global scale. The headliner for the International Society for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery's press release claims that the top five countries – USA, Brazil, Japan, Italy, and Mexico – account for 41.4% of the world's cosmetic procedures, followed by Russia, India, Turkey, Germany and France (The International Society of Aesthetic Plastic Surgery: Press Release, June 27, 2017). The "Global Aesthetic Surgery Statistics: A Closer Look" states that although "the US and Brazil are often quoted as the countries with the highest demand for plastic surgery, according to the presented analysis, other countries are beginning to surpass these countries in surgical procedures per capita" (Heidekrueger et. al. 2017).

Although Kristeva does not discuss cosmetic surgery and normalization in *New Maladies of the Soul* and *Intimate Revolt* she does suggest that a form of psychic loss is implicitly linked to consumer culture's normalizing practices (Kristeva 1997 [1993], 2002 [1997]). Feminist scholars argue that the normalization of cosmetic surgery provides an exemplary example of contemporary consumer culture's efficacious impact on women's bodies (Blum 2003, Blood 2005, Holliday and Taylor 2006, Clark and Griffin 2007).

In the second decade of the twenty-first century, women remain the most impacted by the normalization of cosmetic surgery (Jha 2016). The statistics are clear evidence of this: "Women continue to drive the demand for cosmetic procedures, accounting for 86.2% of cosmetic procedures worldwide" (The International Society of Aesthetic Plastic Surgery: Press Release, June 27, 2017). The justification of cosmetic surgical procedures by the cosmetic surgical industry becomes evident in relation to its discourses on self-esteem and self-empowerment aimed particularly at women. Cosmetic surgical sites are inundated with suggestive discourses targeting women's bodies and promoting means for self-improvement, renewal, or rejuvenation. As an example, Erika Sato, a cosmetic surgeon, clearly highlights the impact of cosmetic surgical discourses. On her website she writes:

> Many of us work hard to attain our ideal body shape through diet and exercise. This especially holds true in the case of women. There is a saying that beauty lies in the eyes of the beholder, but these days, the idea of beauty has become more complex and therefore harder to attain without surgery.
>
> (Sato January 26, 2018)

In addition to its anti-ageing discourses aimed at women, the cosmetic surgical industry is targeting "older" individuals. An association aimed at the promotion of a sense of community, health, and well-being for the aged, The American Grandparents Association, openly advocates cosmetic surgery for the aged. The website discusses choices when it comes to affordable anti-ageing cosmetic surgical procedures – payment plans and "smart options" that "promise to smooth, tighten, and plump" ("Plastic Surgery 'Light': 7 Anti-Aging Treatments You Can Afford" 2018). Bridget Garnham's research draws attention to this developing form of normalization in the context of anti-ageing discourses aimed at "older" individuals (Garnham 2017). Garnham argues that the cosmetic surgical industry promotes designer discourses that stylize anti-ageing and market it to "older" individuals (Garnham 2017). I discuss her research and Cressida Heyes' theory (Heyes 2007) on the normalization of cosmetic surgery, the "authentic self," and counter discourses in the "Background to the Problem" where I discuss my argument in relation to recent feminist theory and the cosmetic surgical industry.

2) Kristeva's theory does not elaborate on normalization processes as such nor does she underscore the shaping of the "false self" in the context of the twenty-first century, and, of relevance to my argument, its overwhelming and violent impact on women's bodies as is evident in relation to the cosmetic surgical industry. I therefore use a selection of post-structuralist, feminist, and psychoanalytic theories to present a detailed analysis of normalization processes and its violent impact – a deconstruction of the normalized self, or what Kristeva might refer to as society's shaping of the "false self."

Firstly, I analyze the shaping of the "false self," or what I refer to as the "normalized self" in a social context.

I adopt Michel Foucault's theory on subjection and extend his theory on pastoral power to trace the impact of normalization from its emergence as a new form in, according to Foucault, the 1700s and highlight its culminating impact in the twenty-first century (Foucault 1990 [1978], 1995 [1975], 2002) – the cosmetic surgical industry and its ageist discourses that confine women's bodies.

I extend Foucault's ideas on a form of power that he refers to as pastoral power in "The Subject and Power" (Foucault 2000 [1982]). Although Foucault does not elaborate on pastoral power he does emphasize that "[never] in the history of human societies has there been such a tricky combination in the same political structures of individualization techniques and of totalization procedures" (Foucault 2000 [1982]: 332). He argues that modern western society has integrated a new political shape and an old power technique, which originated in Christian institutions. He terms this form of power "pastoral power" (Foucault 2000 [1982]: 332). He underscores the adaptability and efficiency of pastoral power and that it can find "expression" in a range of institutions. I therefore extend his proposal on pastoral power and analyze its individualizing techniques in relation to the shaping (with emphasis on the confinement) of women's bodies in contemporary consumer culture and the cosmetic surgical industry.

Secondly, I analyze the shaping of the "false self," or what I refer to as a "normalized self," in an intimate context – I apply Jacques Lacan and Judith Butler's theory on the underlying workings of normalization in relation to its shaping of the individual's psyche or the unconscious.

If, as Butler claims, the subject's body or flesh is the surface upon which subjection inscribes itself (Butler 1997: 91), then the approach I use is one that relates to and explains the shaping of the body in the context of metaphorical layers – as if the body were a "structure" itself. Beginning with the shaping of the body using Foucault's theory on society's confinement of the body and then shifting metaphorically "inwards" to explore the psychoanalytic and psychodynamic mechanisms that underlie the shaping of the body – the body's psyche or the "unconscious" in relation to Butler's arguments predominantly from *The Psychic Life of Power* (Butler 1997). Lacan's theory on the Mirror Stage, the role of the Father, the shaping of the conscience, the "ideal I" all play a relevant role in my argument – his theory provides additional support in the context of a theoretical framework for my arguments on the underlying workings of normalization, its shaping of the psyche, and in the context of providing my argument with further reinforcement for its theoretical reconstruction in relation to an "originary ideal," as the maternal representation, that is prior to normalization as is initiated at the Mirror Stage.

Thirdly, the aim of this deconstruction of the normalized self is to draw attention to the implicit, all-encompassing and overwhelming, violence that shapes the subject's psyche, and, most importantly in relation to my argument, the possibility of *that* which then underlies this violence itself. This in turn suggests a space or realm that is not exclusively controlled and oppressed by normalization – that which underlies normalization is surely prior to normalization itself. As my thesis involves a response to Kristeva's proposal, in *Intimate Revolt* (Kristeva 2002 [1997]), in the context of both intimate and revolt – a return to the past and a displacement of the past in the context of a re-activation and resurgence of what Kristeva suggests are desensitized semiotic drives and affects – the theoretical assertion and establishing of a basis that is prior to normalization provides the theoretical support for my promotion of Kristeva's theory. In other words, my return to Kristeva's theory as a means to promote an authentic feminist voice in the context of the overwhelming impact of the twenty-first century's globally expanding cosmetic surgical industry requires a justifiably structured premise from which to both defend Kristeva's theory and theoretically reconstruct a voice. This is achieved in the following manner – I outline the process in the discussion that follows.

In *The Psychic Life of Power* Butler argues that it is the conscience that performs the role of the "psychic voice of judgment addressed to (turned upon) oneself." She adds that "the 'institution' of the ego cannot fully overcome its social residue, given that its 'voice' is from the start borrowed from elsewhere, a recasting of a social 'plaint' as psychic self-judgment" (Butler 1997: 198).

It is therefore, according to Butler, a "turning upon" one's own "self" that fabricates the effect of an "internalized" psychic voice; and it is through this psychic voice that the conscience shapes the subject. All "psychic excess" and psychic idealization is but a consequence of this psychic voice which in turn is but an effect of normalization. There is no "excess to" normalization. The subject is exclusively confined within the realm of normalization. Her voice is but a by-product, a residue, of the mechanisms or workings of normalization itself.

Foucault and Butler's arguments support my deconstruction of the normalized subject. However, their theory also supports the premise on which to reconstruct theoretically an authentic feminist voice.

Butler's work reveals a contradiction in the context of *that* which supports her argument on "psychic excess" and the conscience – if, as Butler asserts, there is no psychic excess that is "outside of" normalization, what of that which is prior to normalization itself?

By returning to a space that is prior to normalization suggests a possibility of that which is not exclusively a by-product of subjection, of violence, but a "voice" of "one's own" – an authentic feminist voice.

3) In response to Kristeva's proposal on an intimate revolt, I outline a premise upon which to initiate theoretically a mode of revolt, to initiate a theoretical reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice – a psychic *space* that underlies the normalized self, or, in response to Kristeva, that underlies the "false self." I challenge Butler's argument on an attachment that she argues is an attachment formed during infancy and is the basis from which the subject itself both emerges and is consequently and exclusively produced.

I extend Butler's work on the shaping of the conscience by arguing that *that* which is prior to normalization, excluded or blocked by the mechanisms of normalization, is a basis from which the conscience is shaped, a prerequisite for the consequent confinement and subjection of the subject – I challenge Butler's argument on loss[6] and her argument on a "passionate attachment" to subjection in the context of the initiation of the subject at the infant stage with my argument for an "originary loss" and an "originary attachment." In so doing, I both support my return to Kristeva's theory and I promote the idea of an underlying *space* that both participates in and, furthermore, is excluded from Butler's mechanisms of normalization themselves – a paradoxical space, yet a premise, an assertion of a *presence,* that escapes the exclusive confinement provoked by normalization mechanisms.

[6] Butler's extension of Louis Althusser's ideas on interpellation and loss.

The theoretical support for Butler's argument on the exclusivity of subjection, and, therefore, normalization's exclusive confinement and oppression of women's bodies, is based on the premise of, what Butler's claims is, a "passionate attachment" to subjection. According to Butler, a "passionate attachment" is a bond that is formed between an infant and a primary caregiver. However, and of relevance to my argument against Butler's assertion, it is an attachment that is based on the infant attaching to subjection, to violence itself, during the infant stage (Butler 1997). Furthermore, it is an attachment that forms the subject, initiates the formation of the subject, yet is paradoxically prior to the emergence of the subject itself. In *The Psychic Life of Power*, Butler defends her claim. She writes: "The insistence that a subject is passionately attached to his or her own subordination has been invoked cynically by those who seek to debunk the claims of the subordinated." "Over and against this view, I would maintain that the attachment to subjection is produced through the workings of power" (Butler 1997: 6). She emphasizes that "no subject emerges without a passionate attachment to those on whom he or she is fundamentally dependent" (Butler 1997: 7). She justifies her premise by claiming that love is essential for an infant's survival, existence itself, however, this love is exploited, abused by the infant's attachment to subjection. She writes:

> The child does not know to what he/she attaches; yet the infant as well as the child must attach in order to persist in and as itself. No subject can emerge without this attachment, formed in dependency, but no subject, in the course of its formation, can ever afford fully to "see" it. This attachment in its primary forms must both come to be and be denied, its coming to be must consist in its partial denial, for the subject to emerge.
>
> The "I" emerges upon the condition that it deny its formation in dependency, the conditions of its own possibility.
>
> (Butler 1997: 8-10)

Firstly, I challenge Butler's argument on a "passionate attachment" – I argue that the attachment which Butler claims is denied by the infant as she/he cannot fully "see it" includes a prominent visible basis. The mother or primary caregiver's face, the maternal representation, prior to the Mirror Stage and prior to the inauguration of the subject, or the emergence of the normalized self, plays a pivotal role in the formation of the subject. It is the *presence* of the

maternal representation that is the "originary loss." The originary loss therefore suggests a challenge to Butler's argument against the possibility of a psychic excess, or what she refers to as a psychic idealization (Butler 1997: 191), that exceeds the confinement of normalization. In addition I argue against Lacan's claim that the "ideal I" is the originary ideal that inaugurates the individual or normalized self; and I argue against his claim that the mother or maternal representation does not participate in the inauguration of the self at the Mirror Stage. I argue that the maternal representation plays a prominent role in the formation of the subject as an "originary ideal." I utilize the feminist Diana Fuss's emphasis on consumer culture's exploitation of the mother's image as a means to market products; and recent research on the infant's ability to recognize the mother or primary caregiver's face (Simion & Di Giorgio 2015) as support for my argument for an "originary ideal."

The "originary ideal" is pivotal to my thesis in that I use my argument as support for my theoretical reconstruction in the context of my analysis, using Kristeva's theory, of Krog's poetic text(s). In addition, my argument for an originary ideal presents an extension of Kristeva's methods on poetry analysis – an extension of semanalysis. I will contextualize this further in point 5. of this overview.

Secondly, I delineate this space that underlies normalization in the context of what I refer to as an "originary attachment." The outline that follows delineates this *space*. The diagram (page 76) attached depicts the psychic position of the "I," the Maternal and Paternal Realm, what I call the originary attachment and originary ideal.

4) In response to Kristeva's proposal of an intimate revolt, I elaborate on a *space* that underlies normalization[7] and its desensitization of the individual – an "originary attachment" as that which underlies normalization itself. In so doing I both challenge Butler's argument on a "passionate attachment" as the basis from which the subject is formed and I position the theoretical underpinnings that support my argument in the context of a return to Kristeva's theory.

[7] Underlies The Mirror Stage itself.

An “originary attachment” is a term I use to delineate a paradoxical space or realm that plays a role in the normalization of the subject, and the shaping of the conscience, and is a basis for an authentic feminist voice in contemporary consumer culture in that it is “outside of,” prior to, normalization and its shaping of the conscience.

In the context of the subject-as-infant, the term supports the idea of a bond that develops between the infant and mother or primary caregiver that is, with emphasis on, prior to Lacan’s Mirror Stage and includes love, in the context of the infant, as a pre-Mirror Stage affect.

Before I continue with my discussion that outlines my proposal on an “originary attachment” I should clarify my use of the terms “affect,” “emotion,” and “love.” These terms are further contextualized in the discussion that follows.

I use the term “affect” when discussing feelings or affective states that are prior to the Mirror Stage. In addition, I refer to pre-Mirror Stage affects to differentiate them from drives, semiotic drives, or desires. Furthermore, I use this term to differentiate affects from emotions.

I refer to “emotion” in the context of feelings that are experienced predominantly after the Mirror Stage and after the initiation of normalization processes and mechanisms. I do not refer to emotion in relation to intuition, instinct, innateness, or affects. However, the theories and research that I reference might not discuss emotion in the same manner. I refer to emotion in the context of an effect of or product of normalization – a socially conditioned response that is after the Mirror Stage – to align with Butler and Foucault’s theory on the exclusivity of subjection and the overwhelming impact of normalization that confines the subject. This suggests that the subject’s emotions are then a mere effect of normalization mechanisms and are not authentic in the context of “belonging to” a subject; emotions are then not the subject’s “own.” I argue for an affective dimension that is prior to the Mirror Stage as support for the possibility that a degree of emotion belongs to the subject. I utilize Lacan’s proposal on the infant’s chaotic pre-Mirror stage affects and Kristeva’s theory on pre-Mirror Stage maternal semiotic drives as theoretical support for my argument on an affective dimension that belongs to the subject. I refer to this as “pre-Mirror Stage affects.”

I reference "love" in the context of Ian Suttie's promotion of the concept. Suttie argues that an infant is born with an instinct for self-preservation that is bound up with a "dependent love-for-mother" (Suttie 2014 [1935]: 20). According to Suttie, we are born with an instinct that combines with a form of love for the mother. This suggests that "love" is experienced prior to the Mirror Stage. I therefore reference love in the context of a pre-Mirror Stage affect – I argue that love is a pre-Mirror Stage affect that is experienced when the infant bonds with and attaches to the mother or primary caregiver, an "originary attachment."

The idea of a mother-infant bond that is shaped by or based on love is not my own idea. I use psychoanalytic theory and object-theory – I combine Melanie Klein's theory on the mother as an initial "object" or "love object" and Ian Suttie's theory on the mother-infant relationship as based on love—as support for my reference to an "originary attachment" (Klein 1993 [1952], Suttie 2014 [1935]). My contribution, in this context, is to use the idea of this bond to challenge Butler's theory on the shaping of the conscience and the exclusivity of violence; and, most importantly, to position a basis for a theoretical reconstruction of, what I call, an authentic feminist voice in contemporary consumer culture. I use the term "originary attachment" in the context of being at variance with Butler's term "passionate attachment" which she aligns with an attachment to violence that is initiated during infancy. According to Butler, it is a "passionate attachment" that "attaches" the infant to the realm of violence wherein she remains, confined, exclusively produced by violence itself (Butler 1997). I emphasize an "originary attachment" in the context of a loving attachment and interconnection as a means to challenge Butler's assertion of subjection's exclusive formation of the subject. If the subject is exclusively a product of violence then love is exclusively a residual effect of the mechanisms of normalization, a socially or discursively conditioned response – by positioning love in the context of a pre-Mirror Stage affect suggests a challenge to the exclusivity of normalization's violence as this suggests that in the pre-Mirror Stage form "love" is not exclusively a product of the mechanisms of normalization, as Butler suggests. I therefore extend Lacan's theory on pre-Mirror Stage affects and Kristeva's argument on semiotic drives[8] to include love as a pre-Mirror Stage, prior to normalization, affect.

[8] Semiotic drives are, according to Kristeva, dynamic bodily energies or drives.

As previously mentioned, Klein and Suttie support my argument on love as a pre-Mirror Stage affect. Furthermore, Suttie challenges the primacy of sexuality or sexual drives or desire (love being merely an extension of sexuality) by underscoring that sociability, the need to love and be loved, to exchange and to participate, are as primary as sexuality itself.

*5)* I both promote and modify Kristeva's theory on the maternal realm or *chora* and her theory on semiotic drives – as support for my return to Kristeva's theory, with emphasis on her techniques on poetry analysis, I utilize Kristeva's argument on the *chora* as a maternal realm that is prior to the Mirror Stage and is a container of semiotic drives. As my argument will illustrate, an intimate revolt is a return to these drives, an activation of previously excluded drives, and a re-structuring of drives in the context of poetic texts. Although my thesis promotes Kristeva's theory it additionally modifies it in the context of my argument on an "originary attachment," an "originary ideal," and love as a pre-Mirror Stage affect. I will clarify this in the discussion that follows in relation to Kristeva's *chora,* semiotic drives, and methods of poetry analysis. In so doing I highlight my contribution in the field of Kristevean theory, feminist theory, and poetics.

In *Revolution in Poetic Language* Kristeva suggests that the infant's drives are structured and ordered by the mother's body – both prior to birth and after birth until the infant reaches the Mirror Stage through a space that she refers to as a *chora* (Kristeva 1984 [1974]). The *chora* is therefore a maternal realm that represents a shared space between the infant and the mother. Yet, it also suggests a personal and intimate space in that it shapes the infant's pre-Mirror Stage affects and drives. However, as it is a space that is prior to birth it incorporates a realm that exceeds teleological and paternal confinement, it suggests a form of boundlessness – Kristeva claims that the *chora* aligns with Plato's theory on the *khora* in the context of a receptacle (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 25). In *Powers of Horror* Kristeva argues that the infant represses the *chora,* represses the maternal realm, just prior to the Mirror Stage as she/he is preparing to enter the realm of the paternal – the realm of symbolic systems and its rules, regulations, norms, and ideals ( (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 12-20).

In the context of my theoretical reconstruction, Kristeva's *chora* suggests a realm or space that is not exclusively confined by normalization as Butler claims it is. Kristeva suggests a space that is therefore prior to patriarchal oppression which, if as Butler suggests, is an effect of normalization processes itself. In addition, according to Kristeva the semiotic drives are within the maternal space or *chora.* Kristeva's theory on poetry analysis involves the structuring of semiotic drives which are contained within the maternal realm or *chora*. As my thesis proposes a return to Kristeva, and utilizes Kristeva's theory on poetry analysis as its means to present a theoretical reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice involving Krog's poetic texts, my "originary attachment" does align with and compare to Kristeva's *chora.* However, it also differs.

As previously discussed, I utilize Klein and Suttie's theory on infant-mother bonds and love as support for my argument for an "originary attachment." In addition, an "originary attachment" is a bond that is not exclusively based on an attachment to the mother but on an attachment formed between the infant and a primary caregiver regardless of the caregiver's gender. In this context it differs from Kristeva's *chora* as she emphasizes the *chora* in the context of the mother and the mother's body. Furthermore, Kristeva's *chora* is present prior to the infant's birth. However, as an "originary attachment" it is shaped by the infant's attachment to a primary caregiver it takes place after birth and until the Mirror Stage.

Secondly, besides my analysis of Krog's poetic texts in relation to Kristeva's *chora,* semiotic drives, and my idea of an originary attachment, I analyze Krog's "writing ode" in relation to what I refer to as an "originary ideal."

In "Towards a Semiology of Paragrams" and "The Subject in Process," using exclusively male writers' work, Kristeva argues that the poetic text demonstrates a *chora* that underlies the thetic.[9] She uses the sounds made by infants prior to their acquisition of language (prior to the infant's learning of the rules and regulations, grammar and syntax, which structure speech and the realm of the symbolic) as support for her argument that a maternal realm or *chora* underlies

[9] The thetic is, according to my reading of Kristeva, a boundary or border that is situated at the Mirror Stage. It is where the "I" is positioned. In the context of writing, the writing self then has access to both the realm of the symbolic – grammar, syntax, words, metaphor – and the realm that underlies the thetic – the unconscious semiotic drives and the maternal realm (Kristeva 1982 [1980], 1984 [1974], 1998a, 1998b).

the structuration of these male writers' texts (Kristeva 1998a, 1998b: 133-175). Through the process of writing, the poet is then able to reconstruct this space or maternal realm – through skilled poetic technique the poet is able to re-arrange these drives and affects which she terms an "articulation of expulsion" (Kristeva 1998b: 145) and in effect fabricate or re-construct a space, or "new c*hora*" as she terms it (Kristeva 1998b: 145-180) – an act that indicates an ethical process or *practice* (Kristeva 1984 [1974], 1998a).

My argument is in agreement with Kristeva's claim that sound plays a predominant role in the formation and structuring of subversive poetic texts. In addition, I argue for the possibility that colour and visual images plays a relevant role in the skilled poets structuring of pre-Mirror Stage drives and affects within the poetic text. As support for my argument, I emphasize an "originary ideal" as the visual image of a mother or primary caregiver's face prior to the Mirror Stage.

Recently published research claims that infants are capable of seeing colour (Yang, Kanazawa, Yamaguchi & Kuriki 2016). Furthermore, and most relevant to my argument concerning Krog's demonstration that colour is a predominant poetic image that underlies the symbolic level of a poetic text,[10] this research reveals that "pre-linguistic infants can categorize colour" (Yang, Kanazawa, Yamaguchi & Kuriki in *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 2016).

Yang, Kanazawa, Masami, Yamaguchi and Kuriki's research underscores that the infant's ability to perceive colour is prior to her/his acquisition of language; and, therefore, supports my challenge to Kristeva's emphasis on the relevance of sound as prior to the Mirror Stage and predominant in the structuring of the underlying layers of a poetic text. Their ideas support my demonstration, using Krog's "writing ode," that colour is a predominant poetic image that underlies the symbolic and linear level of a poetic text; and, therefore, underlies the normalization, the shaping of the subject's conscience, and, paradoxically, provokes a space that exceeds the confinement of the normalized self in that it is prior to, outside of, normalization.

[10] and, therefore, underlies the normalization and shaping of the subject's conscience which in turn further promotes a voice that is not exclusively shaped by normalization – an authentic feminist voice.

In addition, recent research claims that infants are capable of recognizing the mother or primary caregiver's face (Simion and Di Giorgio 2015, Frank et al. 2009, Farroni et al. 2007). This research further supports my argument in the context of the relevance of visual in addition to, as Kristeva emphasizes, phonetic images. This in turn supports my assertion of the relevance of the mother or primary caregiver's visual image as the "originary ideal." Furthermore, as Kristeva applies her theory on semanalysis to a selection of exclusively male written texts elaborating on their skill in this context of structuring phonetic images in their work, I show that a woman poet, Antjie Krog, challenges the predominance of underlying phonetic images as a means to structuring the realm that underlies metaphor[11] – I argue that the proficient structuration of Krog's poetic text capacitates the fabrication of visual images in a predominant context rather than emphasizing phonetic images or grams[12] as underlying metaphor in her poetic text "writing ode." I discuss this further in point 10 in relation to male writers and Kristeva thereby clarifying my contribution in this context.

I use John Lechte's reading of Kristeva's theory in relation to love in the context of a pre-Mirror Stage affect – I argue that love is a pre-Mirror Stage affect as a further means to challenge Butler's argument on the exclusivity of normalization, of its violence. In "Horror, love, Melancholy" Lechte claims that, according to Kristeva, "the constitution and dissolution of the psychic space called love" is based on the subject's "separation from the mother" (Lechte 2013b: 167). Love therefore, according to Lechte's reading of Kristeva's ideas on love, requires a separation from the mother and therefore is after the Mirror Stage. In this context, love is of the symbolic realm and therefore constituted by the confinement of normalization, or grammatically speaking, via the rules of grammar and syntax. Using Krog's work, I challenge Kristeva's ideas on love as being of the symbolic realm and suggests that love, as an un-conditioned pre-Mirror Stage affect, is prior to the thetic, the Mirror Stage, and therefore prior to the formation of the Super-ego and the conscience itself.

[11] Kristeva argues that metaphor is of the paternal and symbolic realm which further suggests that that which underlies metaphor is of the maternal realm (Kristeva 1998a, 1982 [1980])

[12] Kristeva sometimes references components that underlie the symbolic realm as grams; she emphasizes phonetic images or grams (Kristeva 1998a).

In addition to promoting and utilizing Kristeva's theory on the *chora* and semiotic drives, I extend Kristeva's argument on the *chora* in relation to the predominance of the phonetic layer of a poetic text – by emphasizing an originary ideal as playing a relevant role in provoking an underlying realm. In addition, I extend Kristeva's argument on semiotic drives and metaphor by including un-conditioned or pre-normalized love as that which underlies, grammatically speaking, the paternal realm of metaphor itself.

6) In addition to asserting theoretically an excess that escapes psychic confinement, I present the initiation of the subject at the Mirror Stage, to which I refer as the inaugural moment, in the context of a degree of implicit choice. I argue that the inauguration of the subject-as-infant at the Mirror Stage is underlined by a mode of unconscious choice. This in turn provides further theoretical support for my presentation of Krog's poetic texts in the context of an inscription of an authentic voice – a fabrication of a psychic mode of revolt and an unconscious provocation that "belongs" to the writer Krog. I do this by arguing against Butler's proposal on the exclusivity of the mechanisms of normalization and the manner in which its mode of violence fabricates an inner dimension or psychic idealization that the subject perceives as her "own" (Butler 1997). I argue that it is the infant's inaugural moment that severs her originary attachment, that it is this choice that not only renounces the maternal representation at the Mirror Stage but further disconnects the subject from her pre-Mirror Stage affects, energies or semiotic drives, which are then "exchanged," or rather replaced by, in support of Lacan, the desire of the other – Lacan claims that the ego itself is exchanged "for this desire which he sees in the other" (Lacan 1991 [1975] 1953-1954: 177). As this mode of psychic choice is excluded by the infant herself at the Mirror Stage, the writing subject then, I argue, has access to this component of unconscious choice as the practice of writing, according to Kristeva's arguments, situate the writing "I" at the Mirror Stage where she has access to both the realm of symbolic systems and the unconscious semiotic drives.

7) I elaborate on an intimate revolt in the context of the process of writing. Using Kristeva's theory on the process or *practice* of writing I consider the possibility of accessing these previously blocked and excluded drives and pre-Mirror Stage affects (Kristeva 1984 [1974]).

This in turn suggests that a skilled writer is capable of structuring these drives and affects as a means to fabricate a realm or basis for a "voice" that is outside of normalization and the paternal realm – or what I term an "authentic feminist voice." Furthermore, it suggests that a skilled writer is capable of using this voice as a means to subvert dominant and patriarchal ideologies and norms. I discuss this further in my "Background to the Problem" in relation to feminist theory and Cressida Heyes' argument on self-transformative methods as counter discourses to the oppressive normalizing discourses promoted by the cosmetic surgical industry of the twenty-first century (Heyes 2007). In addition, I discuss counter discourses to the cosmetic surgical industry's oppression of the "older" individual in relation to Bridget Garnham's recent research (Garnham 2017).

8) I promote an intimate revolt in a current setting – I discuss Louise Viljoen's work on Antjie Krog's poetry and the ageing body (Viljoen 2014). With Viljoen's work as support for my argument, I then highlight a selection of Krog's poetic texts as counter discourses to the normalization of the cosmetic surgical industry.

In "I Have a Body, therefore I Am," Louise Viljoen discusses Krog's writing of the body in the context of abject imagery. She argues that Krog's use of abject imagery is both an expression of her ageing and menopausal body in the context of making her body visible and a challenge to the existing social order (Viljoen 2014: 120). Viljoen analyzes a selection of Krog's poetic texts that focus on the ageing and menopausal body and she elaborates on the intensity Krog displays in the context of her use of abject imagery. (Viljoen 2014). Her analyses suggest that Krog embraces her "old" body rather than negating, denying, or conforming her body to society's beauty norms and ideals. Krog's work therefore suggests a counter discourse to the cosmetic surgical industry and its oppression of women's bodies. In addition, I apply Kristeva's theory on paragrams to show that Krog's "leave me a lonely began" destabilizes the patriarchal norms embedded within cosmetic surgical discourses – a response to the norms implicit in the male gaze and the cosmetic surgical industry.

9) Using skillfully written poetic texts by a woman writer, Antjie Krog, I will show an inscription of an authentic feminist voice, an intimate revolt, in the twenty-first century. In

addition, in so doing, I will position Kristeva's theory, with emphasis on her methods of poetry analysis, in a current and feminist context.

In "Towards a Semiology of Paragrams," "The Subject in Process," *Power of Horror* and *Desire in Language* Kristeva demonstrates that skilled poetic technique provokes a movement within the fabric of the text, and, therefore, highlights the existence of the semiotic realm as a mode of revolution (Kristeva 1998a: 25-49; 1998b: 133-175; 1982 [1980], 1980a [1977]). However, Kristeva focuses exclusively on male writers – Mallarmé, Joyce, Comte de Lautréamont, Bataille, Sollers, Marquis de Sade. In *Revolution in Poetic Language*, her analyses of Mallarmé's "A Throw of the Dice" and "A Constellation," for example, demonstrate a "movement" from a confining logic – "a certain logic whose order is dependent upon the social order" – to a boundlessness that opens the normalized writing self to an infinity that defies the confines and restrains of the "logic" of "Absolute religion." "As if they designated through and beyond their fixed position what we have called the dangerous motility of the semiotic *chora"* (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 226-227). These male writers indicate, according to Kristeva, an ethical response in that they destabilize their subjectivity. She suggests that the poetic texts indicate a pushing through the fear, the loss or "sacrifice" of the self, to experience the semiotic drives that underlie the "I." This suggests an intimate revolt in the context of male writers, but what of women writers?

My feminist response to Kristeva's sanctioning of an intimate revolt is to situate women's poetry in the context of destabilizing the normalized self, re-activating previously excluded semiotics drives and, furthermore, a re-structuring of a space that aligns with Kristeva's *chora.* With skillfully written poetic texts by a South African writer, Antjie Krog, I will show an inscription of such a space – an authentic feminist voice in the twenty-first century. In so doing, I will position Kristeva's theory, with emphasis on her methods of poetry analysis, in au courant and feminist context; and situate my contributions in the field of Kristevean theory, feminist theory, and poetics.

10) I have discussed my return to Kristeva's theory in the context of applying her theory on methods of poetry analysis to a selection of Krog's poetic texts. In addition, I have discussed a positioning of her work in a current and feminist context. I will briefly draw

attention to my main contribution in the context of its extension of her theory on poetry analysis and my further promotion of Krog's voice as feminist.

Firstly, as previously discussed, I extend Kristeva's argument on the relevance of the phonetic realm as underlying the paternal metaphor within poetic texts with my argument on an "originary ideal" as that which additionally plays a role in the structuring of an unconscious realm within poetic texts – structuring subversion within poetic "sub-text." Secondly, I extend Foucault's proposal on pastoral power – its translation in the context of the act-of-confession and the cosmetic surgical body. I then present a translation of the act-of-confession in relation to Krog's poetic texts. Furthermore, I argue that Krog's original Afrikaans work, "rondeau in vier dele," exceeds the act-of-confession and proposes Kristeva's principle of negativity, and, in so doing, destabilizes the Super-ego itself – the oppressive shaping of the conscience by the moral voice of authority – thereby provoking an aggression, an intimate revolt that destabilizes psychically imposing patriarchal oppression. Lastly, an application of Kristeva's theory on paragrams to Krog's "leave me a lonely began" enables me to show both a structuring of patriarchal ideals within a poetic text and in turn a destabilization of this very ideal. This suggests an underlying technique of patriarchal subversion within Krog's work – a destabilizing of the male gaze that both objectifies and fetishizes women's bodies, asserts their relevance in the context of their visibility, and renders the ageing menopausal body as an invisible object, as an unworthy and "lifeless" object, that is no longer allocated the position of being relevant to patriarchal men as this body is now undesirable. I show Krog's "leave me a lonely began" as positioning the ageing menopausal body in an inscriptive politically assertive feminist context.

The "Background to the Problem" situates my research in relation to recent feminist theory and the cosmetic surgical industry. In addition, I highlight a clear lack of recent research in the field of Foucauldian theory, in relation to pastoral power and the cosmetic surgical industry, and psychoanalytic theory, in relation to Butler and loss, and I suggest my possible contributions in this context.

## Background to the Problem

In the discussion that follows, I situate my argument in relation to recent feminist theory and the normalization of the cosmetic surgical industry.

There is an ongoing debate amongst feminist scholars in relation to the normalization of cosmetic surgery. Feminist scholars argue that cosmetic surgery empowers women in the context of agency and self-improvement (Gimlin 2002 Kuczynski 2006). Others have argued that cosmetic surgery is oppressive in that it contributes to the propagation of dominant patriarchal ideologies that confine women's bodies – beauty norms and ideals oppress women (Blum 2003, Blood 2005, Heinricy 2006, Clarke and Griffin 2007, Tait, 2007). My thesis does not enter the debate but rather proceeds from the premise that the normalization of cosmetic surgery is a form of violence.

I adopt a Foucauldian perspective in the context of normalization itself being a process and practice of subjection or violence (Foucault 1995 [1975]). In *Discipline and Punish* Michel Foucault claims that the individual or normalized subject is itself a mere product of subjection – the normalized self is a process that is effectively "made," shaped, by normalization practices (Foucault 1995 [1975]). Judith Butler appropriates Foucault's ideas on subjection in *The Psychic Life of Power* where she argues that subjection is a mode of violence that operates through social norms and ideals. Her theory includes a detailed and complex argument on the shaping of the conscience that I include in my analyses of the normalized self. She underscores the exclusivity of normalization in that there is no "outside of" or "excess to" its impact. Echoing Foucault, Butler claims that the subject is merely a product of subjection (Butler 1997). Although Butler does not emphasize norms specifically in relation to patriarchal oppression or ideologies as such, it stands to reason that patriarchal norms are modes of violence that promote the oppression, exploitation, and objectification of women's bodies. Normalization's violent impact on women's bodies – its confinement and shaping of the psyche – is a relevant component of my argument. As previously discussed, the cosmetic surgical industry is an expanding industry and exemplifies the impact of normalization in the second decade of the twenty-first century. It represents an effective case study in the context of normalization processes and the shaping of women's bodies with emphasis on the psyche.

In relation to the cosmetic surgical industry itself, a selection of feminist theorists have utilized Foucault's work implicitly as a framework from which to discuss the normalization of the cosmetic surgical industry and its negative impact on women's bodies (Heyes 2007), and explicitly as a means to discuss the cosmetic surgical industry's negative impact on the individual in a social or political context (Garnham 2013, 2017). In addition, as a counter discourse to the cosmetic surgical industry, Heyes adopts Foucault's theory of an "ethics of care" (Heyes 2007).

In the discussion that follows, I elaborate on both Cressida Heyes and Bridget Garnham's work as their cutting-edge critiques on the normalization of cosmetic surgery carve a distinct place in the field of feminist theory. I highlight Heyes's proposal in relation to feminist theorists, her theory on the authentic self, and her counter discourse to the cosmetic surgical industry – Heyes's adaptation of Foucault's work on the "ethics of care" to promote self-transformation through a process of self-reflection which she argues represents a feminist ethical response to the normalization of the cosmetic surgical industry. I elaborate on Garnham's theory in relation to the cosmetic surgical industry's discourses that target "older" individuals – which she argues are emerging and exploitative normalizing discourses – and her use of Foucault's theory on the "ethics of care" as a means to critique the anti-aging discourses that are aimed at the "older" individual. I situate my argument in relation to both Heyes and Garnham's theoretical contributions**.**

In *Self-Transformations: Foucault, Ethics, and Normalized Bodies,* feminist Cressida Heyes underscores that cosmetic surgery is a "reluctant response to psychological suffering"; and she doubts cosmetic surgery as capable of providing any cure, adequate or permanent, for the individual. The problem, according to Heyes, is the ambivalent nature of cosmetic surgery in that it encompasses both psychological struggles and the sense of identity. She claims further that this problem is one that should be addressed by feminist scholars rather than maintaining a continued debate that circumscribes the idea of either having or not having agency and individual choice when it comes to undergoing cosmetic surgical procedures (Heyes 2007: 92). Heyes writes:

> Feminist philosophers thus have two tasks: on the one hand, we need to understand contemporary institutions and discourses of cosmetic surgery in a

> novel and rapidly evolving landscape. On the other hand, we need to have something helpful to say to individual women contemplating cosmetic surgery about that choice.
>
> The rather scant literature on feminist ethical responses to cosmetic surgery has yet to squarely face this emerging discursive terrain.
>
> (Heyes 2007: 92)

Heyes argues against Kathy Davis's work on the normalization of cosmetic surgery (Davis 2003).[13] Heyes asserts that Davis "lacks an apparatus for theorizing" in that she focuses on normalization predominantly in the context of beauty norms and ideals of femininity rather than including the suffering imposed by normalization. She adds that this "enables" Davis "to represent her conclusions as outside the terms of the Foucauldian model" (Heyes 2007: 92).

As a response to Heyes's argument in relation to feminist theorists, I address the above-mentioned tasks in the following manner: firstly, advocating a Foucauldian approach, I employ Foucault's theory to provide a detailed analysis of normalization itself with emphasis on the shaping and confinement of women's bodies and the shaping of the cosmetic surgical body in the second decade of the twenty-first century. In addition, I highlight the role liberal feminist discourses play in promoting normalization processes. The aim of this detailed analysis of the normalized self is to shed light on the underlying violence promoted by normalization processes and practices, its psychological and emotional impact on women, and its exploitation of feminist discourses, thereby emphasizing and justifying the relevance of a feminist response. Secondly, in relation to her proposal of a "feminist ethical response" (Heyes 2007: 92), I adopt a Kristevean approach to ethics. In *Revolution in Poetic Language*, Kristeva argues that art, with emphasis on poetry or the poetic text, has the potential to be an ethical practice as the "ethical cannot be stated, instead it is practiced"; "and the text is one of the most accomplished examples of such a practice" (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 234). She calls for a new ethics – a form of ethics that liberates the normalized self, or individual, by "returning" the subject to her or his unconscious semiotic

[13] In *Dubious Equalities and Embodied Difference: Cultural Studies on Cosmetic Surgery*, Davis claims that the cosmetic surgical industry promotes a dilemma for feminism – a strategic balancing act between critiquing the technologies and discourses that define women's bodies as lacking and a sociological understanding of why women might view cosmetic surgery as their best and sometimes only choice

drives. She claims, that “a practice is ethical when it dissolves those narcissistic fixations” that narrowly confine the subject ((Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 233). In this context, an ethical response is a response that is intimate, personal, and that finds expression through the process of writing. To return to my earlier discussion on Kristeva’s theory in relation to the “false self” and to position this concept in relation to Heyes’s appeal, a feminist ethical response is one that unsettles the “false self,” disturbs its desensitized form, and re-activates affects. I endorse a twenty-first century woman writer, Antjie Krog (Krog 2006). I then apply Kristeva’s techniques of poetry analysis to a selection of Krog’s poetic texts and demonstrate a feminist ethical response – a theoretical reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice.

Following a discussion and debate on the merits of a selection of established feminist theories, Heyes presents her own contribution: “I will show a new direction for feminist thinking about the strategies we need to resist cosmetic surgery’s normalizing effects, which I illustrate through a brief analysis of the televisual makeover” (Heyes 2007: 92). Firstly, she elaborates on the harmful impact of normalization processes – she discusses cosmetic surgical discourses, which she refers to as “fairytale narratives,” and the formation of an “authentic self.” Then, as an ethical response, she translates Foucault’s theory on “the ethics of care” in relation to self-care, self-reflection, and practices that promote the individual’s well-being (Heyes 2007). My discussion that follows outlines Heyes’s theory.

Heyes argues that normalization effects function through fairytale narratives that promote the ideal of an “authentic self” as an achievable goal. These normalizing narratives, however, are complex and conflictual in that they do not exclusively operate from the premise that promotes a docile individual conforming to established beauty norms and societal standards. In addition, normalizing narratives promote a moral dimension to the self – the idea that the individual is capable of healing her past trauma and through this form of self-improvement she is effectively making herself a better person (Heyes 2007: 9-38, 89-110). The “authentic self” as suggested by Heyes is therefore a self that is in conflict, a self that is shaped by the ideal of psychological and emotional healing or “wholeness” based on an unattainable ideal of beauty. Furthermore, the “authentic self” has a moral dimension that emerges from this place, or position, of psychological trauma.

Heyes supports my argument in that her theory on an "authentic self" draws attention to the concept of a "self" that is confined within a continual process – rather than normalization promoting or producing a "self" that is stable, fixed, and therefore represents an essential identity, the "authentic self" suggests a self that is shaped by normalizing practices that function by maintaining the "self" through continuous conflict. The "authentic self" is a dynamic process shaped by psychological and emotional conflict. This suggests that the individual in the context of an "authentic self" is attempting to repair her self, "fix" her psychological and emotional past, her psychic trauma, by "moving forward," teleologically, toward an unattainable solution, an ideal beauty, and the traumatic past is excluded, possibly denied or repressed, rather than addressed. The "authentic self" is effectively confined within a different realm of psychological and emotional conflict but it is a form of trauma that is produced by normalizing discourses promoted by the cosmetic surgical industry. This further suggests that the cosmetic surgical industry then effectively performs the role of a new "voice" of oppression, or subjection as an application of Foucault's theory might suggest, aimed at confining the "authentic self" within normalization processes – a voice with a moral dimension. As Heyes clearly claims, the cosmetic surgical industry promotes a moral dimension; it is moral in that the individual believes this form of self-improvement promoted by undergoing cosmetic surgical procedures will make her a better person. The consequences of not attaining an ideal body, or ideal self, promotes feelings of inadequacy and guilt (Heyes 2007: 9-38, 89-130). If, as my reading of Heyes' theory suggests, the cosmetic surgical industry promotes psychological and emotional conflict, how do these conflicts shape the individual intimately – on a psychic and unconscious level? In addition, if, the cosmetic surgical industry promotes a moral dimension in the context of an "authentic self," how does this translate in relation to the psyche? I turn to Judith Butler's theory on normalization mechanisms and the shaping of the psyche and address these questions. As her theory is outlined earlier in this chapter, I will briefly highlight her ideas on norms, the conscience, and morality from *The Psychic Life of Power* (Butler 1997) in this discussion.

In *The Psychic Life of Power* Butler argues that norms function from a psychic level and that they govern the formation of the subject itself. However, they do not merely govern the formation of the subject but establish the subject's entire social reality – the normalized self's

lived experience is formed and controlled by the psychic operation of norms (Butler 1997: 21-70). She adds that the psychic operation of norms function effectively due to its less visible form of violence – a violence that shapes the subject on an unconscious level through a mechanism of reflexivity (Butler 1997). Butler argues that norms shape the subject through the conscience (Butler 1997: 62-82, 106-131). In relation to morality, Butler suggests that norms function by producing guilt, which the subject then believes is her own. As a response, the subject "represses" the undesired sensations thus initiating and consequently maintaining a "conscience" confined within a realm of morality (Butler 1997: 56-58).

In an earlier discussion, I elaborated on the aim of my deconstruction of the normalized self in relation to normalization's impact on a psychic and unconscious level in order to establish the possibility of *that* which is "outside" or "in excess" of normalization processes – in "excess of" its violent norms and oppressive moral dimension. This in turn provides theoretical support for a reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice, which is my response to Kristeva's proposal of an intimate revolt and to Heyes's appeal – by establishing a theoretical basis or underpinning that underlies an "authentic self," as Heyes might term it, or a "false self," as Kristeva might term it, provides a theoretical support from which a reconstruction can then both emerge and develop. Furthermore, by sufficiently demonstrating that my thesis is itself structurally supported by established theories, I, in turn, provide and reinforce the justification for a return to Kristeva's theory, and for then positioning her theory, with emphasis on her methods of poetry analysis, in a current and feminist context. Additionally, this provides theoretical support for my analysis of Antjie Krog's twenty-first century work *Verwerskrif/Body Bereft* (Krog 2006) and promoting her work in the context of a feminist voice that is also authentic – a voice that belongs to her as an aspect of her self that is "in excess" of normalization, "outside of" the normalized self, "false self," or an "authentic self."

I have not yet elaborated on Heyes's argument in favour of a feminist thinking that promotes strategies that resist normalizing effects – her feminist ethical response. She writes:

> A feminist ethical response to cosmetic surgery cannot, therefore, simply be the moral injunction 'don't do it.' Instead, a compassionate and effective strategy involving changing our relation to ourselves (by working on ourselves

> alone or together) to generate ways of allowing the body to play a less tortured role in our awareness, or to create new and more expansive forms of embodied self-expression.
>
> (Heyes 2007: 92)

In the concluding chapter of *Self-Transformations*, Heyes engages with Foucault's theory on the "ethics of care" as support for her feminist ethical response (Heyes 2007: 111-17). In an interview shortly before his passing, "The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom," Foucault defines an "ethics of care" as a process of caring for and nurturing the self (which is to be distinguished from Annette Baier's feminist ethics of care (1992)). Contrary to his earlier works, which tend to elaborate on the subjection and confinement of the self, he underscores a shift in his focus to that of self-reflection and self-care. He says: "Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection" and "In antiquity, ethics as the conscious practice of freedom has revolved around this fundamental imperative: 'Take care of yourself.'" "In other words, make freedom your foundation, through the mastery of yourself" (Foucault qtd. In Becker, Fornet-Betancourt & Gomez Muller 1984: 284-285, 301). Heyes underscores Foucault's ideas on the self in the context of self-reflection, self-care, and morality translated in the context of self-freedom – as a "practice of freedom" of the self rather than a mode of political freedom (Heyes 2007: 112-114). She interprets Foucault's work as having two distinct features. "First, we are urged to reflect intransigently on the processes by which we are made into subjects, and to devise ways to resist their constraining, painful, even insufferable aspects" and, second, "to resist judgement of others" but to continue to promote critique as "normalization typically robs subjects of effective practices of critique" (Heyes 2007: 116-117). She argues that a mode of feminist ethics is that which incorporates an excess to normalization, is not preoccupied or focused on a transcendental view of perfection but an "ethical attitude toward our own becoming" and "I suggest that embodied practices of freedom should allow us to diminish the suffering induced by normalization" (Heyes 2007: 120). Heyes then suggests yoga as an ethical practice in the context of her reading of Foucault's practice of freedom. She writes: "For me yoga presents the best personal counterattack to the teleology of corporeal normalization" (Heyes 2007: 128-129). She

justifies her response by claiming that many practitioners and therapists use a range of somatic treatments different to the "talking cure" (Heyes 2007: 130).

As a response to Heyes' interpretation of Foucault's "ethics of care" in relation to self-transformative practices, my argument shows that the process of writing itself is self-transformative.

A close reading of Kristeva's theory suggests that the process of writing presents a means to challenge the process of normalization – an intimate mode of resistance to the norms embedded within consumerist driven discourses. My argument presents a detailed analysis of this process. Kristeva suggests that an identification between the writing subject and the text takes place and that, through this process, the text itself acts as a mirror from which the writing subject then confronts her normalized self, challenges the images and ideals promoted by contemporary consumer culture that confine, restrict, and shape the normalized self. In other words, a skilled writing subject, through her positioning of a writing self or "I'" via the poetic text-as-thetic, is able to use signs – she is able to choose words, phrases, metaphors, for example, rather than being, grammatically speaking, merely and exclusively an effect of normalizing ideals, a literary trope confined to the teleology of symbolic systems, as Lacan and Butler's arguments suggest (Kristeva 1980 [1977], 1982 [1980], 1984 [1974], 1998).

Furthermore, in response to Heyes's appeal in the context of a mode of feminist ethics as that which incorporates an excess to normalization, the skilled writing subject is not preoccupied or focused on a transcendental view of perfection but an "ethical attitude toward our own becoming" (Heyes 2007: 120), I argue that the process of writing incorporates a mode of self-transformation that exceeds normalization. My reading of Kristeva's theory on the practice of writing suggests that, besides the writer's choice of metaphor (for example) as a means to fabricate a sense of agency, of subjectivity, within symbolic systems, the encounter with the inaugural moment at the Mirror Stage provokes the emergence of a realm or *space* that underlies metaphor itself – the realm of (Kristeva's terms) the semiotic drives and the maternal *chora.* I argue that it is this realm or *space* that suggests a basis for a degree of creative freedom and agency of the individual's own becoming (Kristeva 1980 [1977], 1982 [1980], 1984 [1974], 1998:

45). I show that Krog's work provokes an expansive form of embodied self-expression and transformation on an intimate level (Krog 2006).

In the discussion that follows, I highlight that Krog's work is (implicitly) a positive feminist and ethical response to the negative impact of normalization mechanisms such as those promoted by the cosmetic surgical industry in the twenty-first century (Krog 2006) – an implicit challenge to the emerging anti-ageing discourses promoted by the cosmetic surgical industry aimed at oppressing and controlling the "older" individual. I reference Bridget Garnham's recent research and discuss my contribution in this context.

Bridget Garnham's research draws attention to an emerging form of normalization in the context of anti-ageing discourses aimed at "older" individuals (Garnham 2013). In "Designing 'older' rather than Denying Ageing: Problematizing Anti-ageing Discourse in relation to Cosmetic Surgery undertaken by Older People," Garnham argues that the cosmetic surgical industry oppresses "older" individuals by effectively designing ageing – by promoting essentialist concepts of the "naturally ageing body." She uses interview data and media texts to show how anti-ageing discourses inscribe ageing in the practice of cosmetic surgery by older people – she highlights the repeated use of the notion "re" suggested by terms such as rejuvenation, reversal and renewal. To advance her argument she suggests that the forms of rationality associated with cosmetic surgery constitute a contemporary regimen of "care of the self" which enable ethical agency and creative self-stylization. Through this framework, cosmetic surgery can be re-imagined as a practice for designing "older" rather than denying ageing (Garnham 2013).

Garnham's recent work, *A New Ethics of Older: Subjectivity, Surgery, and Self-stylization*, utilizes Foucault's work on the "ethics of care" as a means to support her argument on an emerging strategy in the context of contemporary consumer culture – the cosmetic surgical industry's promotion of anti-ageing designer discourses aimed at "older" individuals (Garnham 2017). In the discussion that follows, I will outline Foucault's work on the "ethics of care" and Garnham's argument in relation to an "ethics of care," cosmetic surgical discourses, and its impact on the ageing body. I should underscore that Garnham's work on the "older" individual plays a relevant role in the context of providing further support for my analyses of Krog's poetic

texts – in relation to Krog's writing of the ageing body, re-claiming of her menopausal body, as an affront to existing patriarchal establishments with emphasis on the cosmetic surgical industry and its emerging discourses aimed at the "older" individual. Louise Viljoen's work provides additional support for my analysis of Krog's work in this context (Viljoen 2014). I discuss Viljoen's work in "Overview of the Problem," point 7.

Foucault was working on a genealogy of ethics that revolved around the care of the self as is evident in a compilation of his lectures, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject* (1981- 1982) and *The Courage of Truth* (1983-1984). In these works he traces the techniques of the Classical and Hellenistic practices in relation to the care, nurturing, and development of the "self" and he challenges modern western concepts of ethics. He suggests that western society promotes a normalized self that is further confined by supposed absolute truths – normalizing discourses oppress the subject by asserting the concept of the self as a "natural" and essential "truth." Sexual identity is then further confined by these essentialist discourses. He turns to ancient Greek and Roman texts as they suggest a form of self that is not defined or confined by this concept of an essentialist or absolute truth; instead, they promote an aesthetic ethics that functions on a principle which involves a care of the self. This form of aesthetic ethics promotes a process of continual self-improvement, self-renewal, of focusing on a self in the context of beauty and virtue (Foucault 1981-1982, 1983-1984). It is this context that Garnham draws insight from Foucault's work on the "ethics of care" – in her earlier work, "Designing Older," Garnham underscores that the cosmetic surgical industry targets "older" individuals by promoting discourses on renewal, rejuvenation, and reversal (Garnham 2013). In her later work, *A New Ethics of Older*, she argues that Foucault's "ethics of care" sheds light on the manner in which the cosmetic surgical industry impacts the "older" individual – Foucault's "ethics of care" which promotes a care of the self draws clear comparisons to cosmetic surgical discourses that promote a continual process of renewal, re-inventions, rejuvenation. She suggests that the repeated notions of "re" – renewal, rejuvenation, reversal – are used to oppress the "older" individual, deny the naturally ageing body, and further promote the confinement of the ageing self. In addition, she suggests that an ethics of care is used to promote the ideal of an ethical agency that is not restricted or inhibit by age but rather incorporates not only rejuvenation and renewal but

the unrealistic ideal of it being an attainable goal – a goal that is reached when the individual is "old" (Garnham 2017).

Garnham's work on the "older" individual sheds light on the manner in which Foucault's "ethics of care" as a means of taking care of the self in the context of a mode of self-empowerment, or subjectivity that is not exclusively shaped by normalization processes, is effectively, I suggest, "turned" against the individual. The ageing self or "older" individual is denied the natural process of growing old and is instead trapped in a discourse of continual self-renewal, perpetual self-improvement. Furthermore, the naturally ageing body is denied; the "being old," or "actual old," is constantly suggested as undesirable unless it includes the best or better version of the self. This improved "best" version is only attained by undergoing cosmetic surgery and, paradoxically, reached when the subject is "old." The "older" individual is maintained as precisely that – as being "older" but never quite reaching "old" as the goal is constantly deferred. Although Garnham does not discuss nor reference G. W. F. Hegel's theory in her work, her critique on the cosmetic surgical industry and its designer discourses aimed at the "older" individual draws comparisons to Hegel's theory, in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, on the process of the self – the idea that the self is constantly moving towards a better version of the self, constantly aimed at realizing or actualizing the self, while paradoxically moving away from its origins, from its original self (Hegel 2009 [1807]). Hegel's theory is implicit to my argument. His theory is further discussed in the section that follows, "Theoretical Framework and the Review of the Literature," where I highlight his work in relation to the psychoanalytic theories of Jacques Lacan, Judith Butler, and Julia Kristeva – as these theorists' work form the underpinnings that support and structure my arguments. "Theoretical Framework and the Review of the Literature" briefly discusses and clarifies the various theories that I adopt, adapt, and extend thereby further contextualizing my contributions.

In response to Garnham's theory on the anti-aging designer discourses promoted by the cosmetic surgical industry and in opposition to its oppression of "older" individuals, I propose a counter discourse. I turn to the work of the South African poet, Antjie Krog – I show that a selection of her poems destabilizes the anti-aging discourses promoted by the cosmetic surgical industry. Viljoen's work, "I Have a Body Therefore I Am," that discusses Krog's poetry in relation

to the ageing and menopausal body provides additional support for this analysis (Viljoen 2014). In relation to both Heyes and Garnham's research, I will show that Krog's work is a positive feminist and ethical response to the negative impact of normalization mechanisms such as those promoted by the cosmetic surgical industry in the twenty-first century (Krog 2006).

I have indicated my thesis's contribution to the field of feminist theory in relation to Foucault's work and the cosmetic surgical industry. The discussion that follows suggests my contribution in relation to Foucault's work on pastoral power where there is a clear lack of research in the context of the normalization of the cosmetic surgical industry and the translation of pastoral power in the context of the cosmetic surgical body.

Foucault did not complete his work, to be titled *The Confessions of The Flesh*, thereby extending his ideas in the context of pastoral power. However, he does briefly discuss pastoral power in a selection of his works. I have discussed pastoral power earlier. Here I will briefly outline his theory of pastoral power in relation to recent research and, in so doing, position my own research in this context.

In "The Subject and Power" Foucault underscores pastoral power as a new mode of power that has evolved as a combination of individualization techniques and totalization procedures (Foucault 2000 [1982]). He emphasizes that it is oppressive and suggests that it is a form of power that is less visible which, he suggests, further assists its adaptability and therefore its effectiveness – its effective subjection of individuals, its shaping of the normalized self (Foucault 2000 [1982]). Furthermore, he claims that pastoral power had been linked to a defined religious institution, Christianity, centuries ago, but that it has expanded into the entire social body finding support in many institutions and practices including, but not exclusively, the family, medicine, psychiatry, and the work force (Foucault 2000 [1982]: 332-335).

Possibly due to Foucault's claim that pastoral power has expanded into a variety of institutions, recent research concerning pastoral power has emerged spanning across several fields including, though not exclusive to, philosophy, sociology, feminist theory. A growing interest in Foucault's ideas as is evident in the field of medical and health care theory,

environmental theory and educational theory (Malin & Malmberg 2015, O'Byrne, Holmes & Roy 2015, Claire 2015, Hörberg & Dahlberg 2015, Besley 2015).

However, pastoral power is predominantly referenced in relation to Foucault's work on "the ethics of care" in the context of an analysis of Foucault's existing work on pastoral power; in the context of Foucault's deciphering of established gnostic discourses of "truth" as a means to promote or support a subjectivity in the context of freedom from established or oppressive religious institutions and ideologies; or as a counter discourse to subjection.

Nob Doran's work "Beyond Phenomenological Anti-sociologies: Foucault's 'Care of his Self'" argues that Foucault's final investigations go beyond traditional phenomenological and sociological viewpoints of the "self" in an attempt to access a "truth" in the context of subjectivity. He claims that Foucault's last works elucidate the idea that Foucault was indeed attempting to unravel a means to promote a care of the self (Doran 2015).

Chris Menehan's *Care of the Self, Foucauldian Ethics, and Contemporary Subjectivity*, argues that Foucault's later ideas offer contemporary western culture a means to escape the institutionalization of Christianity, since an ethics of self-care practices suggests a forming of one's own identity in exchange for, what he refers to as, antiquated practices of self-finalizing subjectivity (Menehan 2012).

Laurie Ouellette and Jacquelyn Arcy's "Live through This: Feminist Care of the Self" use Foucault's proposals on the care of the self and morality to challenge anti-neoliberal discourses in relation to the media's impact on young women, while remaining critical of neoliberalism. They argue that ethics of, or rather "for," the self does not necessarily refer to moral codes but can be applied to the manner in which one lives and conducts oneself in everyday existence. Ethics of the self, according to Ouellette and Arcy, is not self-indulgence but a form of self-preservation, which they relate to political activism (Ouellette & Arcy 2015).

Steven G. Ogden's recently published work, *The Church, Authority and Foucault: Imagining the Church as an Open Space of Freedom,* is a detailed study of Foucault's theory on sovereign power in relation to the church and its marginalization of individuals who do not conform to its "truths." He extends Foucault's proposal on pastoral power by exploring the

paradoxical dynamic between pastoral power in the context of caring for others and pastoral power in the context of submission, personal sacrifice, and docility. He argues that certain contemporary churches emulate the early monastic master-disciple narrative based on practices and techniques of submission (Ogden 2017).

As highlighted above, there is a surge of recent research on Foucault that relates to pastoral power. However, my extension of Foucault's theory on pastoral power in the context of its emergence within contemporary consumer culture with emphasis on the cosmetic surgical industry promotes a new approach – in particular, my demonstration of pastoral power's translation in the context of twenty-first century women and the cosmetic surgical body. In addition, as discussed earlier in this chapter, my presentation of a theoretical reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice in contemporary consumer culture promotes a new subjectivity that challenges established practices and institutionalized techniques of individualization. This in turn responds to Foucault's later work on an ethics of care in the context of a mode of freedom or caring for the normalized self – Foucault argues that the individual should establish freedom as a basis from which to live (Foucault in Becker, Fornet-Betancourt & Gomez Muller 1984: 301).

The discussion that follows briefly outlines research in the field of psychoanalytic theory in relation to Butler, the conscience, and Loss. I then highlight where my work might contribute to the field.

Noela Davis critiques Butler's ideas on interpellation in "Subjected Subjects? On Judith Butler's Paradox of Interpellation" (Davis 2012). Davis argues that despite Butler's emphasis on the idea of no pre-existing subject, Butler nonetheless theorizes a guilt and compulsion acting on an "individual" that compels his or her turn to answer (according to Althusser's ideas on interpellation) the hail. Using Foucault's work as support, Davis then provides her own reading of Althusser arguing against Butler's ideas on guilt by claiming that, according to Foucault, the individual is always already the principle of his/her own subjection therefore the individual is not compelled. She writes, "As subjects, we are always-already the embodiment of the field of society-power-ideology" (Davis 2012: 881).

David McIvor critiques Butler claiming that her proposal on guilt, loss, and the melancholic subject is restricted due to Freud's influence on her work. In "Bringing Ourselves to Grief: Judith Butler and the Politics of Mourning," he argues that Butler's investments in melancholia compromise her "ethico-political interventions by obscuring the ambivalence of political engagements and the possibilities of achieving and sustaining non-dogmatic identities" (McIvor 2012: 409). Using Melanie Klein's proposal on mourning, he then highlights that Klein demonstrates ethical and political potential suggesting that Butler's argument on loss and mourning would benefit from a greater influence by Klein (McIvor 2012).

My extension of Butler's arguments on the conscience and loss contributes in the following manner: Firstly, my extension of Butler's argument on a "passionate attachment" to subjection. Butler claims that a "passionate attachment" is necessarily both formed and denied in order for the subject itself to emerge and consequently be shaped by normalization and the exclusivity of violence. I extend Butler's claim to argue that it is the mother or primary caregiver that is *denied* at the Mirror Stage, and that it is this denial that supports the infant-as-subject's entrance into the realm of subjection. It is this denial that is the necessary exclusion, the basis from which the mechanisms of normalization shape the conscience and produce the normalized self. Furthermore, it is this denial at the Mirror Stage that simultaneously excludes, or blocks, the infant's pre-Mirror Stage affects and drives, which include the affect of love. An individual's reconnection to previously denied – blocked or excluded – pre-Mirror Stage affects and drives suggests the possibility of a reconstruction of the normalized self. Kristeva's theory is used and promoted in this context.

I connect the idea of the past to that of a theoretical reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice in the context of a return to that which is forgotten – a return of the maternal realm, the "originary loss." In this context, I challenge Butler's theory on the mechanisms of subjection in the context of its production, and formation, of the conscience with emphasis on loss. Utilizing Kristeva's ideas on an archaic memory and Nietzsche's theory on memory and forgetting as further support, I extend Butler's argument on the mechanism of subjection in relation to temporality – the subject being bounded by time, confined within linear time – with my emphasis on a "return to the past." My theoretical reconstruction of an authentic feminist

voice utilizing Kristeva's theory on poetry analysis and, as I argue, is inscribed by Krog's poetic texts, demonstrates a "return to the past" – a restructuring of previously excluded, blocked, drives and pre-Mirror Stage affects. As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, Kristeva underscores revolt in the context of a "return to," a "questioning and displacement of the past" (Kristeva 2002 [1997]: introduction), and in the context of a personal or intimate revolt (Kristeva 2002 [1997]), I present a categorical and detailed response to her proposal.

## Methodology

Besides analyzing Antjie Krog's poetry, I use cosmetic surgery as a case study that represents the adverse impact of contemporary consumer culture in the context of the twenty-first century. A large part of my thesis is an articulation of and critical engagement with several related post-structural and psychoanalytic theorists. However, I do not simply apply their theories to Krog's poetic texts but challenge and extend the theories too.

I should clarify that I provide my own readings of the theories used in my thesis with the exception of readings provided by John Lechte – his reading of Kristeva's proposal on love. The theories adopted, applied, and extended in the course of my argument provide the framework or basis from which both my deconstruction and reconstruction proceed and develop; in this context, the theories effectively provide the underpinnings that support my argument. With established theorists' work as support, a degree of legitimacy is then provided from which my response to Kristeva's proposals on a "false self" and an "intimate revolt," and my "own voice" emerges. In addition, carefully selected direct quotes are utilized as a means to further support any assertions, analyses, applications, or extensions made in my thesis. This in turn assists my argument in relation to positioning it in the context of my contribution to the fields of post-structural feminist theory, poetics, and psychoanalytic theory.

The methodology is qualitative and interpretive and consists of three components:

1. a discussion of the case study of cosmetic surgery;

2. a critical interrogation and articulation of various related theories;

3. an analysis of Krog's poetry.

## 1. A Discussion of the Case Study of Cosmetic Surgery

I use cosmetic surgery to demonstrate the harmful impact of normalization mechanisms and practices in contemporary consumer culture – with Foucault's theory on subjection, confinement, pastoral power, and a selection of theorists' work, I demonstrate the manifestation of these modes of violence in the context of contemporary consumer culture.

## 2. A Critical Interrogation and Articulation of Various Related Theories

I have briefly discussed and clarified in this chapter that my argument critically articulates and interrogates various theories. Therefore, I will present an outline to highlight my interrogations and articulations in the discussion that follows. These processes are further clarified in the introduction of Chapter 2 – an elaboration of my theoretical framework, and throughout my thesis.

i) I use predominantly Kristeva, Lacan, Foucault, and Butler's theories.

ii) Secondly, I engage with Klein and Suttie's theories.

iii) Implicitly, Plato and Hegel's ideas are used.

iv) I extend Foucault's argument on pastoral power.

v) I extend Butler's argument on subjection and normalization.

vi) Utilizing Lacan, Kristeva, Klein, and Suttie's theory, I delineate a space that underlies the mechanisms of normalization itself.

vii) Applying Kristeva's theory on poetry analyses to Krog's poetry, I demonstrate a fabrication of a *space* that underlies normalization itself – a theoretical reconstruction, an inscription, of an authentic feminist voice in contemporary consumer culture. The next section outlines the methods used to analyze Krog's poetry.

## 3. An Analysis of Krog's Poetry

Kristeva's theory on semanalysis, the principle of negativity, and paragrams is used to analyze a selection of poetic texts from Antjie Krog's work *Verweerskrif/Body Bereft* (Krog

2006). It is the skill demonstrated through Krog's structuring of her poetic texts that accommodates my analyses in the context of semanalysis, the principle of negativity, and paragrammatic structure. The section that follows outlines the methods used for my poetry analyses.

## Semanalysis

In "Women's Time" Kristeva writes of a maternal space or *chora* that is in excess of linear (paternal) time and consequently suggests an "outside" to the confinement promoted by paternal or patriarchal oppression (Kristeva 1981). In "Towards a Semiology of Paragrams" she extends these ideas to argue that poetic language is unrestricted, limitless, "a potential infinity" that is capable of exceeding the confinement of linear time or linearity. She references linearity in the context of poetic texts – the linear or surface level of a poetic text, which, her ideas suggest, she aligns with linear time (Kristeva 1998a). The skilled poet, therefore, according to Kristeva, is not merely a "grammatical effect" but capable of provoking or structuring this *signifying space* that is in excess of linear or paternal time by the fabric of the poetic text itself. Furthermore, it is by her *own choice* of metaphors and signifiers that she has the power to reconstruct this space and therefore her own voice. Semanalysis explores the fabrication of this underlying space; and, therefore, supports my reconstruction – my illustration of an inscription of an authentic feminist voice in contemporary consumer culture. In *Revolution in Poetic Language* Kristeva writes that semanalysis is a process of analysis that "breaks through the sign, dissolves it"; "tears through the veil of representation to find the material signifying process [or *signifiance*]" that underlies the surface or linear layer of a poetic text (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 103).

Using Krog's "writing ode," I demonstrate a detailed semanalysis beginning with an explication of a disturbance from the surface layer of the poetic text through to the underlying phonetic layer and bold use of colour.

## The Principle of Negativity

In "Beyond the Sentence: The Transfinite of Language" Kristeva mentions her ideas on the principle of negativity that suggest a poet is capable of destabilizing the Super-ego (and therefore the normalized conscience) at the Mirror Stage thereby unsettling the normalized self while simultaneously provoking the influx of previously excluded semiotic drives and affects (Kristeva 1980b [1977]).

The idea of confession is suggested in the English translation of "rondeau in vier dele" – "Mountain rondeau in four parts." However, the original Afrikaans version extends the idea of confession to demonstrate an influx of psychic excess or drives thereby destabilizing the Super-ego itself – The Principle of Negativity.[14] This idea of "revolt" – of destabilizing the paternal or Super-ego itself – is suggested in "farewell, "colonialism of a special kind" and "Every day I treat you as if you are mine."

In addition, in **"**Four seasonal observations of Table Mountain" I highlight an underlying feminist act in the context of Antjie Krog's poetic expression – a reclamation of the metaphor "Table Mountain" from that of a paternal representation to that of a maternal omnipresence suggesting a resurgence of maternal power itself.

Furthermore, Krog's poetic texts indicate an underlying expression of my idea of an "originary attachment" in "writing ode," and the idea of the relevance of the Maternal and love in "ode vir 'n ander lewe" and "letter-poem lullaby for Ntombizana Atoo."

## Paragrammatic Analysis

In "Towards a Semiology of Paragrams" Kristeva expounds her argument on the poetic text as a paragrammatic structure or paragram (Kristeva 1998a). The next paragraph briefly outlines selected aspects of this form of analysis, which I apply in Chapter 9 in order to

[14] The super-ego is the manner in which the paternal voice or voice of authority normalizes the subject according to Lacan.

demonstrate that Krog provokes a reclamation of her ageing body through the fabric of the poetic text itself.

"In an alienated society … writers *participate* by means of a paragrammatic writing" (Kristeva 1998a: 29). The poetic text-as-paragram "presents itself as a system of multiple connections" that: "*makes* meaning" (Kristeva 1998a: 32); is not static but rather moves (Kristeva 1998a: 32-36); is not confined or defined by the rules or logic of conventional language, the norms of ideology (Kristeva 1998a: 27 -29); consists of smaller units or "grams" (Kristeva 1998a: 32); functions on a number of levels – phonetic, syntagmatic, sequential, ideological and semic (Kristeva 1998a: 32); and is not hierarchically structured (Kristeva 1998a: 32 -42).

Krog's "leave me a lonely began" demonstrates a paragrammatic structure; and in so doing Krog challenges pastoral power in the context of contemporary consumer culture and the cosmetic surgical industry. This poetic text demonstrates or inscribes a network, a paragram, that fabricates a "body" within the fabric or materiality of the poetic text itself; and, in so doing, subverts cosmetic surgical discourses that promote the renouncement of the ageing body in exchange for a "new" and surgically reconstructed body. In addition, using Kristeva's theory on ideological level(s), I demonstrate that Krog's "leave me a lonely began" subverts the male gaze and the norms implicit in it. [15]

## Theoretical Framework and Review of the Literature

This section briefly discusses a selection of arguments and theories that are relevant in relation to the structuring of my thesis. As my thesis is a detailed investigation involving both a deconstruction and a reconstruction it uses, extends, and is supported by several theoretical perspectives and recent research.

[15] Laura Mulvey's work "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" uses cinema to demonstrate the objectification of women's bodies by the male gaze underscoring that the male gaze constitutes women as objects. Women are then defined, valued, by being 'looked at,' by the *presence* of the male gaze (Mulvey 1999 [1975]) while simultaneously being shaped, confined, by the norms embedded within the male gaze.

## Plato

Donald Zeyl's reading of Plato's *Timaeus*, "Plato's *Timaeus,*" explicates Plato's ideas, a selection of which should be briefly mentioned – as my thesis uses Kristeva's ideas on the *chora*, which she adopts from Plato.

According to Zeyl's reading, Plato elaborates on a universe that is shaped by a rational and purposive agency (Zeyl 2014). In addition, this agency is benevolent and good. Although the governing explanatory principle of the account is teleological, the universe as a whole as well as its various parts are so arranged as to produce a vast array of good effects. The orderliness of the universe is not only the manifestation of Intellect, but is also the model for individuals to emulate in the context of a returning to an "original state" that was lost prior to embodiment. His ideas further suggest and support an ethical dimension (Plato in Zeyl 2014). Plato's idea of an "originary" state or dimension that was lost implicitly supports my reconstruction in Chapter 8. As I show there, Kristeva's ideas on the *chora*, that I employ in this thesis, are based on Plato's ideas. However, as previously mentioned, Kristeva's *chora* is a maternal realm or matrix that is chaotic and unstructured rather than ordered.

## Hegel

In Hegel's *The Phenomenology of Spirit* the struggle of the self or self-consciousness towards a recognition of itself suggests a self, or ego, that attempts to, paradoxically, discover or actualize "itself" or the ego by moving away from itself, its origins or "essence" (Hegel 2009 [1807]). Since Freud's ideas on the unconscious, psychoanalytic theorists such as Lacan, Butler and Kristeva have used inverted or modified versions of Hegel's ideas on the dialectic nature of the self-consciousness or ego as a metaphor to represent the unconscious workings of the self. Each theorist argues different versions of the confinement of the subject and the manner in which The Symbolic, symbolic systems, the paternal realm, (Lacan) or subjection (Butler) confine the subject (Lacan 2002 [1948-1960]: 188-211, Butler 1997). Butler and Lacan's extension of Hegel's ideas suggest that society, language, subjection, maintain the subject in a closed, confined, system or structure either successfully in which there appears to be no *excess* or affect

that exceeds this confinement, as Butler claims (Butler 1997: 198); or, as Lacan's ideas suggest, an excess that is repressed, excluded, at the Mirror Stage (Lacan 1998 [1964], 2002 [1949]). Hegel references time in the context of temporality and suggests a linear time that alienates the subject – the "movement" of the "I" unfolding as moments and in the context of a linear succession (Hegel 2009 [1807]: 81-86).

It is Hegel's argument on the self or self-consciousness as moving teleologically forward, in a linear fashion, that is further used by Butler and Lacan. Butler uses it in *Bodies That Matter* as a means to support her argument on the temporality of normalization processes or mechanisms (Butler 1993). Lacan uses Hegel's ideas on the movement of the self-consciousness as support for his argument on the normalized self or self-consciousness (Lacan 2002 [1948-1960], 2014a [2004]); and, therefore, as support for his claim on the individual forgetting his "past" as a prerequisite for entrance into the realm of the symbolic (Lacan 1991[1975] 1953-1954). Using Kristeva's ideas, and indirectly Lacan's, I present a return to the past in the context of a reconnection to or activation of previously excluded, at the Mirror Stage, affects and drives. Using Krog's work I demonstrate a use of these affects and drives as a means to fabricate a space, realm, or network, that exceeds the confinement of linear time in that it is prior to the emergence of the normalized self.

## Psychoanalytic Theory

Sigmund Freud's theory in *Studies in Hysteria* (Breuer & Freud 2009 [1893-1895]) and *Introductory Notes on Psychoanalysis* ((Freud 1989 [1905-1933]) supports my deconstructive argument by underscoring an underlying connection between the speaking voice and the idea of confession in the context of a woman expressing or speaking her "repressed voice."

In *Love, Guilt and Reparation*, Klein argues that it is at approximately 6 months of age that the infant fears losing her loved object; she terms this the depressive position ((Klein 1975 [1921-1945]). Klein's depressive position corresponds to Lacan's Mirror Stage which is between 6 to eighteen months (Lacan 2002 [1949]: 3 -10, 20). It is therefore a threat of this loss

of the love object.[16] Klein can be used to support my argument in that she asserts the idea of love as being prior to the depressive position; and therefore, prior to the Mirror Stage and the normalization of the subject. I argue that love is a pre-Mirror Stage affect (in addition to Lacan's pre-Mirror Stage drives and Kristeva's semiotic drives) that a writer then structures within the fabric of the poetic text itself. It is in this context that I use Klein's argument on the depressive position – as support for its theoretical reconstruction.

Using Klein's theory as support, I then extend Butler's argument on the subject's exclusive subjection, exclusive formation through violence, with the idea of love as being prior to normalization, prior to the Mirror Stage itself. As previously mentioned, an argument that promotes love as a pre-Mirror Stage affect is at variance with Lacan and Kristeva's theory on pre-Mirror Stage affects. I emphasize this in Chapter 7, Section I: "Lacan's Pre-Mirror Stage Affects" where I underscore that Lacan dismisses the idea of love or "primary love" in order to emphasize his ideas on desire. In Chapter 8, Section 8: The Maternal and Love in Krog's "ode vir 'n ander lewe" and "letter-poem lullaby for Ntombizana Atoo," I utilize John Lechte's reading of Kristeva's ideas on love, from "Horror, love, Melancholy," which highlights that love does not underlie the Mirror Stage (Lechte 2013).

Ian Suttie's work in relation to a symbiotic bond between infant and mother that is based on love further supports my argument for an "originary attachment." In *The Origins of Love and Hate*, Suttie argues that the infant is born with a simple attachment-to-mother. He challenges Freud in the context of asserting that love is primarily sexual; that hate is but an extension of love, as love is a primary need; an infant is born with a need for a non-sexual loving relationship; and the infant is born with an impulse to give and respond (Suttie 2014 [1935]).

[16] In Object relations theory – an extension of psychodynamic theory – it is usually the mother who represents the first or primary object (Klein 1952).

## Structuralism and Psychoanalytic Theory

Although Lacan uses a predominantly psychoanalytic approach, he combines psychoanalytic theory with structuralism[17] to emphasize the structures that underlie the shaping of the subject – the subject's psyche or the "unconscious" – with emphasis on the manner in which language or discourses shape the subject. Lacan's theory is pivotal to my thesis as his ideas help form a theoretical framework for its psychoanalytic deconstruction and reconstruction of the normalized self. His argument on the Super-ego, the normalized self or ego, the conscience, the Mirror Stage, the Ideal-image, the subject's voice, the Law of the Father, and pre-Mirror Stage affects are all relevant in the context of my argument. As these arguments are explicated in Chapter 2, I briefly highlight a selection of Lacan's arguments that are key to my argument in the discussion that follows.

In "The Nucleus of Repression," Lacan extends Freud's argument on the conscience as emerging from a paternal base to argue that it is a product of language or symbolic systems. The "voice of the conscience" or the Super-ego is therefore the manner in which the law or "The Law of The Father" (Lacan 1991d [1975] 1953 -1954: 196) shapes or normalizes the subject in the vehicle that is language or symbolic systems (Lacan 1991d [1975] 1953 -1954).

In "Écrits: A Selection," Lacan references Ferdinand de Saussure and relates to the subject in the context of a grammatical effect. He then combines Saussure's theory with Hegel's argument on the shaping of the subject. He emphasizes the subject as a mere signifier in a chain of signifiers that can easily be replaced or substituted with another signifier – that 'moves' or develops in linear or teleological time (the idea of time as unfolding in a teleological or linear fashion; the normalized self is confined within this teleological dimension). The subject is therefore confined to linear time or linearity. He also refers to the subject in the context of metaphor and, with emphasis on, metonymy (Lacan 2002 [1948-1960]). I use these arguments to demonstrate the manner in which, according to me, Krog uses signifiers, metaphors and language itself to fabricate a *space* that exceeds the confinement of linear time – in the context

[17] It should be mentioned that although I have categorized Lacan's ideas under "Structuralism and Psychoanalytic Theory" they are also labelled as poststructuralist. I also use his ideas in the context of dynamic forces/energies/drives and therefore discuss his ideas under the heading "Psychodynamic Theory."

of exceeding linearity, which is, Kristeva suggests, of the surface or semantic layers, also referred to in the context of the linear layer of poetic text(s). Kristeva's theory support this argument.

## Psychodynamic Theory

I use psychodynamic theory[18] to explore the underlying mechanisms that shape the subject – when the body's drives are discussed in the context of forces, reflexive or automated responses and energies. Lacan, Kristeva, Butler, and Fuss make use of psychodynamic theory in their work; I will outline aspects of their theory that are relevant to my argument.

In "The Split between the Eye and the Gaze," Lacan refers to the relation between the subject and the subject's self-image in the mirror as a "scopic relation" based on a continual vacillation between the subject's initial image at the Mirror Stage (which is perceived by the infant as ideal) and all consequent self-images (Lacan 1998 [1964]). I utilize Lacan's argument to highlight that contemporary consumer culture exploits this scopic relation in order to market products. The idea that consumer culture exploits the subject by 'returning' her to the Mirror Stage is not my idea. Diana Fuss analyses the advertised images promoted by the fashion and beauty in "Fashion and The Homospectatorial Look" (Fuss 1994 [1992]). Using Lacan's theory on the Mirror Stage, she argues that these advertised images return the individual to the Mirror Stage. She then extends Lacan's theory to argue that it is the mother's image that underlies these advertised images and that the consumer industry plays into the individual's "pre-mirror phase fantasies" (Fuss 1994 [1992]: 200). Fuss's theory thereby supports my argument on the maternal realm as underlying the normalization of the subject.

Butler's theory in *The Psychic Life of Power* promotes a psychodynamic approach as she emphasizes the impact of subjection in the context of vectors of force. She uses Foucault and Nietzsche's theory to analyze subjection in the context of a "movement that structures" "reflexivity" (Butler 1997: 33) and argues that the self-reflecting subject is but a reflexive effect,

[18] Psychodynamic Theory is a subfield of Psychoanalytic Theory.

a by-product of the mechanisms of subjection (Butler 1997). The will is a mere consequence of this reflexive effect (Butler 1997).

In *Revolution in Poetic Language*, Kristeva claims that a semiotic *chora* is a space of perpetual bodily drives or movements and chaotic affects that are regulated by the mother's body. She refers to the drives as "quantities of energy" or "charges" that "articulate what we call a *chora*: a nonexpressive totality formed by the drives and their stases in a motility that is full of movement as it is regulated [by the mother's body]" (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 25). Kristeva's theory on semiotic drives are most relevant to my reconstruction; using Kristeva's methods of poetry analysis I show a structuring of these drives within Krog's poetic texts (Krog 2006).

## Poststructuralism and Psychoanalytic Theory

Although Butler asserts that the subject is discursively produced she suggests a poststructuralist approach in that she challenges the rigidity of the supposed established structures that define the subject (Butler 1990). In addition, Butler uses psychoanalytic theory to demonstrate the shaping of the subject's psyche. *The Psychic Life of Power* is pivotal to my deconstruction and reconstruction of the normalized self or subject. In the context of my deconstruction, my reading of Butler's theory in *The Psychic Life of Power* focuses on six key aspects of subjection: the confinement of the subject as/or the individual, agency, empowerment, emancipation, the shaping of the conscience, guilt and the origins of the conscience (Butler 1997). Furthermore, I use Butler's argument on a "passionate attachment" to subjection in my deconstruction and reconstruction of the normalized subject. Butler suggests that the infant forms an attachment to the lack of love or attention and therefore the "passionate attachment" to subjection is initiated (Butler 1997). I challenge Butler and argue instead that an "originary attachment" as a bond between the infant and maternal representation prior to the normalization of the subject forms a basis from which the subject emerges. I challenge Butler's argument by emphasizing that it is the presence rather than absence of love that plays a pivotal role in the shaping of the subject – it is because the infant loves the maternal representation that she preserves her/his image, an "originary ideal," within her unconsciousness. Consumer culture then exploits this originary ideal. I find support in Diana Fuss's argument in relation to the impact

of consumer culture. Klein and Suttie's theory support my argument in relation to love and the maternal representation as being prior to normalization and the Mirror Stage.

Butler's arguments in *Bodies That Matter* support my deconstructive argument in that they underscore the relevance of norms in the shaping of the subject (Butler 1993). Butler writes that the subjection "of the subject is not a singular 'act' but always a reiteration of a norm or a set of norms that manages to conceal or disguise the conventions of which it is a repetition" by maintaining its status in the present; and, confining the subject within linear time (Butler 1993: 11). In addition, this idea of the temporality and "present tense" of subjection is returned to in *The Psychic Life of Power* when Butler writes that power[19] "assumes its present temporal position" as the "agency of the subject"; however, this "agency" does not 'belong to' the subject but is merely an effect of power or subjection itself (Butler 1997: 13 -14). Butler therefore supports my argument through her assertion of the proposal that subjection maintains the subject in a sense of "now-ness" and in so doing confines the subject within temporality; as she suggests that it is through this mechanism of subjection that the subject remains circumscribed by normalization. By "returning" the subject to the past in the context of a re-connection to previously excluded drives and affects supports my return to Kristeva's theory and supports my argument in the context of its reconstruction. As previously discussed, Kristeva's argument on the reactivation or reconnection to semiotic drives suggests a means of returning the excluded "past," the "absent" past in the context of pre-Mirror Stage affects and drives – provoking a presence from a previous absence, a space from that which was previously denied or blocked by the mechanisms of normalization and the exclusivity of violence as Butler suggests.

In *Powers of Horror* Kristeva, writes of the infant's abjection or violent rejection of the mother in order to enter the realm of the paternal. It should be noted that, according to Kristeva, the abjection of the mother is prior to Lacan's Mirror Stage (Kristeva 1982 [1980]). I argue that it is *at* the Mirror Stage that the infant exchanges her attachment to her mother or primary caregiver for that of her own image in the mirror.

[19] She uses Foucault's idea of power in the context of subjection.

## Social Constructionism

Although Foucault, Lacan, Butler, and Kristeva discuss the shaping of the subject in relation to social factors, I predominantly make use of Foucault's theory in the context of social institutions or practices that underscore Western society's impact on the body. The paragraph that follows provides a brief review of the key texts with emphasis on the arguments that are pivotal to my deconstruction of the normalized self.

According to Daniel Boyarin and Elizabeth A. Castelli's *Introduction: Foucault's The History of Sexuality: The Fourth Volume, or, A Field Left Fallow for Others to Till*, Foucault did not complete his planned fourth volume of *The History of Sexuality*, to be titled *The Confessions of The Flesh*, due to his passing in 1984 (Boyarin & Castelli 2001). This work was to be on confession and the conscience in early Christian literature (Boyarin & Castelli 2001). Foucault does, however, reference the act of confession, the conscience, and a technique of power he terms "pastoral power" in a handful of his works. As I have discussed pastoral power earlier in this chapter I will highlight aspects of pastoral power not previously discussed.

In "The Subject and Power" Foucault briefly discusses a technique, a form of power, that he suggests binds the subject to his 'own identity' through the fabrication of a conscience and, therefore, maintains the subjection of the subject through a repeated struggle with one's "self" – a form of power he terms pastoral power (Foucault 2002 [1982]). He writes that: "This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual"; it "imposes a law of truth on him"; it "is a form of power which makes individuals subjects"; and of further relevance to my argument, "it is a power that ties the subject to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge" (Foucault 2002 [1982]: 781). Foucault then briefly elucidates his proposals on pastoral power in relation to what he terms an "individualizing technique" that is capable of prevailing regardless of the subject or individual's resistance to, or struggle against, its oppression (Foucault 2002 [1982]: 781-782). I explore and extend Foucault's theory on "individualizing techniques" throughout my thesis.

In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault expounds his ideas on what he refers to as a "new type of control" (Foucault 1995 [1975]: 142) that would result in a most efficient and widespread means to govern subjects – a less visible disciplinary process suggestive of the "internalization" of subjection promoted by the mass scale introduction of confinement (Foucault 1995 [1975]). I trace Foucault's arguments on confinement while simultaneously demonstrating its connection to pastoral power. I then extend his argument on pastoral power to demonstrate its impact on women's bodies in contemporary consumer culture with emphasis on the expanding cosmetic surgical industry. In addition, Foucault's text mentions that the voice of authority – of discipline and subjection – finds expression through the "voice of religion" (Foucault 1995 [1975]: 294). This idea further supports my investigation of pastoral power in the context of the shaping of the subject's voice.

In an interview, titled "The Eye of Power," Foucault highlights the paradox of a less visible subjection and draws attention to an historical connection between the normalization of the subject and the confessional act (Foucault 1972). In addition, in a later interview, "Confessions of The Flesh" (Foucault 1980 [1977]) assists my argument by revealing a connection between "invisible violence," the act of confession and women's sexuality.

In *The History of Sexuality* Foucault critiques Freud's theory of sexual repression by claiming that repression is a consequence or effect of subjection rather than an act initiated and maintained by the individual subject (Foucault 1990[1978]: 81-132). These ideas further support my extension of Foucault's ideas on pastoral power in relation to the speaking subject, the act of confession, and women's bodies in the context of consumer culture.

## Feminist Theory

I use a variety of feminist theorists work as support for my arguments, explanations or extensions. I discuss two key theorists, Cressida Heyes and Bridget Garnham, in "Background to the Problem." The brief descriptions that follow outline a selection of feminist theories which focus on consumer culture's impact on women's bodies.

### The confinement of women's bodies from the late 1800s to the early 1900s

Janell Caroll and Wendy Mitchinson's work on the confinement and restriction of women's bodies in the late 19th Century helps me to refine the techniques of confession. Caroll's work, *Sexuality Now*, discusses the legitimizing of the sexual restraining of women's bodies in the late 1800s America (Caroll 2012[2009]); and Mitchinson's *The Nature of Their Bodies* documents the impact of fashion and the beauty industry on Victorian women's bodies and the role the medical profession played in supporting this confinement (Mitchinson 1991).

### The beginnings of the beauty industry's use of feminist ideals to market products

In *Advertising to The American Woman 1900-1999,* Daniel Hill claims that the marketing of beauty products in the 20th century signified a distinct shift by the 1920s that incorporated the ideals of female empowerment and liberation (Hill 2002).

### The use of liberal feminist ideals to market beauty products from the late 1900s

Robert Goldman, Deborah Heath and Sharon Smith's work "Commodity Feminism" (1991) argue that the consumer industry uses liberal feminist ideals to market products. They highlight the re-articulation of the feminist value of personal freedom into a desire to be sexually objectified (Goldman et al. 1991 and Goldman 1992). *The Aftermath of Feminism* by Angela McRobbie underscores the impact of contemporary consumer culture's manipulation of feminist ideals in the first decade of the twenty – first century (McRobbie 2009). "Media, Empowerment and the 'Sexualization of Culture' Debates" by Rosalind Gill highlights the hyper-sexualization of modern western women by the consumer industry and the continuous use of "female empowerment" to market products (Gill 2012).

### With emphasis on the growing cosmetic surgical industry prevalent in the second decade of the twenty – first century

Meeta Jha uses Susan Bordo's ideas in *The Global Beauty Industry: Colorism, Racism and The National Body* to emphasize the cosmetic surgical industry's impact on women's bodies and its global impact, which further emphasizes the confinement and restriction of the female body in the context of the contemporary consumer culture of the second decade of the twenty – first century (Jha 2016). Alan Petersen's *Hope in Health: The Socio-Politics of Optimism* highlights the

use of neoliberal ideals of empowerment and individuality in the beauty and cosmetic surgical industry (Petersen 2015).

### Reconstruction in relation to Antjie Krog's reclamation of her ageing body in the poem "leave me a lonely began" (Krog 2006: 21-22)

In *Feminist Perspectives on The Body,* Barbara Brook argues that consumer culture silences and negates the women's ageing and menopausal body (Brook 2014).

## Recent Research

In addition, as support for its deconstruction and reconstruction of the normalized self, I make use of recent research from a selection of sources.

### To support the deconstruction of the normalized subject

Recent research on confinement and its impact on the brain: Brandon Keim writes in "The Horrible Psychology of Solitary Confinement" of the devastating psychological impact caused by the confinement of the body (Keim 2013). Jean Casella and James Ridgeway's "What Solitary Confinement Does to the Brain" claims that brain imaging conveys the damage of confinement in a most compelling way. They assist my argument by underscoring the impact of violence in the context of a less visible subjection (Casella and Ridgeway 2015).

### To support the reconstruction of a normalized subject in the context of an "originary attachment"

**In relation to Butler's ideas on an infant's "passionate attachment" to subjection**

Research published by *The National Scientific Council on The Developing Child* and based on extensive biological and developmental research over the past 30 years has generated substantial evidence that "young children who experience severe neglect" – defined broadly as the ongoing disruption or significant absence of caregiver responsiveness – "bear the burdens of a range of adverse consequences" (*National Scientific Council on the Developing Child* 2012). These ideas support Butler's ideas on a passionate attachment to subjection.

### As support for the argument for an "originary attachment" as playing a pivotal role in the shaping of the subject (the shaping of the conscience) prior to the Mirror Stage and the normalization of the subject

"Core Concepts in the Science of Early Childhood Development" provides research by several psychologists in relation to the infant and early development (2015). Emphasis is placed on a healthy, loving environment based on a mutual interaction between the infant and primary caregiver(s), which is initiated prior to the infant's birth and extends well into the infant's first few years of life. The "serve and return" interaction between the developing child and the primary caregiver(s) is vital for the child's neurological development as it forms vital neurological networks ("Core Concepts in the Science of Early Childhood Development" 2015). As Lacan's Mirror Stage is, according to Lacan, between 6 to eighteen months (Lacan 2002 [1949]: 3 – 10), the ideas in "Core Concepts in the Science of Early Childhood Development" support my argument in the context of the relevance of a loving bond prior to the Mirror Stage and the normalization of the subject. His ideas also assist my challenging of Butler's ideas on a passionate attachment to subjection, namely, that this is, according to Butler, formed during the infant stage.

"Direct gaze modulates face recognition in young infants" argues that newborns can recognize human faces; and that at birth, a baby knows her mother's voice and may be able to recognize the sounds of stories her mother read to her while she was still in the womb (Farroni et al. 2007).

"Development of Infant's Attention to Faces during the First Year" claims that between 3 and 9 months of age infants gradually focused their attention on faces (Frank et al. 2009).

Francesca Simion and Elisa Di Giorgio research, "Face perception and processing in early infancy: inborn predispositions and developmental changes" claim: "It's a matter of fact that newborns, despite their immature visual system, are able to recognize individual faces." "Data collected in our lab employing face-like, real faces and geometric stimuli converge to suggest that, at least at birth, the operations involved in face processing are the same that occur to process any visual object" (Simion and Di Giorgio 2015).

## Overview of the Chapters

### Chapter 2: An Elaboration of the Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, I explain relevant aspects of my thesis's theoretical framework. It provides established psychoanalytic theoretical support for my explanations, demonstrations and extensions, and for my analyses of poetic texts.

Lacan's theory is discussed as his arguments on the Mirror Stage are pivotal in relation to my deconstruction of the normalized self – Lacan's argument on the conscience as controlled or confined by the ideal image at the Mirror Stage; and the role of the paternal realm or Law of the Father in the context of the super-ego are relevant to my argument. In addition, as a theoretical reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice involving Krog's poetic texts relies on the idea of positioning the poetic text at the Mirror Stage itself,[20] Lacan's theory is relevant in the context of my reconstruction.

Most importantly, in relation to my argument, according to Freud and Lacan, the subject's voice is but an expression of the paternal realm. This emphasizes that a woman's voice in the context of the normalized self is exclusively a product of patriarchal oppression. Therefore, in addition to outlining established theoretical support, this chapter argues against Lacan and Freud's argument on the speaking subject. I argue against Lacan's proposal on an initial ideal or subject-as-infant image and promote the relevance of, what I refer to as, an "originary ideal" – the maternal image prior to the Mirror Stage.[21] The "originary ideal" is a relevant constituent of the basis from which I present a theoretical reconstruction of a *space* or realm that is outside of normalization using Krog's poetic texts and Kristeva's theory on poetry analysis. In addition, it supports my extension and positioning of Kristeva's theory – this chapter's conclusion outlines the manner in which I both extend and position Kristeva's theory on semanalysis in a feminist context.

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[20] According to Kristeva's proposal, the skilled poet, through the process or *practice* of writing, positions herself at the Mirror Stage; and in so doing, she accesses previously excluded and/or blocked semiotic drives.
[21] A non-gender specific caregiver's image that represents the maternal realm.

## Chapter 3: Foucault, Pastoral Power, and 'Invisible Violence'

In response to Kristeva proposal in *New Maladies of the Soul* (Kristeva 1997 [1993]) in the context of the alienation and desensitization of the "false self," this chapter comprises a deconstruction of the normalized self in a social context. Kristeva's theory does not elaborate on normalization processes or mechanisms as such nor does she underscore the shaping of the "false self" (Kristeva 1997 [1993]) in the context of individualization techniques that oppress women's bodies and restrict their voices with emphasis on the developing cosmetic surgical industry. Foucault, however, provides an elaborate means to analyze normalization practices with emphasis on the overwhelming, confining, and violent impact on the body, the conscience, and the voice. I therefore adopt Michel Foucault's theory on subjection and extend his theory on pastoral power to trace the impact of normalization from its emergence as a new form, according to Foucault, in the eighteenth century to its culminating impact in the twenty-first century (Foucault 1990 [1978], 1995 [1975], 2002 [1982]) – the cosmetic surgical industry and its ageist discourses that confine women's bodies.

This chapter provides the framework for Chapter 4, which extends Foucault's theory on pastoral power to demonstrate its impact in contemporary consumer culture with emphasis on its role in the shaping of the cosmetic surgical body.

Firstly, I trace Foucault's proposals on pastoral power, beginning with its connection to a strain of subjection (confinement) that emerged in the late 1700s through to the late 1800s with emphasis on the confinement of Victorian women and repression. This is followed by a demonstration of pastoral power's connection to the emerging consumer culture at the turn of the 1900s and to the emerging ideals of female empowerment and emancipation. This chapter focuses on Foucault's theory on confinement and the conscience. Furthermore, in this chapter I highlight Foucault's ideas on confession in relation to the confinement of women's bodies and psychoanalysis underscoring the connection between the act of confession and the speaking subject or voice. This further emphasizes pastoral power's oppression of women's voices.

## Chapter 4: Pastoral Power, Liberal Feminism, and the Cosmetic Surgical Body

In this chapter I continue the deconstruction of what Kristeva might term the "false self," to which I refer as the normalized self, and elaborate on the shaping of the normalized self in the context of contemporary consumer culture and the cosmetic surgical industry. I discuss the role liberal feminism plays in this process. I elaborate upon the feminists Cressida Heyes' theory on the cosmetic surgical industry's shaping of the "authentic self" and Bridget Garnham's theory on an emerging designer cosmetic surgical discourse that exploits the ageing or "older" individual.

I extend Foucault's ideas on pastoral power aimed at demonstrating the manner in which pastoral power continues to function today in contemporary consumer culture, with an emphasis on its role in the shaping of the cosmetic surgical body as an unconscious mode of oppression. Firstly, I highlight pastoral power's individualizing techniques by underscoring that it impacts women's bodies in the late twentieth century and that it continues to impact women's bodies in the second decade of the twenty -first century. Secondly, I demonstrate the role liberal feminist ideals – with emphasis on empowerment and individuality – play in the endorsement of pastoral power. Robert Goldman et al.'s theory on "commodity feminism" and "possessive individualism" support this explanation. Thirdly, using Butler and Lacan's theory I critique pastoral power's shaping of what Foucault terms a "new subjectivity" in the context of Heyes' proposal on the cosmetic surgery and the "authentic self." [22] I then translate what I argue is an adaptation of the act-of-confession in the context of the cosmetic surgical body and the Mirror Stage. This is followed by my argument that pastoral power, its expression as an act-of-confession, translates as an underlying mode of psychic oppression in the context of what I refer to as an "originary ideal."

[22] As previously discussed, the term "authentic self" is used with reference to the normalized self and is at variance with my use of the term authentic feminist voice which refers to a *space* that is prior to and therefore outside of normalization.

## Chapter 5: Butler, the Shaping of the Conscience, and an "Originary Loss"

In the context of Kristeva's "false self" this chapter analyzes the underlying and unconscious workings of normalization itself. In Chapter 3 and 4, I use predominantly a Foucauldian model to analyze pastoral power's adverse impact on the female body and I highlight it as a mode of psychic oppression. In the chapter I further respond to Kristeva's proposal in an intimate context to deconstruct the shaping of the psyche using a Butlerian model. The aim of this chapter is to underscore the exclusivity of subjection, the extremity of its violence, thereby enhancing the validation of a return to Kristeva's theory in the context of an intimate or psychic revolt – a return to the past in the context of a maternal realm that is in excess of the paternal realm, the Law of the Father; and, therefore a feminist and authentic voice.

In this chapter, I mainly use Butler's arguments from *The Psychic Life of Power* to extend my deconstruction of the normalized "self." I explain the shaping of the psyche with emphasis on the shaping of the conscience. I focus on several key aspects of subjection according to my reading of Butler's ideas: subjection in the context of the confinement of the subject or the individual; agency, empowerment and emancipation; the shaping of the conscience; guilt and the origins of the conscience. In addition, in this chapter I explain four core mechanisms in the shaping of the subject according to my reading of Butler: there is no "outside" of subjection, violence/subjection is prior to the subject, "as the agency of the subject power assumes its present temporal dimension," subjection functions through a reflexivity. I then extend Butler's argument on the conscience and provide a framework for Chapter 6: firstly, I extend my argument on an "originary ideal" in the context of a loss that underlies the conscience. Lacan, Fuss, Klein and Kristeva's arguments support its extension. Secondly, using Freud and Klein's theory I explicate the idea of an originary loss. Using Kristeva's ideas on an archaic memory and Nietzsche's theory on memory and forgetting, I then connect the idea of the past to that of a theoretical reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice in the context of a return to that which is forgotten – the maternal realm, the "originary loss."

## Chapter 6: Loss, Butler's "Passionate Attachment," and an "Originary attachment"

The relevance of this chapter in relation to my proposed return to Kristeva's theory and my reconstruction is to establish theoretically and affirm a basis from which my reconstruction using Krog's poetic texts and Kristeva's theory on poetry analysis can then develop. The aim of this chapter is to establish what I refer to as an "originary attachment" as that which underlies the mechanisms of normalization and therefore provides a premise that is in excess of the exclusivity of normalization and its violence, a maternal space that exceeds the oppression promoted by the paternal realm, the Law of the Father, and its patriarchal norms that confine women's bodies, shape women's voices.

With Klein and Suttie's theory as support, this chapter situates my theoretical underpinning, which then provides the theoretical support for, and justification of, my return to Kristeva's theory and a response to Kristeva's proposal (Kristeva 2002), a space from which to initiate a theoretical intimate revolt. In addition, this chapter challenges Butler's assertion of the exclusivity of normalization's violence by arguing that love in the context of a pre-Mirror Stage affect plays a relevant role in an originary attachment.

This chapter argues against Butler's theory on loss and its role in the formation of the conscience. It begins with an analysis of Butler's argument on loss in relation to Louis Althusser's theory on interpellation from "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" which she extends in *The Psychic Life of Power*. Butler underscores Althusser's use of religious metaphors as a means to represent ideology in the context of a voice of authority that hails the subject into being. She then extends Althusser's ideas, in relation to the inauguration of the subject, by arguing that the voice of authority fabricates a sense of loss, fabricates the subject's idea or rather "ideal" of an originary loss itself. There is therefore, according to Butler, no actual loss. She extends her argument further by claiming that the voice of authority or ideology withdraws its presence, and in so doing, effectively is "missed," mourned by the subject. As the conscience is, according to Butler, exclusively an effect of an "originary violence" she attempts to explain the manner in which a subject experiences the loss of a primary love object if, as she claims, the primary love

object plays no role in the formation of the subject, or its conscience, or, as she underscores, the subject's voice itself. I then challenge Butler's argument on loss with my argument on an "originary attachment" in the context of a dependency and interconnection that includes love as a relevant component. It is the loss of the love object prior to the Mirror Stage, the loss of the maternal representation that further shapes the conscience. Klein's work on loss, the love object and the mother support my contention. Suttie's theory on a loving relationship between the mother and infant, and his ideas on the need for love as innate, support my argument. Kristeva's theory on the infant and the mother, and recent research provide further support my argument against Butler's argument on loss and its role in the formation of the conscience. In addition, I argue against Butler's ideas on a "passionate attachment" to subjection, which she argues is an attachment formed during the infant stage that is based on a denial or a lack of love from a primary caregiver. Butler claims that a "passionate attachment" formed during the infant stage "must both come to be and be denied" in order for the subject to emerge and consequently be shaped by normalization and the exclusivity of its violence. I extend Butler's claim to argue that it is the mother or primary caregiver that is *denied* at the Mirror Stage and that the severing of the infant's "originary attachment" or bond initiates the infant-as-subject's entrance into the realm of subjection. It is this denial that underlies the normalization of the subject, the shaping of the conscience. Furthermore, it is this denial at the Mirror Stage that simultaneously excludes or blocks the infant's pre-Mirror Stage affects and drives which include the affect of love. This in turn suggests that love is not exclusively an effect of subjection, of violence, an exclusively reflexive and conditioned response.

## Chapter 7: Lacan's Pre-Mirror Stage Affects and Kristeva's Semiotic Drives

In the context of my proposed return to Kristeva's theory, this chapter provides the theoretical framework for Kristeva's theory on semiotics drives – as I apply Kristeva's methods of poetry analysis to a selection of Krog's poetic texts which involves, according to Kristeva, a return to previously excluded drives. This chapter provides the support for a theoretical reconstruction in the context of an authentic feminist voice (Chapter 8 and Chapter 9) involving a selection of poetic texts by Antjie Krog. Using Kristeva's theory on the *chora* and semiotic drives to extend Lacan's ideas on pre-Mirror Stage affects, I argue in this chapter that pre-Mirror Stage affects and

semiotic drives suggest a means to reconnect to that which is lost or excluded at the Mirror Stage – a means to reconstruct an authentic feminist voice. Secondly, as support for my use of Kristeva's theory on semiotic drives as a means to fabricate a *space* that is outside of normalization, prior to The Mirror Stage, I challenge Butler's argument on drives in the context of an innate "drive to survive".[23] This provides further theoretical support for my reconstruction that follows in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9. In addition, using Lacan's concept of the Mirror Stage, this chapter challenges Butler's theory on a "desire to survive." I argue that it is the inaugural moment that paradoxically initiates the exclusion of the subject's pre-Mirror Stage "drive to survive" (and "originary attachment") while simultaneously initiating an "originary desire." This supports my argument in the context of the exchange or blocking of pre-Mirror Stage affects (including love) at the Mirror Stage, which further supports a reconstruction in the context of an authentic feminist voice. Through the process of writing, the writer then weakens this exclusion or block, this boundary (thetic) at the Mirror Stage, so that the previously excluded drives and affects are then accessed. Finally, in this chapter I briefly outline Kristeva's proposal on writing in the context of a means to reconnect to semiotic drives underscoring that a reconnection or reactivation of semiotic drives enables a reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice in contemporary consumer culture.

## Chapter 8: Antjie Krog and a Reconstruction of an Authentic Feminist Voice

This long chapter presents a return to Kristeva's theory in the context of an intimate revolt. Using a selection of poetics texts by Antjie Krog, I present a theoretical reconstruction – an inscription of an authentic feminist voice – in the context of a fabrication of a maternal realm, a structuration of *that* which underlies the paternal metaphor, that therefore exceeds the realm of paternal oppression and the Law of the Father (Krog 2006). I begin by briefly clarifying and calibrating Lacan and Butler's arguments on the shaping of the subject (with emphasis on the subject's conscience) in the context of the paternal metaphor, semantics, syntax, and

[23] Butler rejects the idea or presence of drives – instinctual, survival, sexual or affective drives –and refers to, through briefly, a "desire to survive" as a means to associate the idea of survival to that of desire rather than a drive, need or instinct.

grammatical structure(s). I follow this with an elaboration of Kristeva's theory on the grammatical subject as not exclusively confined within grammatical structures. I then provide a semanalysis of a selection of poetic texts from Krog's *Verweerskrif/Body Bereft* (Krog 2006) to present a reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice in contemporary consumer culture. "Methodology" briefly outlines the methods used. The following list outlines my semanalysis in relation to specific texts by Antjie Krog. Points 1 to 7 trace a process demonstrated by Krog's poetic texts, a structuring of drives and pre-Mirror Stage affects within the fabric or materiality of the texts themselves thereby fabricating an underlying maternal space or realm. Points 9 to 10 analyze Krog's poetic texts in relation to a reclamation of the maternal realm.

1. Section I: Krog's Confrontation with the Thetic Boundary or Border in "writing ode"
2. Section II: Semanalysis part I – Disturbance from the Semantic or Formalist Layer of "writing ode"
3. Section III: Semanalysis part II – Extending Disturbance in "writing ode"; Hyperkinesis
4. Section IV: Semanalysis part III – A Phonetic Layer in "writing ode"
5. Section V: Semanalysis part IV – Displacement in "writing ode"
6. Section VI: Semanalysis part V – Bold Colour in "writing ode"
7. Section VII: An Originary Attachment and "writing ode"
8. Section VIII: The Maternal and Love in Krog's "ode vir 'n ander lewe" and "letter-poem lullaby for Ntombizana Atoo"
9. Section IX: Revolt in "farewell, "colonialism of a special kind" and "Every day I treat you as if you are mine"
10. Section X: Reclaiming the Metaphor in "Four seasonal observations of Table Mountain"

## Chapter 9: Krog, Subversion, and Pastoral Power

This chapter shows a return to Kristeva's theory in relation to her proposal on an intimate revolt and her methods of poetry analysis. However, where I illustrate, in Chapter 8, that Krog's poetic texts provoke an underlying expansive maternal realm – an excess to the realm of the paternal and its oppression, in this chapter I present Krog's poetic texts in the context of subversion of patriarchal norms and a counter discourse to the oppressive and exploitative cosmetic surgical discourses. This chapter therefore discusses, in relation to Kristeva's proposal, an intimate revolt as a mode of active expression against the Symbolic, against the Law of the Father and its implicit moral voice of authority that confines the subject– the Super-ego.

Chapter 3 highlights that Foucault's proposal on pastoral power translates as a mode of subjection that confines the female body or oppresses women's voices. Chapter 4 extends Foucault's proposal to demonstrate the role pastoral power plays in the context of the cosmetic surgical industry and the shaping of the cosmetic surgical body. In this chapter, with Louise Viljoen's work as support, I present Krog's work as a counter discourse to the cosmetic surgical industry and a reclamation of her ageing and menopausal body. In addition, I illustrate that "leave me a lonely began" (Krog 2006: 21-22) destabilizes patriarchal ideologies. If, as Kristeva argues in "Towards a Semiology of Paragrams" (Kristeva 1998: 28-31), a well -structured poetic text subverts dominant ideologies by paradoxically "containing" these prohibitions within its very structure and, furthermore, by demonstrating a dialectical opposition within its fabric, then Krog subverts dominant ideologies that silence and ignore the ageing menopausal woman, as is evident in "leave me a lonely began." Both Laura Mulvey's hypothesis on the male gaze (Mulvey 1975) and Kristeva's techniques on paragrammatic structures support my analysis (Kristeva 1998: 25-47).

Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 4, I extend Foucault's argument on pastoral power and analyze the act-of-confession or its translation in the context of the cosmetic surgical body as a mode of underlying psychic exploitation. In this chapter, I translate Foucault's act-of-confession – its underlying psychic exploitation – in the context of Krog's poetic texts.

I then turn to Kristeva's theory on intimate revolt as a mode of ethics and therefore as a means to destabilize the Law of the Father and the Super-ego that confines the conscience and shapes the subject's voice. I apply Kristeva's theory on the principle of negativity to show its transcription in Krog's "rondeau in vier dele" – a destabilization of the psychic voice of authority, the Super-ego. In so doing, I argue that Krog presents a challenge to the emerging designer cosmetic surgical discourses aimed at oppressing the ageing female subject through their promotion of moral codes that conceal their exploitation.

Furthermore, I assert Krog's voice as a challenge to Kristeva's exclusivity in the context of the artistic capabilities of great male writers and the abject. In *Powers of Horror* Kristeva argues that it is great modern male writers who experience the banished maternal and primal realm –

who experience the abject itself and consequently express this mode within their poetic texts (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 17-18). In this chapter, I present Krog's voice as an authentic feminist voice that capacitates a mode of unconscious provocation and an intimate revolt. A mode of ethics that successfully compares to Kristeva's elite poets.

### Chapter 10: Conclusion

This chapter begins with a summary of my thesis's limitations in relation to what I do not accomplish in the context of my proposal on an "originary attachment" and in relation to feminist theory in the context of social or political activism. I follow this with a summary of my contributions to the fields of Kristevan theory, poetics, Feminist theory, Foucauldian theory, and psychoanalytic theory. I conclude this chapter with a précis of possible future research.

## Diagram 1: A Depiction of the Psychic Position of the "I" and the Inaugural Moment



# Chapter 2: An Elaboration of the Theoretical Framework

As a return to Kristeva's theory, and as a feminist response, my argument is a process aimed at demonstrating a theoretical reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice with emphasis on its manifestation as a mode of transcription within poetic texts. In so doing, I present Krog's poetic texts as a challenge to contemporary consumer culture and a destabilization of patriarchal norms embedded within ageist cosmetic surgical discourses that promote the confinement and oppression of women's bodies and their voices.

My argument involves detailed analyses, explanations and extensions of established theories aimed at highlighting a problematic process, in the context of normalization, in order then to solve the problem by demonstrating a theoretical reconstruction of a *space* – an abstract or virtual zone – that is "outside of" the mechanisms of normalization and exceeds the confinement of normalization itself. In other words, a mode of psychic or unconscious subversion.

As outlined in Chapter 1, the framework for the shaping of the normalized self, or what Kristeva suggests is a "false self," in the context of social factors, institutions, and practices is explicated in Chapters 3 using Foucault's theory on the normalization of the subject – what he terms "individualization" or "individualization techniques" (Foucault 1972, 1975, 1977, 1982). Chapter 4 then extends Foucault's theory to underscore the shaping of the individual in the context of contemporary consumer culture with emphasis on the cosmetic surgical industry's impact on women's bodies and, in response to Heyes' proposal (Heyes 2007), its shaping of the "authentic self" in the second decade of the twenty-first century. Butler's arguments are explicated, in Chapter 5, to demonstrate the mechanisms of normalization's "internalization effect"– the fabrication of the psyche in the context of what Kristeva might suggest as a fabrication on an intimate level.

The aim of my convergence is to accentuate the possibility that there is a space or realm that underlies normalization itself. Furthermore, it assists my proposal (provokes additional

support for my argument)[24] in that this s*pace* is based on – structured and supported by – a necessary exclusion, denial, or blocking of that which is prior to the process of normalization itself. If, as Butler claims, norms govern the formation of the subject, demarcating the restricted space in which the individual lives, and this space is delineated exclusively by violence or subjection (Butler 1997), then I aim to demonstrate a fabrication of a space that is not exclusively shaped by violence – a reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice in contemporary consumer culture. In addition, as I advocate a return to Kristeva, I aim to underscore the relevance of Kristeva's theory in the context of normalization – its promotion of a mode of emancipation from normalization's exclusive and overwhelming violence.

The aim of this chapter, firstly, is to position a theoretical underpinning for my reconstruction in the context of established theorists' arguments providing my argument with established theoretical support. With this underpinning established, my reconstruction then emerges or proceeds – Chapter 5, Section V and VI, Chapters 6, 8 and 9. Chapter 7 provides further established theoretical support – the validation or sanctioning of pre-Mirror Stage affects and drives or semiotic drives using Lacan and Kristeva's theory – which in turn supports my reconstruction in the context of my semanalyses of Krog's poetic texts.

My second aim in relation to this chapter is to highlight the shaping of the voice, the shaping of the normalized voice, as is argued by Freud and Lacan. They emphasize that the subject's voice is a direct expression of, exclusively produced by, the realm of the paternal and its norms and ideals. This suggests that a woman's voice is confined within the realm of the paternal and its patriarchal oppression. I therefore argue against Freud and Lacan in this chapter to highlight the relevance of, what I refer to as, an "originary ideal" as that which is of the

[24] I extend Butler's proposal arguing that the mechanisms of normalization are supported by a necessary exclusion that participates in the structuring of the psyche itself – I extend Butler's theory on the shaping of the conscience by arguing that *that* which is prior to normalization, excluded or blocked by the mechanisms of normalization, is a basis from which the conscience is shaped, a prerequisite for the consequent confinement and subjection of the subject; in other words, I challenge Butler's argument on loss and her ideas on a "passionate attachment" to subjection in the context of the initiation of the subject at the infant stage with my ideas on an "originary loss" and an "originary attachment." In so doing, I promote the idea of an underlying *space* that both participates in and, furthermore, is excluded from Butler's mechanisms of normalization themselves – a paradoxical space, yet, a basis from which to initiate my reconstruction.

maternal realm and underlies the normalized and oppressed voice. This in turn will support a reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice that I will show is expressed in Antjie Krog's work.

Thirdly, I aim to underscore the relevance of the maternal image in my theoretical reconstruction – I argue that the "originary ideal," the maternal representation's face, plays a relevant role in the context of a visual image as it is through the poet's re-activation of the visual image of the maternal representation, in addition to a reconnection to pre-Mirror Stage sounds or phonetic "images" as Kristeva argues, that a skilled poet re-structures the realm that underlies metaphor in his work. As Kristeva uses male poets work to demonstrate a mode of intimate revolt in the context of their structuring of a phonetic layer that underlies metaphor in their work, I argue that it is a visual image, an originary ideal, that additionally plays a relevant role in the structuring of an underlying layer in relation to metaphor in poetic texts. Furthermore, I show that a skilled woman poet, Antjie Krog, is capable of structuring this subtext within her work. In so doing I then additionally extend and situate Kristeva's theory on semanalysis in au courant and feminist context.

## Outline of this chapter

i) This chapter provides established psychoanalytic theoretical support for my deconstruction of the normalized self or individual in the context of the psychic or psychodynamic factors that shape the subject's conscience. Using Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan's theory, this chapter outlines the shaping of the conscience with emphasis on the Law of the Father, the Mirror Stage, the super-ego, and the ideal-image. It traces the confinement of the normalized self and the role that the Mirror Stage, the Law of the Father or paternal realm, and the ideal image play in this confinement.

ii) Secondly, this chapter articulates links between these established psychoanalytic theories and my argument, which in turn provides further support for my extensions and arguments in the chapters that follow.

iii) Thirdly, this chapter positions a relevant component of a reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice in contemporary consumer culture and, using Dianna Fuss and recent research on infant face recognition this chapter (Section IV) ,extends Lacan and Butler's theory to argue that the maternal image (the mother or primary caregiver's image) underlies the shaping of the conscience, that is, underlies the Mirror Stage itself. In this chapter, I outline my argument on an "originary ideal" as the maternal image that paradoxically supports the confinement of the psyche, that underlies the conscience, due to its exclusion, denial, and preservation at the Mirror Stage. However, as it is the "originary ideal" that is excluded at the Mirror Stage, and therefore prior to normalization, it is then the "originary ideal" that supports my reconstruction of a *space* in that it is outside of normalization itself. In addition, Kristeva's theory on *the chora* are used to expand this space thereby positioning it outside of the paternal realm itself, Section V.

iv) Finally, I outline my argument in relation to the originary ideal and the structuring of a visual realm as that which underlies metaphor. In this context, I challenge Kristeva's emphasis on a phonetic level as predominant in the male poet's structuring of a realm that underlies metaphor within poetic texts.

## Section I: The Paternal Realm, the Super-Ego, and the Speaking Subject

This section begins with Sigmund Freud's theory on the conscience to underscore that, according to Freud, the origin of the super-ego is based on the subject-as-infant's identification with her/his father suggesting that the conscience emerges from a paternal base. Section I then highlights Lacan's extension of Freud's argument that underscores the super-ego as a moral censorship that predominates in the dimension of speech. The aim of this discussion is to underscore that (according to established psychoanalytical theorists Freud and Lacan) the paternal realm plays a relevant role in the shaping of the conscience and the shaping of the speaking subject, or the subject's "voice."

In “The Ego and the Super-ego (Ego Ideal)” Freud claims that the ego retains a boundary or division that is primarily of the unconsciousness rather than the consciousness, the “super-ego” or “ego-ideal” (Freud 1989 [1923]: 22-37). He writes:

> If the ego were merely the part of the id modified by the influence of the perceptual system, the representative in the mind of the real external world, we should have a simpler state of things to deal with. But there is a further complication.
>
> The considerations that led us to assume the existence of a grade in the ego, a differentiation within the ego, which may be called the ‘ego ideal’ or ‘super-ego’…
>
> The fact that this part of the ego is less firmly connected with the consciousness is the novelty which calls for explanation.
>
> (Freud 1989 [1923]: 22)

It was Lacan who extended Freud’s work on the conscience and super-ego to argue that the super-ego is not merely situated in the subject’s unconsciousness (or pre-consciousness as Freud suggests) but that due to the unconscious being induced by language or symbolic systems, the super-ego is therefore a product of language or symbolic systems (Lacan 1991 [1975] 1953-1954). In “The Nucleus of Repression” Lacan writes:

> In a general fashion, the unconscious is, in the subject, a schism of the symbolic system, a limitation, an alienation induced by the symbolic system. The super-ego is an analogous system, which is produced in the symbolic system integrated by the subject. This symbolic world is not limited to the subject, because it is realized in a language which is the common language, the universal symbolic system, in so far as it establishes its empire over a specific community to which a subject belongs. The super-ego is this schism as it occurs for the subject – but not only for him – in his relation with what we call the law.
>
> (Lacan 1991d [1975] 1953-1954: 196)

In “The Ego and The Super-Ego (Ego-Ideal)” Freud claims that the origin of the super-ego or ego-ideal is based on the subject-as-infant’s identification with his/her father. He argues that “the effects of the first identifications made in earliest childhood,” which are “general and lasting,” conceal “an individual’s first and foremost identification, his identification with the

father in his own personal prehistory" (Freud 1989 [1923]: 26); and therefore, the super-ego is founded on, or emerges from, this paternal base. "As a child grows up, the role of the father is carried on by teachers and others in authority"; "their injunctions and prohibitions remain powerful in the ego ideal and continue, in the form of conscience, to exercise the moral censorship. The tension between the demands of conscience and the actual performance of the ego is experienced as a sense of guilt" (Freud 1989 [1923]: 33).

Lacan adds, in support of Freud's argument on the super-ego and censorship, that the super-ego is a censorship that predominates in the "dimension of speech" as "an agency which splits the subject's symbolic world, or cuts it in two, into one accessible part, which is recognized, and one inaccessible, forbidden part" (Lacan 1991 [1975] 1953-1954: 195).

Yet, Lacan claims that the speaking subject is a "lie," he is "distinct from what he says. Well the dimension of the speaking subject, of the speaking subject *qua* deceiver, is what Freud uncovered for us in the unconsciousness" (Lacan 1991: 194). The speaking subject is a deception as the hidden dimension of the subject, that which Lacan suggests is the dimension that constitutes the speaking subject, is the unconsciousness, yet the speaking subject is also a contradiction in that to speak is to be of consciousness, of ego or "self" – as the Lacanian enunciating subject of the unconscious speaks through the ego while remaining irreducibly distinct from it; and the ego, as Lacan argues, is merely an effect of language and of the unconsciousness itself, a "mirage" or "residue," that is both initiated at the Mirror Stage and, Lacan suggests, maintained by or through the individual's interaction(s) with the "mirror" – maintained through either specular images of the self in the mirror or through "seeing" oneself "reflected" through interaction with others (Lacan 1991 [1975] 1953-1954; 2002 [1949]). Lacan writes:

> In science, the subject is only sustained, in the end, on the plane of consciousness … He is the subject, in so far as he is the reflection, the mirror, the support of the objectal world [Lacan is referencing the Mirror Stage] … The ego acquires the status of a mirage, as the residue, (it is only one element in the objectal relations of the subject.)
>
> (Lacan 1991 [1975] 1953-1954: 194)

The Mirror Stage is most relevant to my argument and is discussed in Section II.

## Section II: The Mirror Stage and the "Self"

In "The Mirror Stage as Formative of The I Function," the Mirror Stage marks the infant's inaugural moment– I refer to the inaugural moment as the infant's first step into the Imaginary Order,[25] which remains the predominant influence throughout the subject's life. It is this step into the Imaginary Order that is required in order for the infant to enter the Symbolic Order[26] (Lacan 2002 [1949]: 3-10).

The inaugural moment is relevant to my argument in the context of an "originary attachment." In Chapter 7, Section V, I argue that it is the inaugural moment that severs the originary attachment – severs the bond between the infant and mother or primary caregiver *at* the Mirror Stage. This consequently blocks the subject's pre-Mirror Stage affects and drives.

In "The Mirror Stage as Formative of The I Function," Lacan claims that the Mirror Stage is a most relevant stage in the shaping of the subject, as it is the Mirror Stage that initiates the sense of the self, initiates the basis from which the ego emerges. It is when the subject-as-infant sees her body in the mirror and misrecognizes this bodily image as her "self" or "I." The infant then enters the imaginary realm due to her fantasized dismissal or "exchange" of her real body (which is argued by Lacan as being affectively chaotic) for the fantasy body-image reflected in the mirror which she perceives as her "self" (Lacan 2002 [1949]: 3-10). I should mention that I return to this idea of chaotic pre-Mirror Stage affects in Chapter 7 in relation to Butler's argument on drives and Kristeva's ideas on semiotic drives.

Lacan claims that the infant when confronted with her specular image in the mirror, reflexively identifies with this image and that it is this identification with her specular image that

[25] The Imaginary Order is, according to Lacan, a realm of narcissistic fantasies centred around the "self" or ego.
[26] The Symbolic Order as the realm of language – Society's laws, regulations, norms, conventions, social relationships and communication.

initiates the sense of self in a fictional direction, alienated from reality (Lacan 2002 [1949]: 3-10). Lacan writes:

> But the important point is that this form situates the agency known as the ego, prior to its social determination, in a fictional direction that will remain irreducible for any single individual, or rather, that will only asymptomatically approach the subject's becoming, no matter how successful the dialectic synthesis by which he must resolve, as I, his discordance with his own reality. For the total form of his body, by which the subject anticipates the maturation of his power in a mirage, is given to him only as a gestalt that is as an exteriority in which, to be sure, this form is more constitutive than constituted …
>
> (Lacan 2002 [1949]: 4)

Lacan further argues that a faultiness of the body as an "intra-organic mirror" enables the subject to be easily deluded. He refers to the "intra-organic mirror" as demonstrating a deficiency and argues, that "these reflections lead" him to "recognize in the spatial capture manifested in the mirror stage, the effect of man, even prior to this social dialectic, of an organic inadequacy" (Lacan 2002 [1949]: 6-7). He adds that the "temporal dialectic that decisively projects the individual's formation into history; the mirror stage is a drama whose internal pressure pushes precipitously from insufficiency to anticipation" and that the subject is "caught up in a lure of spatial identification" (Lacan 2002 [1949]: 6-7).

In "From the Cosmos to *The Unheimliche*," Lacan uses G. W. F. Hegel's theory from *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (the struggle of the self or self-consciousness towards a recognition of itself) as support for his argument on the ego as a self-consciousness *or Selbstbewusstsein* modelled on an imaginary relation to a specular image that is initiated at the Mirror Stage (Lacan 2014b [2004]). He writes:

> *The Selbstbewusstsein,* considered to be constitutive of the cognizing subject, is an illusion, a source of error, because the dimension of the subject deemed to be transparent in his act of taking cognizance of some entity only begins with the coming into play of a specified object, which is the one that the mirror stage attempts to circumscribe, namely, the image of one's body, in so far as faced with this image, the subject has the feeling of jubilation on account of being indeed faced with an object that renders him transparent to himself. The extension of this illusion of consciousness to all types of cognizance is prompted by the object of cognizance being constructed and modelled in the image of the relation to the specular image. It's precisely in this respect that the object of cognizance is

insufficient.

(Lacan 2014b [2004]: 59)

The Mirror Stage is therefore pivotal in the initiation of the subject as a "self" or what Lacan terms a "self-consciousness"; and, therefore, initiates the boundary or split between the self-consciousness and the unconsciousness. Furthermore, it is the basis from which, according to Lacan's ideas, the super-ego, and therefore the paternal realm, shapes the conscience, which in turn induces and maintains the schism (split or boundary) between the unconsciousness and the consciousness.

The Mirror Stage as an initiation of the schism that results in the emergence of a consciousness suggests, therefore, that *that* which is excluded or *denied* at the Mirror Stage constitutes, or is preserved in, an emerging unconsciousness. I extend this argument in Chapter 6 in relation to the infant and caregiver's relationship: Butler asserts that the basis of a "passionate attachment" to subjection is due to the infant forming a dependency on the primary caregiver's *denial* of attention; this denial therefore initiates the subject's "passionate attachment" to subjection. I support Butler in the context of the relevance of denial. However, I extend her claim by arguing that it is the denial of an "originary attachment" at the Mirror Stage that plays a pivotal role in the inauguration and normalization of the subject. This denial suggests the split that inaugurates the split between *that* which is excluded, blocked or preserved in the unconsciousness and the emerging "self" or, what Lacan terms, self-consciousness. The split is briefly highlighted in Section I of this chapter in relation to the super-ego; it underscores that it is the Law of the Father translated both as and in the form of the super-ego that, at the Mirror Stage, induces this schism or splitting of the subject into an unconsciousness and an emerging consciousness. This further suggests that it is the super-ego that maintains this division.

Lacan's theory on the super-ego as situated at the Mirror Stage is relevant in relation to my analysis of Krog's work, Chapter 9, where I demonstrate, using Kristeva's methods on poetry analysis, that the original Afrikaans version of "Mountain rondeau in four parts," "rondeau in vier dele," extends the idea of confession and destabilizes the super-ego itself.

## Section III: The Ego-Ideal and Ideal Image

The discussion that follows underscores the relation between the super-ego and the ego-ideal and analyses the "internalization" of the super-ego and the role that the Mirror Stage plays in this process. In addition, I provide extensive support for my argument – I trace Lacan's argument on the "internalization" of the super-ego in the context of the ego-ideal at the Mirror Stage in order to draw attention to the relevance, according to Lacan, of the ideal-image. Lacan underscores the relevance of the ideal-image as the original or initial ideal that continuously impacts the subject. In so doing, Lacan provides a theoretical basis from which I can extend his argument in the context of an original ideal with, what I refer to as, an "originary ideal." The "originary ideal" being, according to my argument, the visual image of the mother or primary caregiver that is prior to the Mirror Stage – the maternal image.

The idea of the maternal image as being the original or "originary ideal" that paradoxically both shapes, normalizes, the subject and suggests a basis for an authentic feminist voice[27] is pivotal to my argument in relation to its challenge of Kristeva's analysis of exclusively male writers' work, and in the context of my extension of Kristeva's argument in relation to the predominance of a phonetic component that underlies the structuring of poetic texts. The relevance of the maternal image is highlighted in Section IV and V of this chapter.

In "Ego-Ideal and Ideal-Ego" Lacan writes:

> In fact, the virtual subject, reflection of the mythical eye, that is to say the other which we are, is there where we first saw our ego – outside us in the human form … the human being only sees his form materialized, whole, the mirage of himself, outside of himself …
>
> Now let us postulate that the inclination of the plane mirror is governed by the voice of the other. This doesn't happen at the level of the mirror stage, but it happens subsequently through our overall relations with others – the symbolic relation. From this point on you can grasp that extent to which the imaginary depends on something which is located in a transcendent fashion … in other words, it's the symbolic relation which defines the position of the subject as

[27] In relation to the reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice – the originary ideal is most relevant in relation to my semanalysis of Krog's poetic texts.

> seeing. It is speech, the symbolic relation, which determines the greater or lesser degree of perfection, of completeness, of approximation, of the imaginary.
>
> (Lacan 1991b [1975] 1953-1954: 140-141)

He then adds that "Symbolic exchange" is what links human beings to each other, "that is, speech, and it makes it possible to identify the subject. That isn't a metaphor – the symbol begets intelligent beings"; furthermore, "The *Ichideal,* the ego-ideal, is the other as speaking, the other in so far as he has a symbolic relation to me [moi]" (Lacan 1991b: 142).

Lacan suggests therefore that the Mirror Stage is pivotal in the structuring of the subject's voice and he underscores the voice in relation to the individual's ego-ideal – the voice does not belong to the individual but is a voice of the other, a voice of the symbolic realm. How then does this dynamic play out in the context of its connection to the super-ego?

In "The Fluctuation of the Libido" Lacan writes that it is the *Ichideal* or "Ego-ideal" that is "sometimes taken to be a synonym for the super-ego" (Lacan 1991c [1975] 1953-1954: 186). In "The Ego-Ideal and Ideal ego," Lacan suggests that the super-ego, as that which represents authority and the norms and rules of the Symbolic Order – the dominance and the law of the Father that controls, restricts and confines the subject – operates through the ego-ideal (Lacan 1991b [1975]: 137-142). He claims, that "The ego-ideal governs the interplay of relations in which all relations with others depend. And on this relation to others depends the more or less satisfying character of the imaginary structuration … This guide governing the subject is the ego-ideal" (Lacan 1991b [1975] 1953-1954: 141).

In *The Psychic Life of Power,* Judith Butler explicates Lacan's argument on the super-ego and its relation to the ego-ideal. She writes that:

> In the psyche, the subject's ideal corresponds to the ego-ideal, which the super-ego is said to consult, as it were, in order to measure the ego. Lacan redescribes this ideal as the "position" of the subject within the symbolic, the norm that installs the subject within language and hence within available schemes of cultural intelligibility. This viable and intelligible being, this subject, is always produced at a cost, and whatever resists the normative demand by which subjects are instituted remains unconscious.
>
> (Butler 1997: 86)

Butler highlights that the super-ego, according to her reading of Lacan, consults with the ego-ideal as a means to normalize and control the subject; and that the ego-ideal is the “norm” responsible for the inauguration of the subject within language and, thereafter, the rules and conventions of society and culture.

In “Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis” Lacan writes: “Just as the super-ego’s insane oppression lies at the root of the well-founded imperatives of moral conscience, mad passion – specific to man, stamping his image on reality – is the obscure foundation of the will’s rational mediations” (Lacan 2002 [1948]: 24).

In *The Psychic Life of Power*, Butler analyzes Lacan’s argument on “mad passion” and its roots. Using Freud, she underscores that this self-aggression or self-rivalry forms the basis for the conscience. She writes:

> Freud will argue in *Civilization and Its Discontents* that these social ideals are transformed into a sense of guilt through a kind of internalization which is not, ultimately, mimetic. In "On Narcissism," it is not that one treats oneself as harshly as one was treated but rather that the aggression toward the ideal and its unfulfillability is turned inward, and this self-aggression becomes the primary structure of conscience: "by means of identification [the child] takes the unattackable authority into himself".
>
> (Butler 1997: 142)

With the support of Freud, Butler highlights that it is through an aggression towards normalization, towards social ideals, that the primary structure of the conscience is established; and, of relevance to my argument, that authority is “internalized” through this self-aggression which further suggests that it is through this “turning inward” of this social or cultural violence as promoted by ideals that violence or what Butler terms subjection shapes the subject’s conscience and consequently the subject’s voice. In addition, and of further relevance to my argument, Butler suggests (the above quotation (Butler 1997: 86)) that the ego-ideal is the “norm that installs the subject in language,” which suggests that the ego-ideal is responsible for the initiation of the normalization process. Butler’s argument on the shaping of the conscience through this process or mechanism of “turning inward” is analyzed in Chapter 5.

However, I ask, what of the origins of the ego-ideal?

Lacan suggests that the interaction between the ego-ideal and the super-ego is a consequence of the Mirror Stage, whereas the super-ego, as previously discussed, is, according to Lacan, an unconscious agent that shapes the subject. In "Ego-ideal and Ideal-Ego," Lacan suggests that the ego-ideal's origins emerge in conjunction with the subject's consciousness, the initiation of narcissism, and therefore has its roots at the Mirror Stage (Lacan 1991b [1975] 1953-1954: 129-143).

The section that follows traces Lacan's ideas aimed at highlighting the relevance of the Mirror Stage as a basis from which the super-ego can function (normalize – control and confine the subject) and shape the subject's conscience through interacting with the basis of the ego-ideal.

In "Ego-Ideal and Ideal-Ego" Lacan claims, as previously discussed in this section, that the *Ichideal,* the ego-ideal, is the "other as speaking"; but he adds that "the *Ichideal*, considered as speaking, can come to be placed at the level of objects on the level of *the Idealich* [the ideal-I], that is, on the level where this narcissistic capitation which Freud talks about over and over again throughout this text can take place" (Lacan 1991b: 142).

Lacan underscores several points of relevance to my argument. Firstly, that it is the subject's ego-ideal or *Ich-ideal* that speaks; secondly, that the subject's voice is not her own but shaped by the other; lastly, that the ideal-I plays a role in the shaping of the subject's voice. Therefore, the ideal I that is initiated at the Mirror Stage by or through the infant seeing and identifying with his/her own image in the mirror forms a basis, according to Lacan, from which the subject will speak.

In "The Fluctuations of The Libido," Lacan writes: "Each time, the projected image awakens in the subject the feeling of an exaltation without limit, of a mastery of every outcome, which is already laid down at the beginning of the experience of the mirror. But now, paradoxically, he can name it, because he has since learnt to speak. If he hadn't, he wouldn't be here" (Lacan 1991c [1975] 1953-1954: 186).

Lacan suggests that the bounded wholeness of the image as first perceived by the infant at the Mirror Stage initiates *the image* as the initial ideal that is the basis from which the ego-ideal will emerge. Due to its unified and non-fragmented appearance, this image is analogous to an image of perfection and therefore establishes the first ideal as a pre-verbal ideal – as the infant cannot yet speak, has not yet entered the laws and conventions of symbolic systems, she cannot as yet name it, or recognize it. This suggests that Lacan's claim of an "initial ideal" as that of an image which is unified and whole at the Mirror Stage is effectively prior to the infant's subjection or normalization through language and the paternal realm of the Symbolic Order. Yet the initial ideal remains present in the subject's psyche while continuing to assert its influence on the subject's consciousness and ego if, as Lacan claims, it is the basis for the subject's ego-ideal (Lacan 1991b [1975] 1953-1954: 129-143). He suggests that besides the initiation of the subject's sense of "I" or "ego" through the infant's seeing of his/her image reflected back at him/her from the mirror, so too is it the basis for what will become the ego-ideal; which, in turn, will shape the subject's conscience upon his/her entrance into The Symbolic and its laws, norms and conventions. Although the infant is not as yet "of language" and does not as yet understand the idea or concept of an ideal, the image itself initiates the infant's primary identification with it and therefore initiates an ideal prior to its formation, modification or adaptation through language. The ideal-I is therefore "the ideal" that initiates both the sense of self or ego and the basis for the formation of the ego-ideal. The image the infant sees in the mirror at or during the Mirror Stage is, therefore, underscored as being pivotal in the development and normalization of the individual.

In "Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis" Lacan writes:

> The notion of aggressiveness as a tension correlated with narcissistic structure in the subject's becoming allows us to encompass in a very simply formulated function all sort of accidents and atypicalities in that becoming.
>
> But it is clear that the structural effect of identification with a rival is not self-evident, except at the level of fable, and can only be conceptualized if the way is paved for it by a primary identification that structures the subject as rivaling with himself. In fact, a note of biological importance is met with again here – as is the effect of anticipation characteristic of the human psyche's genesis – in the fixation of an imaginary "ideal," which, as analysis has shown, determines whether or not the "instinct" conforms to the individual's physiological sex …

> But what interests me here is what I shall refer to as the "pacifying" function of the ego-ideal: the connection between its libidinal normativeness and a cultural normativeness, bound up since the dawn of history with the imago of the father.
>
> (Lacan 2002 [1948]: 23-24)

Lacan's ideas support my argument by demonstrating the relevance of an image or imago as a basis for the ideals that shape the subject. It is the infant's identification with her own image at the Mirror Stage that is therefore, according to Lacan, pivotal in the formation of the subject's ego-ideal and consequently impacts the subject's conscience. Furthermore, Lacan suggests, that it is the initial specular image that acts as a basis from which the subject speaks. It is due to this "fixation of an imaginary ideal," as Lacan argues, at the Mirror Stage that a basis for the control and confinement of the subject through or via the super-ego is established. In addition, the pacifying function of the ego ideal that is "bound up with the imago of the father," the paternal, as Lacan claims, is a consequence of the ideal image as first seen by the infant at the Mirror Stage.

However, may I ask, does the mother or primary caregiver not play a role in the formation of an originary ideal? What of the infant -mother relationship that is prior to the Mirror Stage? Furthermore, does this relationship not influence the shaping of the subject's conscience? Section IV will address these questions.

## Section IV: The Maternal Image as an "Originary Ideal"

This section delineates a relevant component – an "originary ideal" – as support for the theoretical reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice that follows in Chapter 8. Furthermore, an originary ideal is used in my argument against Kristeva's proposal on the relevance of male poets—their exclusive ability to structure poetic texts in such a manner that these texts capacitate an underlying and unconscious mode of subversion, or intimate revolt – in Chapter 9.

If, as Lacan claims, the super-ego is supported by the infant's initial identification with an image, self-image (as reflected through the Mirror Stage), then I challenge Lacan and underscore the maternal image prior to the Mirror Stage. In so doing, I emphasize the mother or primary caregiver's image as playing a role in the shaping of the subject's conscience. I should emphasize that the idea of the maternal realm as prior to the Mirror Stage is not my idea. Julia Kristeva

claims that the maternal realm is prior to the Mirror Stage. The discussion that follows is therefore an argument in agreement with Kristeva to promote my return to her theory further. However, I aim to underscore the maternal representation's face – a non-gender specific visual image itself –then, in turn, to extend Kristeva's argument on the maternal realm or *chora* as playing a relevant role in the structuring of a realm that underlies metaphorical representation in poetic texts. As I will elaborate on later in Chapter 8, in addition to the phonetic component's predominance in relation to the maternal realm, I argue that the visual image, the originary ideal, plays a relevant role in the underlying structuring of poetic texts. As a challenge to Kristeva's predominant focus on male writers, I show that women writers, using Krog's skillfully written poetic texts, are capable of structuring the originary ideal within poetic texts.

In *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex,* Butler underscores that Lacan does not include any pre-Mirror identifications in the process of identification (Butler 1993). Identification is an enclosed if not confined process that emphasizes narcissism as a necessary delusion. She further emphasizes that the infant-mother relation prior to the formation of the subject at the Mirror Stage plays no role in the formation of the subject (Butler 1993). She writes:

> The postulation of the primacy of the maternal body in the genesis of signification is clearly questionable, for it cannot be shown that a differentiation from such a body is that which primarily or exclusively inaugurates the relation to speech. The maternal body prior to the formation of the subject is always and only known by a subject who by definition postdates that hypothetical scene. Lacan's effort to offer an account of bodily boundaries in "The Mirror Stage" (1949) takes the narcissistic relation as primary, and so displaces the maternal body as a site for primary identification. This happens within the essay itself when the infant is understood to overcome with jubilation the obstruction of the support which presumably holds the infant in place before the mirror …
>
> … Here it is not a question of whether the mother or the imago [the infant's image of herself in the mirror] comes first or whether they are fully distinct from one another but, rather, how to account for individuation through the unstable dynamics of sexual differentiation: and identification that takes place through the elaboration of imaginary bodily contours.
>
> (Butler 1993: 40-41)

Butler questions the possibility of the maternal realm as playing a role in the formation and subjection of the subject – as the mother-infant relationship prior to the subject's entrance into the realm of the Symbolic and its rules and norms are prior to the infant's acquisition of language therefore, according to Butler, this infant-mother relationship plays no part in the subjection, normalization or the formation of the subject itself.

Butler uses Lacan's earlier work, 1949, as support for her above-mentioned argument. However, Lacan's later seminars, *Anxiety: Book X; 1962-1963,* first published in French in 2004, underscore the role of a caregiver at the Mirror Stage. In *Anxiety* Lacan writes:

> Already just in the exemplary little image with which the demonstration of the mirror stage begins, the moment that is said to be jubilatory when the child, grasping himself in the inaugural experience of recognition in the mirror, comes to terms with himself as a totality functioning as such in his specular image, haven't I always insisted on the movement that the infant makes? This movement is so frequent, constant I'd say, that each and every one of you may have some recollection of it. Namely, he turns round, I noted, to the one supporting him who is there behind him. If we force ourselves to assume the content of the infant's experience and to reconstruct the movement, we shall say that, with this mutating movement of the head, which turns towards the adult as if to call upon his assent, and then back to his image, he seems to be asking the one supporting him, and who here represents the big Other, to ratify the value of this image.
>
> (Lacan 2014a [2004] 1962-1963: 32)

Lacan claims that the caregiver at the Mirror Stage – due to his support – represents the Symbolic Order or the "big Other." Furthermore, that the caregiver acts as that which connects the infant's image or Ideal I to the realm of the symbolic and the laws of the father. Which in turn translates into inaugurating the infant's participation in the realm of language and its norms and conventions. Is it not possible, however, that this caregiver represents the maternal realm? Is it not possible that it is the mother or primary caregiver who supports the infant at the Mirror Stage? Suggesting, therefore, that it is the mother's image that underlies the normalization of the subject?

Recent research provides evidence in support of the infant's capacity to recognize her/his mother or primary caregiver's image from birth and therefore prior to not merely the normalization of the subject but prior to Lacan's the Mirror Stage itself. Farroni et als.' research,

"Direct gaze modulates face recognition in young infants" argues that newborns can recognize human faces, which they prefer over other objects, and can even discriminate between happy and sad expressions. At birth, a baby knows her mother's voice and may be able to recognize the sounds of stories her mother read to her while she was still in the womb (Farroni et al. 2007). Frank et al.'s research "Development of Infant's Attention to Faces during the First Year" claims that between 3 and 9 months of age, infants gradually focused their attention on faces (Frank et al. 2009). Stephanie Pappas 2013 article "Babies are Born with Some Self-Awareness" highlights recent research that supports the idea of the basis for self-awareness as being innate (Pappas: 2013). Francesca Simion and Elisa Di Giorgio research, "Face perception and processing in early infancy: inborn predispositions and developmental changes" claim: "It's a matter of fact that newborns, despite their immature visual system, are able to recognize individual faces." "Data collected in our lab employing face-like, real faces and geometric stimuli converge to suggest that, at least at birth, the operations involved in face processing are the same that occur to process any visual object" (Simion & Di Giorgio 2015).

If, as Farroni et al. and Frank et al. suggest, the infant is capable of recognizing the mother's image prior to the Mirror Stage (Lacan's Mirror Stage takes place between 6 months and eighteen months of age (Lacan 2002 [1948]: 20)), then the mother's image as providing an ideal image, or originary ideal, is a basis from which the emergence of the conscience, prior to the Mirror Stage, is possible.

Although I support Lacan's idea of the "Ideal I" as being initiated at the Mirror Stage, I question the idea that the originary ideal is the image the infant sees of herself at the Mirror Stage; and I argue that it is the mother's image that suggests an originary ideal that underlies the process of normalization and the shaping of the subject's conscience. I argue that the possibility of the mother's image as forming a basis, an originary ideal, that underlies the development of the ego-ideal suggests that the mother's image plays a role in the normalization of the subject; and that it is the maternal realm prior to the Mirror Stage that is therefore a basis from which the subject's conscience emerges. Diana Fuss's ideas in "Fashion and The Homospectatorial Look" provides additional support for my argument (Fuss 1994: 200-230). Fuss argues that the

mother's image prior to the Mirror Stage is exploited through the advertising images portrayed by the fashion industry. She writes:

> The importance Lacanian psychoanalysis contributes to specularity and identification in the formation of the sexed subject suggests several points of entry to the psychical geography traversed and bounded by the arena of women's commercial fashion photography. I will argue that these photographs work as post-mirror phase images that create fascination precisely through a cultural staging of pre-mirror phase fantasies; they in effect mirror the pre-mirror stage, directing our gaze solipsistically back to our own specular and fictive origins. Through secondary identification(s) with the sequence of images fashion photography serially displays, the female subject is positioned by the photographic codes of framing, color, lighting, focus and pose to rehearse repetitiously the introjection if the (m)other's imago, which is itself a complex rehearsal of primary identification or absorption with the (m)other. These images of the female body reenact obsessively the moment of the subject's first self-awareness as if to suggest the subject's profound uncertainty over whether her own subjectivity "took." This subject is compelled to verify herself endlessly, to identify all her body parts, and to fashion continually from this corporeal and psychical jigsaw puzzle a total picture, an imago of her own body.
>
> (Fuss 1994: 200)

I argue that the severance of an "originary attachment" at the Mirror Stage promotes the infant's preservation of the mother's image in her unconsciousness – the preservation of the infant's originary love "object" and originary ideal. It is because of an infant's dependency on the mother or primary caregiver that is shaped by, includes, love, an "originary attachment," that the infant protects and preserves this originary ideal upon entrance into the Symbolic and its norms and conventions. Furthermore, it is because of this love experienced prior to the Mirror Stage that contemporary consumer culture exploits the originary ideal in the context of repetitively exposing the subject as adult to images that suggest a "return" of the preserved and protected mother or primary caregiver– the momentary re-surfacing of the maternal realm that is necessarily preserved or "forgotten" in that it is a space that is prior to the infant's entrance into the Symbolic Order and therefore outside of the norms and laws that govern the ability to speak.

Chapter 6 explicates this process and uses recent research on infant development, Melanie Klein, and Ian Suttie's theory as support. This chapter argues against Butler's argument on a passionate attachment to subjection.

## Section V: The "forgotten" Maternal Realm that Exceeds the Paternal Realm

Using Lacan, Butler and Kristeva's theory, the discussion that follows aligns my proposal with Kristeva's concept of a *chora* as a theoretical means to extend my argument in the context of a reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice. Aiming my reconstruction toward a space that exceeds the paternal realm itself, and therefore exceeds the control and oppression promoted within the paternal realm in the context of patriarchal norms and ideals that confine women's voices, provokes a space that exceeds linear time and suggests a sense of boundlessness. As previously outlined, in Chapter 1, my idea of an originary attachment differs from Kristeva's argument on the *chora.* An originary attachment is based on a bond between an infant and a maternal representation, a primary caregiver regardless of the caregiver's gender, and is after the infant's birth and until the Mirror Stage. The maternal representation's face plays a relevant role in the context of a visual image as it is through the poet's re-activation of the visual image of the maternal representation, in addition to a reconnection to pre-Mirror Stage sounds or phonetic "images," that a skilled poet re-structures the realm that underlies metaphor.

In *Giving an Account of Oneself*, Butler discusses the individual and the effects of memory, she writes that the subject is fundamentally "opaque to itself" (Butler 2005: 21). Referencing Lacan's Mirror Stage she writes that "Lacan has made clear that whatever account is given about the primary inaugural moments of a subject is belated and phantasmatic … The origin is made available only retroactively, and through the screen of fantasy" (Butler 2005: 52-3).

In "The Nucleus of Repression" Lacan underscores the subject's entrance into language and its laws and conventions as being one accompanied by a loss, a form of "normal forgetting." He writes that "for every human being, everything personal which can happen to him is located in relation to the law to which he is bound. His history is unified by the law, by his symbolic

universe, which is not the same for everyone" (Lacan 1991d [1975] 1953-1954: 197); yet, "every successful symbolic integration involves a sort of normal forgetting" (Lacan 1991d [1975] 1953-1954: 192). He writes:

> Integration into history evidently brings along with it the forgetting of an entire world of shadows which are not transposed into symbolic existence. And if this symbolic existence is successful and is fully taken on by the subject, it leaves no weight behind it. One should then have to bring in Heideggerian notions. In every entry of being into its habitation in words, there's a margin of forgetting.
>
> (Lacan 1991d [1975] 1953-1954: 192)

Lacan emphasizes, in the above quoted passage, that in order for the infant to enter the realm of normalization, the realm of the paternal and the symbolic with its laws to which the subject is bound, necessitates a form of "loss," a necessary forgetting of the past – He suggests that the infant forgets that which is prior to the Mirror Stage. I emphasized in Chapter 1 that it is a return to Kristeva, and in response to her proposal in *Intimate Revolt*, a return to the past and the realm that is excluded upon the inauguration of the subject.

Is it not what I refer to as an "originary attachment" that is "forgotten"? Denied? The mother barred or foreclosed by the infant upon her inauguration into the realm of subjectivity at the Mirror Stage? Kristeva's theory provides support for my questions.

In *Revolution in Poetic Language*, Kristeva claims that a maternal realm or semiotic *chora* exists that is prior to the Mirror Stage – the *chora* is a "space" or "realm" in that it is the mother's body that structures the infant's affects or drives prior to the Mirror Stage (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 25-30). She writes:

> Neither model nor copy, the *chora* precedes and underlies figuration and thus specularization [the infant seeing his/her specular image at the Mirror Stage], and is analogous only to vocal and kinetic rhythm. We must restore this motility's and gestural and vocal play (to mention only the aspect relevant to language) on the level of the socialized body.
>
> (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 26)

Kristeva also suggests that the *chora* "as rupture … precedes spatiality and temporality … not yet unified in an ordered whole because deity is absent from it" (Kristeva 1984: 26). A subject's reconnection to what Kristeva terms a *chora* suggests a reconnection to, what might be termed, an archaic mother or what she terms in *The Powers of Horror* as an "archaic memory" that "language lays out as much as it betrays it … That is, of rampancy, boundlessness, the unthinkable, the untenable, the unsymbolizable" (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 23).

It is the maternal realm prior to the Mirror Stage, or what Kristeva terms a semiotic *chora*, that further supports a reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice in that it is not only "outside of" normalization in the context of after birth but prior to the Mirror Stage, or what I refer to as an originary attachment, but *exceeds* the confines of the paternal realm itself in the context of a realm of time that suggests a boundlessness. Kristeva's argument on the *chora* therefore provides support for my argument in the context of Antjie Krog's *Verweerskrif/Body Bereft* and a reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice (Chapter 8).

This chapter has highlighted Freud and Lacan's theory in relation to the role that the paternal realm, or Law of the Father, plays in the shaping of the conscience and the subject's voice. Secondly, it traces Lacan's argument outlining the link between the paternal realm, the super-ego and the speaking subject – the super-ego as a product of society's discourses, of language, is the vehicle through which societal norms, laws, moral censorship, shape the subject's voice – further underscoring the idea that the normalized "self"[28] is a delusion and, according to Lacan, a lie. Thirdly, as the Mirror Stage is most relevant in relation to my deconstruction and reconstruction of the normalized self, this chapter highlights Lacan's the Mirror Stage. The connection between the super-ego and ego-ideal is underscored. The relevance of the ideal image as a basis from which the subject is, according to Lacan, shaped by normalization, confined within the paternal realm is challenged using Fuss, Kristeva, and recent research as support. This chapter concludes by delineating a relevant component of my reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice in contemporary consumer culture – the "originary

[28] Or in the context of Kristeva's proposal on the "false self," and Heyes' proposal on the "authentic self."

ideal" or maternal representation as a visual image that is prior to the Mirror Stage and, as I will show, plays a relevant role in the underlying structuring of metaphor in Krog's poetic text the "writing ode" (Krog 2006).

Chapter 3 extends Foucault's theory on pastoral power and the act of confession to underscore the impact of the paternal realm – or as Butler terms "religious" or "theological metaphors" (Butler 1997: 109) – in the context of social factors, institutions, and practices that shape and confine the subject's body. Chapter 4 continues my extension of pastoral power demonstrating its impact in contemporary consumer culture with emphasis on the cosmetic surgical industry and the shaping of the cosmetic surgical body. In the United States, although its impact is global, the mainstreaming and normalization of cosmetic surgery (Lewis Plastic Surgery 2015, Applebaum 2015, Sato 2015, Joseph 2017) underscore the impact of the cosmetic surgical industry in the second decade of the twenty-first century with emphasis on its deleterious impact on women's bodies and psyche.

# Chapter 3: Foucault, Pastoral Power, and 'Invisible Violence'

*Detailed techniques were elaborated for us in seminaries and monasteries, techniques of discursive renditions of daily life, of self – examination, confession, direction of conscience and regulation of the relationship between director and directed. It was this technology which it was sought to inject into society as a whole and it is true that the move was directed from the top downwards.*

*-Michel Foucault, qtd. in "The Confession of the Flesh," 1977*

Kristeva's theory does not elaborate on normalization processes or mechanisms as such nor does she underscore the shaping of the "false self" (Kristeva 1997 [1993]) in the context of individualization techniques that oppress women's bodies and restrict their voices with emphasis on the developing cosmetic surgical industry. Foucault, however, provides an elaborate means to analyze normalization practices with emphasis on the overwhelming, confining, and violent impact on the body, the conscience, and the voice.

Therefore, I adopt Michel Foucault's theory on subjection and extend his theory on pastoral power to trace the impact of normalization from its emergence as a new form, according to Foucault, in the eighteenth century through to its culminating impact in the twenty-first century (Foucault 1990 [1978], 1995 [1975], 2002 [1982]) – the cosmetic surgical industry and its ageist discourses that confine women's bodies. The aim of this tracing of pastoral power is to both elaborate on and emphasize the underlying workings of power, of subjection, in the context of a mode of oppression that has evolved and developed from the historical past. In *Intimate Revolt* Kristeva proposes a revolt as a displacement of the past (Kristeva 2002: 5). Although she emphasizes revolt in an intimate and personal context and predominantly in relation to a re-activation of semiotic drives, she does briefly discuss revolt in a social context. In her introduction, she argues that revolt has been employed in the context of adopting new ideologies and an "abandonment of retrospective questioning" that results in a mode of nihilism rather than transformation (Kristeva 2002: 6). As a response then to Kristeva's proposal in the context of a

displacement of the past, I turn to Foucault's theory. Furthermore, by discussing his work, I highlight the overwhelming impact of subjection, thereby underscoring the difficulty in establishing one's own voice in the context of its violence with emphasis on its culminating impact in the twenty-first century.

Before continuing with this chapter, I outline Foucault's theory on pastoral power.

Although Foucault does not elaborate on pastoral power, he does briefly discuss pastoral power in a selection of his works. In "The Subject and Power," he claims that pastoral power is a "new form of power" that presents a "tricky combination" of individualization techniques and totalization procedures. Its adaptability is evident in that it combines "old power technique which originated in Christian institutions" with new modes of political oppression (Foucault 2000 [1982]: 332). Of further relevance in relation to my argument is his emphasis on pastoral power as finding expression in a variety of institutions (Foucault 2000 [1982]: 332-333), which promotes an analysis of pastoral power in the context of contemporary consumer society that follows in Chapter 4. In addition, he claims that pastoral power is capable of finding innovative ways to confine the body and subject the normalized self. He writes, "It is certain that the mechanisms of subjection cannot be studied outside their relation to the mechanisms of exploitation and domination. However, they do not merely constitute the 'terminal' of more fundamental mechanisms." They "entertain complex and circular relations with other forms" (Foucault 2000 [1982]: 332). Foucault clearly indicates that the emergence of this new form of pastoral power took place in the eighteenth century (Foucault 2000 [1982]: 334).

This chapter provides the framework for Chapter 4, where I use Foucault's theory to analyze and elaborate on normalization's shaping of the cosmetic surgical body. In this chapter, I trace Foucault's argument in relation to individualization processes and practices with emphasis on a form or strain of subjection that emerged in the late 1700s, which as Foucault suggests in *Discipline and Punish*, is due to the emergence of a new model for the normalization of the subject (Foucault 1995 [1975]). I then underscore the impact of this subjection in the century that follows, the late 1800s, in the context of Victorian women and Foucault's theory in *The History of Sexuality* (Foucault 1990 [1978]). This is followed by demonstrating its connection to

the emerging consumer culture at the turn of the 1900s. In addition, I discuss Foucault's proposal on a new subjectivity and the act of confession. I conclude this chapter by demonstrating a connection between pastoral power, consumer culture and the emergence of female empowerment.

## Section I: Confinement, Subjection, and Psychic Idealization

In "The Subject and Power" Foucault writes:

> An important phenomenon took place around the eighteenth century – it was a new distribution, a new organization of this kind of individualizing power. I don't think that we should consider the "modern state" as an entity which was developed above individuals, ignoring what they are and even their very existence, but, on the contrary, as a very sophisticated structure, in which individuals can be integrated, under one condition: that this individuality would be shaped in a new form and submitted to a set of very specific patterns. In a way, we can see the state as a modern matrix of individualization or a new form of pastoral power.
>
> (Foucault 2000 [1982]: 334)

In the above quoted passage, Foucault suggests that a new form of pastoral power emerged in the eighteenth century that was a new form of individualizing techniques; and that it oppressed individuals in a sophisticated manner by promoting a new form of individuality in the context of the normalized self. However, Foucault does not elaborate on his argument in relation to pastoral power in the context of its adaptability in the confinement of the normalized self, its subjection of the subject through this new form of individuality. In *Discipline and Punish*, however, Foucault presents a comprehensive analysis on what he refers to as a "new type of control" (Foucault 1995 [1975]: 142) that would result in a most efficient and widespread means to govern subjects – a less visible disciplinary process suggestive of the "internalization" of subjection promoted by the mass scale introduction of confinement. According to Foucault, the Indret factory, 1777, introduced the monastic cell: "The factory was explicitly compared with the monastery, the fortress, a walled town" (Foucault 1995 [1975]: 142). He writes:

> Discipline organizes an analytical space. And there too, it encountered an old architectural and religious method: the monastic cell. Even if the compartments it assigns becomes purely ideal, the disciplinary space is always, basically, cellular. Solitude was necessary to both body and soul, according to a certain asceticism; they must, at certain moments at least, confront temptation and perhaps the severity of God alone …
>
> This disciplinary model extended to hospitals, the military and the navy, as in Rochefort, France, with the confinement of contagious patients where gradually an administrative and political space was articulated upon a therapeutic space that tended to individualize bodies … Out of discipline, a medically useful space was born.
>
> (Foucault 1995 [1975]: 143-144)

In 1787, Benjamin Rush prompted a shift towards a less visible form of control in the disciplining of criminals in an address to the Society for Promoting Political Enquiries. He remarks, "I can only hope that the time is not far away when gallows, pillory, scaffold, flogging and wheel will, in the history of punishment, be regarded as the marks of the barbarity of the centuries and of countries and as proofs of the feeble influence of reason and religion over the human mind" (Rush qtd in Foucault 1995 [1975]: 10). Foucault suggests that Rush and his supporters promoted the idea that punishing the body through torture or physical pain was an inadequate means to discipline the subject as it merely impacted the body without "curing" the subject, without reforming the mind. In addition, "a technique of improvement represses, in the penalty, the strict expiation of evil-doing, and relieves the magistrates of the demeaning task of punishing" (Foucault 1995 [1975]: 10).

The emergence of the 1800s, according to Foucault, demonstrated the decline of the visibility of punishment used in the disciplining of convicts (Foucault 1995 [1975]: 5-31). He writes that the "great spectacle of physical punishment [and the] tortured body was avoided; the theatrical representation of pain was excluded from punishment [and the] age of sobriety in punishment had begun. By 1830-48, public executions, preceded by torture, had almost entirely disappeared" (Foucault 1995 [1975]: 14). These were replaced by a "punishment of a less immediately physical kind, a certain discretion in the art of inflicting pain, a combination of a

more subtle, more subdued, suffering, deprived of their visibility display" (Foucault 1995 [1975]: 8). He writes that:

> One no longer touched the body, or at least as little as possible, and then only to reach something other than the body itself … the body is caught up in a system of constraints and privations, obligations and prohibitions. Physical pain, the pain of the body itself, is no longer the constituent element of the penalty … If it is still necessary for the law to reach and manipulate the body of the convict, it will be at a distance, in the proper way, according to strict rules, and with a much "higher" aim.
>
> As a result of this new restraint, a whole army of technicians took over from the executioner, the immediate anatomist of pain: warders, doctors, chaplains, psychiatrists, psychologists, educationalists; by their very presence near the prisoner, they sing the praises that the law needs'; they take on the role of 'agents of welfare,' 'alleviators of pain.'
>
> (Foucault 1995 [1975]: 11)

Foucault underscores a distinct and relevant shift in disciplinary strategy, as highlighted by the prison system. From the displayed visible suffering of the convict to a hidden and "invisible pain" that is "quietly controlled by 'agents of welfare' through the subject's continual restraint only to be quietly subdued upon execution via physiological 'disconnectors' – psycho-pharmacology – as a logical consequence of this 'non-corporal' penality" (Foucault 1995 [1975]: 11).

This "new restraint" promotes a suffering that is seemingly internalized by the subject, kept confined by the subject himself; and through this process it paradoxically takes on the form of a possession, of that which is owned by the subject in the context of an inner dimension or "inner self." Foucault writes:

> Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished. And, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains, corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul, which is unlike the soul represented by Christian

> theology, is not born in sin and subject to punishment, but is born rather out of methods of punishment, supervision and constraint.
>
> (Foucault 1995 [1975]: 29)

Recent research on confinement underscores its devastating impact on the individual's body. In "The Horrible Psychology of Solitary Confinement," Brandon Keim highlights the psychological torture, the maddening psychic trauma that confinement inflicts on an individual without requiring any effort or physical violence from those in power. Keim writes that:

> The human brain is ill-adapted to such conditions, and activists and some psychologists equate it to torture. Solitary confinement isn't merely uncomfortable, they say, but such an anathema to human needs that it often drives prisoners mad.
>
> In isolation, people become anxious and angry, prone to hallucinations and wild mood swings, and unable to control their impulses …
>
> Consistent patterns emerge, centering around the aforementioned extreme anxiety, anger, hallucinations, mood swings and flatness, and loss of impulse control. In the absence of stimuli, prisoners may also become hypersensitive to any stimuli at all. Often they obsess uncontrollably, as if their minds didn't belong to them, over tiny details or personal grievances. Panic attacks are routine, as is depression and loss of memory and cognitive function.
>
> (Keim 2013)

Jean Casella and James Ridgeway's "What Solitary Confinement Does to the Brain" claims that brain imaging conveys the damage of confinement in a more compelling way. "There are few people who say that mental distress is impermissible in punishment. But we do think harming people physically is impermissible … If you could do brain scans to show that people suffer permanent damage, that could make solitary look less like some form of distress, and more like the infliction of a permanent disfigurement" (A. Pustilnik qtd in Casella and Ridgeway 2015).

Casella, Ridgway, Pustilnik and Keim underscore the anxiety experienced through confinement and the restriction of the body, the degree of psychological and physical damage

that is inflicted upon the body without visible subjection. This anxiety shapes the subject, fabricates a soul as Foucault suggests. Yet the body, the psyche, is limited in its capacity to contain this anxiety and the impact of this anxiety momentarily seeks "release," "liberation," through the act of speaking. Foucault's argument in relation to subjection's fabrication of a sense of "inner self" elucidates the idea of the subject's need or desire to express her voice or confess her sins as being a consequence or effect of the restriction or confinement of her body itself. I return to the idea of confession and the speaking subject in Section II**.**

In "The Subject and Power" Foucault argues that pastoral power is exercised in a suggestive fashion. Pastoral power promotes the ideal that the subject himself should, for his own benefit, speak his innermost "truth," disclose his secrets. It is a form of violence that affects the subject and "implies a knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it" (Foucault 1982: 332-335). Yet, the secrets revealed are but effects of subjection, the consequences of its violence.

In *The Psychic Life of Power* Butler elucidates Foucault's argument. She writes:

> But if, following Foucault, we understand power as *forming* the subject as well, as providing the very condition of its existence and the trajectory of its desire, then power is not simply what we oppose but also, in a strong sense, what we depend on for our existence and what we harbor and preserve in the beings that we are. The customary model for understanding this process goes as follows: power imposes itself on us, and, weakened by its force, we come to internalize or accept its terms. What such an account fails to note, however, is that the "we" who accept such terms are fundamentally dependent on those terms for "our" existence. Are there not discursive conditions for the articulation of any "we"? Subjection consists precisely in this fundamental dependency on a discourse we never chose but that, paradoxically, initiates and sustains our agency.
>
> (Butler 1997:2)

Butler suggests, in the above quoted passage, that power works in such a manner that its expression is such that the individual becomes dependent on it for her very existence. It does not necessarily function through an obvious mode of oppression, a visible violence, but rather functions highly effectively when the individual believes that it is *that* which is owned, possessed

in the context of preserved within ourselves. Yet this "inner dimension" or psychic idealization is not "internalized" but merely an effect of power, of subjection, itself. Furthermore, the normalized self becomes fundamentally dependent on subjection as it both initiates and sustains the sense of agency.

Foucault fixes the date that marked the completion of the carceral system on 22 January 1840, specifically, as "the date of the official opening of Mettray," because it is the "disciplinary form at its most extreme, the model in which are concentrated all the coercive technologies of behavior" (Foucault 1995 [1975]: 293). In it were to be found "cloister, prison, school, regiment" (Foucault 1995 [1975]: 293). According to Foucault, "In the normalization of the powers of normalization, in the arrangement of power-knowledge over individuals, Mettray and its school marked a new era" (Foucault 1995 [1975]: 296). He writes:

> Borne along by the omnipresence of the mechanisms of discipline, basing itself on all of the carceral apparatuses, it has become one of the major functions of society. The judges of normality are everywhere … And each individual, wherever he may find himself, subjects to it [normalization] his body, his gestures, his behavior, his aptitudes, his achievements. The carceral network, in its compact or disseminated forms, with its systems of insertion, distribution, surveillance, observation, has been the greatest support, in modern society, of the normalizing power.
>
> (Foucault 1995 [1975]: 304)

Foucault's claim suggests that normalization functions effectively through confinement; through restricting and isolating the body, normalization is able to shape the subject invisibly. The individual himself learns through this form of continuous but less visible normalization then to control and consequently further confine himself. Casella, Ridgway, Pustilnik and Keim's research emphasize the devastating impact of confinement on the subject's body and brain; as Pustilnik claims, the psychological trauma is equated to "physical disfigurement." Keim's research highlights a further point of relevance in that he claims that it is the lack of stimulation that suggests an exaggeration of psychological trauma. This suggests that a lack of physical violence or visible subjection is both horribly effective and efficient in shaping the subject as it requires no effort as such by the oppressors or those in charge. I return to this point in Chapter 5 in relation to Butler's extension of Foucault's theory on power and subjection. In *The Psychic*

*Life of Power* Butler claims: "The process of forming the subject is a process of rendering the terrorizing power of the state invisible – and effective – as the ideality of conscience" (Butler 1997: 191). She adds: "This is not to suggest that conscience is a simple instantiation of the state; on the contrary, it is the vanishing point of the state's authority, its psychic idealization, and, in that sense, its disappearance as an external object" (Butler 1997: 191).

In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault quotes an administrator of moral conduct at Mattray, Ducpetiaux, to suggest the impact of "invisible subjection" and the "voice of religion":

> The least act of disobedience is punished and the best way of avoiding serious offences is to punish the most minor offences very seriously; at Mattray; the principle punishment inflicted was confinement to one's cell; for isolation is the best means of acting on the morals of children; it is there above all that the voice of religion, even if it has never spoken to their hearts, recovers all its emotional power.
>
> (Ducpetiaux, 1852: 377 qtd in Foucault 1995 [1975]: 294)

Foucault adds that "the entire parapenal institution, which is created in order not to be a prison, culminates in the cell, on the walls of which are written in black letters: 'God sees you'" (Foucault 1995 [1975]: 294). He underscores the use of the voice of religion as an effective means to oppress and silence children at Mattray. The reinforcement of continuous control imposed by confinement to a cell as it is through this confinement that the children are most effectively silenced. This suggests that the child then learns effectively to control their own behavior by "internalizing" the voice of authority.

In an interview, "Questions of Method," Foucault is asked his reason for overstating the prison in his analysis of punishment and discipline as is evident in his work *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault 1991 [1977]: 73). Foucault says that he wanted to "trace the lines of transformation of what might be called 'moral technologies.' In order to get a better understanding of what is punished and why" (Foucault 1991 [1977]: 74). He adds, "I wanted to ask the question: how does one punish? This was the same procedure I used when dealing with madness: rather than asking what in a given period, is regarded as sanity or insanity, as mental illness or normal behavior, I wanted to ask how these divisions are operated" (Foucault 1991 [1977]: 74). Foucault writes:

> I was aiming to write a history not of the prison as an institution, but of the *practice of imprisonment:* to show its origin, or more exactly, to show how this way of doing things – ancient enough in itself – was capable of being accepted at a certain moment as a principle component of the penal system, thus coming to seem an altogether natural, self-evident and indispensable part of it.
>
> It's a matter of shaking this false self-evidence, of demonstrating its precariousness, of making visible, not its arbitrariness but its complex interconnections with a multiplicity of historical connections, many of them of recent date …
>
> Prison continues, on those entrusted to it, the work begun elsewhere, which the whole of society pursues on each individual through innumerable mechanisms of discipline.
>
> (Foucault 1991 [1977]: 75-76)

In Section II, I emphasize a connection between "invisible subjection" and the act of confession. The aim of this discussion is to highlight a shift that took place in society, according to Foucault, and to highlight its impact in the 19th century. By tracing this shift in the context of the impact of pastoral power, Section II provides further support for Chapter 4, which is aimed at demonstrating its continual impact in relation to contemporary consumer culture and the cosmetic surgical body.

## Section II: The Act of Confession and the New Subjectivity

In "The Subject and Power," Foucault claims that the role of pastoral power was adopted by psychoanalysis and medicine, amongst other institutions, suggesting that the therapist or doctor performs the role of mediator – the individual who supports the act of confession. He writes, that "this form of power cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of people's minds, without exploring their souls, without making them reveal their innermost secrets. It implies a knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it" (Foucault 2000 [1982]: 333).

With the above-mentioned quote as support, this section extends Foucault's theory on confession in relation to the confinement of the subject, the medicalization of women's bodies and psychoanalysis.

In an interview, "The Eye of Power," Foucault highlights the paradox of invisible subjection in relation to the "making visible" and draws attention to an historical connection between the normalization of the subject and the confessional act. He traces the line of transformation, what he terms "moral technologies," and demonstrates, I suggest, a connection between individualization and a form of "power through transparency," a subjugation through a process of "illumination" (Foucault 1972: 13). He claims that by the late eighteenth century monarchic power was renounced and a new technology had to be invented that "would ensure the free-flow of the effects of power within the entire social body down to its most minute of levels. And it is by such means that the bourgeoisie not only achieved a political revolution, but also managed to establish a form of social hegemony which it has never relinquished since" (Foucault 1972: 13). He writes:

> A definite fear prevailed during the second half of the 18th century: the fear of a dark space, of a screen of obscurity obstructing the clear visibility of things, of people, of truths. It became imperative to dissolve the elements of darkness that blocked the light, demolish all of society's sombre spaces, those dark rooms where arbitrary political rule foments, as well as the whims of a monarch, religious superstitions, tyrants' and priests' plots, illusions or ignorance and epidemics. From even before the Revolution, castles, hospitals, charnel houses, prisons and convents gave rise to a sometimes over-valued distrust or hatred; it was felt that the new political and moral order could not be instituted until such places were abolished …
>
> A form of power whose *primum mobile* is public opinion could hardly tolerate zones of darkness.
>
> (Foucault 1972: 12-13)

Foucault's claims in "The Eye of Power" demonstrates an emerging emphasis on, what could be referred to as, a subject's desire or need to reveal or speak the "truth" as being a consequence of the eighteenth century's political and religious corruption. This idea of making known or revealing the truth about others then evolves or transforms into a need or desire to

speak or reveal the "truth" about the self. This suggests an emergence of a new subjectivity and a new means to shape the subject.

In an interview, "The Confessions of The Flesh" (Foucault 1980 [1977]), Foucault says that:

> In the 18th century one finds a very sharp falling away, not in pressure and injunction to confess, but in the refining of techniques of confession. During this period where the direction of conscience and the confessional have lost the essential force of their role, one finds brutal medical techniques emerging, which consists in demanding that the subject simply tell his or her story or do so in writing.
>
> (Foucault 1980 [1977]: 215)

He adds that he references confession in the context of the acts and procedures by which the subject is incited to speak about her sexuality, to "produce a discourse of truth about her sexuality," which results in the individual being led to believe that this form of self-expression will benefit her, heal her medical or psychological issues (Foucault 1980 [1977]: 215-216). "From the moment the woman begins to take on importance in medico-social terms. In the 19th century this seems to become the dominant problem" (Foucault 1980 [1977]: 217).

Janell Caroll, Wendy Mitchinson and Sigmund Freud shed light on Foucault's argument on the "refining techniques of confession" and its relation to the confinement and restriction of women's bodies in the late nineteenth Century.

Janell Caroll's work, *Sexuality Now*, discusses the legitimizing of the sexual restraining of women's bodies in the late 1800s America (Caroll 2012[2009]). Caroll says that by the end of the 1800s the medicalization of women's bodies marked the beginnings of the legitimizing of sexual restraint in America. The "medical model of sexuality began to emerge and physicians and reformers began to advocate self-restraint." In 1905, laws were passed making it mandatory to have blood tests before marriage and pre-marital sex was claimed to damage the individual's later sex life and marriage (Carroll 2012 [2009]: 18-20).

In *The Nature of Their Bodies,* Wendy Mitchinson documents the impact of fashion and the beauty industry on Victorian women's bodies and the role the medical profession played in

supporting this confinement (Mitchinson 1991). Mitchinson writes that "not until the 1860s and 1870s did a major emphasis on dress begin… and fashion became a health issue" (Mitchinson 1991: 66). Theodore Thomas's 1868 publication *A Practical Treatise on The Disease of Women* emphasizes the impact of women's corsets on the blood circulation, women's breathing and "of particular concern" was the "habit of tight waists that left impressions on the liver and the uterus being displaced resulting in disease following intercourse" (qtd from Mitchinson 1991: 66). The *Canada Health Journal* of 1870 claimed that tight-lacing inhibited breathing upset digestion and "led to temper and general complaints of ill health which made them burdens to their friends and families. Their husbands in particular suffered from it" (qtd from Mitchinson 1991: 66). *The Sanitary Journal* of the late 1870s argued that corsets were "unnatural and interfered with what God designed a woman's body to be" (qtd from Mitchinson 1991: 67). Though initially against the use of corsets and restrictions in women's fashion, the medical profession soon became a support system. Mitchinson writes that:

> Physicians would rescue women from themselves. In this way the balance dearly loved by Victorians was maintained. In earlier decades when women dressed more sensibly they had few physical ailments, which was just as well as the medical profession was not in any position to help them. By the 1870s, when women's dress was causing them problems. The medical profession believed it had developed to a stage when its therapeutics were useful.
>
> (Mitchinson 1991: 67)

In *The History of Sexuality* Foucault highlights that the Victorian age perceived their privileged women as fragile and "protected" them through confinement. This ideology of control and repression would spread through the entire social body so that by the late 1800s hysteria would become evident in Victorian society (Foucault 1990[1978]: 120-128).

In *Studies on Hysteria*, Freud emphasizes the importance of verbally expressing that which he claims is an individual's innate desire:

> We found that each individual's hysterical symptoms immediately and permanently disappeared when we had succeeded in bringing clearly to light the memory of the event by which it was provoked and in arousing its accompanying

> affect and when the patient had described the event in as greatest possible detail as possible and put the affect into words, the psychical process which originally took place must be repeated as vividly as possible; it must be brought back to its status nascendi and then given verbal utterance.
>
> (Breuer & Freud 2009 [1893-1895]: 6)

In *Introductory Notes on Psychoanalysis,* Freud claims that society's norms restrict the individual's behaviour to such an extent that the individual remains unaware of the existence of her unconscious desires or drives. The individual's psyche is not what it appears to be; society affects the individual in such a way that the individual is compelled to inhibit her socially unacceptable desires; and an underlying psychic force is responsible for structuring the behavior of the individual (Freud 1989 [1905-1933]). He writes that:

> Ostensibly society appears methodical and refined yet within each member of society an underlying force seeks emancipation. Freud suggests that psychoanalysis is a resistance to society's norms and conventions by promoting or providing a channel for the expression of forbidden desires. The therapist sanctions the patient's opportunity to confront her fears and anxieties by legitimizing a 'safe space' that is outside of society's restrictions. The therapist promotes a means for the patient to express that which she has repressed without imposing judgment on the patient.
>
> (Freud 1989 [1905-1933]: 354 -397)

In *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault critiques Freud's theory of repression by claiming that repression is a consequence or effect of subjection rather than an act initiated and maintained by the individual subject (Foucault 1990[1978]: 81-132). Foucault claims that "repression" was promoted in the early 1800s as a means of social differentiation, as a means for the bourgeoisie and aristocracy to separate themselves from the less privileged classes "not by the 'sexual' quality of the body but by the intensity of the repression" (Foucault 1990 {1978]: 129). "The bourgeoisie began by considering that its own sex was something important, a fragile treasure, a secret that had to be discovered at all costs" (Foucault 1990 [1978]: 120-121). With the outbreak of cholera in 1832 and the growth in sexually transmitted diseases (Foucault 1990 [1978]: 126), the more

“elite” body would be further protected by restraining from intercourse and association with the less privileged classes (Foucault 1990 [1978]: 127).

If, as Foucault claims in his argument on the shaping and subjection of bourgeois women, repression is not that which a subject does to herself, not a form of self-imposed confinement, but that which society does to women, in what manner does this form of oppression translate in the context of pastoral power? How does it shape women’s voices? With emphasis on women in the context of contemporary consumer culture.

In the final section of this chapter, Section III, I extend Foucault’s theory on pastoral power to demonstrate its impact on an emerging consumer culture at the turn of the 1900s. In addition, I highlight the role pastoral power plays in the context of female empowerment.

## Section III: Pastoral Power, Consumer Culture and the Emergence of Female Empowerment

In “The Subject and Power” Foucault claims that this new pastoral power changed in its objective in that it “was no longer a question of leading people to their salvation in the next world but rather ensuring it in this world” (Foucault 1982: 334). He writes:

> In this context, the word "salvation" takes on different meanings: health, well-being (that is, sufficient wealth, standard of living), security, protection against accidents. A series of "worldly" aims took the place of the religious aims of the traditional pastorate, all the more easily because the latter, for various reasons, had followed in an accessory way a certain number of these aims; we only have to think of the role of medicine and its welfare function assured for a long time by the Catholic and Protestant churches.
>
> (Foucault 1982: 334)

Foucault suggests, in the above quoted passage, that salvation is then translated in a variety of forms – he emphasizes that pastoral power is such that it finds expression in a more relatable, less explicit worldly manner, than it would be in a fundamentalist religious context. This suggests that it finds expression in the context of consumer culture – as consumer culture is

a most effective and overwhelmingly prominent influence in the shaping of the contemporary individual. I have underscored the growth of the cosmetic surgical industry – feminist scholars have discussed their growing concerns in relation to the normalization of cosmetic surgery and its adverse impact on women's bodies (Blum 2003, Blood 2005, Heinricy 2006, Clarke and Griffin 2007, Tait, 2007, Heyes 2007). I discuss this further in Chapter 4, where my aim is to analyze Foucault's argument on pastoral power and translate its expression in the context of twenty-first century women and the normalization of cosmetic surgery. To achieve this would entail highlighting pastoral power's emergence in consumer culture and then translating its expression in the context of women's bodies and women's voices. With this as a theoretically situated premise, I then analyze pastoral power's impact on an intimate level in the context of women's psyche and the shaping of the conscience; and, most relevant in relation to my theoretical reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice, draw attention to the possibility of that which underlies the conscience – *that* which is therefore outside of the impact of pastoral power and its subjection or its violence.

T.J. Jackson Lears' work, *From salvation to self-realization: Advertising and the therapeutic roots of the consumer culture*, *1880-1930*, assists my extension of Foucault's argument on pastoral power in that he underscores the impact of religious Puritan ideals in an emerging consumer culture (Jackson Lears 1983). Jackson Lears claims that the American consumer industry caters to the consumer's psychological needs by marketing products as having therapeutic qualities. He proposes that the consumer industry between the 1880s and the 1930s promoted an ethics that incorporated a form of therapy or self-healing which he refers to as a therapeutic ethos. Jackson Lears argues that advertising cannot be considered in isolation but that its role in supporting consumer culture can only be understood within a network of institutional, religious, and psychological changes. He argues that between the 1880s and the 1930s there was a crucial moral change, the beginning of a shift from a Protestant ethos of self-denial towards a sense of self-realization in the world. This ethos was characterized by an almost obsessive concern with psychic and physical health. The moral ethos of the 1800s, of perpetual work, saving, responsibility, and a rigid morality of self-denial had shifted by the 20th century into an attitude supporting leisure, compulsive spending, apolitical passivity, and a morality of

individual fulfillment. The culture of the 1800s was suited to a production-oriented society of small entrepreneurs, however, the 20th century culture initiated a consumption-oriented society dominated by bureaucratic corporations (Jackson Lears 1983).

In *Advertising to The American Woman 1900-1999*, Daniel Hill claims that the marketing of beauty products in the twentieth century signified a distinct shift by the 1920s that incorporated the ideals of female empowerment and liberation. Hill highlights the use of liberal feminist ideals as a means to exploit and manipulate women (Hill 2002). I discuss this further in Chapter 4 in relation to Robert Goldman, Deborah Heath and Sharon Smith's cutting-edge theory on the formation of commodity ideals – consumer culture's promotion of commodity-type and feminist ideals as a means to exploit women consumers. I extend their argument by showing how this translates in the context of the cosmetic surgical body. This further supports my extension of Foucault's argument on pastoral power with emphasis on its translation in the context of the act-of-confession. As my main objective centers around an analysis of Krog's poetic texts, I should highlight here that I use this idea of confession in the context of the manner in which it translates within Krog's poetic text(s).

Hill assists my argument by highlighting, I suggest, a shift in pastoral power's expression in the context of its translation from a mode of repression in the Victorian era – its confinement of women's bodies with emphasis on a literal confinement of their bodies by corsets and "protecting" them by keeping them "safely" confined within their homes – to a sense of scandalous sexual freedom, a mode of revolt. He writes:

> At the conclusion of the Victorian Era, advertising for the beauty industry was restricted by the ideal of 'virginal purity': 'For the Victorian woman applying a touch of face powder to preserve the virginal purity of an unblemished complexion was about as far as she would go with make-up. The use of lip and cheek rouge was almost as scandalous as smoking cigarettes. The "painted lady" stigma was very real for women in American Society.
>
> (Hill 2002: 93)

The impact of traumatic events initiated by World War I, followed by the recession, resulted in women's right to vote – The Nineteenth Amendment joined the constitution and

women were officially given the right to vote, on August 26 1920 – thus promoting the impetus for the "chaotic decade of the 1920s" which signified the emergence of a "new American woman." Hill writes:

> An era of exuberance began to unfold for the nation, and a new American woman stepped into the spotlight at center stage. Enter "the flapper girl." Hollywood's contribution to the creation of this new woman was to obligingly nudge her into the 1920s with the promise of "all the excitement you lack in your daily life." The glittering stars of the screen demonstrated how the modern woman could and should behave. A new morality was presented to a mass audience daily with each feature film and a great many women eagerly embraced the new ideas and possibilities they witnessed here …
>
> The slick surface of the celluloid image exuded an aura of female sexuality that "shocked social housekeepers and purity crusaders," noted historian Mary Ryan, "but it conformed nicely to the ambition of the producers of consumer goods and their advertising agents legitimizing as it did impulses for personal gratification, be they material or sexual".
>
> (Hill 2002: 93)

The 1920s initiated a distinct shift in the way women were approached by the beauty industry – replacing images and discourses that supported the ideal of a passive and compliant woman with that of a sexually empowerment one (Hill 2002: 85-97). Hill claims that, for example, the shy and demure women of the Palmolive and Jonteel advertisements had been replaced by confident and sexually empowered women whose images reflected that of Hollywood's glamorous screen stars. "Vivaudou vowed that its bottles contained 'beauty secrets' that would make the 'irresistible,' perhaps even to one's self, as might be deduced from the illustration of a woman kissing herself in the mirror" (Hill 2002: 95). Gaining the right to vote was aligned with gaining a sexual identity. The 1920s America had ushered in a means for women to express a voice that had not been promoted in American society before. Cosmetic companies took advantage of the beginnings of female empowerment in America and "from this expansion of products came the promotion of the beauty regimen by cosmetic manufacturers. This was to become part of the life of most every American woman throughout the rest of the century" (Hill 2002: 95). In 1928, the advertisement for Armani began with an acknowledgement of "this era

of women's freedom and activity." This was followed by a list of beauty products and a guide to the daily regimen of how to apply them (Hill 2002:95).

In advertising to the American woman, Hill says that "the marketing strategies of the beauty corporations worked superblyBy the beginning of the 1990s, magazine advertisements revenue from cosmetics and fragrances had skyrocketed to more than $650 million while household cleaning products yielded about a tenth of that amount" (Hill 2002: 99).

Hill underscores the extreme growth of the beauty industry by the 1990s but more importantly he highlights a distinct shift from the beauty industry of the Victorian age to that of the 1990s – a shift from the promotion of the ideal of passivity and "virginal purity" to that of female empowerment and liberation. However, as Jackson Lears' highlights in *From Salvation to Self-Realization* (Jackson Lears 1983), it is merely a translation of the mode of salvation into that of self-realization; and, in this context, self-realization translates into empowerment and liberation. The beauty industry became an effective means not merely to influence but to shape women's bodies under the guise of empowerment, and feminist ideals play a pivotal role in this form of subjection.

In this chapter, I have highlighted the impact of normalization in the context of the confinement and oppression of the normalized self with emphasis on women's bodies. I have traced Foucault's theory on individualization and confinement in the 1700s highlighting an invisible subjection that continues in the 1800s, in the context of Victorian women and the shaping of the speaking subject, as it does in the emerging consumer culture at the turn of the 1900s. Furthermore, I underscore a connection between pastoral power and feminist ideals. In Chapter 4, I extend Foucault's theory on pastoral power to demonstrate its impact in relation to the exploitation of liberal feminist ideals and I analyze pastoral power's translation in the context of the twenty-first century with emphasis on the cosmetic surgical industry.

# Chapter 4: Pastoral Power, Liberal Feminism, and the Cosmetic Surgical Body

*My own body has betrayed me, as I feared when I saw my reflection. My body distracts me such that I cannot be distracting. Or am I confused? Momentarily, I imagine skin as volitional, even vindictive, making me look foolish by hiding itself from others. Or a battle of two skins; one visible and one suppressed. Both of my personages surface.*

*My own perception of deficiency comes (seemingly) from within, prompted by my willful ability to act as a free agent for myself. I demonstrate my health by confessing to its absence. I am divided in this process. I bear witness against myself.*

*-Carole Spitzsack,"The Confession Mirror: Plastic Images for Surgery" 1988*

In this chapter I analyze what Kristeva proposes as the alienation and desensitization of the "false self" (Kristeva 1997 [1993]), to what I refer as the shaping of the "normalized self," in contemporary consumer culture. With a selection of feminist, poststructuralist, and psychoanalytic theories as support, I elaborate on normalization's subjection of women's bodies aimed at emphasizing the cosmetic surgical industry and its adverse impact on the psyche.

As a continuation of Chapter 3, this chapter extends Foucault's theory on pastoral power to demonstrate its continuous impact in relation to contemporary consumer culture and its exploitation of feminist ideals; and I analyze pastoral power's translation in the context of the twenty-first century with emphasis on the cosmetic surgical industry. I demonstrate that pastoral power continues to function in the second decade of the twenty-first century with emphasis on its role in the shaping of the cosmetic surgical body.

I translate Robert Goldman's argument on possessive individualism – liberal feminist ideals and its role in the objectification and fetishization of women's bodies – in the context of the shaping of the cosmetic surgical body and the confinement of the psyche in the second decade of the twenty-first century. In so doing, I underscore that pastoral power continues to function through contemporary consumer culture, continues to exploit women, confine their voices, in the context of the second decade of the twenty-first century and the expanding

cosmetic surgical industry. I highlight an oppressive discourse in relation to the cosmetic surgical industry and its shaping of an "authentic self"[29] and an emerging discourse aimed at the "older" individual. The arguments of feminist theorists Cressida Heyes (Heyes 2007) and Bridget Garnham's (Garnham 2013, 2017) provide support for my extension of Foucault's theory in this context.

Furthermore, I translate pastoral power in the context of the cosmetic surgical body and the act-of-confession – I translate the impact of individualization techniques, its concealed violence in the context of the individual's psyche. In addition, I argue that pastoral power, the act-of-confession, transposes as a mode of underlying unconscious oppression in the context of to what I refers as an "originary ideal." This in turn provides the validation and theoretical support for my return to Kristeva's theory as a mode of revolt – where I apply Kristeva's theory on the principle of negativity to Krog's poetic texts thereby demonstrating an act-of-confession as it translates within Krog's poetic text itself (Chapter 9).

In "The Subject and Power" Foucault claims that pastoral power is "salvation oriented (as opposed to political power)"; it is "oblative (as opposed to the principle of sovereignty)"; it is "individualizing (as opposed to legal power)"; it is "coextensive and continuous with life"; it is "linked with a production of truth – the truth of the individual himself" (Foucault 2000 [1982]: 333). In addition, it involves a mode of intimate immediacy in that it "applies itself to immediate everyday life" ((Foucault 2000 [1982]: 331). He then writes, "A few more words about this new pastoral power. We may observe a change in its objective. It was no longer a question of leading people to their salvation in the next world but rather ensuring it in this world" (Foucault 2000 [1982]: 334).

[29] I use the term "authentic self" in contrast to its use of the term "authentic feminist voice." This will become clear in the discussion that follows where I explain an "authentic self."

Foucault suggests in the above quotations that a new subjectivity, in the context of individualization techniques, would include the production of an individual that promotes and possibly maintains the subject's sense of participating in her own "salvation" – a sense of agency that is bound up with an effective means of oppression in that the individual believes this mode of oppression is her own. It is a "truth" that involves her salvation as an accessible and achievable goal as it is she who controls her own self-actualization. It is a mode of subjection that finds expression in everyday life and therefore is not visible or recognized as the oppression that it is. Furthermore, pastoral power functions through a sense of immediacy and it is possibly this immediacy that further promotes its effectiveness. In addition, Foucault claims that pastoral power takes on a form that continues to promote an oblative role in relation to the individual, an act of giving up, of offering an aspect of the self as a means to salvation – to self-actualization in the context of self-transformation. I will explore these claims in this chapter with emphasis on Foucault's proposals in relation to pastoral power, an "inner truth" and agency, the suggested immediacy of its functioning, and the oblative role in the context of "giving up" or the act-of-confession and its translation in the context of women's bodies aimed at analyzing its impact on the cosmetic surgical body.

## Section I: Liberal Feminist Ideals, Empowerment and Pastoral Power

In the discussion that follows, I translate Foucault's proposal on pastoral power in relation to the suggested immediacy of its functioning and in relation to agency in the context of empowerment and liberal feminism. Robert Goldman, Deborah Heath, and Sharon Smith's proposal on commodity feminism and Butler's argument on subjection's fetishization of the "living body" provide theoretical support for my extension of pastoral power in this context.

Robert Goldman, Deborah Heath and Sharon Smith's "Commodity Feminism" was the first work to analyze the consumer industry's use of liberal feminist values to market products. Goldman et al. argue that the consumer industry re-articulates the feminist value of personal freedom into a desire to be sexually objectified (Goldman et al. 1991). They claim that the many

faces of feminism appearing in the media are "a single aspect of an internally contradictory hegemonic process – an ongoing dialectic between dominant and oppositional discourses aimed at negating the political relevance of feminism" (Goldman et al. 1991: 333).

"Commodity Feminism" suggests that the media, through advertising images, promote a tension between these images and what they refer to as the "commodity self"; and that this ongoing dialectic acts as an underlying mechanism that promotes patriarchal oppression in the context of using liberal feminist values to objectify women. They argue that this detaches the commodity self from the political relevance of feminism. They propose a re-politicization by showing these ideological tensions as they play out in media images. Goldman et al. write:

> The commodity self that emerges from the totality of advertisements is the flip side of demographic profiles and the selling of audience segments. Our decomposition and interrogation of these advertising texts aim at rearticulating the ideological tensions concealed by the advertising and commodity forms and we seek to repoliticize the depoliticized, bring back into the picture the social and economic relations that are absent in the ads.
>
> (Goldman et al. 1991: 333)

In *Reading Ads Socially*, Goldman explains that commodity feminism is a means for industry to sell more products in a competitive market by translating women's discourses in such a manner that they shape the commodity self, propagate patriarchal ideologies, in a seemingly unthreatening and pleasing manner. The advertised images appear as both relatable and desirable in that they further promote improved versions of the commodity self that appears to be within reach (Goldman 1992: 131). Providing examples from issues of an American beauty magazine*, Mademoiselle,* Goldman claims that the advertisements display strong visual images of women in control of their bodies yet profit from the "visual dissections of the female body" through inextricably linking feminism and femininity (Goldman et al, 1992: 337). He argues that the success of these advertisements lies in their "producing of a commodity audience" or "commodity self" through the blurring of boundaries between feminism and femininity, subjectivity and objectification, empowerment and passivity, in the advertised images; this enables the exploitation of women's bodies while simultaneously profiting from this exploitation

(Goldman 1992). Goldman suggests, according to my view, that the power of these media images to exploit women lies in their promotion of conflicting discourses which then provoke conflicting emotional and psychological tensions within the commodity self.

Using Karl Marx' idea of commodity fetishism, Goldman then argues that commodity feminism fetishizes feminism, translates it into an "iconography of things. When advertisers' appropriate feminism, they cook it to distill out a residue – an object; a look, a style" (Goldman 1992: 131). He writes:

> Feminist morality has been turned into yet another 'raw material' in the never-ending drive to renew and expand the commodity-sign values of consumer goods. Feminism has been reduced to the status of a mere signifier, so that it may be re-encoded by advertisers as a sequence of visual clichés and reified signifiers. This produces visual abbreviations – second order signifiers – that gradually eclipse the original referent system of feminism. The visual signs focus meaning intensively but at a cost of hermeneutic reductivism. Feminist values including self-definition, equal treatments in labor markets, control over one's body and personal freedom have been semiotically transformed into what signifies attractiveness to men.
>
> (Goldman 1992: 131)

Goldman emphasizes that through the functioning or mechanisms of commodity feminism, feminism – as an objectified, fetishized, commodity form – then *forgets* its origins and consequently becomes "depoliticized." He writes, "Change, in these representations, has no history but is simply a marker of novelty, of difference, represented in fetishized forms by special commodities" (Goldman 1992: 132). He adds: "When framed by ideologies of individualism and free choice, feminism put into commodity form *forgets* its origins in a critique of unequal social, economic and political relations" (Goldman 1992: 132).

Goldman underscores a relevant aspect of commodity feminism in relation to my analyses of pastoral power and its exploitation of feminist ideals – through the functioning(s) of commodity feminism the political and social origins of feminism are *forgotten*. Goldman is referring to the exploitation of feminist values in relation to fetishization and the consequent loss of feminisms' origins this fetishization provokes. However, he is additionally drawing attention,

in relation to my argument, to the impact of normalizing discourses in the context of the shaping of the individual or commodity self that involves not merely a desensitization, from political and social issues, but an effective detachment of the commodity self from her own past – a detachment that plays out on an underlying and psychic level. In addition, he draws attention to an underlying mechanism in relation to the fetishization and objectification of women's bodies. Butler's theory in the *Psychic Life of Power* sheds light on the shaping of the individual – normalization's oppression of the normalized self – by effectively detaching the normalized self from her past (Butler 1997). Furthermore, she presents a cohesive argument in the context of the process of self-transformation and objectification – transforming the body into a fetishized object itself.

In *The Psychic Life of Power*, Butler discusses Foucault's argument on normalizing discourses and asserts that, according to her reading of Foucault, these discourses are said to "imprison the body, within *the soul*" both "animate and contain the body within that ideal frame" (Butler 1997: 86). The individual's body is confined by an ideal that is itself a product of normalizing discourses. She suggests that the functioning or workings of discourse transform the subject into an object, a fetishized form, a mere product of the workings of normalization itself. However, the subject believes this idealized form, this objectified body, is an expression of her "true" self. She is therefore deluded into thinking that she has agency over her own body as normalizing discourses fabricate the illusion of a "true self" as an exclusive and intimate realm or "inner truth" itself (Butler 1997).

Butler sheds light on Foucault's theory in relation to my extension of his argument on pastoral power. As discussed earlier in this chapter, Foucault claims that pastoral power functions by maintaining the subject as responsible for her own salvation, an agency that is bound up with an effective means of oppression in that the individual believes this mode of oppression is her own (Foucault 2000 [1982]). It is a "truth" that involves her salvation as an accessible and achievable goal as it is she whom controls her own self-actualization. In addition, as a mode of subjection that finds expression in everyday life suggests that it cannot be recognized but is rather easily accessible (Foucault 2000 [1982]). Pastoral power functions more effectively through the promotion of a sense of immediacy, of confinement to the present – the subject

exists within what appears to be a normalcy but it is an oppressive frame that confines the subject while simultaneously producing the effect of an "inner self" as a truth that is further revealed by detaching from the psychic past.

Butler suggests that normalization functions through a process that does not disclose its history but rather keeps its past concealed. In *Bodies That Matter*, she writes: "Moreover, this act[30] is not primarily theatrical; indeed, its apparent theatricality is produced to the extent that its historicity remains dissimulated (and conversely its theatricality gains a certain inevitability given the impossibility of a full disclosure of its historicity)"; and, she claims that it "acquires an act-like status in the present" (Butler 1993: 11- 12).

In relation to my extension of Foucault's argument on pastoral power and its translation in the context of feminist ideals, "commodity feminism" suggests an effective means to support the normalization and individualization of the subject – or, Goldman's term commodity self – by maintaining the subject, as Butler argues, "in the present moment," confining the subject to a present frame in the context of captivating advertising visual images, thereby securing the commodity self's continual interaction with and confinement within consumer culturalist discourses. I will continue my discussion on the fetishization and objectification of women's bodies and its translation in the context of the cosmetic surgical body after I briefly discuss the manipulation of feminist ideals in the second-decade of the twenty-first century thereby underscoring that pastoral power continues to function through consumer culture, continues to exploit women, confine their voices, through discourses that promote feminist ideals. I then discuss this continued exploitation in relation to the cosmetic surgical industry. In addition, I highlight an emerging and oppressive discourse in relation to the "older" individual and the cosmetic surgical industry's targeting of the "older" individual, manipulating them by provoking the possibility of a self-transformation in the form of a delayed and future "authentic self." This in turn is a translation of Foucault's argument on salvation in relation to pastoral power's functioning through the promotion of a self-actualized mode of salvation.

[30] The repetition of norms that shapes or produces the individual.

Angela McRobbie's work' *The Aftermath of Feminism* underscores the impact of this manipulation of feminist ideals by contemporary consumer culture by 2008 (McRobbie 2009). She argues that contemporary consumer culture had invalidated feminist ideals and replaced them with an "aggressive individualism" and "an obsession with consumer culture" (McRobbie 2009: 5). McRobbie argues that patriarchy[31] has renewed authority over young women. The "post-feminist masquerade" works to "re-secure the terms of submission of white femininity to white masculine domination, while simultaneously resurrecting racial divisions by undoing any promise of multi-culturalism through the exclusion of non-white femininities from this rigid repertoire of self-styling" (McRobbie 2009: 70).

In "Media, Empowerment and the 'Sexualization of Culture' Debates," Rosalind Gill highlights the sexualization of modern western women by the consumer industry and the continuous use of "female empowerment" to market products (Gill 2012). In her introduction, she stresses that the "sexualization of culture" has been a topic of much debate concerning policy intervention and research amongst academic scholars (including Atwood 2009, Dines 2010, Walter 2010, Ringrose 2011, Lamb & Peterson 2011) in the last decade, and that the notion of empowerment has emerged as central to the lexicon of feminist debate (Gill 2012:736) urging the necessity of further debate concerning the impact of discourses of "empowerment" and "choice" on the modern woman (Gill 2012). Gill discusses the spectrum of positions and often conflicting proposals by feminist scholars concerning "empowerment" and "choice" in context of today's modern women: the feminist scholars who champion sexualized and borderline pornographic behaviours as empowering for women and the feminist scholars who emphasize that "empowerment" and "choice" are influenced by the consumer industry; "empowerment as cynical rhetoric wrapping sexual objectification in a shiny feisty postfeminist package that obscures the continued underlying sexism"; and women who perform hypersexualized roles in order to be accepted by a male dominated and sexualized consumer culture (Gill 2012:736-737). In addition, Gill claims the normalization of empowerment is a growing concern regarding the future of today's adolescent woman. She outlines the wide scale abuse of "empowerment" in

[31] Or in Lacanian terms the Symbolic Order- McRobbie also uses this term.

the second decade of the twenty-first century arguing that it has become normalized to the degree that it is "used to sell everything from liquid detergents to breast augmentation" (Gill 2012: 736).

I agree with Gill's argument in relation to the promotion of empowerment and individuality in the context of this decade's modern women. The normalization of cosmetic surgery suggests evidence in support of this. Nearly 11.7 million cosmetic surgical and nonsurgical procedures were performed in the United States in 2007, according to statistics released by the American Society for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery. The Aesthetic Society, which has been collecting multi-specialty procedural statistics since 1997, says the overall number of cosmetic procedures has increased 457 percent since the collection of the statistics first began. The most frequently performed procedure was Botox injections and the most popular surgical procedure was liposuction (The American Society for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery, Inc [USA] Procedural Statistics 2007). In 2014, in the United States alone, this number exceeds 15.6 million (Cosmetic Plastic Surgery Statistics for 2014). By the end of 2015, this number reached 15. 9 million cosmetic surgical procedures in the United States. In March 2017, the American Aesthetics of Plastic surgery claimed that Americans broke the record in relation to the amount of money spent on cosmetic surgical procedures (The American Aesthetics of Plastic surgery: Statistics and Surveys 2017). Although America is amongst the leaders in cosmetic surgical procedures, cosmetic surgical statistics indicate the immense growth in cosmetic surgical procedures on a global scale (Heidekrueger et. al. 2017). The headliner for the International Society for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery's press release claims that the top five countries – USA, Brazil, Japan, Italy, and Mexico – account for 41.4% of the world's cosmetic procedures, followed by Russia, India, Turkey, Germany and France (The International Society of Aesthetic Plastic Surgery: Press Release, June 27, 2017).

As a response to Gill's proposal urging the continued debate by feminist scholars concerning the topic of empowerment and the future of feminism, my argument highlights the normalization of cosmetic surgery as a paradigm case of the beauty industry's continued manipulation of the feminist ideals of "empowerment" and "choice" in today's consumer culture,

and the globalization of cosmetic surgery, as an indication of the beauty industry's continual manipulation and control of women.

In her recently published work, *The Global Beauty Industry: Colorism, Racism and The National Body,* Meeta Jha uses Susan Bordo's theory to underscore contemporary consumer culture's normalization of the female body. She argues that:

> Women's bodies are a battleground fought over by religious ideologies and national and political institutions as well as by media, beauty and health corporations. The cultural norms of a society inscribe meanings in order to socialize and discipline female bodies which Bordo points out are socially regulated and molded by patriarchy and capitalism as well as feminist resistance.
>
> (Jha 2016: introduction, 2)

Jha's chapter on cosmetic surgery underscores that cosmetic surgery has a global impact which further emphasizes the confinement and restriction of the female body in the context of the contemporary consumer culture of the second decade of the twenty-first century (Jha 2016: 73-90).

Alan Petersen's *Hope in Health: The Socio-Politics of Optimism* draws attention to the underlying use of neoliberal ideals of empowerment, individuality, and control in the emerging beauty and cosmetic surgical industry. He writes that:

> As with the stem cell treatment market, the anti-ageing market is buoyed by the promises and hopes that attach to particular technologies and a consumerist ethos that promises choice, empowerment and fulfillment through the personal consumption of goods and services. Advertisements are in effect marketing 'hope,' offering the prospect of longer lives, a more youthful appearance and reclaiming what apparently has been lost as one ages – vigour, complexion, sex appeal and so on. This has powerful appeal in the neoliberal consumerist age.
>
> (Petersen 2015: 112)

## Section II: Advertisements, Confinement and the Ego-Ideal

I have shown in Section I that pastoral power is further supported and maintained by what Goldman et al. claim is commodity feminism; and I have translated pastoral power's functioning through immediacy with Butler's proposal on normalizing discourses that oppress the subject as theoretical support – normalization functions by maintaining the subject within a sense of "present-ness," a detachment from the past. In this section, I translate pastoral power's functioning in the context of, as Foucault claims, everyday life. I explain and analyze the confinement of the female subject in contemporary consumer culture with emphasis on advertising visual images and an oppressive mode of repetition. Goldman, Lacan, and Butler's arguments are discussed and provide support for my extension of pastoral power in this context.

Robert Goldman claims that his work *Reading Ads Socially* aims at exposing the mass media's underlying ideological meanings as they unfold in the timespan between 1977 and 1990. "Watching ads for over a decade has made it possible to track how a dialectic of interpretive contestation and ideological reincorporation unfolds in a commodity culture – a dialectic of hegemony, alienation and resistance played out in the mass media" (Goldman 1992: 2). He claims that when he began his study in the 1970s, advertisements seemed one-dimensional, structured around fixed frames and ensuring the most efficient mass-mediated semiotic process possible; yet by the late 1980s to early 1990s advertisements had lost their transparency becoming opaque and ambiguous. The unidirectional process promoted in advertising in the 1970s had become a bidirectional process, a dialectic between the consumer (Goldman terms spectator), the advertisement (representation) and society (social formation). "Each ad hails viewers through its mode of address, asking us to insert ourselves when the model fits – when we perceive 'already ness.' Invited to see a potential 'self' in the mirror of the ad, we are bidden to perform a critical interchange of meanings" (Goldman 1992: 143). He argues that the ideological significations underlying advertisements are not static and do not reside within the images displayed but are part of this circulatory process between the representation, the spectator and society (Goldman 1992: 136-146).

Lacan's theory on the Mirror Stage, the ego-ideal (discussed in the elaboration of my thesis's framework, Chapter 2), and Judith Butler's theory on the shaping of the subject, elucidate the manner in which media images confine the subject in contemporary consumer culture. The discussion that follows elaborates on their arguments.

In his most recently published work *Anxiety* (2014)*,* Lacan emphasizes the impact of the Mirror Stage in the shaping of the self or ego. *Anxiety* further suggests that the mirror frame itself plays a relevant role in shaping the body as object due to it providing a frame or structure that contains and therefore confines the manner in which the infant and later adult individual perceives or rather misrecognizes herself, her body and others in society (Lacan 2014a [2004]). This frame or idea of framing images suggests an effective manner in which the consumer industry promotes normalizing practices that objectify women's bodies. This suggests that besides the images themselves and their designed suggestive qualities, whether televisual, online images or virtual simulators, the screen is framed and therefore disconnected from that which surrounds it promoting a contained and exclusive space and simultaneously an illusion of exclusivity. This suggests a normalization process that indulges the ego, shapes the individual, by continuously and repetitively confining it. This paradoxical self is therefore both sustained and controlled not only by the influx of images and discourses the self is exposed to but by that which is excluded, or kept invisible, from view.

Butler's argument on normalization supports this idea of exclusion. In *Bodies That Matter*, she argues that the subjection and individualization of the subject "is thus not a singular 'act,' for it is always a reiteration of a norm or a set of norms, and to the extent that it acquires an act-like status in the present, it conceals or dissimulates the conventions of which it is a repetition" (Butler 1993: 11).

According to Butler, the concealed and therefore excluded "haunt signification as its abject borders or as that which is strictly foreclosed: the unlivable, the nonnarrativizable, the traumatic" (Butler 1993: 188). Butler's argument highlights the difficulty in resisting normalizing processes as promoted by televisual and online images and ideals as these repetitive acts that underlie or drive normalization are invisible or "unspeakable" due to their being excluded or

outside of our frame of reference. The oppression promoted by normalizing discourses, an oppression that confines the subject visually goes unnoticed by the subject due to its concealment of the subject's past, its present-ness (as discussed previously in this chapter) and its repetition. Butler suggests that an effective means for normalization to control and confine the individual is through this process of repetition. This translates effectively in the context of the twenty-first century with its continual bombardment of visual images.

Lacan's argument further supports my extension of Foucault's theory on pastoral power and the act of confession in relation to the confinement of the subject. In "The Ego-Ideal and ego," Lacan claims that it is the ego-ideal that governs the subject ((Lacan 1991b [1975]: 140-141). He suggests that the images we see of others supports normalization processes such as those promoted by advertising images in contemporary consumer culture in that they affect the ego-ideal.

Butler supports Lacan in *The Psychic Life of Power* Butler where she argues that it is the ego-ideal that maintains the subject's normalization. She writes:

> … one might for the purposes of clarification counterpose the "soul," which Foucault articulates as an imprisoning frame, to the psyche in the psychoanalytic sense. In the psyche, the subject's ideal corresponds to the ego-ideal, which the super-ego is said to consult, as it were, in order to measure the ego. Lacan redescribes this ideal as the "position" of the subject within the symbolic, the norm that installs the subject within language and hence within available schemes of cultural intelligibility.
>
> (Butler 1997: 86)

In *Bodies that Matter*, Butler underscores that performativity – the reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains – is a "ritualized production, a ritual reiterated under and through constraint" (Butler 1993: 60). "Performativity cannot be understood outside of a process of iterability, a regular and constrained repetition of norms" (Butler 1993: 60).

In *The Psychic Life of Power*, she suggests that religious metaphors, or Butler's term "divine performatives," play an efficacious role in shaping the subject (Butler 1997: 197, 198, 106-

132). Referencing Louis Althusser's ideas on interpellation and religious rituals to argue that "the exemplary status of religious authority underscores the paradox of how the very possibility of subject formation depends upon a passionate pursuit of a recognition which, within the terms of the religious example, is inseparable from a condemnation" (Butler 1997: 113). Butler writes that:

> The constitution of the subject is *material* to the extent that this constitution takes place through *rituals,* and these rituals materialize "the ideas of the subject." What is called "subjectivity," understood as the lived and imaginary experience of the subject, is itself derived from the material rituals by which subjects are constituted. Pascal's believer kneels more than once, necessarily repeating the gesture by which belief is conjured.
>
> (Butler 1997:121-122)

Butler elucidates the manner in which the subject is normalized in contemporary consumer culture by a repetitive "ritualized" exposure to online or virtual images, which continuously reflect the ideals promoted by consumer culture. Butler's arguments therefore provide support for my extension of Foucault's theory on pastoral power in the context of contemporary consumer culture and its confinement of the subject. Yet, there are several questions that I have not addressed as yet.

Firstly, how does this process of confinement and "invisible subjection" translate in the context of the cosmetic surgical body itself? Secondly, in relation to Foucault and Jackson Lears' ideas on "salvation" and rebirth (discussed in Chapter 3), how does this translate in the context of the cosmetic surgical body? Finally, does the cosmetic surgical body demonstrate the impact of pastoral power in the context of the speaking subject and the act of confession and therefore represent a paradigm case of the functioning of pastoral power in the second decade of the twenty – first century? Section III and IV will answer these questions.

## Section III: The "Authentic Self," Confession and the Cosmetic Surgical Body

In the discussion that follows, I translate Foucault's argument on salvation in relation to pastoral power's functioning through the promotion of a self-actualized mode of salvation in the context of the second decade of the twenty-first century and the cosmetic surgical industry. I highlight Heyes' argument on the normalization of the cosmetic surgical industry and an "authentic self" (Heyes 2007), and Garnham's theory on an emerging and oppressive discourse in relation to the "older" individual (Garnham 2013, 2017). I discuss the cosmetic surgical industry's targeting of the "older" individual, manipulating them by provoking the possibility of a self-transformation in the form of a delayed and future "authentic self."

In *The Psychic Life of Power*, Butler extends Foucault's theory on power and subjection to demonstrate the shaping of the subject's conscience (Butler 1997). Using Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the "unhappy consciousness," she draws attention to a relevant shift in the context of the workings or mechanisms of power as becomes evident in today's contemporary consumer culture. Although Butler does not specify as to which modality of power she is referring (disciplinary power, pastoral power, sovereign or bio-power), she elucidates the manner in which power as a force or mechanism of subjection fabricates the illusion of individuality or an "inner" and "authentic" self as that which the subject identifies with as an aspect of her self that is both her own and unique or exclusive in comparison to other individuals. Furthermore, she highlights the manner in which the conscience is then not that which belongs to an individual but that which is merely an effect of normalization itself. She writes, that "in each case, power that at first appears as external, pressed upon the subject, pressing the subject into subordination, assumes a psychic form that constitutes the subject's self-identity … The master, who at first appears to be 'external' to the slave, reemerges as the slave's own conscience" (Butler 1997: 3).

In "Foucault and The Paradox of Bodily Inscriptions," Butler explicates Foucault's theory in relation to the impact of power[32] and its shaping of the subject, the subject's body. She writes that it "is not literally internalized but incorporated on bodies"; there it "is manifest as a sign of the essence of their selves, … their conscience, the law of their desire. In effect, the law is fully dissimulated into the body as such." She argues that the ideal of an "inner self" understood as

[32] as subjection or a force that circumscribes the body.

"within" the body is produced through its inscription on the body. This effect of possessing an inner dimension or psychic idealization is but inscribed on the surface of the body, “a signification that produces on the flesh the illusion of an ineffable depth.” Through discourse, language in the context of signs, words, inscription itself invisibly structures the effect of an inner and intimate dimension to the self (Butler 1989: 606).

In the discussion that follows, I explore Butler’s argument by contextualizing it in relation to the cosmetic surgical industry and recent feminist research on the normalization of cosmetic surgery. I aim to highlight and elaborate on the manner in which Butler’s extension of Foucault’s argument on an inner dimension or psychic excess translates in the context of the cosmetic surgical body and an “authentic self.” This in turn further highlights the extent of normalization’s impact on women’s bodies, women’s voices, and provides established theoretical support for my presentation of a theoretical reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice and my return to Kristeva’s theory.

In *Self-Transformations: Foucault, Ethics, and Normalized Bodies,* Cressida Heyes argues that American televisual makeover shows have initiated the mainstreaming of cosmetic surgery in contemporary consumer culture by promoting narratives that imbue the idea of an “authentic self” as an essential identity anticipating its animation – a radical transformation to be successfully realized through the cosmetic surgical procedure (Heyes 2007).

Heyes’ argument on an “authentic self” draws comparisons to Goldman’s argument on the commodity self in the context of the conflict and tension promoted by consumer cultural discourses – these discourse provoke continuous conflict, and anxiety, as a means to confine the “authentic self,” in the context of cosmetic surgical discourses, and confine the “commodity self,” in the context of media images and commodity feminism (Heyes 2007, Goldman 1992).

Heyes describes an “authentic self” as, according to her, a self that is produced by normalizing discourses, with emphasis on cosmetic surgical discourses, that promote an inner dimension to the self, which is perceived by the individual as her exclusive truth. By undergoing cosmetic surgical procedures, the individual is led to believe that she will then realize her “true”

and "authentic" self through this process of cosmetic surgical self-transformation. She further suggests that an individual's agency and empowerment combined with choice is inscribed within these cosmetic surgical discourses (Heyes 2007). She argues that normalization effects function through fairytale narratives that promote the ideal of an "authentic self" as an obtainable goal. These normalizing narratives, however, are complex and conflictual in that they do not exclusively operate from the premise that promotes a docile individual conforming to established beauty norms and societal standards. In addition, normalizing narratives promote a moral dimension to the self – the idea that the individual is capable of healing her past trauma and through this form of self-improvement she is effectively making herself a better person (Heyes 2007: 9-38, 89-110). The "authentic self" as suggested by Heyes is therefore a self that is in conflict, a self that is shaped by the ideal of psychological and emotional healing or "wholeness" based on an unattainable ideal of beauty. Furthermore, the "authentic self" has a moral dimension that emerges from this place, or position, of psychological trauma. She claims that the cosmetic surgical industry promotes discourses that are "less about becoming *beautiful* and more about becoming *oneself"* (Heyes 2007: 96) and in so doing adversely impact women. She argues that American televisual makeover shows are unethical – they suggest that an "authentic inner personality of great moral beauty must be brought out of the body that fails adequately to reflect it" (Heyes 2007: 96).

Heyes' underscores that cosmetic surgical procedures are violent – surgery is a form of violence – however this violence is concealed, kept invisible, and a fairytale narrative analogous to that of Sleeping Beauty is used to veil this mode of violence ((Heyes 2007: 89-111). She writes that:

> Extreme Makeover makes liberal use of tacit and explicit fairy-tale tropes to reinforce and idealize the narrative structures of normalization …
>
> Fairytales notoriously provide metaphorical accounts of identity transition in which traumatic and chaotic phases (especially adolescence) are erased, and the motif "and they lived happily ever after" describes a mature, static, flawless self.
>
> (Heyes 2007: 102)

She emphasizes that these fairytale narratives, as promoted by makeover shows, further conceal the violence of surgery through the use of explicit visual images in the context of the before surgery and post-surgery images; yet, these images are presented in such a way that they appear seamless – a "continuous tale in which trauma and chaos are erased resolved" and the "post-surgical individuals represented as triumphant in that they overcame their monstrous pre-surgical selves" (Heyes 2007:102).

Heyes suggests that cosmetic surgery and the visual before and after images are promoted in a therapeutic sense, that undergoing cosmetic surgical procedures is then smoothly aligned with a self-transformation, self-actualization that draws comparisons to, I suggest, Foucault's argument on pastoral power in the context of it promoting a sense of salvation and liberation of an "inner" and "authentic" self. The second decade of the twenty-first century highlights the cosmetic surgical industry as more effective in its adoption of a therapeutic role. Online Virtual Simulators conceal the trauma of the surgical procedure itself and the painful recovery process is downplayed, minimized. Online Virtual Simulators and the individual's uploaded images of herself allows the patient to see her "before" picture and compare it the new, improved "after" cosmetic surgery image. In addition, she can alter her post-surgery visual images according to her desires and beauty ideals. The division between these images is further blurred, made seamless, in that the individual herself now plays a more active role in her own transformation and consequent "salvation" in the context of her intolerable pre-surgical self. The trauma of undergoing cosmetic surgical procedures is conveniently dismissed and in its place the idea of giving up or renouncing the "old" body and replacing it with a "new" and improved version. Online Virtual Simulators highlight the adaptation of "salvation" or "rebirth" in today's contemporary consumer culture. Foucault's concept "pastoral power" has adapted both effectively and efficiently, invisibly and silently impacting the westernized individual's psyche. Most importantly in relation to my argument, the psychic act of renouncing the "old" body draws comparisons to Foucault's act-of-confession. Where the speaking subject in the context of Foucault's bourgeois Victorian woman was provided a "protected" space in which to reveal her supposed repressed intimate desires, now, in the context of the cosmetic surgical body and the second decade of the twenty-first century, this act-of-confession in its modified and adaptable

form translates as a literal confinement of women's flesh. It is a silencing of woman's voices, an exploitation and oppression of the individual's psyche, by a deconstruction of the living body and a less visible, less explicit, mode of incarceration that is concealed by an aesthetic and moral ideal.

Bridget Garnham's research draws attention to an emerging form of normalization in the context of anti-ageing discourses aimed at "older" individuals (Garnham 2013). In "Designing 'older' rather than Denying Ageing: Problematizing Anti-ageing Discourse in relation to Cosmetic Surgery undertaken by Older People," Garnham argues that the cosmetic surgical industry oppresses "older" individuals by effectively designing ageing – by promoting essentialist concepts of the "naturally ageing body." She uses interview data and media texts to show how anti-ageing discourses inscribe ageing in the practice of cosmetic surgery. To advance her argument she suggests that the forms of rationality associated with cosmetic surgery constitute a contemporary regimen of care of the self, which enable ethical agency and creative self-stylization. Through this framework, cosmetic surgery can be re-imagined as a practice for designing "older" rather than denying ageing (Garnham 2013). In her recent work, *A New Ethics of Older: Subjectivity, Surgery, and Self-stylization*, she extends her argument on an emerging strategy in relation to the cosmetic surgical industry's promotion of anti-ageing designer discourses aimed at "older" individuals (Garnham 2017). She argues that normative discourses have evolved in their approach to "older" individuals. Rather than promoting an anti-ageing regime and advocating being youthful to the aged, Garnham argues that the cosmetic surgical industry promotes discourses that shape the "older" individual by promoting the ideal of being better, the improved and self-actualized version of the self; or, as Heyes might argue, a self-transformative version of the self that aligns with the inner or "authentic self," however, it is less focused on aesthetics in the context of youth and beauty and marketed as self-improvement (Garnham 2017).

Rather than the promotion of narratives, as Heyes has demonstrated, that delude the subject via a fairytale of transformation, the cosmetic surgical industry in the second decade of the twenty-first century suggests an efficient and effortless process that is further supported by the idea of cosmetic surgery as a right, an extension of empowerment, and a continual

participation, an active participant, in popular culture regardless of the individual's age. Garnham draws attention to this in the context of normalizing discourses that no longer deny the ageing process but rather re-inscribe it in a designer frame and, therefore, as a desirable but attainable goal – a goal that is exclusively attained by participating in this culturally styled and appealing discourse which entails undergoing cosmetic surgery itself (Garnham 2017).

Furthermore, cosmetic surgical procedures are no longer promoted as events, suggesting a sense of completion, but rather as a process of continual and necessary maintenance, a repeated renewal of the body and renouncing of the old suggesting, I argue, an adaptation of Foucault' act-of-confession. As an example, "The Aesthetic Maintenance Plan from Herte Center for Cosmetic Surgery" claims that maintenance "is defined as the support or upkeep of your property … Your beauty and youth need to be protected and preserved" (Herte Center for Cosmetic Surgery accessed 2015); and the more recent slogan, "your beautiful change" (Herte Center for Cosmetic Surgery accessed 2017).

I should mention here that Heyes' theory on the "authentic self" relates to my illustration of a theoretical reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice in Chapter 8. My reconstruction is an additional response to Heyes' proposal on feminist theorists promoting transformative acts or theorizing on self-transformative processes or practices. This is discussed in my introduction, Chapter 1. In this context I present a counter discourse to the cosmetic surgical industry and its shaping of the "authentic self" with my analysis of Krog's poetic texts and my application of Kristeva's theory on poetry analysis. In addition, I discuss Garnham's theory in Chapter 9 where I present Krog's poetic texts as a counter discourse to the oppressive designer cosmetic surgical discourses that exploit the ageing subject. Furthermore, I translate Foucault's proposal on pastoral power in the context of its underlying oppression within poetic texts. These arguments are clarified in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9.

## Section IV: The Cosmetic Surgical Body, Confession, a Return to The Mirror Stage, and an "Originary Ideal."

In the discussion that follows I argue that Goldman's commodity feminism (discussed in Section II), as an objectification and fetishization of women's bodies, translates as an act-of-confession in the context of the cosmetic surgical body and a return to the Mirror Stage. In so doing I further situate Foucault's argument on pastoral power in a twenty-first century consumer culturalist setting with emphasis on the role liberal feminist ideals play in this mode of exploitation. Lacan, Butler, Fuss, Kristeva, and recent research provides the theoretical framework that supports my arguments. In addition, I extend pastoral power's translation in the context of the act-of-confession at the Mirror Stage – I argue that the maternal image underlies this manipulation of the cosmetic surgical subject and plays a relevant role in this mode of patriarchal oppression. I argue that it is paradoxically the originary ideal, the originary love object, that underlies the act-of-confession and therefore it is the originary ideal that presents a mode of unconscious oppression in the context of pastoral power's inscription of the cosmetic surgical body.

In *Reading Ads Socially*, Goldman asks, "what happens to individuals when they are repeatedly directed towards commodified images in their search for authenticity?" (Goldman 1992: 122)

He argues that consumer society promotes what he terms "possessive individualism." "The individual has a right to all that is accrued by virtue of her ownership (her proprietary relationship) of her own body. Her appearance is her value and her avenue to accumulating capital" and that ideologically loaded representations of gender and power derive as much from what they conceal as what they make visible. He claims that women who objectify themselves conceal "a mundane psychic terror associated with not receiving 'looks' of admiration – of not having others validate one's appearance. A similar sense of terror associated with 'losing one's looks' – the quite reasonable fear that aging will deplete one's social power" (Goldman 1992: 123). Goldman adds that:

> In the model of the commodity self the negation of authenticity takes place when the named commodity (the means of self-satisfaction) displaces or pushes aside the ego – it decenters the self since fetishized self-identity becomes lodged in its many subdivided object-parts …
>
> The ideal consumer makes himself not just once, but repeatedly – the ideal ego is not sturdy or fixed but plastic. Enshrined in possessive individualism the self-sufficient ego is free to appropriate, to own, to alienate the world around it. The bourgeois ego-ideal is also tapped into a belief in a self that is an expressive totality.
>
> Self-expression as the hallmark of individual freedom becomes aligned with being master and maker of one's own world.
>
> (Goldman 1992: 220)

Goldman's argument assists my argument in this chapter by suggesting that the individual, the ego, in the context of possessive individualism is enshrined or preserved, underscoring the violence concealed within the processes that objectify the subject. He adds that the "seductively idealized ego that stared back at subjects from the advertising mirror for decades" has transformed the self "from one anchored in depth to one floating in appearances … the schizophrenic fragmentation of experience and loss of identity" (Goldman 1992: 217).

"Possessive individualism" as proposed by Goldman suggests that underlying the ownership of one's body in the context of contemporary consumer culture involves, paradoxically, a loss of the self, a "loss of identity." This suggests that the commodity self renounces or surrenders aspects of the self in exchange for the delusional sense of power that is gained through transforming the body into an object. Goldman's argument therefore provides support for my extension of Foucault's argument in the context of the aspect of pastoral power that translates in consumer culture as an act of confession: cosmetic surgery suggests a self-transformative process driven by an underlying obligation to reform the existing body, purge the excess and undesirable flesh, in exchange for a recognized and therefore redeemable body. Yet, it is more than a loss of identity, it suggests a loss of the body, the living and affective body itself. Butler provides support for this assertion in *The Psychic Life of Power* where she writes:

> The body is not a site on which a construction takes place; it is a destruction on the occasion of which a subject is formed. The formation of this subject is at

> once the framing, subordination, and regulation of the body, and the mode in which that destruction is preserved (in the sense of sustained and embalmed) *in* normalization.
>
> (Butler 1997: 92)

Butler suggests in the above quoted passage that the body, through the mechanisms of normalization, effectively loses its existence outside of normalization itself. Furthermore, it is an objectification that exceeds an implicit or implied categorization of bodies, as it is a transformation, in a more literal sense, to that of a preserved object. Butler writes, the body is "sustained and embalmed *in* normalization." Does Butler's profound argument not translate effectively in the context of the twenty-first century and the cosmetic surgical body? Does this not suggest a normalizing discourse that has, as Foucault claims, emerged from a new mode of subjection, a new form of individualization techniques aimed at confining and, furthermore, transforming the body into an object, a commodity, itself? Is there any aspect then, in relation to the cosmetic surgical subject or "authentic self" that is in excess of normalization, that exceeds pastoral power, and its exclusive and seemingly inescapable control? The discussion that follows argues that pastoral power functions on an underlying psychic level. Using Lacan's theory on the Mirror Stage and Diana Fuss's argument on the media's exploitation of the maternal image, I extend Foucault's argument on pastoral power in relation to the act of confession. In addition, I emphasize the relevance of the maternal image in relation to my argument and its reconstruction.

"The Mirror Stage as Formative of The I Function" claims that the infant when confronted with her specular image in the mirror, reflexively identifies with this image. Lacan argues that the infant's specular image is perceived as an ideal image and therefore an "Ideal-I" initiates a false sense of mastery that accompanies the individual throughout her existence (Lacan 2002 [1949]: 3-10). The claiming of her specular image as her own suggests that an identification with images – as those promoted in advertised, online or virtual images – plays a pivotal role in the normalization of subjects.

Lacan claims that at the Mirror Stage the infant's perceiving this image as whole, as an "orthopedic form of totality," rather than a fragmented and chaotic image of the body as perceived by the infant prior to the Mirror Stage motivates her initial identification with this/her image or object (Lacan 2002 [1949]: 6)]. This further suggests that the objectification of the body, as suggested by Goldman and his argument on possessive individualism and fetishization was initiated at the Mirror Stage itself.

In *Anxiety*, Lacan writes, "The whole impasse lies here. In demanding to be acknowledged, right where I get acknowledged, I only get acknowledged as an object" (Lacan 2014a [2004] 1962-1963: 24). He uses Hegel's argument from *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, the struggle of the self or self-consciousness towards a recognition of itself as support for his ideas on the objectification of the subject (Lacan 2014a [2004] 1962-1963). He writes:

> *The Selbstbewusstsein,* considered to be constitutive of the cognizing subject, is an illusion, a source of error, because the dimension of the subject deemed to be transparent in his act of taking cognizance of some entity only begins with the coming into play of a specified object, which is the one that the mirror stage attempts to circumscribe, namely, the image of one's body, in so far as faced with this image, the subject has the feeling of jubilation on account of being indeed faced with an object that renders him transparent to himself. The extension of this illusion of consciousness to all types of cognizance is prompted by the object of cognizance being constructed and modelled in the image of the relation to the specular image. It's precisely in this respect that the object of cognizance is insufficient.
>
> (Lacan 2014a [2004] 1962-1963: 59)

Lacan's argument, on the Mirror Stage, suggests that it is the inaugural moment[33] that is repeated in adulthood in the context of the commodity self or cosmetic surgical subject looking at her body in the mirror.[34] The body is perceived in terms of its imperfections, its lack in terms of conforming to the rigid boundaries established by society's norms and standards of beauty. The cosmetic surgical subject's image of her "disordered body" suggests momentary yet repeated confrontations with her "pre-I" or pre-verbal I which in turn produces an anxiety as the

[33] I use the term inaugural moment to refer to the infant's initial interaction with her own image at the Mirror Stage.

[34] or as reflected by/through online or virtual images.

“pre-I” is that which is outside of the Symbolic Order. This produces and sustains a desire to purge the body of its excess and conform it to society’s standards. Therefore, the cosmetic surgical body is shaped by a desire to be socially recognized and accepted, and a precondition for this recognition is based on a necessary exclusion of the unacceptable, unrecognized body. The cosmetic surgical body demonstrates the impact of Foucault’s act of confession in the context of today’s contemporary consumer culture. Furthermore, it demonstrates that adaptability and effectiveness of pastoral power. In her chapter, “Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us All,” Butler argues:

> How are we to understand the psychic disposition at work at the moment in which the pedestrian responds to the law? What conditions and informs that response? Why would the person on the street respond to "Hey you there!" by turning around? What is the significance of turning to face a voice that calls from behind? This turning toward the voice of the law is a sign of a certain desire to be beheld by and perhaps also to behold the face of authority, a visual rendering of an auditory scene—a mirror stage or, perhaps more appropriately, an "acoustic mirror"'—that permits the misrecognition without which the sociality of the subject cannot be achieved.
>
> (Butler 1997: 112)

Butler suggests that it is the paternal realm and law of the Father that initiates the guilty conscience; the subject prior to its fabrication in and through normalization automatically responds to the voice of authority. However, is it not be the mother or primary caregiver that supports the subject-as-infant at the Mirror Stage? This suggests therefore that it is the maternal representation that is exploited by consumerist discourses and media exposure – that which underlies consumer culture’s psychic subjection of the individual at the Mirror Stage, and, in the case of the cosmetic surgical industry, the objectification and fetishization of women’s bodies, is the maternal image itself.

I outline my argument in Chapter 2, Section IV, against Lacan’s emphasis on the father’s presence as initiating the inauguration of the infant-as-subject at the Mirror Stage. I argue that it is the mother or primary caregiver (or maternal representation), the originary ideal that is present at the Mirror Stage. In the discussion that follows I extend my argument in the context

of the maternal image as underlying the Mirror Stage and emphasize that the normalized self, or "authentic self" as Heyes proposes, is additionally exploited by consumerist images due to the underlying maternal image. If the cosmetic surgical industry promotes the exploitation of the cosmetic surgical subject by returning her to the Mirror Stage, provoking her ridding of her "old" body in exchange for a "new" transformed version, thereby aligning her body with her "Ideal I," then, I argue, the maternal image that underlies this manipulation of the individual plays a relevant role in this mode of patriarchal oppression. I argue that it is paradoxically the originary ideal, the originary love object, that underlies the act-of-confession and therefore it is the originary ideal that presents a mode of unconscious oppression in the context of pastoral power's inscription of the cosmetic surgical body.

Julia Kristeva claims that the maternal realm is prior to the Mirror Stage (Kristeva 1984 [1974], 1981, 1982 [1980]). The discussion that follows is therefore an argument in agreement with Kristeva to promote further and theoretically support my return to her theory. However, I aim to underscore the maternal representation's face – a non-gender specific visual image itself.

In *Anxiety*, Lacan claims that an underlying alienation and anxiety shapes the subject's interaction with her image in the mirror. He writes that:

> The body is not in a word, constitutable in the way that Descartes establishes in the field of extension. It is a matter of our seeing that the body in question is not given to us in a pure and simple fashion in our mirror, that even in this experience of the mirror, there can occur a moment where this image, this specular image that we think we have in our grasp, is modified: what we have face to face with us, our stature, our face, our pair of eyes, allows there to emerge the dimension of our own look and the value of the image then begins to change especially if there is a moment at which this look which appears in the mirror begins to look no longer at ourselves, *initium*, aura, the dawning of a feeling of strangeness which opens the door to anxiety.
>
> (Lacan 2014a [2004] 1962-1963: 88)

In the above quoted passage, it is clear that, according to Lacan, the Mirror Stage is a period of anxiety and alienation in relation to the infant and that this experience of alienation accompanies the subject throughout her adult life. He suggests that there is an underlying

"other" that stares back at the individual and that this look disorientates and unsettles the individual. In "The Split Between the Eye and the Gaze," he claims that underlying the subject's image of herself in the mirror is an unsettling gaze which disturbs the subject – an unsettling anxiety due to a "looking back" at the self from the mirror image itself – and therefore this gaze is suppressed by the individual (Lacan 1998 [1964]: 73). He writes that:

> … The scopic relation, the object on which suspends the phantasy from which the subject is suspended in an essential vacillation is the gaze … From the moment that this gaze appears, the subject tries to adapt himself to it, he becomes the punctiform object, that point of vanishing being with which the subject confuses his own failure. Furthermore of all the objects in which the subject may recognize his dependence in the register of desire, the gaze is specified as un-apprehensible. This is why it is more than any other object misunderstood and it is perhaps for this reason too that the subject manages fortunately to symbolize his own vanishing and punctiform bar in the illusion of consciousness of *seeing oneself in oneself* that the gaze is elided.
>
> (Lacan 1998 [1964]: 83)

Lacan suggests that it is a paternal representation that underlies the scopic relation at the Mirror Stage – as it is the Law of the Father, the Symbolic, that both supports the infant's entrance into the realm of the paternal and consequently shapes the subject (Lacan 1991 [1975] 1953-1954).

Diana Fuss's work "Fashion and The Homospectatorial Look" analyses the advertised images promoted by the fashion and beauty industry. Fuss uses Lacan's argument on the gaze in the context of consumer culture and argues that it is the mother's image that underlies the advertised images promoted by the fashion and beauty industry, and therefore it is the mother that gazes back at the individual, the mother's face reflected back from the advertised images (Fuss 1994). Fuss writes:

> As one of the earliest planes of psychical organization, the mother's face is refigured by the photographic apparatus as eternally present – fashioned, fetishized, and fixed by the gaze of the desiring subject. These images instill pleasure in the viewer by at once constructing and evoking the memory of a choric union, they bare the imprint of an archaic moment achieved through a technological simulation of a past event. Often in these shots of a severed woman's head we see the face from the distance and the perspective that an

> infant might see it … The loss, the lost object of the mother's beautific face … fills the frame …
>
> (Fuss 1994: 218-222)

In *Powers of Horror* Kristeva argues that the subject's participation in the realm of discourse and the Symbolic is underlined by an abject fear of the return of the maternal (Kristeva 1982). She writes:

> But that word, "fear"—a fluid haze, an elusive clamminess—no sooner has it cropped up than it shades off like a mirage and permeates all words of the language with nonexistence, with a hallucinatory, ghostly glimmer. Thus, fear having been bracketed, discourse will seem tenable only if it ceaselessly confront that otherness, a burden both repellent and repelled, a deep well of memory that is unapproachable and intimate: the abject.
>
> (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 6)

Kristeva suggests that it is the mother, the maternal realm, who is excluded, "repressed," in order for the infant to enter the realm of the Symbolic. She writes:

> But what is primal repression? Let us call it the ability of the speaking being, always already haunted by the Other, to divide, reject, repeat. Without *one* division, *one* separation, *one* subject/ object having been constituted (not yet, or no longer yet). Why?
>
> Perhaps because of maternal anguish, unable to be satiated within the encompassing symbolic.
>
> (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 12)

With Fuss and Kristeva's arguments providing theoretical support, I argue that the maternal image, the visual image of the maternal representation, shows a translation of pastoral power in the context of an act-of-confession and the cosmetic surgical body.

I argue that the cosmetic surgical industry's psychic manipulation of the individual by media and televisual images is further exemplified through an exploitation of the underlying mother's image. I argue that this promotes guilt in relation to the individual, which is then

"confessed" through the act of undergoing cosmetic surgical procedures and the ridding of undesirable excess flesh. Furthermore, and most relevant to my argument, it is through repeatedly returning the individual to the Mirror Stage that this process of subjection and normalization by advertised images as promoted by the cosmetic surgical industry is both supported and maintained – it is through a return to the Mirror Stage that the mother or primary caregiver is repeatedly renounced, rejected. Therefore, it is the Mirror Stage that initiates the guilt – the origins of conscience – due to the infant's initial rejection of the mother in favour of her own ideal image or "ideal I" at the Mirror Stage. It is therefore, I argue, the maternal image, the visual image of the maternal representation, that shows a translation of pastoral power in the context of an act-of-confession.

In *Powers of Horror*, Kristeva claims that the precondition for narcissism is the rejection or rather abjection of the mother's body. She emphasizes "the difficulty the mother has in acknowledging (or being acknowledged by) the symbolic realm" (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 13), and that the symbolic function prohibits the maternal body (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 14). The mother or the maternal body is therefore abjected by the infant as a precondition for his/her entrance into the Realm of the Symbolic and society's norms and conventions. In addition, she suggests that the Mirror Stage plays a relevant role in the promotion of the individual or narcissistic subject. She writes that:

> Abjection, with a meaning broadened to take in subjective diachrony, *is a precondition of narcissism. It* is coexistent with it and causes it to be permanently brittle. The more or less beautiful image in which I behold or recognize myself [Here Kristeva is referencing Lacan's The Mirror Stage and the subject's *meconnaissance* – the individual's misrecognition of her ideal image in the mirror as her 'self'] rests upon an abjection that sunders it as soon as repression, the constant watchman, is relaxed.
>
> (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 13)

I should underscore that Kristeva's ideas on the abjection of the mother is a process that takes place prior to the Mirror Stage itself (Kristeva 1982 [1980]). The above quote indicates that the individual's acceptance of her "self" at the Mirror Stage is based on a previous abjection or

rejection of the mother. I argue that it is *at* the Mirror Stage itself that the infant exchanges her "originary attachment" to the mother or primary caregiver with emphasis on it being an attachment that includes love, for the image of the "self" in the mirror. As outlined in Chapter 2, Section IV, where I argue that it is at the Mirror Stage that the infant exchanges her "originary ideal" for the ideal image of her "self." This exchange suggests a paradoxical process in that it includes both a rejection of the maternal image in favour of a more "orderly" and structured self-image in the mirror and a preservation of this maternal image as an originary ideal, an originary love object. In addition, my argument on the exchange at the Mirror Stage is at variance with Kristeva's argument on abjection in the context of a less aggressive "casting off" and abhorrence of the mother or primary caregiver as it includes a preservation of the maternal image as an originary ideal, a loved object. Furthermore, it is due to a love for the maternal representation, a pre-Mirror Stage love, that fear, anxiety, and guilt (rather than abhorrence) is induced when cosmetic surgical discourses and virtual images provoke the resurgence of the preserved and unconsciously protected originary love object – the originary ideal.

In Chapter 5, I extend Foucault's proposal on pastoral power utilizing Judith Butler's argument predominantly from her work *The Psychic Life of Power* and translate its mode of oppression in the context of the underlying mechanisms of normalization, its shaping of the psyche, with emphasis on the shaping of the subject's conscience. The aim of this extension is to draw attention to an underlying *excess* that "escapes" pastoral power's psychic confinement.

In Chapter 6, I argue that an "originary attachment" is the "originary loss" that underlies the shaping of the conscience as argued by Butler in *The Psychic Life of Power* (explained in Chapter 5). Melanie Klein and Ian Suttie's theory provide support for this chapter.

In Chapter 9, I further extend and clarify my argument on the originary ideal and the translation of Foucault's proposal on pastoral power and Krog's poetic texts.

# Chapter 5: Butler, the Shaping of the Conscience, and an "Originary loss"

*When the starry sky, a vista of open seas, or a stained-glass window shedding purple beams fascinate me, there is a cluster of meaning, of colors, of words, of caresses, there are light touches, scents, sighs, cadences that arise, shroud me, carry me away, and sweep me beyond the things I see, hear, or think, the "sublime" object dissolves in the raptures of a bottomless memory. It is such a memory, which, from stopping point to stopping point, remembrance to remembrance, love to love, transfers that object to the refulgent point of the dazzlement in which I stray in order to be.*

*— Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, 1980*

This chapter is a response to Kristeva's proposal in the context of a deconstruction of the "false self" on an intimate level – using Judith Butler's theory on the shaping of the psyche, I deconstruct the underlying and unconscious mechanisms of normalization itself.

In Chapter 3 and 4, I deconstruct the "false self," or what I refer to as the "normalized self," in a social context – I extend Foucault's theory on pastoral power demonstrating its culminating impact in the twenty-first century and its translation in the context of the cosmetic surgical body with emphasis on the act of confession. In this chapter, I extend Foucault's theory on pastoral power to demonstrate the underlying workings of normalization with emphasis on the shaping of the conscience.

In *The Psychic Life of Power*, Judith Butler uses Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan, Louis Althusser, Friedrich Nietzsche, G. W. F. Hegel and extends Foucault's theory on power to demonstrate the impact of power – Butler uses the term subjection – in the production of the subject's psyche (Butler 1997). Butler shows that the shaping of the individual's psyche is a paradoxical process in that subjection not only affects the subject but produces the subject in its entirety (Butler 1997).

In this chapter, I provide my reading of Butler's theory from *The Psychic Life of Power* and I focus on six key aspects of subjection. In Section I, I underscore aspects of the functioning of

subjection that are relevant to my argument in the context of normalization and the confinement of the subject, or the individual. In Section II, I demonstrate that, according to Butler, agency, empowerment and emancipation are mere effects as a result of the workings of subjection. In Section III, I explain the shaping of the conscience. Section IV is on guilt and the origins of the conscience. Section V argues that an "originary attachment" is the "originary loss." Section V provides additional theoretical support for Chapter 6.

Furthermore, I underscore four core mechanisms in the shaping of the paradoxical subject according to my reading of Butler.

- There is no "outside" of subjection
- Violence or subjection is prior to the subject
- "as the agency of the subject power assumes its present temporal dimension"
- Subjection functions through a reflexivity

The aim of this chapter is to challenge Butler's theory on the shaping of the conscience by underscoring that it is an "originary loss" as that which underlies the conscience and to position an "originary loss" as a basis in the context of my idea of an "originary attachment" which is discussed in Chapter 6.

## Section I: The Confinement of the Subject – No 'Outside' of Subjection and the Present

In *The Psychic Life of Power*, Butler suggests that the subject is exclusively confined to the realm of subjection – there is no "outside" of subjection. In addition, power – as that which functions through subjection – is prior to the subject. She writes:

> According to the formulation of subjection as both the subordination and becoming of the subject, power is, as subordination, a set of conditions that precedes the subject, effecting and subordinating the subject from the outside.

> This formulation falters, however, when we consider that there is no subject prior to this effect. Power not only *acts on* a subject but, in a transitive sense, *enacts* the subject into being. As a condition, power precedes the subject.
>
> (Butler 1997: 13)

In Chapter 4, Section II, I discuss Butler's *Bodies That Matter* where she argues that the subjection of the subject is not a singular "act" but always a reiteration of a norm or a set of norms that manages to conceal or disguise the conventions of which it is a repetition by maintaining its status in the present (Butler 1993: 11). In *The Psychic Life of Power* she extends these ideas and demonstrates subjection's impact in shaping (producing) the individual's sense of agency and empowerment.

Butler writes that power "loses its appearance of priority, however, when it is wielded by the subject, a situation that gives rise to the reverse perspective that power is the effect of the subject, and that power is what subjects effect" (Butler 1997: 13). She emphasizes the idea of temporality – of agency as being an effect of power due to power (as subjection) keeping the subject confined to a sense of presence in the context of the present. She writes:

> A condition does not enable or enact without becoming present. Because Power is not intact prior to the subject, the appearance of its priority disappears as power acts on the subject, and the subject is inaugurated (and derived) through this temporal reversal in the horizon of power. As the agency of the subject, power assumes its present temporal dimension.
>
> (Butler 1997: 13-14)

According to Butler then an individual is produced by confining "it within power," trapped within a realm of subjection that in turn maintains the individual by containing her within its "present temporal dimension"; and it is this present dimension that produces the effect of agency. Butler then explains her proposal on the maintaining of the individual's sense of agency and choice. She writes:

> Power considered as a condition of the subject is necessarily not the same as power considered as what the subject is said to wield. The power that initiates

> the subject fails to remain continuous with the power that is the subject's agency. A significant and potentially enabling reversal occurs when power shifts from its status as a condition of agency to the subject's "own" agency (constituting an appearance of power in which the subject appears as the condition of its "own" power). How are we to assess that becoming? Is it an enabling break, a bad break? How is it that the power upon which the subject depends for existence and which the subject is compelled to reiterate turns against itself in the course of that reiteration?
>
> (Butler 1997: 12)

Butler highlights a relevant aspect in the production of the individual by subjection. The power that inaugurates the subject is not the same as that which the subject "owns." In the context of an individual's agency, to assume or "possess" power suggests that a transformation or shift in the manner in which power subjects the subject takes place.

In what manner then, does Butler suggest the "internalization" of violence takes place? Furthermore, most importantly, how does this form the subject's sense of agency, if, as she claims, the subject is produced and maintained by violence?

Butler argues that "the act of appropriation may involve an alteration of power such that the power assumed or appropriated works against the power that made that assumption possible" (Butler 1997: 13); she adds "in fact, the power assumed may at once retain and resist that subordination." However, "this conclusion is not to be thought of as (a) a resistance that is *really* a recuperation of power or (b) a recuperation that is *really* a resistance. It is both at once, and this ambivalence forms the bind of agency" (Butler 1997: 13).

Butler suggests that through the act of appropriation itself the subject is led to believe, deludes herself into thinking, that she is in possession of power itself. This act fabricates a sense of agency. This appropriated "possession" is then taken as her own and further assumes a resistance toward the very power she falsely believes is her own.

## Section II: Emancipation Equals Self-Enslavement

With reference to Hegel's "self-enslavement" from "The Unhappy Consciousness" and Nietzsche's "the instinct for freedom" from *On the Genealogy of Morals,* Butler argues that the "instinct for freedom" is equivalent to "self-enslavement"; and that both are an effect of subjection itself (Butler 1997: 30-61). She argues that to refer to a "drive" or "will," much less to its "turning back on itself," is "a strange way to speak, strange because it figures a process which cannot be detached from or understood apart from that very figuration" (Butler 1997: 69).

According to Butler, Nietzsche claims that *"the instinct for freedom* is forcibly made latent, repressed, incarcerated within and finally able to vent itself, it does so only on itself, and this is the beginnings of a bad conscience'' (qtd by Butler 1997: 32- 33). Using Hegel's idea of self-enslavement from "The Unhappy Consciousness" Butler argues that Nietzsche's "forcibly repressing of freedom" is "self-enslavement" (Hegel). Butler argues that self-harm (self-enslavement) is due to the repetitive turning of punishment – the violence of subjection. This repetition affects the subject in that it fabricates the effects of an "inner self" who is "self-reflecting" (Butler 1997: 31-61). She uses Foucault's theory from *Discipline and Punish* as support for her argument. She writes:

> Underscoring the painful realization that "liberation" from external authorities does not suffice to initiate a subject into freedom, Foucault draws upon Nietzsche and, in particular, upon the self-incarcerating movement that structures modern forms of reflexivity. The limits to liberation are to be understood not merely as self-imposed but, more fundamentally, as the precondition of the subject's very formation. A certain structuring attachment *to* subjection becomes the condition of moral subjectivation. Consider the expanded text of Foucault's remarks on the prisoner's subjection, previously cited, in *Discipline and Punish:* "The man described for us, whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection *[assujettissement]* much more profound than himself. A 'Soul' inhabits him and brings him to existence, which is itself a factor in the mastery that power exercises over the body. The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body."
>
> (Butler 1997: 33)

An instinct for freedom is then an effect of self-harm or self-enslavement, the subject's response to the force or impact of subjection. Butler therefore reverses the process. I will outline my reading of this process: rather than being born with an instinct or will that is repetitively repressed by the individual – in order for the individual to live what society refers to as a moral existence and the individual's possible emancipation as a form of resistance to this self-imposed repression – it is power through the mechanisms of subjection that "turns," inverts, thereby fabricating the sense of emancipation. The subject is repetitively exposed to society's violence and consequently "internalizes" this violence. Butler suggests that it is the subject's repeated exposure to violence, the subject's constant witnessing or experiencing of violence that fabricates and maintains both the reflexive and the reflective subject. Self-enslavement is therefore emancipation and both are bodily-subjection, a mere effect of power. In the context of today's modern women and contemporary consumer culture, Butler's proposal on self-enslavement as emancipation which are both products of the process of subjection, suggests that the modern woman cannot empower or liberate herself through bodily transformation. Emancipation is the mere effect of the subject being led to believe, by the process of normalization, that she was initially repressed. Butler's proposal on the power of subjection as both normalizing and constructing the subject (or the subject's psyche) suggests that the subject is confined to a circular narrative without the possibility of freedom; trapped in a circuit of self-enslavement; repeatedly shaped by the violence of subjection that fabricates the effect of a conscience which she (the subject which is itself an effect) is led to believe is a result of her own self-reflection. The subject is bound to a story that is not her own. Butler argues:

> The subject might yet be thought as deriving its agency from precisely the power it opposes, as awkward and embarrassing as such a formulation might be … If the subject is *neither* fully determined by power *nor* fully determining of power (but significantly and partially both), the subject exceeds the logic of noncontradiction, is an excrescence of logic, as it were. To claim that the subject exceeds either/or is not to claim that it lives in some free zone of its own making. Exceeding is not escaping, and the subject exceeds precisely that to which it is bound.
>
> (Butler 1997: 17)

## Section III: Morality and the Conscience

This section explains Butler's argument on power as forming or producing a reflexivity – power "turning on itself" – which then fabricates the conscience. She writes, "Conscience is the means by which a subject becomes an object for itself, reflecting on itself, establishing itself as reflective and reflexive" (Butler 1997: 22).

Through the act of shaping or producing the subject – the subject's psyche – power is transformed into a reflexive act suggestive of an "internalization." Butler argues that "a redescription of the domain of psychic subjection is needed to make clear how social power produces modes of reflexivity at the same time as it limits forms of sociality" (Butler 1997: 21).

Butler then explicates her ideas on reflexivity in relation to norms and morality. She claims that "The notion that morality is predicated on a certain kind of violence is already familiar, but more surprising is that such violence founds the subject. Morality performs that violence again and again in cultivating the subject as a reflexive being" (Butler 1997: 64). "The psychic operation of the norm … does not merely reinstate social power, it becomes formative and vulnerable in highly specific ways" (Butler 1997: 21). Using Nietzsche's ideas on morality and the will, she argues that reflection is itself a "turning on oneself" a "kind of violence," and therefore self-reflection cannot be perceived in the context of an opposition to violence as it is in itself an "expression" of the violence from which it emerged (Butler 1997: 64-65). She emphasizes that the circle of violence cannot be broken as the subject is contained, confined, within the realm of violence. She writes:

> How and when does that breakage occur? And what emerges as a significant possibility in which the subject loses its closed contour, the circularity of its own reflexive closure? A pure will, ontologically intact prior to any articulation, does not suddenly emerge as a principle of self-augmentation and self-affirmation that exceeds the bounds of any and all regulatory schemas.
>
> Rather, the formative and fabricating dimension of psychic life, which travels under the name of the "will," and which is usually associated with a restrictively aesthetic domain, proves central to refashioning the normative shackles that no subject can do without but which no subject is condemned to repeat in exactly the same way.
>
> (Butler 1997: 64-65)

According to Butler, morality, as a violence in itself, fabricates the psyche through a repetition – a repeated violence – which then becomes a reflexive process. The subject's "will" is but an effect of the psyche which is itself produced and then "shackled" to itself through this reflexivity which it depends upon for its very existence. It is the psyche that normalizes the subject, produces and then confines the "will" within a closed and contained fabricated space that through repetition becomes an automatic response, a reflex, that then suggests an agency, a possible empowerment, as an effect of this reflexive process; which, in return, is "claimed" by an individual as her own (Butler 1997: 63-80). A "power *exerted on* a subject, subjection is nevertheless a power *assumed by* the subject**,** an assumption that constitutes the instrument of that subject's becoming" (Butler 1997: 11).

In her chapter, "Circuits of Bad Conscience," Butler uses Freud and Nietzsche's theory to extend her argument in relation to the role the conscience plays in the production of the subject – the conscience as a reflexive effect (Butler 1997: 63-80). She claims that the will in relation to Nietzsche's ideas is said to "turn back on itself" (Butler 1997: 64). She then asks how to "imagine a will such that it recoils and doubles upon itself." She emphasizes this question by then asking how this figure being offered, of a recoiling will, then articulates in the context of the conscience (Butler 1997: 64-65). She writes:

> Freud will use a similar language in writing of the formation of conscience, especially in relation to paranoia and narcissism. He describes conscience as the force of a desire— although sometimes a force of aggression—as it turns back on itself, and he understands prohibition, not as a law external to desire, but as the very operation of desire as it turns on its own possibility. What sense do we make of the figure that emerges in the context of both explanations, that of a will that turns back on itself, that of a desire that turns back on itself?
>
> We must ask not only how this figure of recoiling and redoubling becomes central to understanding bad conscience, but what this figure suggests about the bodily position or disposition encoded in the structure of reflexivity.
>
> … Is this strange posture of the will in the service of a social regulation that requires the production of the subject a consequence or an expression of bad conscience?
>
> (Butler 1997: 64- 65)

Butler extends her argument on reflexivity to include the soul as both a consequence and an expression of the conscience – an effect produced through the turning of the will against itself. She writes: “The soul is precisely what a certain violent artistry produces when it takes itself as its own object. The soul, the psyche, is not there prior to this reflexive move, but this reflexive turning of the will against itself produces in its wake the metaphorics of psychic life” (Butler 1997: 76).

Butler suggests that the soul, or what she terms the “metaphorics of psychic life” is an effect due to the reflexivity of subjection – through the reflexive process that fabricates the “will,” the “will” then “turns against itself”; this turning being a response, suggestive of an automatic reflex, that turns on itself which is then the object. These repeated “turnings” fabricate the effect of a soul. She claims that if “we understand the soul to be the effect of imposing form upon oneself, where the form is taken to be equivalent to the soul, then there can be no protracted will, no ‘I’ that stands for itself through time, without this self-imposition of form, this moral laboring on oneself” (Butler 1997: 76).

Butler therefore suggests that it is the soul that perpetuates and supports the “internalization” of morals. This suggests that the act or process of “self-reflection” is but a mechanism, an automated reflex that turns upon a previous effect; this effect being the “will” or the “self” itself. In addition, it is through a process or mechanism of repeated turnings that the soul performs the task of punishment or “self-affliction” and assumes the form of a conscience.

## Section IV: Guilt and the Origins of the Conscience

In *The Psychic Life of Power* Butler argues that the conscience emerges from an originary violence (Butler 1997: 25, 66, 64). In addition, Butler underscores that the inaugural moment or inauguration of the subject by an originary violence is inextricably linked to the “original conscience” yet the conscience emerges prior to the subject itself (Butler 1997: 67-80). She writes:

> More precisely, what does it mean to say that a subject emerges only through the action of turning back on itself? If this turning back on oneself is a trope, a movement which is always and only *figured* as a bodily movement, but which no body literally performs, in what will the necessity of such a figuration consist? The trope appears to be the shadow of a body, a shadowing of that body's violence against itself, a body in spectral and linguistic form that is the signifying mark of the psyche's emergence.
>
> Considered grammatically, it will seem that there must first be a subject who turns back on itself, yet I will argue that there is no subject except as a consequence of this very reflexivity. How can the subject be presumed at both ends of this process, especially when it is the very formation of the subject for which this process seeks to give an account?
>
> (Butler 1997: 68)

Butler therefore suggests that the inauguration of the subject correlates to an originary conscience. The subject is first, prior to being a subject, a "turning back on itself," an act or force of punishment – a self-beratement – that is prior to the subject itself. She reinforces this proposal when she argues that "the very notion of reflexivity, as an emergent structure of the subject, is the consequence of a 'turning back on itself,' a repeated self-beratement which comes to form the misnomer of 'conscience,' and that there is no formation of the subject without a passionate attachment to subjection" (Butler 1997: 67).

The subject is therefore an emergent or originary "conscience" before it is a subject itself as, according to Butler's ideas, a "turning back" or self-punishment is prior to the production of the subject itself.

Butler uses Louis Althusser's theory from "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" as support for her argument that the subject is "guilty first" – the idea of guilt as being prior to the subject itself. This in turn is aimed at supporting Butler's core argument that a passionate attachment to subjection is prior to the formation of the subject itself. In Chapter 6, I explain and expand on my argument against Butler's passionate attachment to subjection and I argue that an originary attachment is a basis from which the subject emerges.

In "On Ideology," from *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*, Althusser argues that "all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as

concrete subjects" (Althusser 2014a [1969]: 190). Ideology functions in such a way that it "recruits" subjects, shapes subjects. He writes:

> by that very process which I have called *interpellation* or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most common everyday police (or other) hailing: 'Hey, you there.' . . . [T]he hailed individual will turn around. By this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion, he becomes a *subject*. Why? Because he has recognised that the hail was 'really' addressed to him.
>
> (Althusser 2014a [1969]: 190-191)

Butler uses Althusser's argument on interpellation – of the subject turning back, responding to the voice of authority, the call of the law – to promote the idea of the subject being guilty first, guilty prior to his/her formation through interpellation (Butler 1997: 5-6; 106-131). She writes:

> Significantly, Althusser does not offer a clue as to why that individual turns around, accepting the voice as being addressed to him or her, and accepting the subordination and normalization effected by that voice. Why does this subject turn toward the voice of the law, and what is the effect of such a turn in inaugurating a social subject? Is this a guilty subject and, if so, how did it become guilty? Might the theory of interpellation require a theory of conscience? The interpellation of the subject through the inaugurative address of state authority presupposes not only that the inculcation of conscience already has taken place, but that conscience, understood as the psychic operation of a regulatory norm, constitutes a specifically psychic and social working of power on which interpellation depends but for which it can give no account.
>
> (Butler 1997: 5)

In her chapter, "Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us All," Butler expounds her proposal on guilt as being prior to the formation of the subject itself. She asserts that although, according to Althusser, the response to the call – the voice of authority or the law – is an aligning of the self to the law while simultaneously entering the realm of language "of self-ascription" (Butler 1997: 107), there is "no 'I' who might ascribe a place to itself, who might be announced in speech, without first a self-attribution of guilt, a submission to the law through an acceptance of its demand for conformity" (Butler 1997: 107). She writes that:

> The one who turns around in response to the call does not respond to a demand to turn around. The turning around is an act that is, as it were, conditioned both by the "voice" of the law and by the responsiveness of the one hailed by the law …
>
> Although there would be no turning around without first having been hailed, neither would there be a turning around without some readiness to turn. But where and when does the calling of the name solicit the turning around, the anticipatory move toward identity? How and why does the subject turn, anticipating the conferral of identity through the self-ascription of guilt? What kind of relation already binds these two such that the subject knows to turn, knows that something is to be gained from such a turn?
>
> How might we think of this "turn" as prior to subject formation, a prior complicity with the law without which no subject emerges? The turn toward the law is thus a turn against oneself, a turning back on oneself that constitutes the movement of conscience.
>
> (Butler 1997: 107)

Butler then reinforces her argument on the relevance of guilt as prior to the subject's production through interpellation or subjection as further support for her assertion that the subject is exclusively a product of violence. Guilt itself is but an effect due to a previous, already existing violence, a previous and already existing law. There is no "outside of," no "excess to," the realm of subjection and its normalizing impact. The guilty conscience is but an effect of an originary violence without which the subject, or conscience, could not be formed – the subject is trapped or confined within a circle of continuous subjection. Furthermore, the guilty conscience ensures that the subject remains confined, or conformed, within this closed circuit. Butler writes:

> This subjectivation is, according to Althusser, a misrecognition, a false and provisional totalization; what precipitates this desire for the law, this lure of misrecognition offered in the reprimand that establishes subordination as the price of subjectivation? This account appears to imply that social existence, existence as a subject, can be purchased only through a guilty embrace of the law, where guilt guarantees the intervention of the law and, hence, the continuation of the subject's existence. If the subject can only assure his/her existence in terms of the law, and the law requires subjection for subjectivation, then, perversely, one may (always already) yield to the law in order to continue to assure one's own existence.
>
> (Butler 1997: 112)

I support Althusser's claim that interpellation shapes the subject; and I support Butler's claim that the conscience and guilt are prior to the normalization of the subject. However, I am at variance with Butler's argument in relation to the basis of the conscience. I argue that it is an originary attachment that forms the basis from which the subject emerges. It is a guilt experienced by the infant due to her rejection of the mother or primary caregiver at the Mirror Stage – the renouncement of the maternal that initiates the guilt that will then be used as a means to normalize the subject or individual.

## Section V: Conclusion: Loss and an "Originary Attachment"

This section provides theoretical support for my argument in relation to my proposal of an "originary attachment" in the context of it being the "originary loss" that underlies the subject's conscience and that which is prior to the Mirror Stage (and, therefore, prior to the initiation of guilt and the resulting normalization of the subject). I argue in Chapter 6 that a return to this originary loss suggests a basis for an authentic feminist voice in contemporary consumer culture.

In *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Freud writes that civilization employs a means to control or restrict individuals' harmful and disruptive behaviours (Freud 1989[1930]: 83-89). In Chapter 2, Section I, I discuss Freud's theory in relation to the super-ego and the "internalization" of a paternal authority (Freud 1989[1930]: 85-87). Freud argues that the ethical progress of society is promoted through the conscience, which suggests an effective means for society to inadvertently restrict an individual's behavior. Through a process of internalization, aggressive behavior, for example, is turned inward by the individual and directed toward his own ego rather than expressed in society (Freud 1989[1930]: 83-84). Freud claims that this aggression is taken over by a portion of the ego, the super-ego, which then structures the "conscience" that in turn acts as an internal monitor of the individual's behavior: "The tension between the harsh super-ego and the ego which is subjected to it, is called by us the sense of guilt; it expresses itself as a need for punishment" (Freud 1989[1930]: 84). However, an individual need not necessarily be

angry yet he/she experiences guilt. As Freud writes, “What is bad is often not what is injurious or dangerous to the ego; on the contrary it may be something which is desirable or even enjoyable to the ego.” (Freud 1989[1930]: 85). Freud claims that guilt, or a “bad conscience,” is shaped by a motive that is other than that which an individual is necessarily aware of, that there is an underlying fear of the loss of love that structures guilt. Freud suggests that the individual’s relationships and dependence on others affects the formation of a bad conscience. The individual desires these bonds with others as they provide a security, a safer means to exist in society. Freud therefore suggests that a fear of losing loving connections or relationships shapes guilt, underlies guilt, and that loss suggests an underlying motive, an underpinning of the conscience itself ((Freud 1989[1930]: 83-95).

In *On the Genealogy of Morals*, in the essay “’Guilt,’ ‘Bad Conscience,’ and the Like,” Nietzsche argues that the individual has forgotten his past, an “active forgetfulness which is a very sentinel and nurse of psychic order” ensures that there is “no happiness, no gladness, no hope, no pride, no real *present* without forgetfulness” (Nietzsche 2003 [1887]: 35). He refers to a memory of the will that is repressed in order for the individual to remain in a state of forgetfulness. He writes, “The proud knowledge of this extraordinary privilege of responsibility, the consciousness of this rare freedom, of this power over himself and over fate, has sunk right down to his innermost depths, and has become an instinct, a dominating instinct – what name will he give to it, to this dominating instinct, if he needs to have a word for it? But there is no doubt about it – the sovereign man calls it his *conscience”* (Nietzsche 2003 [1887]: 36). He claims that the individual relies on this apparatus of forgetfulness which has been bred into him in order not to become tied down in the past. This forgetfulness is, according to Nietzsche, an active "faculty of repression,” not a mere absentmindedness. Man needs to actively develop and challenge this forgetfulness, retrieve this memory, as a necessary basis for the future (Nietzsche 2003 [1887]: 33-50).

In Chapter 6, I argue against Butler’s assertion on loss and a passionate attachment to violence at the infant stage as forming the underpinnings or attachment from which the subject is formed. If, as Freud and Nietzsche’s arguments suggest, it is loss that founds the subject, then, I argue, it is a loss of a bond or interconnection between the infant and the mother or primary

caregiver (a representation of the maternal realm) that underlies the shaping of the subject. Furthermore, it is therefore a return to this loss that suggests a possibility of a theoretical reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice in contemporary consumer culture.

# Chapter 6: Loss, Butler's "Passionate Attachment," and an "Originary Attachment"

*Formally, the tentative theory I have formed belongs to the group of psychologies that originate from the work of Freud. It differs fundamentally from psycho-analysis in introducing the conception of an innate need-for-companionship which is the infant's only way of self-preservation. This need gives rise to parental and fellowship "love," I put in the place of the Freudian Libido, and regard it as genetically independent of genital appetite. The application of this conception seems to re-orient the whole psycho-analytic dynamics. It attributes to the mother the significance in rearing that Freud formerly attributed to the father … It denies the sexual basis of culture sublimation …*

*-Ian Suttie, The Origins of Love and Hate, 1935*

The relevance of this chapter in relation to my return to Kristeva's theory is to establish theoretically a premise, a basis, from which a reconstruction involving Krog's poetic texts and Kristeva's theory on poetry analysis can then develop. This chapter situates my theoretical underpinning, which then provides the theoretical support for, and justification of, my return to Kristeva's theory. In addition, by asserting a theoretical premise as *that* which exceeds the mechanisms of normalization, and exceeds patriarchal oppression, this chapter presents a feminist response to Kristeva's proposal (Kristeva 2002 [1997]), an affirmation of a space from which to initiate a theoretical intimate revolt and present an inscription of an authentic feminist voice as expressed within Krog's poetic texts.

This chapter argues that an "originary attachment" is *that* which underlies the mechanisms of normalization and therefore provides a premise that is in excess of the exclusivity of normalization and its violence – a maternal space that exceeds the oppression promoted by the paternal realm, the Law of the Father, and its patriarchal norms that confine women's bodies, shape women's voices. I use Melanie Klein and Ian Suttie's theory as support for my proposal on an "originary attachment." Recent research on infant development further supports my argument.

This chapter is an extension of Chapter 5 – I argue against Butler's theory on the conscience and loss. I challenge Butler in relation to what I refer to as an "originary attachment" in the context of a space or maternal realm that underlies the shaping of the conscience and is simultaneously outside of the mechanisms of normalization and the exclusivity of its violence. Although the subject cannot return to an originary attachment as such, cannot re-bond with a mother or primary caregiver as she did during the infant stage, a re-connection to this *space* in the context of a re-connection to the drives and affects that constitute this *space* is possible – I demonstrate this in Chapter 7, 8 and 9, with predominantly Kristeva's theory as support and Krog's poetry (Chapter 8 and 9).

In addition, this chapter aims to promote the idea of a *presence* in the context of an "originary attachment" (that underlies the Mirror Stage). This is done to both challenge Butler's argument on the exclusivity of subjection –with emphasis on her ideas on an "originary violence" and the origins of the subject as being based on the infant's dependency ("passionate attachment") on the *presence* of subjection – and to promote the idea of a basis, an underlying presence of an abstract or virtual space. This, in turn, provides further theoretical support for my argument in the context of a reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice in the chapters that follow.

Furthermore, Butler claims that entering the realm of the speaking subject includes the necessary entrance into a realm of violence – to speak necessitates entrance into the realm of normalization with its overwhelming and oppressive impact. Butler's speaking subject draws comparisons with what Kristeva suggests *in New Maladies of the Soul* as a "false self" in the context of a voice that remains alienated and desensitized in a society that further oppresses with continuous media bombardment (Kristeva 1997 [1993]: 7-8). It is in this context of the speaking subject that I promote an originary attachment as a bond that is prior to normalization, "outside of" its violence, and suggests a dimension of the self, of the speaking subject, that exceeds the "false self" Kristeva references in *New Maladies of the Soul* (Kristeva 1997 [1993]).

As a counter discourse to the exclusive violence that shapes the speaking subject, according to Butler, and the alienation and desensitization that shapes the "false self," according

to Kristeva, I argue in this chapter that an originary attachment is an attachment that includes love in the context of a pre-Mirror Stage affect.[35] Using Suttie and Klein's theory I elaborate on this pre-Mirror Stage basis as a premise from which to reconstruct an authentic feminist voice, and promote Kristeva's theory, with emphasis on an inclusion of love.

As further support for my reconstruction in relation to pre-Mirror Stage affects, in Chapter 7, I provide the theoretical framework for a re-connection and re-activation of pre-Mirror Stage affects which then includes love in the context of a pre-normalized form. Kristeva and Lacan's theory provide the theoretical underpinnings for my argument in this context.

With an originary attachment as a theoretically asserted basis, further supported by established theorists' arguments, a reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice involving Antjie Krog's poetic texts then proceeds – Chapter 8. In addition, my proposed return to Kristeva is clarified as it is her theory on poetry analysis – her techniques on semanalysis and paragrams – that are essential in relation to Krog's skillfully written poetic texts and a reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice (Krog 2006).

I accentuate my feminist response in the context of a current and contemporary feminist voice, Antjie Krog, in Chapter 9 where I use Krog's poetic texts, Louise Viljoen's work, and Kristeva's techniques on paragrams and the principle of negativity to present a counter discourse to the patriarchal norms embedded within the cosmetic surgical discourses of the twenty-first century.

## Section I: Butler's Originary Loss, Althusser's Interpellation, and a Basis for an Authentic Feminist Voice

In *The Psychic Life of Power*, Butler extends Althusser's argument on interpellation from "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" to demonstrate the manner in which

[35] Affect- I use the term "affect" when discussing feelings or affective states that are prior to the Mirror Stage. In addition, I refer to pre-Mirror Stage affects to differentiate them from drives or semiotic drives.

interpellation[36] fabricates the loss that founds the speaking subject, the "originary loss" that founds the voice itself. Firstly, she re-emphasizes her ideas on the conscience in the context of a "turning on" one's "self" as the means by which power, as subjection, fabricates the effect of being internalized. She then extends these ideas to elucidate the manner in which this "internalization" takes on the role of the subject's voice if there is no explicit violence itself (Butler 1997: 106-131). Butler therefore attempts to demonstrate the shaping of the conscience via Althusser's argument in relation to an "originary loss," and, most importantly, in the context of an absence of what she terms "explicit regulation." She writes:

> The inaugurative scene of interpellation is one in which a certain failure to be constituted becomes the condition of possibility for constituting oneself. Social discourse wields the power to form and regulate a subject through the imposition of its own terms. Those terms, however, are not simply accepted or internalized; they become psychic only through the movement by which they are dissimulated and "turned." In the absence of explicit regulation, the subject emerges as one for whom power has become voice, and voice, the regulatory instrument of the psyche. The speech acts of power —the declaration of guilt, the judgment of worthlessness, the verdicts of reality—are topographically rendered as psychic instruments and institutions within a psychic landscape that depends on its metaphoricity for its plausibility.
>
> (Butler 1997: 197)

In the above quoted passage, Butler attempts to theorize interpellation (in the context of Althusser's argument) and power (in the context of Foucault's argument) as a dominant and regulatory voice of authority that is impossible to ignore – the subject is effectively compelled to obey the voice of interpellation and power when it calls the subject into existence. However, in order to correlate her argument with her work on the shaping of the conscience as a reflexive act – a "turning" on one's self (discussed in Chapter 5) – she attempts to theorize the voice of interpellation when it is not in the form of explicit violence. In so doing, she aims to, I suggest, show that the subject's own voice is both an effect of the shaping of the conscience by subjection and a mere effect of, an explicit expression of, the voice of interpellation or of power itself. There

[36] In the context of her extension of Foucault's ideas on power and subjection.

is therefore according to Butler no voice that is "outside of" or in excess of normalization and its violence.

Butler emphasizes Althusser's proposal on the hailing of subjects into existence as support for her argument on the subject's voice in the context of the psyche and metaphor – if metaphor suggests an underlying or sub-text in relation to meaning it then provides additional support in the context of theorizing the underlying unconscious workings that shape the psyche. She uses Althusser's example of a policeman hailing or yelling at someone in the street underscoring that the individual responds as the voice is a disciplinary one and impossible to ignore, and that the subject is constituted by being addressed, named, or hailed (Butler 1997:95). She underscores that the voice of interpellation is a voice of authority that is impossible to resist when it hails the subject. Furthermore, that the subject then, in order to exist, is compelled to obey the voice of ideology (Butler 1997:110). To further emphasis the impact of interpellation as a voice of authority she argues that Althusser's concept of ideology's structure is based on religious metaphors: "Althusser has recourse to the example of the divine voice that names, and in naming, brings its subjects into being. In claiming that social ideology operates in an analogous way, Althusser inadvertently assimilates social interpellation to the divine performative" (Butler 1997:110). Through his use of religious metaphors, Althusser highlights the impact of ideology, the force of its power, and further emphasizes the difficulty in ignoring the voice of ideology when it calls or hails the subject into being (Butler 1997:110-111).

Butler then uses Althusser's theory as support for her own claims on the shaping of the conscience and the formation of loss. As support for her argument on the subject's exclusive formation by violence she discusses Althusser's argument on the voice of authority, the voice of interpellation, in the context of an invisible and "internalized" violence. She extends Althusser's argument on interpellation by arguing that the voice of authority then becomes not merely "invisible" but it "vanishes," and, in so doing, fabricates a sense of loss, a feeling of melancholia for *that* which did not as such exist. Butler suggests, according to me, that the subject is not explicitly "called" or "hailed" into social being as the law itself becomes silent. The power of subjection withdraws its presence in society; and in so doing, becomes "an object lost – a loss of a more ideal kind" (Butler 1997:197). Butler writes:

> Eligible for melancholic incorporation, power no longer acts unilaterally on its subject. Rather, the subject is produced, paradoxically, through this withdrawal of power, its dissimulation and fabulation of the psyche as a speaking topos. Social power vanishes, becoming the object lost, or social power makes vanish, effecting a mandatory set of losses. Thus, it effects a melancholia that reproduces power as the psychic voice of judgment addressed to (turned upon) oneself, thus modeling reflexivity on subjection.
>
> (Butler 1997:197)

Butler attempts in the above-mentioned quote to support her argument on the exclusivity of subjection in the context of Althusser's theory. If, as Butler claims, according to my reading of her theory, the subject is exclusively produced through mechanisms of normalization then affective states, sensations, desires, with emphasis on, in this context, feelings of loss, are surely an effect of normalization itself – a mere by-product of the workings of normalization. By arguing that power, in the context of a voice of authority, an all-controlling and dominant presence, paradoxically withdraws its presence, and in so doing becomes a loss that is felt by the subject as her own, she then provides an additional justifiable support for her argument on the exclusivity of subjection. It supports her argument on the "internalization" of violence and therefore in the context of a self-reflexive non-explicit violence or a self-inflicting violence that is not visible, does not actively "hail" as such, but does it support the idea of loss in the context of feelings of loss? Are the subjects feelings of loss exclusively and merely products of subjection? The residual effects of the workings of normalization? What of an "originary loss"?

I agree with Butler's reading of Althusser's work in that subjection functions "invisibly," "silently." Chapter 3 extends Foucault's theory on pastoral power and demonstrates the invisibility of power. It demonstrates the shaping of the subject or individual through a process of confinement and restriction rather than a physical and visible violence that enabled a new pastoral power to emerge and continue its impact and the normalization of the subject, the shaping of the individual and the subject's conscience. Chapter 4 extends these ideas to demonstrate its impact in the context of contemporary consumer culture and the cosmetic surgical body. I agree with Butler in that the speaking subject, the subject's voice, is shaped by subjection. However, I am at variance with Butler in relation to subjection fabricating the

subject's originary loss. I argue that it is an originary attachment as experienced by the infant prior to the Mirror Stage that – upon its severance at the Mirror Stage – becomes the loss, the originary loss, that both shapes the conscience; and, furthermore, suggests a basis for an authentic feminist voice in contemporary consumer culture.

The sections that follow explain and challenge Butler's argument on a "passionate attachment" which she claims is the attachment formed during the infant stage that initiates the subject-as-infant's attachment to, dependency on, subjection. Butler emphasizes the idea that violence is primary, originary, and that the inauguration of the subject is such that she/he emerges both from this violence and simultaneously into it – as subjects are, according to Butler, exclusively produced by subjection then the "birth" of the subject too is but an effect of an already existing realm or domain of subjection, a residual extension of an originary violence (Butler 1997). If, as Butler claims, "the mechanism of production operates on the basis of an originary violence" that "produce the possible domain in which love and loss can operate," (Butler 1997: 25), then I challenge Butler in relation to love and loss with my argument on an originary loss, an originary attachment, and love in the context of a pre-Mirror Stage affect. Suttie, Klein and Kristeva's theory provides the theoretical support for my arguments.

## Section II: An Outline of Butler's "Passionate Attachment" to Subjection at the Infant Stage

In *The Psychic Life of Power*, Butler argues that "no individual becomes a subject without first becoming subjected or undergoing 'subjectivation'" (Butler 1997: 10-11). Butler's idea of a "passionate attachment to subjection" is argued as an attachment formed prior to the emergence of the subject between the mother and infant due to an attachment to the lack of attention from the mother. In addition, Butler claims that the subject-as-infant *denies* this relationship – this dependency she/he has on the absence of, or lack of attention from, the mother or primary caregiver. This form of attachment is argued by Butler as initiating the process of subjection and consequently the normalization of the subject. A passionate attachment to subjection is therefore a basis from which the subject will be subjected – from which the subject

will emerge both into and through the process or mechanisms of normalization (Butler 1997: 6-10, 24-26). Furthermore, she argues that “no subject emerges without a passionate attachment to those on whom he or she is fundamentally dependent (even if that passion is "negative" in the psychoanalytic sense)” (Butler 1997:7). Butler writes:

> Although the dependency of the child is not *political* subordination in any usual sense, the formation of primary passion in dependency renders the child vulnerable to subordination and exploitation, a topic that has become a preoccupation of recent political discourse. Moreover, this situation of primary dependency conditions the political formation and regulation of subjects and becomes the means of their subjection. If there is no formation of the subject without a passionate attachment to those by whom she or he is subordinated, then subordination proves central to the becoming of the subject. As the condition of becoming a subject, subordination implies being in a mandatory submission.
>
> (Butler 1997:7)

Butler’s arguments promote several questions; in addition, they provoke several challenges in relation to my argument. The following paragraph outlines these problems.

- If primary dependency conditions the subject, establishes the basis for the subject’s regulation, normalization, is it necessarily a passionate attachment to those by whom she or he is subordinated? This question is addressed in Section III.
- Does a bond that includes the presence of love not suggest a powerful form of dependency? This question is addressed in Section III and IV.
- Is it a dependency based on *denial?* If so, is it exclusively the subject-as-infant’s denial of her/his dependency on those by whom she/he is subordinated? This question is addressed in Section III and IV.
- In what manner does my thesis challenge or extend Butler’s argument on denial? This question is addressed in Section V.

- In what manner is an originary attachment both a basis from which the conscience is shaped, the subject is normalized, and a basis for an authentic feminist voice? This question is addressed in Section IV and V.
- Does my thesis idealize love? What of the caregiver's love – is an excessive form of love not a form of subjection? Is excessive love not detrimental to the infant and the subject's development? This question is addressed in Section VI
- If, as I argue, the infant's relationship with the maternal representation is a bond that includes love, what motivates an infant's renouncement of this bond, denial of his/her originary attachment, in favour of his/her own image in the mirror (at the Mirror Stage)? This question is addressed in Section VI.

## Section III: A Passionate Attachment to the Presence of Subjection

Butler claims that the infant is fundamentally dependent on those around her for her survival; the infant depends on the primary caregiver for her continued existence. (Butler 1997:7). "Let us consider that a subject is not only formed in subordination, but that this subordination provides the subject's continuing condition of possibility" (Butler 1997:8). In "any usual sense, the formation of primary passion in dependency renders the child vulnerable" (Butler 1997:8). However, rather than focusing on negative or harmful interactions with her mother or primary caregiver as providing a basis from which a subject is inaugurated into the realm of violence and subjection, and as a basis from which a subject's conscience is or will become formed, Butler claims that it is the lack of interaction with the primary caregiver, neglect or rejection itself, that initiates a passionate attachment to a primary caregiver. Using Freud's ideas as support, Butler argues that:

> An infant forms a pleasure-giving attachment to any excitation that comes its way, even the most traumatic, which accounts for the formation of masochism and, for some, the production of abjection, rejection, wretchedness, and so on as the necessary preconditions for love. The gesture of rejection can become masochistically eroticized only because it is a gesture. Although the rejecting

> gesture's alleged purpose is to thwart an oncoming desire, it nevertheless appears *as a gesture,* thus *making itself present* and lending itself to being read as a kind of offering or, minimally, *presence.* Precisely because the gesture of rejection *is,* it rhetorically denies the threat of withdrawal that it nevertheless purports to signify. For the infant, the presence or determinacy of that object, no matter how persistently rejecting, is nevertheless a site of presence and excitation and, hence, is better than no object at all. This truism is not far from Nietzsche's line that the will would rather will nothingness than not will at all.
>
> (Butler 1997: 61)

I agree with Butler in that an infant might prefer a negative or traumatic interaction or stimulation over the lack of any stimulation at all. A passionate attachment to subjection highlights the devastating impact of rejection or lack of physical interaction on the infant's physiological and psychological development. Recent research published by *The National Scientific Council on The Developing Child* and based on extensive biological and developmental research over the past 30 years has generated substantial evidence on the impact of neglect in relation to an infant's development. It claims:

> Young children who experience severe neglect—defined broadly as the ongoing disruption or significant absence of caregiver responsiveness—bear the burdens of a range of adverse consequences … Indeed, deprivation or neglect can cause more harm to a young child's development than overt physical abuse, including subsequent cognitive delays, impairments in executive functioning, and disruptions of the body's stress response.
>
> (*National Scientific Council on the Developing Child* 2012: 4)

In addition, the paper claims that chronic deprivation leads to stress response systems that can weaken developing brain architecture. Over time, the chemicals released from excessive stress response can result in severe difficulties academically as well as social and mental problems, even chronic disease (*National Scientific Council on the Developing Child* 2012: 5). Furthermore, it underscores that responsive relationships are both biologically and developmentally necessary and that their *absence* signals a serious threat to a child's well-being to the extent that her/his survival is threatened (*National Scientific Council on the Developing Child* 2012: 2-6).

Butler makes a valid argument in the context of the devastating impact of neglect on the infant's psyche. Yet does this neglect, abjection, or gesture of rejection, suggest sufficient support for both the subject's emergence and, consequently, the subject's continual confinement, formation itself, by the mechanisms of normalization? I am at variance with Butler's claim that the infant attaches to this lack of attention itself, and that this lack, its *presence* – or "gesture of rejection" "making itself present" as Butler claims (Butler 1997: 61) – is responsible for initiating a basis for not merely the subject's subjection and normalization, the shaping of the conscience, but the formation of the subject in its entirety. Does the *presence* of love not form a basis from which an infant develops?

Butler does agree that love plays a role in the subject-as-infant's passionate attachment – it is a "love" that "is bound up with the requirements of life" (Butler 1997: 8) and that suggests an attachment that is formed primarily to ensure the infant's survival, which is, Butler argues, bound to subjection itself. Butler writes:

> … the child's love, a love that is necessary for its existence, is exploited and a passionate attachment abused. Let us consider that a subject is not only formed in subordination, but that this subordination provides the subject's continuing condition of possibility … This is to say, not that the child loves blindly (since from early on there is discernment and "knowingness" of an important kind), but only that if the child is to persist in a psychic and social sense, there must be dependency and the formation of attachment: there is no possibility of not loving, where love is bound up with the requirements for life. The child does not know to what he/she attaches; yet the infant as well as the child must attach in order to persist in and as itself. No subject can emerge without this attachment, formed in dependency, but no subject, in the course of its formation, **can ever afford fully to "see" it.** This attachment in its primary forms must both *come to be* and *be denied,* its coming to be must consist in its partial denial, for the subject to emerge.
>
> (Butler 1997:7- 8)

Butler re-emphasizes, in the above-mentioned quote, the role subordination plays in the formation of the infant's attachment to subjection. Although the infant loves and this love is bound up with the infant's dependency on the mother or primary caregiver, Butler asserts that this dependency is that which takes on the role or form of an attachment to subjection itself. Furthermore, this attachment is maintained through an exploitation of the infant's passionate

attachment, an exploitation of the infant's love. As mentioned in an earlier quote, an infant, according to Butler, attaches "even'" to "the most traumatic" experience, to "any excitation that comes its way" (Butler 1997: 61). "For the infant, the presence or determinacy of that object, no matter how persistently rejecting, is nevertheless a site of presence and excitation and, hence, is better than no object at all" (Butler 1997: 61). As the subject's formation and production is exclusively via subjection itself, Butler asserts that the infant has no choice but to attach to, form a dependency on, subjection or violence – "no subject can emerge without this attachment, formed in dependency" (Butler 1997: 61). The infant's love is so bound up with an infant's survival, with her/his "requirements for life" that she/he has no choice but to surrender it to exploitation as, according to Butler, a necessary precondition for her/his survival, formation, and production as a subject itself (Butler 1997). In addition, and of relevance to my argument, this dependency on subjection is a dependency that cannot be seen – Butler underscores that the infant does not know to whom or what she/he attaches. Butler re-emphasizes this idea in the context of a subject's inauguration – a subject-as-infant both refuses to and is unable to "see" her/his "primary scenarios"—and denial. Butler writes:

> What does it mean to embrace the very form of power—regulation, prohibition, suppression —that threatens one with dissolution in an effort, precisely, to persist in one's own existence? …
>
> … The "I" emerges upon the condition that it deny its formation in dependency, the conditions of its own possibility. The "I," however, is threatened with disruption precisely by this denial, by its unconscious pursuit of its own dissolution through neurotic repetitions that **restage the primary scenarios it not only refuses to see but cannot see**, if it wishes to remain itself. This means, of course, that, predicated on what it refuses to know, it is separated from itself and can never quite become or remain itself.
>
> (Butler 1997: 9-10)

I agree with Butler in the context of denial playing a relevant role in the emergence of the subject in that the subject-as-infant is not necessarily aware that her survival depends on a mother or primary caregiver (I extend this argument on denial in the context of the infant not 'seeing' her primary scenarios later in this chapter). However, I am at variance with Butler's assertion of this *denial* in the context of the emergence of the subject – an infant's denial that

she/he is attached to, dependent on, rejection and the lack of interaction, an attachment that excludes the presence of love as a relevant, if not pivotal, component of a basis from which the normalized self emerges. Recent research supports my argument. "Core Concepts in The Science of Early Childhood Development" claims that a healthy bond, a mutually responsive environment, based on caring and nurturing caregivers play a pivotal role in the development of the infant. It is a dependency based on the infant's emotional wellbeing that starts during the pre-natal period that greatly impacts her/his future development with emphasis on her/his psychic development in a neurological context (Center on the Developing Child at Harvard University 2012). It claims that:

> Immediately after birth, a strong foundation for human well-being requires responsive environments and supportive relationships to build sturdy brain circuits, facilitate emerging capabilities, and strengthen the roots of physical and mental health. Through mutually rewarding, "serve and return" interactions with the adults who care for them, young children are both initiators and respondents in this ongoing process …
>
> During the first few years of life, 700 new synapses (neural connections) are formed every second … Early experiences affect the nature and quality of the brain's developing architecture.
>
> Cognitive, emotional, and social capacities are inextricably intertwined in the brain … The brain's multiple functions operate in a richly coordinated fashion: Emotional well-being and social competence provide a strong foundation for emerging cognitive abilities, and together they are the bricks and mortar that comprise the foundation of human development.
>
> (Center on the Developing Child at Harvard University 2012)

Research on early child development clearly indicates the impact of social and emotional factors in relation to the early child's neurological development. Emphasis is placed on the formation of healthy relationships and bonds between the infant and early child and the primary caregiver(s).

"Serve and Return" is a back and forth interaction between the infant and caregiver – when an infant babbles, gestures, or cries, and an adult responds appropriately with eye contact, words, or a hug, neural connections are built and strengthened in the child's brain that support

the development of communication and social skills ("Serve and Return" 2017). Without these vital interactions the child's development, be it socially, emotionally or neurologically, is effectively stunted. A bond between the primary caregiver(s) and an infant is then surely more productive, more necessary, and most importantly, essential to an infant's development if it is based on positive connections and communication, positive "serve and return" interactions, which are surely reinforced by loving bonds.

Robert Winston and Rebecca Chicot's research, "The Importance of Early Bonding on the Long-Term Mental Health and Resilience of Children," elaborate on the relevance of infant-primary caregiver bonding in relation to neurological development (Winston and Chicot 2016). They claim that the most important stage for brain development is the beginning of life, starting in the womb and then the first year of life. By the age of three, a child's brain has reached almost ninety percent of its adult size. The experiences an infant has with her caregiver(s) are essentially crucial in enabling millions of new connections in the brain. They underscore the necessity of continuous and repeated interactions between the infant and caregiver(s) in relation to the development of mental pathways that support memories, social interactions and relationships, and learning. The infant's brain is both complicated and vulnerable, which underscores the vulnerability in the context of the importance of healthy and loving bonds between the infant and caregiver(s). Winston and Chicot write:

> They undergo huge brain development, growth and neuron pruning in the first two years of life. The brain development of infants (as well as their social, emotional and cognitive development) depends on a loving bond or attachment relationship with a primary caregiver, usually a parent. There is increasing evidence from the fields of development psychology and neurobiology that neglect, parental inconsistency and a lack of love can lead to long-term mental health problems as well as to reduced overall potential and happiness.
>
> (Winston and Chicot 2016:12)

According to Winston and Chicot, a lack of love leads to long term adverse effects that impact the individual psychologically, emotionally and socially, but also neurologically, thereby negatively impacting the development of necessary cognitive skills and functions. They highlight

that the tragic case studies of "feral" children who have survived with minimal human contact clearly illustrates the severe lack of language and emotional development in the absence of love, language, and attention (Winston and Chicot 2016). Winston and Chicot's research provides additional support for my argument in the context of their emphasis on the necessity of loving connections, interactive bonds between the infant and the primary caregiver(s), that are based on strong attachments formed during the early infant years. Their study emphasizes the relevance of bonds based on loving and positive interactions between the infant and primary caregiver(s) during the first two years of infancy – as this is when the neurological networks vital for later life are primarily established. My idea of an originary attachment emphasizes a bond between the maternal representation, the mother or primary caregiver, that is prior to the Mirror Stage which is, according to Lacan, between six to eighteen months of age (Lacan 2002 [1949]: 3 -10) and therefore aligns with the crucial period of an infant's development, according to Winston and Chicot's research (Winston and Chicot 2016).

Chapter 5 demonstrates, according to my reading of Butler, the shaping of the psyche by and through violence or subjection. I support Butler's argument on self-reflectivity as an automated response, a reflexive "turning on" one's self as the means through which violence is "internalized," the manner in which violence functions silently, invisibly, non-explicitly. However, I challenge Butler's claim on the origins of the subject in the context of an exclusive "originary violence" which she asserts is based on an infant's passionate attachment to a caregiver's rejection, denial, or a lack of love (Butler 1997: 21-29). As recent research demonstrates (quoted above), it is a healthy bond, the emotional well-being of an infant shaped by a mutual "serve and return" interaction that plays a pivotal foundational role in the development of the individual, and therefore suggests a bond that includes love as a basis from which the normalized self emerges rather than a dependency or bond based on the necessary exploitation of love.

## Section IV: Suttie, the Presence of Love and an "Originary Attachment"

Ian Suttie's claims provide support for my argument (Suttie 2014 [1935]). In *The Origins of Love and Hate,* Suttie writes that "I consider then that love of mother is primal in so far as it is the *first formed and directed* emotional relationship" (Suttie 2014 [1935]: 31). He adds, "Hate, I regard not as a primal independent instinct, but as a development or intensification of separation-anxiety which in turn *is roused* by a threat against love" (Suttie 2014 [1935]: 31). Suttie highlights a relevant component in relation to my argument in the context of hate as being an effect or consequence of an "originary love" rather than hate in the context of a primary aggression that is therefore prior to love itself – love then being a mere effect of a primal aggression. He suggests that love is a primary experience as it is bound up with the attachment the infant has for her/his mother. This suggests that love is experienced prior to the Mirror Stage, and, in relation to my argument, as a pre-Mirror Stage affect. Recent research supports Suttie's claim in the context of love being a primary experience that is bound up with an attachment to the mother. Winston and Chicot's research on the neurological development of infants, "The Importance of Early Bonding on the Long-term Mental Health and Resilience of Children," claims that infants have a genetic predisposition to bond to a loving parent. They emphasize that if this bond is disrupted, if an infant's caregivers are neglectful and inconsistent, or if the infant is ignored, the consequences are permanently damaging to the present and future development of the infant (Winston and Chicot 2016).

In *The Psychic Life of Power* Butler clearly contextualizes love as being an ideal and as that which the subject experiences exclusively as a response to the impact of normalization itself. In the discussion that follows I elaborate on Butler's argument in relation to love and then contrast her argument with my argument concerning love in the context of its *presence* rather than an experience that is merely in the context of idealization, or as Butler suggests a "psychic idealization " (Butler 1997: 191, 192). I should emphasize that Suttie's argument on love supports my argument for an "originary attachment" in the context of his promotion of love as that which is between a primary caregiver and an infant and is, most importantly, prior to the Mirror Stage

and therefore prior to the mechanisms of normalization. In addition, I discuss love in relation to Klein's theory on the mother and the love object with emphasis on the presence of love.

Butler argues that the emotional experience of loss in the context of a feeling of sadness due to the loss of the mother as a primary love object is not based on an authentic or "real" experience but, rather, is an effect due to the subject's necessary barring or foreclosure of aggression – this aggression being in the context of a pre-subject aggression. In other words, it is an aggression that existed prior to the emergence of the subject itself and is that which was felt as an infant in the pre-subject state (Butler 1997: 161-167). This loss of love as experienced by the subject is merely, according to Butler, a performance, a form of "acting out," as the subject is not able to, not permitted to, express her/his barred aggression. As aggression toward the mother is barred, the subject psychically incorporates the love object or mother; however, as the mother is necessarily barred as a pre-condition for the inauguration of the subject so too is the possibility of experiencing this form of pre-Mirror Stage love (Butler 1997: 7-12, 161-167). This argument further supports her theory on the infant's passionate attachment to subjection as a necessary condition for her/his initiation as a subject. As previously discussed, the infant has no choice but to attach to and form a dependency on the violence that is subjection (Butler 1997: 61). The infant's love is so bound up with survival that the exploitation of this love transforms it into that which cannot be felt outside of the realm of normalization and its violence. In addition, this foreclosure of aggression is, according to Butler, a necessary prerequisite for the subject's inauguration and entrance into the realm of normalization, the realm of power, which is further necessary for her/his survival and very existence itself (Butler 1997: 161-162). The love experienced by the subject is then contingent on her/his experience of a loss of an "originary" love rather than an experience of "originary" love itself; which is, in turn, a love that is based on an attachment between the infant and primary caregiver. In other words, if love is contextualized in its primary form, it is understood in relation to an attachment between mother and infant. However, this experience is so far removed from the subject – it is from the subject's past and additionally barred as a pre-condition for the subject's inauguration and existence – that the subject is only capable of relating to this love in the form of an ideal. According to my reading of Butler, love then is exclusively experienced by the subject in the context of an *absence.*

Furthermore, it is an absence that is felt as a form of emotion – a feeling of loss – which is based on the loss of the primary love object. The closest experience of love felt by a subject is in relation to loss itself. Feeling love in its primary or "originary" from is not possible for Butler's subject. This suggests that if the subject believes she is experiencing love she is deluding herself as the closest experience we have to love is merely as an effect of normalization, an effect of subjection; and, it is in the context of feeling loss or feeling longing for that which we can never actually feel.

Butler asserts that love is exploited during the infant stage and therefore the subject, and the subject's love, is an effect of an "originary violence" (Butler 1997: 25). The "production of abjection, rejection, wretchedness, and so on as the necessary preconditions for love" (Butler 1997: 61). It is clear that according to Butler "love" in the context of the subject is exclusively based on and therefore an extension of violence.

Butler's assertion of an originary violence that founds the subject – her emphasis on an infant's passionate attachment to this violence, which, in turn, forms the subject in her entirety – rests on her emphasis on the necessary exclusion of love, a loss of a love that never was as it "falls short of the *conditions of existence*." Using Melanie Klein's ideas on loss and love ,she writes:

> Is there not a longing to grieve—and, equivalently, an inability to grieve—that which one never was able to love, a love that falls short of the "conditions of existence"? This is a loss not merely of the object or some set of objects, but of love's own possibility: the loss of the ability to love, the unfinishable grieving for that which founds the subject. On the one hand, melancholia is an attachment that substitutes for an attachment that is broken, gone, or impossible; on the other hand, melancholia continues the tradition of impossibility, as it were, that belongs to the attachment for which it substitutes.
>
> (Butler 1997: 24)

Butler's assertion that the subject is not merely maintained but exclusively produced through subjection is problematic when it comes to the inauguration or initiation of the subject especially in relation to Althusser's argument on loss and Klein's argument on love in the context of an "originary loss" and "originary love object." As well as in the context of an "originary loss" and an "originary love object" that continues to play a role in the shaping of the subject. As I

demonstrate in Chapter 5, Butler's argument on reflexivity and the conscience as an automated response, continually maintained through subjection, underscores an effective means to maintain, to normalize, the subject. However, her insistence on an originary violence as that from which the subject is birthed then necessitates in a psychoanalytic context, and is supported by, her emphasis on a grieving for the loss of a love object that never existed – her necessary exclusion of an originary loss, the affect or feeling of loss, the love object (discussed later in this chapter), the mother or primary caregiver, as playing a role in the inauguration and basis from which the subject, the normalized self, emerges.

Although I agree with Butler's argument on subjection (and recent research supports her claim; discussed in Section III) in the context of rejection or the lack of positive and loving reinforcement from the mother or primary caregiver as impactful in the consequent normalization of the subject by subjection, I argue that the infant first, prior to the Mirror Stage, develops an attachment to a maternal representation that includes the *presence* of love in the context of a pre-Mirror Stage affect, and not in the context of a dependency on subjection and an attachment to an "originary violence" as Butler asserts. Although some infants are not given the love and care required to establish a healthier physiological, neurological and psychological well-being and development, it is an attachment to, a dependency on, the *presence* of a mother or primary caregiver that includes the *presence* of love rather than an attachment to the presence of subjection, a dependency on the caregiver's denial of affection or rejection, that forms a basis from which a subject emerges. If, as Suttie argues, an infant is born with an "instinct for self-preservation" that is bound up with a "dependent love-for-mother" (Suttie 2014 [1935]: 20), and the infant's longing for the mother is an expression of the self-preservative instinct (Suttie 2014 [1935]: 21), then, it is this form of dependency, that includes love, that supports my idea of an "originary attachment" –as that which forms a basis from which a subject emerges, is normalized, and paradoxically, the originary loss that suggests a basis for an authentic feminist voice. Furthermore, if, as Suttie argues, anger, anxiety, even hatred, are but extensions of a demand for love (Suttie 2014 [1935]: 23), then it is a basis formed by a dependency that includes the *presence* of love in a primary context. Suttie writes:

> I am suggesting that in animals born or hatched in a state of nurtured dependency the whole instinct of self-preservation, including the potential

> dispositions to react with anger and fear, is at first directed towards the mother. Anger is then aimed, not at the direct removal of frustration or attainment of the goal of the moment, still less at her destruction, but *at inducing the mother these wishes for the child.* Instead of being the most desperate effort at *self*-help it has become the most insistent demand upon the *help of others* – the most emphatic plea which cannot be overlooked. It is now the maximum effort to *attract* attention, and as such must be regarded as a protest against unloving conduct rather than at aiming at destruction of the mother, which would have fatal repercussions upon the self.
>
> (Suttie 2014 [1935]: 23)

Therefore, Suttie suggests that an infant's need for the presence of love is such that she/he protests against unloving conduct, against the lack of love, against the rejection or denial of the presence of love rather than, as Butler suggests, a need shaped by a dependency on the denial, lack, or rejection itself, which in turn produces the subject as a consequence or effect of subjection, or as Butler argues, a product of an originary violence (Butler 1997: 25).

With Suttie's ideas as support, I have underscored that a bond between the mother and infant that includes love is a basis from which the subject emerges. However, I have not as yet addressed several problems (from the questions at the conclusion of Section II). In Section V, I address Butler's argument on denial and my challenge or extension of her argument using Klein's theory on the mother as a love object. In addition, Section V elucidates my argument on an originary attachment in relation to originary loss and an authentic feminist voice. This chapter concludes, Section VI, with a brief response to the idea of an excessive love and the infant's exchange of her/his originary ideal for her/his own image at the Mirror Stage using myths as case studies.

## Section V: Denial, Klein, an "Originary Attachment," and an "Originary Ideal"

As discussed earlier in this chapter, Butler claims that the inauguration of the subject is based on a denial. She writes that "no subject can emerge without this attachment, formed in dependency," however, "no subject, in the course of its formation, can ever afford fully to "see"

it. This attachment in its primary forms must both *come to be* and *be denied,* its coming to be must consist in its partial denial, for the subject to emerge" (Butler 1997:7- 8).

I support Butler's claim in the context of the subject-as-infant denying the reality of subjection itself but not that the infant, prior to normalization and her/his inauguration into the laws, conventions and norms of society and language, denies her/his dependency on the mother or primary caregiver in the context of an originary attachment**.** However, at the Mirror Stage, denial is a pivotal and determining factor in the inauguration and emergence of the subject. I argue that denial plays a pivotal role in the shaping of the paradoxical subject in that it is *at* the Mirror Stage itself that the subject-as-infant *denies* her/his attachment to the maternal representation, denies her/his originary attachment. Furthermore, it is at the Mirror Stage itself that the infant accepts her ideal image, exchanges the maternal image, the originary ideal, for the infant's own image in the mirror. This denial is that which both inaugurates the normalized self and simultaneously excludes the originary ideal and blocks the pre-Mirror Stage affects that include love. I argue that denial during infancy, prior to the Mirror Stage, suggests a lack of awareness of the violence, or subjection as Butler might suggest, that The Law of the Father promotes and its preeminent ability to shape the infant's, and later subject's, psyche. Melanie Klein's theory provides support for my assertion. Klein supports the idea of denial as playing a relevant and necessary role in the infant's development though it is not an infant's denial of her/his dependency (on subjection) as Butler argues but rather a denial of that which is threatening or harmful to the infant – a denial of subjection itself. In *Love, Guilt and Reparation*, Klein argues that denial is a necessary part of a healthy development and is an active part of the infant's early development (from birth to between 4 and 6 months of age) and corresponds to the infant's basic survival. "Without partial and temporary denial of psychic reality the ego cannot bear the disasters by which it feels threatened" (Klein 1975 [1921-1945]: 349). Klein claims that "in the baby, processes of introjection and projection, since they are dominated by aggression and anxieties which reinforce each other, lead to fears of persecution by terrifying objects" ((Klein 1975 [1921-1945]: 348). However, by approximately 6 months of age the depressive position is initiated. Klein writes: "To such fears are added those of losing his loved objects; that is to say, the depressive position has arisen." Klein emphasizes that besides denial playing a

central role in the shaping of the infant's psyche it is the threat of loss of a/the love object that shapes the infant's development. Klein writes:

> When I first introduced the concept of the depressive position, I put forward the suggestion that the introjection of the whole love object gives rise to concern and lest that object should be destroyed and that these distressed feelings and fears … constitute the depressive position …
>
> I now propose to use for these feelings of sorrow and concern for the love objects, the fear of losing them and the longing to regain them, a simple word derived from everyday language – namely the "pining" for the loved object. In short – persecution (by "bad" objects) and the characteristic defences against it, on the one hand, and pining for the loved ("good") object, on the other, constitute the depressive position.
>
> When the depressive position arises, the ego is forced to develop methods of defence which are essentially directed against the 'pining' for the loved object. These are fundamental to the whole ego-organization.
>
> (Klein 1975 [1921-1945]: 348-349)

Klein emphasizes the infant's love object as playing a pivotal role in the shaping of both the infant and, later, the adult individual or subject and supports my argument by suggesting that besides denial of that which threatens it, there is a fear of losing a love object and a longing to regain the love object that shapes the infant's psyche. Klein's argument on the depressive position as surfacing at around six months of age corresponds to Lacan's idea of the Mirror Stage as developing from the age of six months. In "The Mirror Stage as Formative of The I Function," the Mirror Stage marks the infant's, aged between 6 and 18 months, inaugural step (I refer to as an inaugural moment) into the Imaginary Order – which remains the predominant influence throughout the subject's life. It is this step into the Imaginary Order, according to Lacan, that is required in order for the infant to enter the Law of the Father and consequently be shaped by normalization (Lacan 2002 [1949]: 3-10). If, as I argue, the predominant moment of denial of dependency as such – dependency on the mother or primary caregiver – is at the Mirror Stage, then Klein's argument on the loss of the love object and consequent pining for it are underscored as support for my argument that the Mirror Stage is when an originary attachment is severed, the infant's dependency on the mother or primary caregiver is denied, and the infant makes

her/his first step into the realm of the subject as one who will be subordinated by the rules and norms of the Law of the Father. In addition to the subject-as-infant's denial of that which threatens her/him – this argument corresponds to Butler's argument on denial in the context of the infant's denial of the *presence* of subjection but not Butler's argument in the context of an infant's denial of a dependency on subjection itself. Klein suggests that the potential loss of a/the love object plays a relevant role in the subject's emergence. In her work, "The Emotional Life of an Infant," Klein illustrates her argument on object-relations and identification and she claims that it is the mother who is the infant's primary love object (Klein 1993 [1952]).

Klein's argument supports my extension of Butler's claims on the mechanisms of normalization and originary loss – it is the *presence* of the mother or primary caregiver, the presence of an originary attachment, and the consequent fear of losing the mother or primary caregiver, the love object, that underlies the shaping of the subject by the mechanisms of normalization. Through the experience of this interconnection with the mother or primary caregiver, an originary attachment, the possibility of the potential loss of the maternal representation takes on a powerful role that corresponds to Butler's argument on subjection in that it is due to the pronounced *presence* of the maternal representation that a loss of her/him is paradoxically established. It is a loss that is capable of promoting fear and therefore taking on the role of subjecting or punishing the subject both as an infant and as an adult due to a subject's continual fear of losing this love object yet being unaware (in denial) of the root cause of this fear. Furthermore, it is the Mirror Stage (Lacan's Mirror Stage) that underscores what I argue is the predominant moment of denial for the infant as it is when the infant – through seeing her image in the mirror – renounces the mother, denies her dependency on the mother, in exchange for her bodily image or "Ideal I" in the mirror. I have argued, utilizing Diana Fuss's proposal (Fuss 1994) and recent research on infant development (Farroni et. al 2007, Simion & Di Giorgio 2015) as support, on the presence of an "originary ideal" as that which underlies the Mirror Stage. In so doing I have additionally and indirectly extended Butler's (and Lacan's) theory to outline the maternal representation or mother's face as the "originary ideal" which underlies, yet continues to impact, the conscience itself. This exchange then suggests a paradoxical process in that it includes both a rejection of the maternal image in favour of a more "orderly" and structured self-

image in the mirror and a preservation of this maternal image as an originary ideal, an originary love object, that is preserved by the infant. Melanie Klein, in "Mourning and its Relation to Manic Depressive States," claims that the infant mourns the loss of the mother when she/he is being weaned, and that the object being mourned is the mother who has come to stand for love, security and goodness. It is this loss that Klein refers to as the infant's melancholia (Klein 1975 [1940]: 344-345). It is because of an infant's dependency on the primary caregiver (that includes love in the context of a pre-Mirror Stage affect) prior to the Mirror Stage – an originary attachment – that the mechanisms and practices of normalization have the ability or power to shape the subject, form the normalized self or individual. It is at the Mirror Stage that the infant not only rejects or renounces the mother or primary caregiver but preserves her image, contains or "confines" the love object as a means of protecting or preserving the maternal. Through this process or act initiated at the Mirror Stage, the maternal representation is then forgotten and stored in the infant's unconsciousness as a memory, an "originary loss." If, as Butler argues in *The Psychic Life of Power*, the subject's emergence is based on a denial – of its formation by, dependency on, subjection in the context of an originary violence – that no subject can fully afford to see (Butler 1997: 6-10), then I further challenge Butler by asserting that it is the visual image of the maternal representation, seen by the infant, that both underlies the shaping of the conscience and suggests a basis for a theoretical reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice. Chapter 8 uses Krog's poetic text, "writing ode," to demonstrate a fabrication of a visual layer as that which underlies the thetic.[37] This reconstruction is therefore supported by the idea of a *presence* of an originary ideal. It is because the infant recognizes her mother or primary caregiver prior to the Mirror Stage that I can then extend Kristeva's argument on the predominance of a phonetic layer as underlying the Mirror Stage, prior to the Mirror Stage, and includes a visual layer or dimension in its semanalyses in Chapter 8.

## Section VI: Love, Hate, and Myth

I have demonstrated that it is an originary attachment that is a basis from which a dependency is formed; and it is upon the infant's entrance into the Mirror Stage that this

[37] The thetic is the boundary or border at the Mirror Stage.

originary attachment is severed, the bond disrupted, and the mother or primary caregiver excluded or denied. Lacan's The Mirror Stage therefore marks the threshold for the emergence or inauguration of the subject – It is a preponderant reinforcement of the subject-as-infant's denial of his/her dependency on the mother or maternal representation, a severing of an originary attachment, and, I argue, this denial of the mother is a continual and repeated occurrence throughout the subject-as-adult's life. The repeated renouncement of the mother is an underlying and unconscious occurrence that shapes the subject. Underlying the paternal and religious metaphors that shape the subject are the repeated renouncements of the mother or the maternal.

Kristeva argues that the speaking subject, the literal voice itself, is based on the necessary exclusion of the mother. In "Credo in Unum Deum" Kristeva writes:

> More than any other religion, Christianity has unraveled the symbolic and physical importance of the paternal function in human life. Identification with this third party separates the child from its jubilant but destructive physical relationship with its mother and subjects it to another dimension, that of symbolization, where beyond frustration and absence, language unfolds …
>
> The sadness of children just prior to their acquisition of language has often been observed; this is when they must renounce forever the maternal paradise in which every demand is immediately gratified. The child must abandon its mother and be abandoned by her in order to be accepted by the father and begin talking.
>
> (Kristeva 1987b: 40-41)

Kristeva clearly indicates in the above quoted passages that the infant necessarily gives up or renounces her bond with the mother in order to enter the realm of the symbolic, the realm of the paternal. This abandonment of the mother is a necessary condition for the ability to speak. Our voice itself is based on a necessary exclusion of an aspect of our selves that suggests a joy, a love, a bond and maternal attachment that we deny in order to enter the realm of a speaking subject. However, as Butler's theory suggests, entering the realm of the speaking subject includes the necessary entrance into a realm of violence, of normalization and its overwhelming and oppressive impact. It is the realm of a "false self" as Kristeva suggests *in New Maladies of the Soul*, that remains alienated and desensitized in a society that further oppresses with continuous

media bombardment (Kristeva 1997 [1993]: 7-8). It is in this context that I promote an originary attachment as a bond that is prior to normalization, "outside of" its violence, and suggests a dimension of the self that exceeds the "false self" Kristeva references in *New Maladies of the Soul* (Kristeva 1997 [1993]) – an attachment that includes love in the context of a pre-Mirror Stage affect.

I have not as yet answered the previously mentioned questions at the conclusion of Section II. Firstly, if an originary attachment is a bond shaped by love why would an infant exchange this bond, exclude the mother or primary caregiver at the Mirror Stage in exchange for her own image in the mirror? Secondly, am I not idealizing love to the degree that it excludes, or denies, the presence of affects such as the infant's hate or anger? What of an originary attachment in the context of an excessive love?

Firstly, Lacan claims that it is at the Mirror Stage that the infant first sees his body as an ordered whole rather than in parts, and therefore chaotic, as he did prior to the Mirror Stage. The infant has an imaginary relationship with his mirror image and is deluded by it, perceiving it as a gestalt; and this image of the body promotes feeling of jubilation on account of the infant being faced with an object that renders him transparent to himself. In addition, he claims that the image is perceived by the infant in the context of being "calm," free from the chaotic emotions experienced by the infant. It is in this context that the deluded infant, infatuated by the ideal of a whole and ordered body, enters the realm of the imaginary. Lacan refers to this misrecognition, "méconnaissance," as that which is responsible for the infant's inauguration into the realm of the father (Lacan 2014 [2004], 2002 [1949]). Furthermore, Lacan underscores that the self or ego is a mistake, a delusion of autonomous control (Lacan 1991 [1975] 1953-1954). The myth of Narcissus as a case study further supports the idea of an individual, or infant, being infatuated with his/her own image in the Mirror. Upon seeing his own reflection in a pool of water Narcissus immediately falls in love with his own image. Not able to resist his own image he remains fixated on his image until his demise (Hamilton 1998 [1942]: 117).

Secondly, I have demonstrated in this chapter, using Klein and Suttie's arguments, that an originary attachment is a bond that includes love and I have, therefore, emphasized this love

as a means to further challenge Butler's argument on a passionate attachment to subjection and an originary violence. However, does this not suggest an idealizing of love to the extent that I ignore the idea that the infant is destructive, that the infant is capable of aggressive behavior, even, as Suttie claims, hate or "states of rage"? (Suttie 2014 [1935]: 26). Suttie writes that the "love of others comes into being simultaneously *with the recognition of their existence*, or, in Freudian language, the perceptions which are integrated as the first recognition of mother are 'cathected' with love *from the very beginning"* (Suttie 2014 [1935]: 30). However, he also writes that*: "*I hold that the primary state (Solipsist), where there is no discrimination of 'other' from 'self', gives place *directly* to one in which love and anger are both directed towards *others* (mother)" (Suttie 2014 [1935]: 30). A use of myth as a case study highlights the idea of excessive love as problematic. The myth of Adonis for example, in Robert Segal's *Theorizing About Myth*, highlights the idea of excessive maternal or motherly love resulting in Adonis remaining as an eternal child trapped between two mothers, Persephone and Aphrodite, which contribute to his eventual demise (Segal 1999: 90-110). I should emphasize therefore that an originary attachment is not a bond exclusively formed by love but rather that it is a bond between the maternal representation and the infant that includes love, in the context of the infant, as a pre-Mirror Stage affect.

In this chapter, I have theoretically demonstrated that an originary attachment is the underpinnings of the subject's conscience – the subject's originary loss; and that which is prior to the Mirror Stage and therefore prior to Butler's mechanisms of normalization and the exclusivity of violence.

Yet, in what manner does an originary attachment suggests a basis for an authentic feminist voice? In what manner then does a subject reconnect to this loss? Return to that which was barred upon entrance into the realm of normalization?

I answer these questions in Chapter 7, where Kristeva and Lacan's theory provide the theoretical underpinnings for my argument in this context. With an originary attachment as a theoretically asserted basis, further supported by established theorists' arguments, a theoretical reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice involving Antjie Krog's poetic texts then proceeds –

Chapter 8. In addition, my proposed return to Kristeva is clarified as it is her theory on poetry analysis – her techniques on semanalysis and paragrams – that are essential to my argument in relation to a reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice involving Krog's skillfully written poetic texts (Krog 2006). In Chapter 9, I respond to Kristeva's proposal on an intimate revolt in the context of Krog's poetic texts and the oppressive cosmetic surgical industry.

# Chapter 7: Lacan's Pre-Mirror Stage Affects and Kristeva's Semiotic Drives

*to be able to write one has to enter the self*
*by going beyond the limits imposed by the self*
*one has to leave the daylight*
*the drag of fabricated voices*
*and go underground*
*- Antjie Krog, writing ode, 2006*

In relation to my argument and Kristeva's theory, this chapter discusses the semiotic drives and concludes with its relation to the practice of writing. This chapter provides the theoretical framework that supports a theoretical reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice in the chapter that follows, Chapter 8.

In Chapter 6, I argue that an originary attachment is the underpinnings of the subject's conscience and that which is prior to the Mirror Stage and therefore prior to, Butler's, mechanisms of normalization and the exclusivity of its violence. In addition, I argue that an originary attachment is the originary loss. Therefore, a return to this loss suggests a basis for an authentic feminist voice in contemporary consumer culture in that it is prior to the Mirror Stage, prior to the mechanisms of normalization, the paternal realm, and the exclusivity of violence.

In Chapter 6, Section V, I assert that it is at the Mirror Stage that the infant denies her dependency on the mother or primary caregiver and therefore it is the Mirror Stage that severs the originary attachment. An originary attachment is therefore "lost" and takes on the form of an originary loss.

If, as I have substantiated in Chapter 6, the mother or primary caregiver is excluded, denied, at the Mirror Stage, in what manner then does the subject, the individual, return to this loss? In what manner does (s)he access this maternal realm that is prior to the Mirror Stage?

I argue that it is the Mirror Stage that simultaneously blocks, excludes the primary emotions – the subject-as-infant's pre-Mirror Stage affects and drives, including love in the

context of a primary affect – and therefore it is a return to these pre-Mirror Stage affects and drives that promote a return to that which is lost, a return to the maternal realm, and form a basis for a reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice. These pre-Mirror Stage affects and drives are pivotal to my reconstructions in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 using a selection of poetic texts by Antjie Krog (Krog 2006).

This chapter therefore provides a framework for Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 – a framework for a reconnection to that which is "lost." This chapter provides the theoretical support for the relevance, the *presence*, of pre-Mirror Stage affects and drives. Lacan and Kristeva's proposals are most relevant, in relation to my argument on pre-Mirror Stage affects and drives as a means to return to that which is "lost," and are explained and analyzed in this chapter. With Chapter 7 as support, I then extend this framework and show a fabrication of a *space* using Krog's poetic texts[38]– an authentic feminist voice (Chapter 8) and a subversion of contemporary consumer culture in the context of the cosmetic surgical body (Chapter 9).

Section I outlines Lacan's argument in relation to the infant at the Mirror Stage with emphasis on his/her pre-Mirror Stage affects. If, as Lacan claims, the infant "exchanges" her chaotic body for the ordered body image she sees in the mirror – as this image of her "self" in the mirror provokes a feeling of calmness in comparison to the chaotic feelings experienced by the infant – what happens to these chaotic, pre-Mirror Stage, affects? These questions are addressed in Section I. Using Kristeva's theory, Section II highlights that the subject-as-infant's pre-Mirror Stage affects or "drives" are reorganized by the mother's body. This Section therefore underscores the relevance of the maternal realm in the context of Kristeva's proposal on the *chora*, which in turn further supports a reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9. In Section III, I argue against Butler's proposal on drives as exclusively a product of normalization and violence. I promote Kristeva's proposal on semiotic drives as her proposal on semiotic drives is applied to my theoretical reconstruction(s) in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9. In Section IV I argue against Butler's claims on the "desire to survive" in order to promote the idea of a "drive to survive" in the context of a drive that exists prior to the Mirror Stage. Using Lacan's

[38] I show an underlying network through the structuring of pre-Mirror Stage affects and drives using Kristeva's ideas as support.

argument on the Mirror Stage, in Section V, I argue that it is the inaugural moment that paradoxically initiates the exclusion of the subject's pre-Mirror Stage "drive to survive" while simultaneously initiating an "originary desire." In Section VI, I briefly discuss Kristeva's proposal on writing as a means to reconnect to semiotic drives. Kristeva's proposal on the relevance of writing and a re-activation and structuring of drives in the context of poetic texts support my theoretical reconstruction using a selection of poetic texts by Antjie Krog (Krog 2006).

## Section I: Lacan's Pre-Mirror Stage Affects

In "The Mirror Stage as Formative of The I Function," Lacan suggests that the infant's confrontation with her mirror image at the Mirror Stage initiates a self-identification as an imaginary or fantasized form of assuming or "owning" the image she sees in the mirror. This is due to the infant's perception of the image as in control, as master of the turbulent and chaotic affects experienced by the infant prior to her interaction with the mirror. The "act" of imaginary identification with her image initiates the sense of self as an "I" that is based on an illusionary sense of structured and ordered emotions or affects. He argues that:

> We have only to understand the mirror stage *as an identification,* in the full sense that analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image; but in which, above all, it appears to him as the contours of his stature that freezes it and in a symmetry reverses it, in opposition to the turbulent movements with which the subject feels he animates it.
>
> (Lacan 2002 [1949]: 4)

If, as Lacan claims, the infant perceives the mirror as "freezing" his turbulent emotions, inverting his chaotic pre-mirror body so that it assumes the ideal of an ordered and calm stature, what of the chaotic affects that existed prior to the Mirror Stage and the formation of the "I"?

In "The Two Narcissisms" Lacan suggests that the subject is so "caught up in narcissistic identifications" that so too are his emotions and feelings. Lacan writes:

> To be sure, a subject is not an eye, I've told you that. But this model can be applied because we are in the imaginary, where the eye has great importance … You are well aware that this is what is at issue –the relation between the

> constitution of reality and the form of the body…There is in fact a narcissism connected with the corporeal image. This image is identical for the entirety of the subject's mechanisms and gives his *Umwelt* its form. It makes up the unity of the subject, and we see it projecting itself in a thousand different ways, up to and including what we call the imaginary source of symbolism, which is what links symbolism to feeling, to the *Selfbstgefühl,* which the human being, the *Mensch,* has of its own body.
>
> (Lacan 1991a [1975] 1953-1954: 123-125)

Is Lacan suggesting, I ask, that once the subject becomes integrated into the realm of symbolism and consequently the Symbolic Order the subject's feelings or emotions become so intertwined with language or the realm of symbolism itself – structured and restricted by the norms and conventions of language– that primal affects or more basic emotions that existed prior to the Mirror Stage are no longer sufficiently present or active? Instead, are the emotions reduced or modified to accommodate the norms and conventions of linguistic and social structures as the subject is now predominantly "of language" and symbolic systems?

In "The Fluctuations of the Libido" Lacan argues that desire is "rooted in the Imaginary," a "specular foundation," that alienates the infant (Lacan 1991c [1975] 1953-1954: 176-187), and that "the original notion of the body as ineffable, as lived, the initial outburst of appetite and desire comes about in the human subject via the mediation of a form which he at first sees projected, external to himself, and at first, in his own reflection" (Lacan 1991c [1975] 1953-1954: 176).

In addition to the initiation of a basis from which the ego-ideal will develop, the Mirror Stage, according to Lacan, provides a basis from which desire will emerge. The subject-as-infant's specular image as an "ideal image" is then that which establishes both a basis for the subject's conscience and the subject's desire. The next stage for the infant, the "infant-to-subject" step from the Mirror Stage to that of participating in The Symbolic Order and the laws of the Father– the norms and conventions of symbolic systems and language; society's laws and communication – is then, what Lacan terms a "second moment." He writes:

> In the human subject, desire is realized in the other, by the other. That is the second moment, the specular moment, the moment when the subject has

> integrated the form of the ego. But he is only capable of integrating it after the first swing of the see-saw when he [the subject] has precisely exchanged his ego for this desire which he sees in the other. From then on, the desire of the other, which is man's desire, enters into the mediation of language. It is in the other, by [par] the other, that desire is named. It enters into the symbolic relation of *I* and *You*, in a relation of mutual recognition and transcendence, into the order of the law which is already quite ready to encompass the history of each individual …
>
> (Lacan 1991c [1975] 1953-1954: 177).

Lacan claims that the ego, the individual's sense of "self," is exchanged for the desire of the other, "which is man's desire," upon its entrance into the realm of language and symbolism which will then in turn structure the subject's desire and the individual itself.

If the ego, as Lacan claims, is then exchanged for the desire of the other, then Lacan's ideas further suggest that affects prior to the Mirror Stage play no role in the development or shaping of the subject as an individual but that they are rather blocked or excluded at the Mirror Stage; which is, in turn, reinforced by the subject's exchange of her ego or self with the other and the other's desire.

However, if, as Lacan asserts, the subject has no desire of her own, what of love? I demonstrate in Chapter 6 that an attachment by an infant to the mother or primary caregiver, an infant's dependency on the maternal representation, includes the infant's pre-Mirror Stage affect of love. Klein, Suttie, and recent research support my argument. What of the love that exists prior to the Mirror Stage? The love experienced by the infant herself?

In "The Fluctuations of The Libido" Lacan adds that:

> Speech is that dimension through which desire of the subject is integrated on to the symbolic plane. It is only once it is formulated, named in the presence of the other that desire, whatever it is, is recognized in the full sense of the term. It is not a question of the satisfaction of desire, nor of I know not what primary love, but quite precisely, of the recognition of desire.
>
> (Lacan 1991c [1975] 1953-1954: 183)

I support Lacan's suggestion that the Mirror Stage blocks the infant's pre-Mirror Stage affects. However, I am at variance with Lacan's ideas in relation to love as being exclusively an effect of normalization – a socially conditioned affect or effect of a dialectic of desire – in the context of, as Lacan claims, a "recognition of desire" and therefore exclusively after the Mirror Stage itself. With the support of Suttie, Klein and Kristeva, I argue in Chapter 6 that an originary attachment to the mother or primary caregiver is severed upon the infant's entrance into the Mirror Stage and therefore the attachment itself is disrupted. This suggests therefore that the infant's love –in the context of a pre-Mirror Stage affect – is also blocked at the Mirror Stage. Kristeva's arguments support my contention.

In Section II, I discuss Kristeva's theory on the c*hora.* I have previously discussed the *chora.* In the discussion that follows, I briefly highlight the *chora* in the context of structuring that the subject-as-infant's pre-Mirror Stage affects or "drives." It further highlights the relevance of the maternal realm or the *chor*a as the maternal realm plays a relevant role in my semanalysis of Krog's poetic texts in Chapter 8. In addition, I discuss the thetic, which further plays a role in my analysis of Krog's poetic texts in the chapters that follow.

## Section II: The Chora, an Originary Attachment, and the Thetic

In *Revolution in Poetic Language*, Kristeva claims that the semiotic *chora* is a space of perpetual bodily drives or movements and chaotic affects that are regulated by the mother's body (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 25). The *chora* is therefore a maternal realm that represents a shared space between the infant and the mother. In addition, it plays a role in the structuring and ordering of the infant's drives. Kristeva adds that the c*hora* is not completely chaotic but rather incorporates a structuring principle. She claims that the body's drives are "oriented and structured" around the mother's body which "becomes the ordering principle of the semiotic *chora"* (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 27). In *Powers of Horror* she writes:

> For the benefit of the ego or its detriment, drives, whether life drives or death drives, serve to correlate that "not yet" ego with an "object" in order to establish both of them. Such a process, while dichotomous (inside/outside,

> ego/not ego) and repetitive, has nevertheless something centripetal about it: It aims to settle the ego as center of a solar system of objects. If, by dint of coming back towards the center, the drive's motion should eventually become centrifugal, hence fasten on the Other and come into being as sign so as to produce meaning—that is, literally speaking, exorbitant.
>
> (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 14)

Kristeva therefore suggests that the infant's pre-Mirror Stage affects are not as exclusively chaotic and unstructured as Lacan proposes but rather that the maternal realm or *chora,* as Kristeva terms it, structures the infant's biological and innate affects or "drives." This further suggests that an infant's affects and feelings are supported by a sense of sharing and dependency; and that the infant does not distinguish herself from the mother or primary caregiver. The infant's affects are directionless, and Kristeva describes these affects as drives in the context that they are repetitive movements. However, they tend to move in a curved path, orientated around the mother's body rather than as a teleological force that is directed towards the mother's body itself. Or, as during the Mirror Stage, when these affects are directed towards or focused on the ideal image in the mirror itself—this restricted and confined "focus" is, as Lacan suggests, that which deludes the subject into following a narcissistic path. Furthermore, this teleological focus maintains the subject, the normalized self, within linearity. In *Powers of Horror*, Kristeva adds: "But from that moment on, while I recognize my image[39] as sign and change in order to signify, another economy is instituted. The sign represses the *chora* and its eternal return" (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 14). It is through the infant's participation in the realm of symbolic systems – the rules and conventions of language – that, according to Kristeva, the *chora* is repressed, excluded from the realm of the Symbolic. In *Revolution in Poetic Language*, she writes:

> But we shall distinguish this functioning from symbolic operations that depend on language as a sign system – whether the language is vocalized or gestural. The kinetic functional stage of the *semiotic* precedes the establishment of the sign; it is not, therefore, cognitive in the sense of being assumed by a knowing, already constituted subject. The genesis of the *functions* organizing the semiotic process can be accurately elucidated only within a theory of the subject

[39] Kristeva suggests that she is referencing the mirror at Lacan's Mirror Stage.

> that does not reduce the subject to one of understanding, but instead opens up within the subject this other scene of pre-symbolic functions.
>
> (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 27)

Kristeva claims that the semiotic is then prior to the sign, prior to the Mirror Stage and the infant-as-subject's initiation into the realm of symbolic systems and the realm of grammatical and linguistic oppression. Kristeva's concepts of the *chora* and semiotic drives suggest an "outside" of normalization not merely in the context of being prior to the subject's inaugural moment but also in that the primary affects or "drives" experienced by the infant during the pre-Mirror Stage suggest a means to, in the context of my argument, theoretically reconstruct an authentic feminist voice – both feminist and authentic in that these affects are "outside" of normalization practices itself, prior to the paternal realm and prior to the violence that, according to Butler, not merely shapes the subject, the individual, but produces the subject itself.

Kristeva's proposal on the *chora* centers around the mother's body itself thereby including the infant prior to her/his birth. My idea of an originary attachment includes the infant's connection with a mother or primary caregiver regardless of gender. However, the primary caregiver is a representation of the maternal realm that is excluded upon the infant's entrance into the Mirror Stage. Kristeva claims that the infant's drives, affects, and energies (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 25) are structured by the mother's body. I propose that these drives are structured by a primary caregiver regardless of the primary caregiver's gender. The infant's affects prior to the Mirror Stage are re-organized due to the infant's bond with, and dependency on, the mother or primary caregiver. This suggests that the infant's pre-Mirror Stage affects or drives are directed towards the mother or primary caregiver as the "initial object" that provides sustenance for the infant's survival. This further suggests that these affects, "drives" (and the infant's "drive to survive") are capable of transforming in that they are shaped by a dependency on the mother or primary caregiver, the maternal representation. In addition to the severing of an originary attachment at the Mirror Stage,[40] which is accompanied by a blocking of pre-Mirror Stage affects, these affects and drives are disconnected or blocked by the infant herself.

[40] the renouncement of the mother in exchange for the ideal image or "ideal I"

However, although they are blocked at the Mirror Stage (and consequently repeatedly blocked by the subject or individual, and through advertised online and virtual images promoted by contemporary consumer culture that maintain this restriction) an attrition of this block or boundary would promote a means to return these affects, energies and "drives" to the individual. This provides support in the context of my argument and a theoretical reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice in that, as I will demonstrate in the chapters that follow, the process or practice of writing re-activates previously excluded drives and pre-Mirror Stage affects. This then suggests that this block or boundary at the Mirror Stage itself is, through the process of writing, weakened and the pre-self, in the context of previously excluded drives and affects are then re-activated. Kristeva suggests that the Mirror Stage is that which initiates the first boundary/border or "thetic" as Kristeva terms it, in *Revolution in Poetic Language,* between the subject's semiotic drives and the realm of the symbolic (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 62).

In *New Maladies of The Soul*, Kristeva mentions that consumer culture, which she refers to as "The Society of the Spectacle," desensitizes the individual (Kristeva 1997 [1993]). She claims that the modern individual is continuously bombarded by media-images. This in conjunction with the impact of society's ideals which encompass goal-oriented achievements and materialistic success have shaped the individual as a self-centered subject who has lost contact with the inner psychological dimensions of the self. Kristeva suggests that the process of normalization is one that constructs a "false self" (Kristeva 1997 [1993]: 7-10). Kristeva argues:

> Held back by his aloofness, modern man is a narcissist – a narcissist who may suffer though he feels no remorse ... When he is not depressed, he becomes swept away by insignificant and valueless objects that offer a perverse pleasure, but no satisfaction. Living in a piecemeal and accelerated space and time, he often has trouble acknowledging his own physiognomy; left without a sexual, or moral identity, this amphibian is a being of boundaries, a borderline, or a "false self" – a body that acts, often, though without even the joys of such performative drunkenness. Modern man is losing his soul, but he does not know it, for the psychic apparatus is what registers representations and their meaningful values for the subject. Unfortunately that darkroom needs repair.
>
> (Kristeva 1997 [1993]: 7-8)

In *Desire in Language*, in response to Marx, Kristeva highlights that ideology is claimed as being taken for granted by the individual, considered "natural" due to the subject's continuous exposure to ideologically saturated discourses. Ideology is claimed to be transmitted on a preconscious level, neither repressed by the subject's unconscious nor intentionally and consciously propounded (Kristeva 1980a [1977]: 15). This suggests that the preconscious acts as a buffer or boundary between the individual's unconsciousness, and semiotic drives, and the individual's consciousness, and symbolic systems – the rules and conventions of language itself. Ideology then is psychically located at the boundary or border, the thetic. The more bombarded by ideologies an individual is, the more desensitized the individual becomes, and the more disconnected and insulated from the processes of her "inner self" or unconscious drives.

I have discussed Diana Fuss's proposal on consumer culture's use of advertising images that exploit the individual in that they are structured in such a manner that they suggest a mother's image as underlying these visual images. This further suggests that through the resurfacing of the maternal image, which in turn provokes the resurfacing of those affects experienced prior to the Mirror Stage, the subject herself contributes to her own desensitization by repeatedly blocking these resurfacing affects at the thetic.

Although Kristeva does not elaborate on normalization as such, her proposal on the "false self," as previously discussed, plays a relevant role in my deconstruction. In the above quoted passage, Kristeva draws attention to the alienation and desensitization of the normalized self. In this context, Kristeva's proposal does agree with Butler's proposal on subjection (Butler 1997). However, Kristeva's subject, the subject's psyche, is not exclusively shaped by subjection as Butler's proposes the subject is (Butler 1997). Contrary to Butler, Kristeva suggests that "The Society of The Spectacle" promotes a desensitization or disconnection from an "inner self" rather than a process that constructs the "inner self" as Butler proposes.

In Section III, I argue against Butler's proposal on a "desire to survive." I theoretically assert the relevance of Kristeva's semiotic drives.

## Section III: Kristeva's Semiotic Drives and a Theoretical Basis for an Authentic Feminist Voice

In *The Psychic Life of Power*, Butler underscores that the subject is exclusively a product of normalization processes – there is no "outside" of normalization, no psychic excess or remainder that in some way exceeds or is prior to the mechanisms of normalization. She argues that "norms operate as psychic phenomena, restricting and producing desire, they also govern the formation of the subject" (Butler 1997: 21). She re-asserts her disagreement with the proposal of an "outside of normalization" and "outside of discourses" as playing a role in the formation of the speaking subject. The speaking subject is constituted by discourses (Butler 1997: 102). She then argues that the libido as a pre-Mirror Stage form of desire is but a product of normalization mechanisms and subjection. She writes:

> Here emerges the grammatical problem by which an attachment appears to precede the subject who might be said to "have" it. Yet it seems crucial to suspend the usual grammatical requirements and consider an inversion of terms such that certain attachments precede and condition the formation of subjects (the visualization of libido in the mirror stage, the sustaining of that projected image through time as the discursive function of the name).
>
> Is this then an ontology of libido or investment that is in some sense prior to and separable from a subject, or is every such investment from the start bound up with a reflexivity that is stabilized (within the imaginary) as the ego?
>
> (Butler 1997:102-103)

In *The Psychic Life of Power*, Butler does not respond to her own question, and of relevance to this chapter's argument, concerning the existence of an investment or possible "drive" that is prior to subjection or normalization (Butler 1997: 105). However, in her earlier works, *Subjects of Desire* and *Gender Trouble*, she does respond to her question (Butler 1999 [1987], Butler 1990).

In *Subjects of Desire*, Butler argues that, according to Foucault, desire is not repressed by the law and "neither is it a derivative or sublimated form of that originally repressed instinct"

(Butler 1999 [1987]: 218). She writes, "Desire is an effect of power, a consequence of the law and the impact of discursive practices or discourse. Hence for Foucault, there is no desire outside of discourse, and no discourse freed of power-relations" (Butler 1999 [1987]: 219). Her reading of Foucault clearly asserts that there is no desire that exists outside of normalization. In *Gender Trouble*, Butler challenges Kristeva's concept of semiotic drives; Butler argues that:

> … we cannot justify the postulated existence of drives … If drives must first be repressed for language to exist, and if we can attribute meaning only to that which is representable in language, then to attribute meaning to drives prior to their emergence into language is impossible.
>
> (Butler 1990: 119-120)

Butler's insistence on the exclusivity of language and that the subject and all that the subject is, experiences, or desires is but an effect of her/his existence both within and as a product of linguistic and discursive oppression, or subjection as she refers to it. She claims that the conceptualization of a desire that is ontologically prior to the law does not take into consideration that "the law may well be the cause of the very desire it is said to repress" (Butler 1990: 122); and she emphasizes that a proposal of an "instinctual drive" is a culturally constructed desire (Butler 1990: 123). In addition, Butler argues that:

> Kristeva restricts herself to an exclusively prohibitive conception of the paternal law, she is unable to account for the ways in which the paternal law generates certain drives in the form of natural drives. The female body that she seeks to express is itself a construct produced by the very law it is supposed to undermine.
>
> (Butler 1990: 126)

Butler claims that the female body is a social construct, a product that is fabricated and consequently controlled by the paternal law. A feminist voice is therefore but an extension of, a product of, paternal law, the realm of the paternal itself. In *The Psychic Life of Power* she supports her claim that desire is an effect that is maintained through a turning on itself – in this regard Butler uses the same underlying argument for the continuation of desire as she does for the shaping of the conscience through a "turning on itself." I discuss this in Chapter 5.

According to Butler, desire plays a pivotal role in maintaining subjection; desire ensures that the subject's conscience is continuously and repeatedly shaped by subjection. Butler uses Nietzsche's concept of internalization to argue that desire is a continuous process that "turns" on itself. In *On The Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche argues that internalization is a process in which the basic instinct of freedom (the will to power) is forced back and repressed to the degree that this instinct is no longer dischargeable and turns inward. This then promotes a sense of longing for that which is lost (Nietzsche 2003 [1887]: 55-57). Butler writes that (according to her reading of Nietzsche's repressed instinct of freedom) this sense of loss is both maintained and initiated by violence or subjection through the repetition of turns – subjection's repeated "turning back" on itself – thus precipitating the condition or pre-condition of a subject as a "primary longing in recoil" (Butler 1997: 22).

Butler uses Freud's theory on melancholia to illustrate the conscience as a continual process of desire – a circuitous route that entails desire, renunciation of the desire, and preservation or containment of desire. This in turn acts as the trigger for desiring what is lost or preserved (Butler 1997: 23, 61-105). Butler writes:

> According to Freud, then, the self-imposed imperatives that characterize the circular route of conscience are pursued and applied precisely because they are now the site of the very satisfaction that they seek to prohibit …
>
> Prohibition reproduces the prohibited desire and becomes intensified through the renunciations it effects. The "afterlife" of prohibited desire takes place through the prohibition itself, where the prohibition not only sustains, but is *sustained by* the desire that it forces into renunciation. In this sense, then, renunciation takes place through the very desire that is renounced: the desire is *never* renounced, but becomes preserved and reasserted in the very structure of renunciation.
>
> (Butler 1997:80)

In support of Foucault, I agree that desire is an effect of power (and the impact of discourse) and I agree with Butler's claim that desire is an effect of subjection. However, I am at variance with Butler's claim that desire is exclusively a product of normalization or subjection.

Although I support Butler's concept of desire as a circuitous path that maintains its power through a process of "turning," I argue that this conceptualization of desire, as advocated by Butler, limits "desire," presumes "desire" as an effect of the powers of subjection in the context of subjection as an "already in the process" of subjecting and not desire as an "originary desire" (or drive as I will demonstrate in this section).

Butler argues that through restricting, denying or rejecting an infant, the infant forms a bond or attachment to this subjection and that this act of prohibition inaugurates the infant into the realm of the Symbolic. In Chapter 6, I argue against Butler's claim and I demonstrate an originary attachment as a basis from which the subject is normalized; but what of the subject's "drive to survive"?

In *The Psychic Life of Power* Butler writes:

> … For the subject to persist, the subject must thwart its own desire. And for desire to triumph, the subject must be threatened with dissolution. A subject turned against itself (its desire) appears, on this model, to be a condition of the persistence of the subject. To desire the conditions of one's own subordination is thus required to persist as oneself.
>
> (Butler 1997:9)

I question Butler as to whether this "own desire" in the context of the subject's possession of a drive or affect is not thwarted upon the subject's, as an infant, entrance into the realm of normalization?

Firstly, I question Butler as to whether this "own desire" is not a pre-verbal drive that has been appropriated by an originary attachment and reorganized or restructured thereby representing an "own desire" as that which is prior to the Mirror Stage, prior to, as Lacan claims, the emergence of desire itself – Section IV.

Secondly, I question Butler as to whether this "own desire" is not necessarily foreclosed at the Mirror Stage by the infant herself – Section V.

## Section IV: A "Desire to Survive" and a "Drive to Survive"

Butler claims that prohibition acts as both the foundation for the subject's desire, in the context of the passionate attachment to subjection and the infant's initiation into the realm of normalization; and as that which maintains the dialectic tension necessary to ensure that the subject continues to desire and consequently continues to be subjected (Butler 1997: 55, 56, 61).

Butler argues that, according to Freud, there is a libidinal attachment to a prohibition, which has as its purpose the thwarting of libidinal gratification. Where that thwarting constitutes a repression, the repression is sustained by the libido that it seeks to thwart. She claims that:

> … the libido is not absolutely negated through repression, but rather becomes the instrument of its own subjection. The repressive law is not external to the libido that it represses, but the repressive law represses to the extent that repression becomes a libidinal activity … [according to Freud] prohibition becomes the displaced site of satisfaction for the "instinct" or desire that is prohibited, an occasion for reliving the instinct under the rubric of the condemning law.
>
> (Butler 1997:55)

Although Butler is referring to, in this above-mentioned claim, the shaping of the subject's conscience as a continual and dialectic process entailing the subject desiring and the consequent act of this desire "turning" back on itself and therefore prohibiting itself, this process can be applied to the initial act of desire and the infant's inauguration into the Symbolic. If, as Butler argues, the passionate attachment to subjection is the foundational prohibition from which the powers of subjection initiate the process of shaping the subject, what then initiated this prohibition? According to Freud, the instinctual libido initiated the process which consequently initiated the prohibition. Yet, if as Butler argues, the libidinal drive is a social and linguistic construct**,** an effect of subjection and normalization, what/whom initiated the first step that promoted the consequent prohibition?

In discussing Nietzsche's instinctual drive or will, Butler writes, "Nietzsche describes 'bad conscience in its beginnings' as the '*instinct for freedom* forcibly made latent.' But where is the trace of this freedom in the self-shackling that Nietzsche describes?" (Butler 1997: 75). Butler answers by claiming that it is under the social contract that "the self" experiences punishment

and therefore it is because of the punishment that the "self" seeks freedom. She writes, "Punishment is not merely productive of the self, but this very productivity of punishment is the site for the freedom and pleasure of the will, its fabricating activity" (Butler 1997: 75).

If the "turning back on itself" is both the site for the initiation of self-punishment and simultaneously the origin of the guilty conscience, and this process as reflexivity ensures that punishment is a process that continuously shapes the subject, forms the subject's conscience; then, I ask what aspect of the "self" existed before the subject, through the processes of subjection, and began the process of "internalization" or what Butler terms "turning back on itself"? Is the subject not necessarily exposed repetitively to society's violence or punishment in order for the "circuits" of "bad conscience" to be formed? (Butler 1997: 63- 82).

Using Nietzsche's concept of the will, Butler refers to the need for passionate attachment to subjection as a "desire to desire." Butler writes:

> This truism is not far from Nietzsche's line that the will would rather will nothingness than not will at all. In both cases, the desire to desire is a willingness to desire precisely that which would foreclose desire, if only for the possibility of continuing to desire.
>
> (Butler 1997:61)

I argue that Butler's "desire to survive," as the foundation for Butler's concept of the passionate attachment to subjection which initiates the shaping of the subject and consequently the subject's desires, was first an instinctual and biological drive before it became shaped by a dependence on, or connection to, a primary caregiver or mother — in the context of the mother's body prior to birth, and in the context of a bond between a mother or primary caregiver after birth, but up until the Mirror Stage. However, through an originary attachment the "desire to survive" or rather "drive to survive" adapts, becomes modified by the infant's interaction with an (m)other, and is reorganized or restructured by the mother's body. In addition, as an originary attachment includes love, in the context of the mother or primary caregiver's affection towards the infant, this suggests a "drive to survive" as being influenced by, shaped by, this affection rather than exclusively a drive, or "will," that is aggressively directed towards an object, a love-object, or others.

However, as I argue in Chapter 6, at the Mirror Stage an originary attachment is severed. The bond between the mother and infant is excluded at the Mirror Stage; and, as I have shown in Section I and II with the support of Lacan and Kristeva, these emotions, affects or "drives" are therefore blocked at the Mirror Stage.

In addition, through the blocking of an originary attachment at the Mirror Stage (which is proceeded by repeated exposure to advertised images), the infant's "drive to survive" is no longer bound, through its bond with the maternal representation, thus suggesting that it is paradoxically both blocked, excluded, and unmitigated.

It is at the Mirror Stage that the "drive to survive" is expressed, though only momentarily, as the inaugural moment.

## Section V: The Inaugural Moment, Choice, and an "Originary Desire"

The Mirror Stage, as I have shown, supports the break, or schism, according to Lacan, that not only supports the formation of the ego, the super-ego or ego-ideal but desire itself. However, it also suggests *that* which initiates the subject-as-infant's first step into the realm of the imaginary and consequently her emergence into the realm of symbolic systems and normalization. It is therefore the inaugural moment that marks the infant's step into the realm of the Imaginary Order which remains a predominant influence throughout the subject's life – it is this step into the Imaginary Order that is required in order for the infant to enter the Symbolic Order and its regulations, norms and conventions; and, most importantly, develop relationships and communication with others in society that support an individual's survival.

The inaugural moment is relevant as it is this first step that is initiated by the infant's interaction with the mirror. Yet it is, I argue, the subject-as-infant who makes this first step, who "chooses" the ideal image – who *desires* the control portrayed by its stature which results in the infant's blocking of her pre-Mirror Stage affects.

An infant is not "aware" or conscious of this "choice" to enter the realm of the Imaginary and therefore the realm of the Symbolic Order that accompanies the realm of the Imaginary as

the ego or self-consciousness is only initiated, according to Lacan, at the Mirror Stage; and, as Lacan suggests, the ideal image and its ordered form is irresistible to an infant. However, it is the infant herself who is *driven* to make this first step.

I argue that it is the infant's inaugural moment that severs her originary attachment; and that the consequences of this "choice" is the blocking of her basis for an unconditioned love (love as a pre-Mirror Stage affect) that is "outside" of the restraints and restrictions imposed by the mechanisms of normalization, as argued by Butler, and "outside" of normalization processes or practices such as those promoted by contemporary consumer culture. It is this "choice" that not only renounces the mother or maternal representation at the Mirror Stage but further disconnects the subject from her pre-Mirror Stage affects, energies or semiotic drives, which are then "exchanged," or rather replaced by, in support of Lacan, the desire of the other. In Chapter 2, Section III, and Section I of this chapter – Lacan claims that the ego itself is exchanged "for this desire which he sees in the other" (Lacan 1991 [1975] 1953-1954: 177).

Is it not then the infant's "choice" that originates desire? Is it not her "will" or "drive to survive" itself that makes the first step? That "desires" although at a basic level the image seen in the mirror?

I suggest that it is and that the subject's "originary desire" is initiated at the Mirror Stage itself by a drive that is not an effect of normalization processes but rather a pre-Mirror Stage "drive to survive."

It is the Mirror Stage that initiates the break or barrier that separates the infant-as-subject from an originary attachment that is prior to the Mirror Stage; yet it is the infant who consequently makes the first step. In addition, it is the inaugural moment that paradoxically excludes the infant's "drive to survive" – in addition to blocking pre-Mirror Stage affects – while simultaneously initiating an "originary desire."

In "Women's Time," Kristeva sanctions a mode of feminism that presents a discourse that incorporates an addressment of the Mirror Stage itself. She writes that "this process could be summarized as an *interiorization* of the founding separation of the sociosymbolic contract, as an introduction of its cutting edge into the very interior of every identity whether subjective, sexual,

ideological, or so forth" (Kristeva 1981: 34). This mode of feminism suggests a returning, in the context of the individual subject, to the "founding separation" and therefore a return to the Mirror Stage itself – to the origins of the individual, or to what I refer as the emergence of the "normalized self." My argument on the inaugural moment and it being accompanied by the infant herself making the first step is an additional feminist response to Kristeva's proposal in "Women's Time." As I will theoretically demonstrate in Chapter 8 and 9, Krog's poetic texts facilitate a return to the Mirror Stage. My argument on the degree of choice that underlies this "act", this return to the Mirror Stage itself, is further supported by a mode of choice – a mode of unconsciously expressed authenticity. This in turn further supports my argument in the context of its use and promotion of the term "authentic" in relation to my theoretical reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice with emphasis on its inscription in relation to Krog's poetic texts.

## Section VI: Writing and a Reconnection to Semiotic Drives

Kristeva claims that, through the process of writing, the subject's drives are reintroduced, reactivated within the subject, promoting an extrication of the illusory boundary maintained by the process of subjection that has foreclosed the subject's innate drives as is initiated at the Mirror Stage. In *Revolution in Poetic Language*, *Desire in Language* and *Powers of Horror*, Kristeva argues that through the process of writing, the subject's sense of stable and fixed identity becomes unsettled. She suggests that the process of writing emancipates the semiotic drives. Kristeva further suggests that the fear experienced by a proficient writer, the experience of the abject, is a fear that, through the continued process of writing, becomes an experience of *jouissance* (Kristeva 1984[1974], 1980a [1977], 1982 [1980]). Although I do not discuss or analyze *jouissance* as such it does include love in the context of a pre-Mirror Stage affect. I discuss this in relation to my semanalysis of Krog's poetic texts in Chapter 8.

Using Kristeva's ideas on semiotic drives as support in Chapter 8 I demonstrate a theoretical reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice in contemporary consumer culture – a structuring of pre-Mirror Stage drives and affects within the fabric of Antjie Krog's poetic texts.

# Chapter 8: Antjie Krog and a Reconstruction of an Authentic Feminist Voice

In this chapter, I present a return to Kristeva's theory in the context of an intimate revolt. Using a selection of poetic texts by the South African writer Antjie Krog, I engage in what I refer to as a theoretical reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice (Krog 2006). I apply Kristeva's methods on poetry analysis, or semanalysis, and illustrate that Krog's proficient structuration of her poetic texts capacitate an emergent space that underlies the thetic – a maternal realm that underlies the paternal metaphor and therefore exceeds the realm of paternal oppression and the Law of the Father. In Chapter 9, I extend my analysis of Krog's poetic texts and present an intimate revolt, in response to Kristeva's proposal, in the context of an active expression, a mode of expulsion, that translates as an unconscious revolt against patriarchal oppression. I present Krog's work as a counter-discourse to the cosmetic surgical industry and its exploitation of women's psyches.

I begin by briefly clarifying and calibrating Lacan and Butler's arguments on the shaping of the subject (with emphasis on the subject's conscience) in the context of the paternal metaphor, semantics, syntax, and grammatical structure(s) – for example, grammar, metaphor, metonymy, signifiers[41] – or, what Butler terms in "Circuits of Bad Conscience" a "grammatical effect" (Butler 1997: 68, 102) or a "grammatical subject" (Butler 1997: 111,117). I follow this with an elaboration of Kristeva's theory on the grammatical subject as not exclusively confined within grammatical structures; and I provide a semanalysis of a selection of poems, or poetic texts, from Krog's *Verweerskrif/Body Bereft* (Krog 2006) to illustrate a reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice in contemporary consumer culture.

[41] According to Ferdinand de Saussure, a signifier is a mental image (with emphasis on an acoustic or *sound image* of the sign/word) and a signified is the meaning implied by the sign (de Saussure 1916: 66-67).

My detailed analyses of Butler's theory on the shaping of the subject by the mechanisms of normalization underscore the shaping of the subject's conscience by paternal metaphors, or what Butler terms "religious" or "theological metaphors" (Butler 1997: 110, 109). Butler claims in *The Psychic Life of Power* that the idea of an artist producing work that is somehow inspired by or indicative of a realm or space that precedes the violence of normalization is an illusion – an ideal that is only and exclusively an effect of an automated or reflexive process that fabricates the very "form" this ideal takes. Using Nietzsche's proposal on the artist, creativity, and the "the womb of all ideal and imaginative phenomena" (Nietzsche qtd in Butler 1997: 76), Butler writes that:

> This fundamentally artistic production of bad conscience, the production of a "form" from and of the will, is described by Nietzsche as "the womb of all ideal and imaginative phenomena" (87/326). Bad conscience is fabricated, but it in turn is credited with the fabrication of all ideal and imaginative phenomena. Is there, then, any way to answer the question of whether artistry precedes bad conscience or is its result? Is there any way to postulate something before this "turning back upon itself" which is the tropic foundation of the subject and all artistry, including all imagination and conceptual life?
>
> (Butler 1997: 76)

Butler then answers her questions by emphasizing that all acts, including artistic and creative endeavours, are confined within the realm of normalization, and that there is no ideal space, womb of ideal, or imaginative phenomenon that exceeds or precedes the production of the subject (Butler 1997: 76-82).

Butler uses Nietzsche's work on writing and myth and Lacan's theory on symbolic systems[42] to elucidate the role paternal and religious metaphors play in the shaping of the subject. She claims that the conscience is merely a fictional fabrication. However, it is necessary for the grammatical and phenomenological subject's existence (Butler 1997: 68). She writes:

[42] According to Lacan, symbolic systems refers to the rules, laws of language such as grammar and syntax which function through/via signifying chains.

> More precisely, what does it mean to say that a subject emerges only through the action of turning back on itself? If this turning back on oneself is a trope, a movement which is always and only *figured* as a bodily movement, but which no body literally performs, in what will the necessity of such a figuration consist? The trope appears to be the shadow of a body, a shadowing of that body's violence against itself, a body in spectral and linguistic form that is the signifying mark of the psyche's emergence. Considered grammatically, it will seem that there must first be a subject who turns back on itself, yet I will argue that there is no subject except as a consequence of this very reflexivity.
>
> (Butler 1997: 68)

The subject is therefore, according to Butler, a mere grammatical effect, a literary trope; and the artist through the practice of writing is not harnessing a realm or womb of creativity that somehow exceeds or precedes the shaping of the subject as the act of writing is merely an extension of a writing subject that is itself already and merely a grammatical effect or literary trope.

Lacan's argument aligns with Butler's in relation to the subject as a mere grammatical effect. In *Encore*, Lacan claims that the subject is merely a signifier: "There is not the least pre-discursive reality, for the good reason that what makes a collectivity – what I have called men, women and children – is not at all like a pre-discursive reality. Men, women and children are only signifiers" (Lacan qtd in Lechte 2013a: 54). In *The Seminar: Book III*, Lacan discusses the subject as being inscribed in a symbolic chain. This is later referred to as a signifying chain or "the chain of discourse" (Lacan 1993 [1955-1956]: 261). A signifying chain refers to a series of signifiers that are linked together but is never complete as it is always possible to add another signifier.

John Lechte sheds light on Lacan's theory in relation to the subject-as-signifier in the context of the possibility of an excess, or aspect of the unconscious, that is outside of symbolic systems (Lechte 2013a). Lechte writes in "The Effect of the Unconscious" that the unconscious of the subject would be "quintessentially symbolic – the essence of the symbolic, as it were" (Lechte 2013a: 44-45). He adds that:

> the discourse of the Other is the realm of the symbolic as such. '*It* [the subject] speaks' can now be translated as 'the Other speaks': The Father, the

> phallus, the symbolic, desire, language, the unconscious, and as one of Lacan's commentators has put it culture – these all speak in the subject' as the voice of the subject itself.
>
> (Lechte 2013a: 45)

The unconscious therefore does not exceed nor is it "outside" of symbolic systems. This suggests that, grammatically speaking, according to Lacan, there is no aspect of the subject, no voice, that is outside of the rules or regulations that structure language such as grammar and syntax.

In *The Seminar: Book III,* Lacan claims that identification – the construction of the individual as initiated by the ideal-image in the mirror at the Mirror Stage and through his/her identifying with others in society– is structured like metaphor as through identification one substitutes oneself for another (Lacan 1993 [1955-1956]: 218). In "Ecrits," Lacan references Ferdinand de Saussure and discusses the signifying chain in relation to linear time. He writes that "the linearity that Saussure holds to be constitutive of the chain of discourse … applies to the chain of discourse only in the direction in which it is oriented in time" (Lacan (2002) 1948-1960: 145-146). As support for his claims, he combines Roman Jakobson's theory, on metaphor and metonymy, and Freud's argument, on the libido's charge or affective energy in the context of condensation and displacement – condensation is then translated in the context of the trope metaphor and displacement as metonymy (Lacan (2002) 1948-1960: 57-58, 148-150). He then demotes the value of metaphor in the context of the subject and underscores the subject, the self, as a mode of displacement, in the context of metonymy. He writes, that "metaphor is situated at the precise point at which meaning is produced in non-meaning" (Lacan (2002) 1948-1960: 150). In the context of the subject-as-grammatical effect – metaphor represents the subject's repressed, excluded, drives and pre-Mirror Stage affects. At the Mirror Stage these drives and affects would be repressed and she/he – as a self or self- consciousness and speaking subject – is initiated into the realm of language and desire in the context of metonymy (Lacan (2002) 1948-1960: 150-159). It should be noted that Kristeva uses Lacan's ideas on metaphor and repressed drives as support for her arguments in *Powers of Horror* (Kristeva 1982 [1980]) and "Towards a Semiology of Paragrams" (Kristeva 1998a) – metaphor is related to as of the paternal

realm; however, there are the repressed drives that underlie the "Paternal Metaphor" (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 43-46), which suggests a maternal realm.

Lacan therefore emphasizes that the subject – as a mere signifier in a chain of signifiers that can easily be replaced with or substituted by another signifier – "moves" teleologically or develops in linear time. The subject is therefore confined to linear time or linearity. Slavoj Žižek's reading of Lacan supports this proposal. In *Žižek's Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity*, he writes that the "chronological movement of the chain of signifiers unfurls over linear time" and the enunciating subject is alienated within or by this process (Žižek qtd in Johnston 2008: 251).

To further emphasize the subject's confinement within linearity, in "The Nucleus of Repression," Lacan claims that the subject upon his/her entrance into the realm of the symbolic forgets that which is prior to his/her entry (Lacan 1991d [1975] 1953-1954: 192). In relation to Butler's ideas and linearity, I explain Butler's proposal in *The Psychic Life of Power* on subjection and the normalization of the subject (by confining the subject to temporality) in the introduction of Chapter 5 (Butler 1997: 11-13).

Grammatically speaking then, according to Butler and Lacan, the subject is produced through or via symbolic systems and is merely a grammatical effect. The subject is represented in the context of metaphor or metonymy itself – a "shadow" or "ghostly" consequence of theological metaphors as Butler claims. Or, according to Lacan, merely a signifier – a word/image without a signified or meaning that can easily be replaced or substituted by/through another word/image – and in the context of displacement and metonymy.

Furthermore, according to Butler and Lacan's ideas, there is no aspect of the self that exceeds, precedes or is "outside" of the process or practice of normalization. In addition, the subject or ego is trapped or confined to linear time or linearity and the realm of the symbolic.

Kristeva, however, challenges both Butler and Lacan's claims. In "Women's Time," Kristeva argues for a new mode of feminism that is not exclusively of the symbolic, nor is it

confined within the realm of linearity or linear time, but rather what she terms a "fluid" feminism that "situates itself outside the linear time of identities" by "rejoining" or a re-connection to an "archaic (mythical) memory" (Kristeva 1981: 19-20). She further argues that this mode of feminism would be expressed as a form of inscription that incorporates and expresses a mode of intimate revolt, of subversion, as an expression of subjectivity (Kristeva 1981).

In "Towards a Semiology of Paragrams" she argues that meaning(s) or "significations do not simply exist [*ne sont*], they are made [*se font*]" (Kristeva 1998a: 45), and poetic language is unrestricted, limitless, "a potential infinity" that is capable of exceeding the confinement of linear time or linearity (Kristeva 1998a: 29).

The skilled poet therefore, according to Kristeva's assertions, is not merely a "grammatical effect" but capable of provoking or structuring this *signifying space* that is outside of the exclusive confinement of teleological, linear and paternal, time through the materiality, the texture, of the poetic text itself. Furthermore, it is through her *own choice* of literary tropes and signifiers that she has the power to reconstruct her own voice.

Krog's "writing ode" begins with an immediate reference to the process of writing as that which exceeds or extends the sense of "self" to a realm that is "beyond the limits imposed by the self" (Krog 2006: 33, lines 1 and 2); "one has to leave the daylight/ the drag of fabricated voices/ and go underground" (Krog 2006: 33, lines 3-5).

one travels like a thought

it is quiet there
and completely cut-off
safe  private
one touches down the damp inside
one gropes through the groundless dark
to find one's voice

(Krog 2006: 33, lines 6-12)

Furthermore, she writes of memory, love and the loss of a beloved that she encloses or "cocoons" "underground."

> one bundles your voetstoots underground
> your eyes bleach before memory snaps tight
> one's heart blows out her last breath
> it's the time of endings
> never has one loved him so much
> as the moment one left him

(Krog 2006: 37-38, stanzas 31 and 32)

Is Krog using the text to fabricate an underlying space? A space that supports Kristeva's idea of a *chora?* That challenges what Kristeva terms (in "Women's Time") "Father's Time" (Kristeva 1981: 15)? A space that is outside of what Kristeva terms "Absolute religion" in *Power of Horror* (Kristeva 1982 [1980])? That which defies the One, the Law of The Father, by opening up to the realm of possibilities that infinity provokes? I argue that she does. With Kristeva's theory as support, I challenge Foucault and Butler's emphasis on the exclusively of normalization, "its violent artistry" (Butler 1997: 76) – I demonstrate Krog's reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice.

1. Section I: Krog's Confrontation with the Thetic Boundary/Border in "writing ode"
2. Section II: Semanalysis part I – Disturbance from the Semantic/Formalist Layer of "writing ode"
3. Section III: Semanalysis part II – Extending Disturbance in "writing ode"; Hyperkinesis
4. Section IV: Semanalysis part III – A Phonetic Layer in "writing ode"
5. Section V: Semanalysis part IV – Displacement in "writing ode"
6. Section VI: Semanalysis part V – Bold Colour in "writing ode"
7. Section VII: An Originary Attachment and "writing ode"
8. Section VIII: The Maternal and Love in Krog's "ode vir 'n ander lewe" and "letter-poem lullaby for Ntombizana Atoo"
9. Section IX: Revolt in "farewell, "colonialism of a special kind" and "Every day I treat you as if you are mine"
10. Section X: Reclaiming the Metaphor in "Four seasonal observations of Table Mountain"

In *Revolution in Poetic Language* Kristeva writes that semanalysis is a process of analysis that bursts through the sign, dissolves it, "tears through the veil of representation to find the

material signifying process [or *signifiance*]" that underlies the surface/semantic/linear[43] layer of a poetic text (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 103). I translate this process of semanalysis as it unfolds within Krog's poetic texts from *Verweerksrif/Body Bereft* (Krog 2006). The attached diagram (page 257) provided further supports my semanalyses.

## Section I: Krog's Confrontation with the Thetic Boundary/Border in "writing ode"

In *Revolution in Poetic Language* Kristeva describes the "thetic" as a place or boundary that positions the subject at the Mirror Stage; "it makes him an impassable boundary to the degree that the subject is bound up with the sign, the signifier, and that which is semantic" (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 98). In *Desire in Language* Kristeva expands her proposal on the Mirror Stage and the thetic to include the role they play in the process of writing and the poetic text itself (Kristeva 1980a [1977]). In the section "Beyond the Sentence: The Transfinite in Language" she describes what she terms "the thetic" as a place or position that represents the Mirror Stage and therefore represents the psychic positioning of the "I" or in this case the "writing I".

She claims that the thetic is a place (a psychic position) where identification takes place; and therefore suggests that the thetic is the position from which the subject first (as infant) separates herself from her previous attachments to the mother and through identifying with symbolic systems (as initiated by the "self" image in the mirror) effectively becomes "of," constituted by symbolic systems itself (Kristeva 1980a [1977]: 167-201). However, and most relevant to this section, a close reading of Kristeva's theory in *Revolution in Poetic Language* and *Desire in Language* suggests that the skilled artist or writer is capable of using the text or poem(s) itself as a means to position or return the "I" to the thetic thereby returning the writing self to the Mirror Stage (Kristeva 1984 [1974]; 1980a [1977]).

Kristeva's arguments suggest that through the process of writing an identification between the text and the writer takes place and that the text itself acts as the mirror from which

[43] Kristeva uses these terms interchangeably.

the writing subject can therefore confront her normalized self, challenge the images and ideals promoted by contemporary consumer culture that confine, restrict and shape the normalized self.[44]

In other words, the skilled writing subject, through her positioning of a writing self or "I" via the poetic text-as-thetic, is able to use signs, metaphor, to re-construct a subjectivity rather than being, grammatically speaking, merely and exclusively an effect of normalizing ideals, a literary trope confined to the "line" of symbolic systems (Kristeva 1998a: 45), or the axis of linearity as Lacan claims. In *Verweerskrif/Body Bereft*, Krog clearly chooses metaphor to promote a subjectivity, or "body," within or through the poetic text itself. In "writing ode" for example her choice of the sign "underground" alludes to an emerging subjectivity or voice that underlies the "ground level" of the normalized or "fabricated voices" (Krog 2006: 33, lines 3-5). In "Vier seisoenale waarnemings van Tafelberg" ("Four Seasonal Observations of Table Mountain") Krog uses the metaphor "berg" or "mountain" in relation to her body itself. In the section "Herfs, woensdag 13 mei*"* she writes:

> blou. ek slaan
> my oë op na die berg
> waar sal my lyf vandaan kom?
> my lyf is van die berg
> wat arms en
> hemel gemaak het
>
> (Krog 2006b: location 701)

The English translation ("Autumn, wednesday 13 may*"* from *Body Bereft*) is*:*

> blue. I lift
> up mine eyes to the mountain
> whence cometh my body?
> my body comes from the mountain
> which made arms
> and heaven. the mountain

[44] As Viljoen demonstrates, a selection of Krog's poems in *Verweerskrif/Body Bereft* clearly references the normalization of the female body – the confinement and ostracization of the "ageing" and "menopausal" female body (Viljoen 2014: 98-132).

(Krog 2006: 87)

The line: "I live by the breath of the mountain alone." (Krog 2006: 91) further demonstrates Krog's use of metaphor to allude to a subjectivity or "body" itself. In addition, from "Four seasonal observation of Table Mountain," the lines: "my pulse resounds with/ poems and axillary/ feathers, my blazing gizzard/ buzzes with rhyme" (Krog 2006: 101-102); "and write how the body exists, how it surfaces/ as slendered stone" (Krog 2006: 108) alludes to a body within or through the poetic text, its fabric or "flesh" itself.

Although, as Kristeva argues, through a skilled use of metaphor –or "metaphorizing" (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 38) as Kristeva terms it – and her proficient use of signs the poet is able to reconstruct a subjectivity within the poetic text itself. This subjectivity remains confined within the realm of signs, semantics and symbolic systems; and, this subjectivity remains trapped within the realm of the paternal and therefore linearity or linear time.[45] However, via the poet's confrontation with the boundary or border, the thetic, and her return to the Mirror Stage, her sense of "self" or ego is destabilized as she confronts the space that is on the "other side" of the realm of normalization and symbolic systems.

Kristeva underscores, in *Powers of Horror,* that the proficient writer – through her confrontation with the Mirror Stage – extends the boundaries or border that demarcates the self or "I" and that this confrontation is an unsettling, disturbing, if not terrifying experience, as it returns the subject, the "I" or ego, to her inaugural moment thereby initiating the disturbance of the normalized self or ego (Kristeva 1982 [1980]). Using Dostoyevsky's *The Possessed*, she compares this terrifying experience as a "*fading away*… meaning is lost [as if] burnt as by the flames of a conflagration" (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 18). She writes: "Then, forgotten time crops up … a time of oblivion … of veiled infinity [that] bursts with the shattered mirror where the ego gives up its image in order to contemplate itself in the Other" (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 9).

Kristeva suggests in the above mentioned quote that besides the writer's use or choice of metaphor to fabricate a subjectivity within symbolic systems the encounter with the inaugural

[45] The semantic layer or structure is, according to Kristeva, the linear, symbolic or surface layer of a poetic text; "Towards a Semiology of Paragrams" (Kristeva 1998a: 32-36).

moment at the Mirror Stage provokes the emergence of a realm or space that underlies metaphor itself – as if the fear of confronting the inaugural moment provokes a psychic shift that then initiates an opening up to that which underlies the thetic or Mirror Stage itself. This in turn suggests that the proficient writing subject is initiating, or inaugurating, the emergence of a previously excluded and previously desensitized underlying or unconscious region of the normalized self.

In "writing ode," Krog clearly emphasizes the psychic conflict and unsettling of the normalized self as provoked through the writing process.

Krog introduces her poem with a quote by Janet Malcolm from *The Silent Woman* and, in so doing, she underscores women writers and the anxiety experienced by the process or practice of writing: *"Writing is a fraught activity for everyone, of course, male or female, but women writers seem to have to take stronger measures, make more peculiar psychic arrangements, than men" (*J. Malcom qtd. from *The Silent Woman: Sylvia Plath and Ted Hughes* 1993: introduction).

Krog then begins her poem, clearly indicating that through the writing of the text she is pushing the limits, exceeding the boundary that both confines and defines the "self" in order to fabricate a space that she terms an "underground." She writes:

> to be able to write one has to enter the self
> by going beyond the limits imposed by the self
>
> (Krog 2006: 33, lines 1 to 2)

The lines – "and the writing, the writing down, takes place/ in wrestling the self down" – underscore the conflict which is further emphasized by the lines – "fighting the angry self down/ as underground grief becomes grave" (Krog 2006: 36, line 105- 106) and "I enter this ice age – alone" (Krog 2006: 37, line 111).

> I no longer function on ground level
> I am past all caring
> everything breaks loose
> what have I lost here?
> what do I want here
> in this place

where I am always absent?

It's a morning made for death
I have given up my heart
I live only in my nails

(Krog 2006: 37, stanza 28, lines 119-127)

Krog writes that the writing-self is "lost," or "absent," and she emphasizes this feeling or sense of loss when she writes: "I no longer function on ground level/ I am past all caring/ everything breaks loose" (lines 119-121.)

As if she is barely holding or clinging on to life itself, she writes that "I live only in my nails" (lines 127) which is juxtaposed with the lines "I have given up my heart" (line 126) and "it's a morning made for death" (line 125) suggesting that this loss, or absence of the self, consorts with a loss of her physical body itself.

It is this loss of the self that Krog writes of, this experience of going "beyond the limits imposed by the self" (line 2), that supports Kristeva's proposal on an ethical practice, or what she terms a *practice,* in *Revolution in Poetic Language* where she uses the work of Comte de Lautréamont, James Joyce, Stéphane Mallarmé and Antonin Artaud to demonstrate what she terms *practice* (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 19-226).

In the concluding section of *Revolution in Poetic Language*, "Section IV: Practice," Kristeva argues that the alienated speaking subject is a result of dominant discourses (and capitalistic ideologies) that fabricate the sense of self or "ego" as that which is whole, unified and "fixed" in meaning (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 193-234). She calls for a new ethics, one that liberates the fixed and censored subject or "transcendental ego" by "returning" the speaking subject to his/her unconscious semiotic drives. She writes:

> "Ethics" should be understood here to mean the negativizing of narcissism within a *practice*; in other words, a practice is ethical when it dissolves those narcissistic fixations (ones that are narrowly confined to the subject) to which the signifying process succumbs in its socio-symbolic realization. Practice, such as we have defined it, positing and dissolving meaning and the unity of the subject, therefore encompasses the ethical.

(Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 233)

Kristeva argues that art, with emphasis on poetry or the poetic text, has the potential to be an ethical practice as the "ethical cannot be stated, instead it is practiced"; and the text is one of the most accomplished examples of such a practice (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 234) as it promotes an unsettling of the normalized self, a dissolving of the narcissistic fixations that keep the normalized self confined within grammatical and linguistic definitions, and therefore consequently confined within patriarchal norms and oppression.

As previously highlighted, Krog describes the writing process as one that alienates the self to the degree that she loses her "self." This is further emphasized in the lines: "I *can not* live upper ground" (Krog 2006: 38, stanza 20, line 87) and "my life lies like stone" (line 90). However, as Kristeva argues, the ethical cannot simply be stated; it needs to be practiced.

She writes, that "This practice cannot be understood unless it is being carried out. To do so, the subject must abandon his 'meta' position, the series of masks or the semantic layer, and complete the complex path of *signifiance"* [46] (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 103). In addition, she underscores that it is skillfully written texts that demonstrate this practice by provoking *a space*, an emerging realm, via this psychic disturbance – an emerging space or a virtual "underground" beneath the realm of symbolic systems – which is accompanied by a heightened if not traumatic experience due to the re-surfacing of previously excluded or blocked semiotic drives. As support for her ideas on *signifiance* she suggests, for example, that Mallarmé's poems "A Throw of the Dice" and "A Constellation" demonstrate a "movement" from a confining logic – "a certain logic whose order is dependent upon the social order" – to a boundlessness that opens the normalized writing self to an infinity that defies the confines and restrains of the "logic" of "Absolute religion … As if they designated through and beyond their fixed position what we have called the dangerous motility of the semiotic *chora"* (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 226-227). She suggests that the poetic texts indicate a pushing through the fear, the loss or "sacrifice" of the self to deny and

[46] *Signifiance* as an underlying process that is Kristeva's substitute for "fixed meaning" or "significance" is explicated throughout the process of this chapter; as additional support, I use Roland Barthes' proposal on emergence and "disturbance." (Barthes 1977 [1964[)

subvert the idea of Absolute or finite itself and open up to "the infinite." However, she underscores that it is not to possess or attempt to "*possess* the infinite" (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 228). As it is the madman who tries to possess the infinite while the skilled poet, according to Kristeva, pushes through the barrier of insanity – the loss of the self at the Mirror Stage –and opens up to the infinite and the realm of possibilities via the resurfacing of previously blocked semiotic drives which are [now] unconfined by the linear logic[47] of the symbolic realm (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 232-234). Krog's "writing ode" touches on this idea. Krog writes that although she "*can not* live upper ground" (line 87), she emphasizes that she does not possess the "underground" with the line "I *dare*[48] not have underground" (Krog 2006: 36, stanza 20, line 86).

Although Kristeva writes of a dispossession in *Revolution in Poetic Language* – a dispossession or loss of the self that is in itself an ethical and revolutionary practice – in *Powers of Horror* she extends her argument suggesting a degree of "ownership," of a voice of one's own, when she writes:

> But when I *seek* (myself), *lose* (myself), or experience *jouissance*—then "I" is *heterogeneous.* Discomfort, unease, dizziness stemming from an ambiguity that, through the violence of a revolt *against,* demarcates a space out of which signs and objects arise. Thus braided, woven, ambivalent, a heterogeneous flux marks out a territory that I can call my own.
>
> (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 10)

Kristeva therefore suggests that an underlying realm, *signifying space*, or *chora* is a paradoxical space.

Firstly, it is a "container" for the semiotic drives yet also that which opens up to a boundlessness or infinity. Secondly, it is a space of "one's own" yet paradoxically also a space that is not "possessed" but rather expands the subject outside of the confines of "Absolute religion" to an "archaic maternal memory" (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 23). An archaic maternal memory is discussed in Chapter 2, Section V: The 'forgotten' maternal realm that is 'outside' of normalization. I will explain and expand on both of these paradoxes.

[47] linearity/ linear time
[48] This word is emphasized by Krog.

## Section II: Semanalysis part I – Disturbance from the Semantic/Formalist Layer of "writing ode"

As explained earlier in this chapter, "writing ode" underscores that the process of writing is, to Krog or the "writing-I" in the text, a conflictual experience; but, more importantly, how does "writing ode" provoke a disturbance that underlies the structuration of the surface or semantic layer of the poetic text? If, as I have outlined, Kristeva claims that the proficient writer is capable of provoking this underlying layer, inaugurating an emergence of the semiotic and maternal, in what manner then does Krog suggests this approach in her work?

Following stanza I ("to be able to write one has to enter the self/ by going beyond the limits imposed by the self"), Krog's "writing ode" suggests, according to my argument, the structuring of this space or "underground" through her use of tension and paradox.

The sign "daylight," which is juxtaposed with "the drag of fabricated voices" and that which "one has to leave," is contrasted with the "dark" of the underground (stanza 4). Although the "I" is isolated, "completely cut off," she is "safe" (lines 7 and 8); although this "underground" is "quiet" (line 7), "the earth groans," (Krog 2006: 34, line 25); "the earth talks to herself" (Krog 2006: 39, line 181).

> one writes: the light licks your face clean
> silver in its tips
> you give yourself away with your eyes
>
> one writes: this is a morning to die
> against his blameless neck under the bluegums
> reeling towards his heretical mouth
>
> one writes: you eat as if you feast
> I'm frightened by my hunger for your planed ankles
> the earth is warm with little frogs
>
> one has everything to lose
> one gives up nothing

one balances wounds, scabs and scar tissue

(Krog 2006: 35, stanza 14-17, lines 66-77)

The syntagm (in the above quoted stanzas) "you eat as if you feast" is contrasted with "frightened by my hunger"; "one has everything to lose" is contrasted with "one gives up nothing". The lines promote a tension, a paradox. However, this tension or paradox demonstrated in "writing ode" suggests that it aligns with a formalist reading of "writing ode."

Cleanth Brooks' *The Well Wrought Urn: Studies in the Structure of Poetry* [49]emphasizes paradox or tension as a relevant technique used by a poet to structure a poem (Brooks 1947). In his chapter "The Language of Paradox" he argues that a poem's "truth" is revealed through paradox itself. "It is the scientist whose truth requires a language purged of every trace of paradox"; but he emphasizes that "the truth which the poet utters can be approached only in terms of paradox" (Brooks 1947: 3). As highlighted above, "writing ode" clearly demonstrates Krog's use of paradox to structure her text.

However, Brooks adds that the poem is a "working out of the various tensions—set up by whatever means-by propositions, metaphors, symbols" (Brooks 1947: 207); and that through resolving these tensions, the poem reaches a/its truth (Brooks 1947: 192-215). The poem's "truth" therefore is contained within the poem or poetic text itself as the poem is, or represents, an "organic unity" (Brooks 1947: 160, 165, 166, 174, 186, 200). The poet is trying to unify experience itself within or through the poetic text; and this unifying of experience is the poem and therefore, according to Brooks, the "poet's truth" (Brooks 1947: 166). This suggests that the emotion or affect experienced by a poet is exclusively confined or contained within the poetic text itself. This in turn suggests that the poet's drives are exclusively contained within the poetic text itself.

In "Towards a Semiology of Paragrams," Kristeva extends formalist definitions and analyses of poetic texts and writes:

> Made-up of oppositions that have been overcome, poetic language is an undecidable formalism that does not seek to be resolved. Meditating on the

[49] Considered a seminal text on formalism or the formalist approach to the analysis of poetry (Winchell 1996).

> possibility of discerning contradiction within set theory. Bourbaki finds that 'an observed contradiction would be inherent to the very principles that are at the basis of set theory.' Projecting this reasoning onto a linguistic background we arrive at the notion that at the basis of mathematics (i.e. the structure of language) there are contradictions that are not only inherent but indestructible, constitutive, non-modifiable, the 'text' being a coexistence of oppositions, a demonstration of the conclusion that $0 \neq 0$.
>
> (Kristeva 1998a: 36)

In other words, these tensions or conflicts as suggested by formalist readings or analyses of poetic texts are not resolved but rather suggest an opening up to possibilities. However, Kristeva adds in *Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Language and Art,* "If there is a model for poetic language, it no longer involves lines or surfaces, but rather space and infinity – concepts amenable to formalization" (Kristeva 1980a [1977]: 88). Rather than opposing formalist approaches to the analyses of poetic texts, semanalysis has the potential to extend formalist readings of poetic texts. This suggests that a poetic text is both a container of drives and paradoxically that which opens up to an endlessness of possibilities – a transformative experience, a coexistence between form and formlessness, "a close relationship between language and space" (Kristeva 1980a [1977]: 89).

## Section III: Semanalysis part II – Extending Disturbance; Hyperkinesis

In *Desire in Language*, Kristeva uses Roland Barthes' hypothesis as support for her argument that *signifiance*[50] is detected within the text as movement or disturbance (she refers to this disturbance as hyperkinesis in "The Subject in Process" (Kristeva 1998b: 145)). Kristeva writes that, according to Barthes, "motion or movement" is an "essential principle" that is specific to literature; and she references texts by the feminist Charles Fourier, novelist and playwright Honoré de Balzac and Marquis de Sade as support for this claim (Kristeva 1980a [1977]). She then extends Barthes' proposal and argues that if literature promotes a movement or motion then it is skillfully written poetry – certain poetic texts or what she terms "poetic language" in "Towards a Semiology of Paragrams" – that most effectively demonstrates this movement; and, she

[50] as the emergence of a space that underlies the surface, symbolic or linear level of a poetic text.

emphasizes that it is the excluded or "repressed" semiotic drives that are this movement itself (Kristeva 1980a: 102). In *Revolution in Poetic Language*, she underscores this exclusivity and writes that "this drive process cannot be released and carried out in narrative, much less in metalanguage or theoretical drifting. It needs a [poetic] text." (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 103).

In "Towards a Semiology of Paragrams," "The Subject in Process," *Power of Horror* and *Desire in Language,* Kristeva demonstrates that skilled writers' poetic technique provoke this movement within the fabric of the text, and, therefore, highlights the existence of the semiotic realm within the text itself (Kristeva 1998a: 25-49; 1998b: 133-175; 1982 [1980], 1980a [1977]).

A proficient writer, according to Kristeva, is able to fabricate this space through his or her adroit choice and placement of signs, literary tropes[51], techniques such as repetition (Kristeva 1980 [1977]: 102, 36-148, 169), displacement (Kristeva 1980 [1977]: 102), her use of syntagmatic grams, [52]and hyperkinesis (Kristeva 1998: 145). I will discuss each of these techniques in relation to my analyses that follow.

Although the poetic text has been written in the past and the writer's drives were activated in the past, the movement or *signifying space* within a poetic text in its existing "present," printed or virtual form holds the imprint (the writer's drives are translated/transposed/displaced into the fabric or materiality of the text) of the writer's drives within the fabric or "body" of the poetic text itself – as a "memory" of the drives. Paradoxically the poem acts both to contain the memory of drives and to maintain the continual effect of these drives, which in turn extends to a sense of boundlessness or "un- confinement." These ideas are further clarified through the course of this chapter.

[51] In John Lechte's reading of Kristeva's theory he writes that 'metaphor is on the side of the semiotic in the context of that which underlies metaphor itself. For 'an analyst it is equivalent to a condensation of affect, or psychical energy, in dream work' (Lechte 2013b: 180). In *Powers of Horror*, Kristeva writes of metaphor in the context of drives and repressed drives (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 35, 42). As this chapter will demonstrate using Kristeva's theory, these drives that underlie metaphor are structured by the proficient writer. Although Kristeva does not exclusively focus on metaphor she does, I suggest, emphasize it additionally as a means to challenge Lacan's emphasis on metonymy (Kristeva 1998 a, 1998b)

[52] phonemes, words, phrases as sequences.

In addition, a well-structured poetic text is a relevant support for Kristeva's argument on the existence of semiotic drives as the well-structured poetic text is capable of demonstrating this underlying movement or tension, which, in turn, is evidence, according to Kristeva, of the existence of semiotic drives.

To analyze a poetic text using the method of semanalysis, thereby demonstrating both the existence of an underlying space and the existence of drives within the text itself, would, according to my reading of Kristeva's proposals, entail revealing a disturbance that underlies the signs, syntagms, and metaphors in the text. This section focuses on Kristeva's term *hyperkinesis*. I will translate the manner in which hyperkinesis underlies the signs or metaphor in poetic texts.

According to Lacan, it is the ideal-image at the Mirror Stage that initiates the process of the fabrication of the "self." Therefore, grammatically speaking, *the image* initiates the subject-as-signifier and the image(s)[53] sustain the subject-as-signifier – confine the subject-as-signifier to the "line" of linearity or linear time (Lacan 1993 [1955-1956]: 171-190). In "Towards a Semiology of Paragrams," Kristeva argues that a poetic text or what she terms a paragrammatic network is a multi-layered network that consists of, or is underlined by, "poetic images" (Kristeva 1998a: 33-36). She therefore suggests (although she does not elaborate) that through the poet's proficient use of metaphor (through her selective placement of metaphor or signs) she is able to provoke, to manipulate, the poetic images – visual, tactile, phonetic, olfactory images – that underlie the metaphors themselves thereby constructing a network as that which underlies the metaphors or signs themselves.

However, in her earlier work, *Powers of Horror*, "The Sign – A Condensation," Kristeva suggests that sound or *phonetic images* are the predominant factor in the structuring of an underlying realm or layer. She writes, "What is it that insures the existence of the sign, that is, of the *relation* that is a *condensation* between sound image (on the side of word presentation) and visual image (on the side of thing presentation)?" (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 52). She answers that it is "the paternal function" and "Lacan's Name of The Father" that causes the condensation of drives at the Mirror Stage where, or when, the "stress shifts from the terms (images) to the

[53] such as those promoted by online or virtual advertising images.

functions that tie them together (condensation, metaphoricalness, and more strongly yet, paternal function)" (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 53). Through the process or *practice* of writing, "the sign collapses" (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 53). However, she then adds:

> once the sound image/sight image solidarity is undone, such a splitting allows one to detect an attempt at *direct semantization* of acoustic, tactile, motor, visual, *etc.,* coenesthesia. A language now manifests itself whose *complaint* repudiates the common code, then builds itself into an *idiolect,* and finally resolves itself through the sudden irruption of *affect.*
>
> (*Kristeva* 1982 [1980]: 53)

Although Kristeva claims that sound or phonetic images[54] play a predominant role in provoking an underlying layer within a poetic text, tactile, visual, even a blending of various poetic images, are capable of provoking an underlying realm. This further suggests that an underlying realm or *chora* is not a single layer or dimension but a multi-layered network. This in turn, further supports the idea of an extension outside of the confines of linear time and extends into what Kristeva terms "infinity," or a "drive dimension" (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 42).

This provokes a challenge regarding my argument in relation to hyperkinesis and "writing ode": Does "writing ode" demonstrate a hyperkinesis as that which underlies the surface[55] (formalist layer) in the context of a tension that is not resolved but "opened up"?

As previously demonstrated, paradox provokes a tension in the formalist layer of the text, which inaugurates a tension or disturbance; the sections that follow demonstrates how "writing ode" extends this disturbance through *hyperkinesis*.

Firstly, through visual images – Krog evokes an image of an emerging body within "writing ode." Secondly, through provoking a phonetic layer, Krog's use of repetition (of phonemes). Thirdly, through a technique of displacement and the promotion of tactility or tactile images. Fourthly through bold colour.

> one writes: the light licks your face clean

[54] She refers to as phonetic grams in "Towards a Semiology of Paragrams".
[55] Kristeva refers to this layer as a formalist layer, semantic layer, and sometimes as linearity.

silver in its tips
you give yourself away with your eyes

one writes: this is a morning to die
against his blameless neck under the bluegums
reeling towards his heretical mouth

one writes: you eat as if you feast
I'm frightened by my hunger for your planed ankles
the earth is warm with little frogs

one has everything to lose
one gives up nothing
one balances wounds, scabs and scar tissue
(Krog 2006: 35, stanza 14-17, lines 66-77)

Firstly, Krog's text demonstrates that it extends this tension in the above quoted stanza with the syntagms: "your face clean", "silver in its tips", "with your eyes", "blameless neck", "heretical mouth", "your planed ankles"; and her use of the signs "face," "silver," "eyes" "mouth," "neck," "ankle"' provoke a visual image of an, although disjointed, emerging body that underlies the tension or paradox that structures the formalist layer of the text. However, it is also a body that "balances among wounds, scabs and scar tissue." This precarious balance is further supported by the lines: "I belong to the earth/ and the scars thereof" (Krog 2006: 34, lines 51-52); "it's a morning made for death/ I have given up my heart/ I live only in my nails" (Krog 2006: 37, lines 126-128); "the skeleton of one's heart" (Krog 2006: 37, line 131); "one's hear blows out her last breath/ it's a time of endings" (Krog 2006: 38, stanza 32).

Krog therefore provokes an underlying visual poetic image of a body that emerges through a tension or paradox itself – it is a precarious balance as it is through juxtaposing the abstract idea of life and death that the visual poetic image (the both living and dead body) emerges and therefore begins to take form. In this context, Krog supports Kristeva's proposal.

In "Transgression, Transubstantiation, Transference," Anne-Marie Smith writes, "What permits Kristeva to break the specific hermeneutic codes of literature and psychoanalysis is her

insistence on the incarnation of the body in language, of the writer's creating his body in the text" (Smith 2003: 135).

As previously explained, Kristeva, however, emphasizes sound or phonetic images as that which plays a predominant role in provoking an underlying realm – a space or layer that underlies the semantic or linear layer of a poetic text. In "Beyond the Sentence: The Transfinite in Language," Kristeva underscores alliteration as an indication of the phonetic level of a poetic text, and that through the writer's structuring of sentences – through her use of syntagmatic sequences supported by alliteration (or repetition) – she provokes an underlying phonetic layer (Kristeva 1980b [1977]: 169).

## Section IV: Semanalysis part III – A Phonetic Layer in "writing ode"

"writing ode" clearly alludes to the relevance of sound. In stanza 4 the lines: "one gropes through the groundless dark/ to find one's voice/ to hear the sound of a poem" (Krog 2006: 33, lines 10-13) supports this idea. As I have shown in Section III, "writing ode" demonstrates the visual image of an emerging body. In this section, I will demonstrate the manner in which Krog's "writing ode" suggests a use of phonetic images to extend or support this visual image.

Krog evokes a soft sound through her use of the phoneme "s" in "writing ode." In stanza 4, the line "to hear the sound of a poem" is immediately followed by "the line that softly sputters from somewhere" (line 14). The repetition of the "s" in the line suggests an emphasis on phonetic images in "writing ode." This is supported by the lines: "Sundays when late afternoon sun slips into stone" (Krog 2006: 33, stanza 6, line 19), the phrase "sun spatter" (Krog 2006: 34, stanza 8, line 26), "sparkling stars from the stones" (Krog 34, stanza 9, line 35). Kristeva argues, in *Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Language and Art*, that repetition is a technique used by writers as a means to express drives – the poetic text takes on the role of the object that then contains the writer's drives; the poetic text both holds the imprint of the writer's drives and paradoxically opens up a space (a *chora)* that is linked to the infinite (Kristeva 1980a [1977]: 102, 36-148).

## Section V: Semanalysis part IV – Displacement in "writing ode"

However, "writing ode" does not suggest an emphasis on phonetic images as support for an underlying or emerging space or "body."

Rather the lack of sound or "quiet" of the "underground" (stanza 4) is heightened first by a provocation of tactile images, a sense of texture or tactility within the underlying layer(s) or *chora,* and then through the technique of displacement.

With the use of the word "softly" itself, an underlying sensation of softness emerges. The softness of the "sound of a poem" is enhanced through juxtaposing it with the word "touches" (line 10) that in turn provokes a tactile image – a tactile *image* is not necessarily a vivid *visual image* as such but rather provokes a sense or sensation of texture within the fabric or materiality of the poetic text. Through displacement, Krog suggests that she shifts emphasis from sound or phonetic images to that of tactile image. This, in turn, enhances a tension within the poetic text with the use of a more aggressive word "gropes" (line 11). Which in turn is further enhanced by the lines, "and the writing, the writing down, takes place/ in wrestling the self down" (lines 15-16), "claws" (line 35) and "cuts" (Krog 2006: 35, line 79). The emerging conflict suggested is then further enhanced by juxtaposing it with a sense of safety – the word "unscathed" (Krog 2006: 35, line 82) is followed with "leaves sift like coals from the burning trees" (line 83). This in turn is enhanced with the paradoxical lines, "words do not manage to leave you/ words do not manage to keep you" (Krog 2006: 36, stanza 21, lines 90-91), which suggests a passivity rather than a bold aggressiveness, but the lines are directly followed by "cold bites up from the grass" and "the wind cuts snow" (lines 92 and 94).

Through the technique of displacement, "writing ode" shifts from an emphasis on phonetic images or phonemes to that of texture or tactility. This in turn shifts from a sensation or texture of softness to that of gentleness or passivity, which in turn shifts to provoking a sensation or affect itself through the use of the syntagms "cold bites" and "wind cuts."

Krog clearly indicates what Kristeva terms a dialectic of displacement in *Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Language and Art.* Kristeva writes that (with emphasis on poetry):

> writing would be the recording, through symbolic order, of this dialectic of displacement … that indicates the, cathexes of drives, that operates-constitutes the signifier but also exceeds it: adds itself to the linear order of language by using the most fundamental laws of the signifying process (displacement, condensation, repetition, inversion) … has other supplementary networks at its disposal; and produces a sur-meaning …
>
> (Kristeva 1980a [1977]: 102)

In "Beyond the Sentence: The Transfinite of Language," Kristeva mentions, though briefly, the relevance of texture in the context of the text, the sentence, and the structuring of an underlying layer/network/movement that extends towards the infinite set or transfinite. She writes that "texture" elaborates "on the basis of it: more-than-a-sentence, more-than-meaning, more-than-significance … always more: *more* than syntactic" (Kristeva 1980b [1977]: 168). The logical movement of a sentence – its linear movement or linearity – is exceeded by the promotion or provoking of a textural dimension to a text. This suggests that as the linear dimension – the linear layer or semantic layer of a text – moves or progresses in a forward or teleological direction, so too does the inverse occur. In other words, an underlying semiotic layer then moves in the opposite direction and extends a sense of boundlessness itself. The diagram attached highlights this process, termed "The Signifying Process or *Signifiance."* However, as the diagram is a two-dimensional representation, it suggests that this underlying movement is in a straight line. Kristeva's ideas suggest, as explicated with the multi-layers of Krog's "writing ode," that this movement is multi-directional and extends as a network.

## Section VI: Semanalysis part V – Bold Colour

I have shown that Krog's "writing ode" provokes layers that underlie the semantic or linear layer of the text and the formalist layer of the text. However, I argue, "writing ode" does not emphasize a phonetic layer as the predominant layer, as Kristeva suggests. Instead, I argue, "writing ode" suggests an extended use of visual images – an emphasis on bold colour as further support for the promotion of an additional and underlying layer to the poetic text.

Krog clearly references colour in the structuring of the semantic layer of the poetic text. She writes:

> (the vineyard against the slopes
> takes a consummate green oath
> that nothing will go to pieces
> under this tightly-stretched wind-blown sky
> on moonlit nights you can hear hoofs
> sparkling stars from the stones
> but what do these lines say?
> how much colour is sheafed into them?)
>
> (Krog 2006: 34, stanza 9, lines 30-37)

The lines that demonstrate, according to Kristeva's ideas, a use of repetition and the evocation of underlying phonetic images in the above quoted stanza – the repetition of the phoneme "s" with the words "slopes," "stretched," "sky" followed by the line "sparkling stars from the stones" – is, however, clearly followed by the question: "but what do these lines say?/ how much colour is sheafed into them?" The stanza is also enclosed between or "contained within" parentheses which further promotes the idea that colour is bound into the lines of the poetic text and therefore within the fabric or "body" of the poem itself.

Through Krog's use of colour she provokes a feeling of vibrance, an underlying exuberance or vitality, to the poetic text: the "earth groans in the colour of rust", the sun "spatters brittle blue" (Krog 2006: 34, lines 25-26), the "sandpaper leaves" are of "devastating copper" (Krog 2006: 34, line 50), the black coal leaves sharply contrasted with the colours of autumn and the burning trees (Krog 2006: 35, lines 78-83), the "bluegums" and "silver" (Krog 2006: 35, lines 67 and 70), the green of the grass and the whiteness of snow (Krog 2006: 36, lines 90-94), the colour of ice enhanced by the "blue" of the "mountains in the distance" (Krog 2006: 37, lines 112-113), and the "white" of the "kitchen" against the "last roses" (Krog 2006: 38, lines 151-152). This blending of colour – bold visual images of colour – with texture or tactile images provoke a sensation of being on the verge of "bursting through" the surface of the poetic text, through the linear or semantic layer of the poetic text itself.

I peel your face
I bite your tongue like a banana from your mouth
burning your language crashes into me (stanza 38)

I turn away scorched
the trees are so livid in foreign countries
as your eyes drift towards me in exorbitant light (stanza 39)

with you, loveliness and slumber
are more fundamental than betrayal
the earth rears softly at our feet (stanza 40)

(Krog 2006: 38-39, stanza 38-40, lines 153-161)

The pink or red of exposed, peeled flesh (stanza 38) juxtaposed with the image of a yellow banana provokes a blurring of boundaries that differentiate the distinctness of the colours themselves. This blurring of boundaries is enhanced through superimposing tactile images or texture: the facial flesh, and then the flesh of a tongue in stanza 38; the green of trees dulled by the bluish gray of "foreign countries" is contrasted with the "exorbitant light" in stanza 39. This tension between shades of colour is then softened, pacified, with the lines "you, loveliness and slumber" which provokes a gentleness or softness of texture that in turn is enhanced by the sign "softly" in stanza 40.

Krog's use of colour in "writing ode" promotes a key question in relation to my argument: If, as this section demonstrates, colour plays a key role in provoking an underlying layer –through enhancing the boldness of colour and through blurring the boundaries between shades of colour – what, besides Kristeva's semiotic drives, motivates or drive(s) the structuring of this *chora* or space in "writing ode"?

In addition to being a poem that evokes a space, a realm for the silenced voice, Krog's "writing ode" it is also a poem of love; and, I argue, through the text, its materiality, "writing ode" is fabricating a space, a "safe" space (Krog alludes to the idea of a safe space in the lines "completely cut off/ safe" (Krog 2006: 33, lines 8-9)) for a lost beloved. It is as if, through the

construction of this realm, this "underground," Krog evokes a space that exceeds the "ground level," "the daylight/ the drag of fabricated voices," (lines 3-4) and underlies the "I" (Krog 2006: 37, lines 121, 124, 125), to re-connect to her lost love, and, in so doing, re-creates a psychic space or realm for a voice that includes love itself. The following stanzas support my argument. Krog writes:

> you were the inconvenient
> and irrefutably too late love of my life
>
> I *dare* not have underground
> I *can not* live upper ground
> from everywhere channels run deep
> I search on the wind for a voice to you
> my life lies like stone
>
> words do not manage to leave you
> words do not manage to keep you
> cold bites up from the grass
> behind my scarf I say your name your name
> and the wind cuts snow
>
> never are you out of my thoughts
> you give everything skin
> as my life slips away into yours
>
> it had never been difficult
> your body is of colour
> and nowhere do you keep back from me
> I know you more intimately than a snare or silk or twine
>
> how can I unlearn you
> if only I can hold you tighter
>
> (Krog 2006: 36, lines 84-106)

Krog's lines: "your body is of colour" (line 102) and "I search on the wind for a voice to you" (line 89), further supports my emphasis on visual images of colour as playing a predominant role in the structuring of a *chora* in "writing ode."

"writing ode" is not exclusively a space supported by a desire or rather "drive" (or semiotic drives as Kristeva's ideas suggest) to "find one's voice/ to hear the sound of a poem" (Krog 2006: 33, lines 12-13) in the context of "the line that softly sputters from somewhere" (Krog 2006: 33, line 14) and an emphasis on sound or a phonetic layer, but rather this underlying realm or *new chora* (as Kristeva might term it) provokes an emerging exuberance through colour that is barely contained beneath the thetic boundary or border. My proposal is further supported by Krog's choice of syntagms and syntagmatic sequences of signs such as "bite," "burning," "crashes," "scorched," "exorbitant light." Krog further evokes this sensation of exuberance with the lines: "everything desires long feathered wings" (Krog 2006: 39, line 182), "I fling our eyes like burning coals" (Krog 2006: 40, line 208), "this drizzled breathtaking blue taffeta of earth" (Krog 2006: 40, line 218). It is as if, through this use of signs, Krog breaks the barrier or border between the fixidness of the signifier/signified division thereby separating the signifier, and opening the signifier up to a realm of limitless possibility, a space of multiple and unconfined meanings or *signifiance* as Kristeva might term it (Kristeva 1998b: 169) that not only underlies the signifier(s) but provokes a sensation that almost *exceeds* it. In *Desire in Language*, Kristeva writes that language "possesses" a specificity, "it divides (signifier/signified) and joins (modifier/modified = sentence)"; but, she adds that, "'musicating this division-joining movement" is to "lift" the "signifier/signified censorship" and return life to words – to the signifiers – to language, "to transform this very moment, to allow it to sing" (Kristeva 1980b [1977]: 168). "Poetry works on the bar between signifier and signified and tends to erase it, it would be an anarchic outcry against the thetic and socializing positions of syntactic language" (Kristeva 1980b [1977]: 174). Using *H* by Philippe Sollers, Kristeva argues that a sentence (or syntagmatic) "*sequence"* is a "unit of breathing, meaning, signification" (Kristeva 1980b [1977]: 171) and that through the evocation of underlying sensations (semiotic drives) within a text a "resurgence and metamorphosis," (Kristeva 1980b [1977]: 170) a breathing of new life within the fabric or "body" of the text itself takes place (Kristeva 1980a [1977]: 159-209).

"writing ode" translates this idea of transforming the *moment*[56] that confines words to the page, to the fabric of the text itself. In addition, it supports Kristeva's idea of "breathing life" back into the "body" of the text itself.

you sleep, yes
you have come to sleep in me
and your sleep holds everything
you will never sink out of me again
through my words you have stepped into my breath
with your bony mouth (stanza 45)

past our ageing bodies and lost scars
we hold each other
we sink to the ground
we see the faces of our dying: (stanza 46)

*

and now one can say it
(in one's fought-for language):
it is here that one's beloved sleeps tonight!
and one can call all whom one loves
and say:
see
the trees stand drenched with mortality
Everything weeps with transience (stanza 47)

*

I fling our eyes like burning coals into the cold
airily I brush the knuckle of your middlefinger
before us and after us
listen
how the doves breathe carefully past our bruises
death slobbers at our heels (stanza 48)

we know that everything will die
all writing and all things written
but this earth

[56] The position of the "writing I" at the inaugural moment (at the boundary or thetic of the Mirror Stage). My diagram pg 257 further clarifies these ideas. Although it is a two-dimensional representation, *signifiance* – the sensation of virtually bursting/highly charged semiotic drives – does not move in a 'line' or linearly but is multidirectional.

this drizzled breathtaking blue taffeta of earth
not (stanza 49)

we touch with newer tenderness (stanza 50)

we want to last to watch the earth
and hone language to hold the moment (stanza 51)

in this graced word
we belong with each other (stanza 52)

touch me
tonight
my decomposing cheek with your fingertip tendril (stanza 53)

(Krog 2006: 40-41, stanzas 45-53)

I have demonstrated that Krog's use of colour (visual images), blended with texture or tactile *images*, evokes an underlying energy – an exuberance and sensation of vitality – that corresponds to Kristeva's idea of active or highly charged semiotic drives. In addition, as the above quoted stanzas 45-53 demonstrate, the semantic layer of the poetic text further supports Kristeva's idea of breathing life into the fabric or body of the poetic text itself. The lines "through my words you have stepped into my breath" (stanza 45), "listen/ how the doves breathe carefully past our bruises" (stanza 48), "past our ageing bodies and lost scars" (stanza 46) and "we touch with newer tenderness" (stanza 50) underscore this process.

## Section VII: Krog, a Challenge to Kristeva, Semanalysis, and Male Poets

My semanalysis of "writing ode" has not as yet addressed a relevant factor in relation to my proposal on an originary attachment. In the discussion that follows, I address my proposal on an originary attachment in relation to "writing ode" and in the context of the originary ideal (and its relevance) prior to the Mirror Stage. In addition, I challenge Kristeva's proposal on the

proficiency of modern male writers, their ability, according to Kristeva, to structure unconscious modes of affectivity within the fabric of their poetic texts.

I have asserted that Krog's "writing ode" demonstrates a use of colour as a predominant poetic image(s) to structure an underlying space or "underground." As previously discussed, the lines: "but what do these lines say?/ how much colour is sheafed into them?)" (Krog 2006: 34, stanza 9, lines 30-37) additionally supports my thesis. In addition, stanza 9 is enclosed within parenthesis which further supports the idea of a safe or cocooned – if not maternal or *womb-like* – space that corresponds to Kristeva's proposal on a *chora.* The lines: "one bundles your voetstoots underground"[57] (Krog 2006: 37, line 134) provides further support.

Furthermore, as previously explained, stanza 9's emphasis on sound in the lines, "you can hear the hoofs/ sparkling stars from the stones," suggests a use of phonemes and repetition which provokes, as Kristeva might suggest, an underlying phonetic layer to the poetic text. However, these lines are directly followed by Krog's question: "but what do these lines say?/ how much colour is sheafed into them?)" (Krog 2006: 34, stanza 9, lines 46-37). This further suggests that Krog's "writing ode" underscores colour, and therefore visual images, over sound or phonetic images/grams.

This supports my argument of an originary attachment in the following manner: with Fuss and recent research as theoretical support, I argue, against Butler and Lacan, that the visual image of the mother's face is the originary ideal that underlies the process of normalization and the shaping of the subject's conscience. Therefore, visual images play, paradoxically, both a role in the normalization of the subject (after the Mirror Stage; due to the "Ideal I" image) and, I argue, a relevant role in a theoretical reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice. This chapter has illustrated that colour is a predominant poetic image in the underlying structure of "writing ode"; and, therefore, colour, according to my analysis of Krog's "writing ode," provokes a *space* that is not confined by teleological linear time but indicates a boundlessness that underlies the thetic

[57] The word "voetstoots" is directly translated into English as offhand, with all defects, without picking and choosing.

or Mirror Stage and the emergence of the normalized self itself. However, my argument is at variance with Kristeva's proposal.

As I have explained in this chapter, Kristeva underscores the predominance of sound – phonetic *images* – or what she terms "phonetic writing grams" in "Towards a Semiology of Paragrams" where she extends her proposal and writes that: "the phonetic network joins the other levels of the paragram[58] to communicate a new dimension to the poetic image" (Kristeva 1998a: 35). However, she continues to emphasize the relevance of sound or phonetic grams as the pivotal representation of an ethical practice. Analyzing Lautréamont's *Chants,* she writes that although the writer explicitly uses the image of an ocean, "the writer refuses the romantic image of the ocean as idealization of man. He refuses the image itself as sign, dissolving its *fixed meaning …* If Lautréamont salutes the 'wild, magnetic' ocean, it is so far as the ocean is for the poet a metaphor of a fluctuating network, touching the limits of all possible negations" (Kristeva 1998a: 38).

Yet, what supports Kristeva's claim of, and emphasis on, the relevance of phonetic images or grams as that which underlies the semantic, linear, or symbolic layer of poetic texts?

In "The Subject in Process," Kristeva uses exclusively male writer's work[59] to argue that their texts demonstrate a space or realm that underlies the thetic; and she uses the sounds used by infants prior to their acquisition of language (prior to the infant's learning of the rules and regulations, grammar and syntax, which structure speech and the realm of the symbolic) as support for her argument that a maternal realm or *chora* underlies the structuration of their texts (Kristeva 1998b: 133-175). She argues that the sounds made by infants prior to the Mirror Stage and the advent of the sign[60] indicate the basis from which the speaking subject emerges. "Fusion with the mother's breast," a connection with the mother's body, provides "the base of the vocal apparatus and also the base of the introduction into the order of language … characterized by a

[58] A paragram – a poetic text as a multi-layered network constituted by/through a range of poetic images, syntagmatic sequences etc.
[59] Joyce, Comte de Lautréamont and Bataille.
[60] The sign is initiated at/through the Mirror Stage. It is when, according to Lacan, the visual image of the self initiates the shaping of the subject in/through symbolic systems; it indicates the basis from which the speaking subject emerges**. (**Lacan 2014a [2004] 3-29). "In the beginning was the word" (Lacan 2014a [2004]: 21).

redistribution of the phonemic order [61] of morphological structure and even of syntax" (Kristeva 1998b: 145). Through the process of writing, the poet is able to reconstruct this space or maternal realm – Kristeva argues that the act or process of writing itself triggers "pulsating charges and drives … which are not subsumed by the construction of a super-ego" (Kristeva 1998b: 145). Through skilled poetic technique the poet is able to re-arrange these drives and affects which she terms an "articulation of expulsion" (Kristeva 1998b: 145) and in effect fabricate or re-construct a space, or "new c*hora*" as she terms it. She writes:

> The deformation or repetition of words or syntagms [a linguistic unit which can be a phoneme (a unit of sound), word or phrase] hyperkinesis or stereotype bear witness to the establishment of a new semiotic network, a new *chora,* which defines verbal symbolization at the same time as the formation of a superego modelled by the paternal law and sealed by the learning of language.
>
> (Kristeva 1998b: 145)

Yet, recently published research claims that infants are capable of seeing colour (Yang, Kanazawa, Yamaguchi & Kuriki 2016). Furthermore, and most relevant to my argument about Krog's demonstration that colour is a predominant poetic image that underlies the symbolic and linear level of a poetic text this research reveals that "pre-linguistic infants can categorize colour" (Yang, Kanazawa, Yamaguchi & Kuriki in *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 2016).

Jiale Yang, So Kanazawa, Masami K. Yamaguchi and Ichiro Kuriki's "Cortical response to categorical color perception in infants investigated by near-infrared spectroscopy" claims that:

> There has been much debate on the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis regarding whether language affects our perceptual world. Despite much research on this topic, there remains no clear consensus on whether and how language affects categorical color perception. Here, we provide the first evidence, to our knowledge, that categorical color perception has a universal starting point prior to language acquisition. We measured the neural correlates of categorical color perception in prelinguistic infants. We found increased brain activities to colors in different categories, but not to colors in the same category. These results indicated that different color categories are differently represented in the visual

[61] In linguistics the phoneme is the smallest/base unit of sound.

> cortex of prelinguistic infants, which implies that color categories may develop in the visual system before language acquisition.
>
> (Yang, Kanazawa, Masami, Yamaguchi and Kuriki 2016)

Yang, Kanazawa, Masami, Yamaguchi and Kuriki's research underscores that the infant's ability to perceive colour is prior to his/her acquisition of language; and, therefore, supports my challenge to Kristeva's emphasis on the relevance of sound as prior to the Mirror Stage and therefore, though not exclusively, predominant in the structuring of the underlying layers of a poetic text(s). Their claims support my demonstration, using Krog's "writing ode," that colour is a predominant poetic image that underlies the symbolic and linear level of a poetic text, and, therefore, underlies the normalization, the shaping of the subject's conscience, and, paradoxically, provokes a space that exceeds the confinement of the normalized self in that it is prior to, outside of, normalization. Their work further supports my argument in the context of the relevance of visual rather than, as Kristeva emphasizes, the predominance of phonetic images. This in turn supports my assertion of the relevance of the mother or primary caregiver's visual image as the originary ideal.

It is in this context that I challenge Kristeva's emphasis on the proficient capabilities of modern male poets – their creative capacity to structure poetic texts that provoke an unconscious maternal realm. In "The Subject in Process," Kristeva uses exclusively male poets' work to illustrate and then argue that their skilled technique enabled their articulation of the expulsion of drives and that their structuration of these drives within poetic texts capacitate a maternal network or new chora (Kristeva 1998b). I have theoretically shown that Krog's "writing ode" fabricates a new chora. I argue that "writing ode" translates in excess of the phonetic component as that which underlies the paternal metaphor by provoking an underlying visual dimension through her use of bold colour, and, in so doing, Krog articulates a place, a voice, as a mode of intimate revolt in an exclusive domain according to Kristeva's semanalysis of exclusively male writers poetic texts.

## Section VIII: The Maternal and Love in Krog's "ode vir 'n ander lewe" and "letter-poem lullaby for Ntombizana Atoo"

In Chapter 6, I challenge Butler's assertion on a passionate attachment to subjection and I argue that an originary attachment is the infant's bond with, or dependency on, the primary caregiver or maternal representation that includes the infant's love as a pre-Mirror Stage affect. Klein and Suttie's proposals are used as theoretical support. In this chapter, I have demonstrated a structuring of previously excluded drives that underlie the thetic. However, what of love in the context of a pre-mirror Stage affect? Does Krog's work demonstrate a presence of love within the fabric of her poetic text(s)? As that which underlies the surface layer of a poetic text?

I could argue that as the visual image plays a role in the structuring of the underlying layer of the poetic text – "writing ode" in Section VII – consequently the originary ideal, as a visual image of the maternal representation, participates in the context of the fabrication of realms that underlie the paternal metaphor. This in turn suggests that love as a pre-Mirror Stage affect is present in the structuring of unconscious realms (the originary ideal as the primary love object). However, in relation to Krog's "writing ode" I cannot demonstrate the presence of love as a pre-Mirror Stage affect within the texture, the fabric, or underlying layers of the text itself. Nonetheless, Krog's work does highlight a presence of love, in the context of a maternal love, through the surface or semantic layer of "ode vir 'n ander lewe" ("ode for another life") where she clearly writes of a desire to have a space of love that is also a maternal space. She writes:

> in loved languages I want to call you forth
> until I come right to you
> I want another space
> I want another chance
> to prove to my children my love for them (and as I write this
> their faces appear as if on a monitor
> screen): beloved child
> I want you to know
> that your mother is moved
> by your vulnerable courage
> that I reel at how deep you invest in love (Krog 2006: 47)
>
> I want to plead for a space
> in which I can say that I love every one of you (Krog 2006: 48)

The original Afrikaans version of the above quoted stanzas from “ode for another life,” “ode vir ‘n ander lewe,” suggests a more intense sensation or affect than the English, South African, translation does.

> met geliefde tale wil ek jou oproep
> en volbrag injou terug kom
>
> ek wil ‘n ander kans om my liefde
> in my kinders in te smee
> (terwyl ek skryf verskyn hulle gesigte
> soos op ‘n monitor): geliefde kind
> ma wil hê dat jy moet weet
> dat ek ontroer is deur jou weerlose dapperheid
> dat ek duisel van hoe diep jy in liefde bly belê
>
> (Krog 2006b: location 340)

Where the English translation is more suggestive rather than assertive and passionate, the original Afrikaans version of “ode for another life” provides far more support in the context of provoking a maternal space or realm itself. The use of the word “oproep” which translates into English as “invoke, evoke or conjure” suggests a revival or resurrection of “geliefde tale” which translates as “beloved languages.” The phrases “om my liefde/ in my kinders in te smee” again suggests a more intense, more passionate, motivation as that which drives the poetic text – the signifier “smee” translates as “devise, hammer or forge” rather than “to prove” as the English version of “writing ode” provides. The word “ontroer” translates as “impassioned or touched” which contrasts with the English version “moved.”

In addition, the lines “(terwyl ek skryf verskyn hulle gesigte/ soos op ‘n monitor): geliefde kind”[62] suggest the idea of a maternal love as supporting the text itself. However, in what manner

[62] “to prove to my children my love for them (and as I write this/ their faces appear as if on a monitor screen): beloved child”

does Krog's work provoke a space itself? *That* which underlies the surface or linear layer of a poetic text and suggests a maternal love itself?

Krog's "letter-poem lullaby for Ntombizana Atoo" fabricates an underlying space that is multilayered – through a repetition of phonemes, her use of colour, and texture, she (via the poetic text itself) evokes a space that supports the idea of maternal love and compares to Kristeva's *chora* in the context of a maternal realm.

Firstly, through a repetition of the phonemes "s" and "sh" the text provokes a phonetic layer. Krog writes:

> hush-hush
> sleep-a-bye
> sweet
> sleep soft
> sleep whole
>
> sleep blackly tilted (Krog 2006: 57, stanza 1)
>
> shush now
> shush now (Krog 2006: 57, stanza 6)
>
> hush-hush
> sleep-a-bye
> sweet
> sleep soft
> sleep whole
> sleep blackly tilted (Krog 2006: 57, stanza 8)
>
> sleep sweet
> sleep soft
> sleep loved and blackly tilted (Krog 2006: 61, stanza 19).

In addition, the softness of the phoneme "ch." Krog writes:

> childest child of mine
> childling born wet born now (Krog 2006: 57, stanza 2)
>
> childkin black childkin veld
> childkin nobody
> to nothing ever held. Childkin breast childkin thirst (Krog 2006: 57, stanza 7)

sh-sh
childest childling
child of mine
child of morrow
the veld lies loose in its skin of words (Krog 2006: 61, stanza 20)

Secondly, through Krog's uses colour, "letter-poem lullaby for Ntombizana Atoo" provokes an additional layer that extends the phonetic layer that underlies the poetic text. Shades of blue, green and black. Krog writes:

outside orbits the earth so ah and you
so softly bloused in blue (Krog 2006: 57, stanza 3)

the wind is all over the sky (Krog 2006: stanza 9)

that you could see the earth
clinging with suns and moons and comets and meteorites
(Krog 2006: 58, stanza 10)

this continent drifting like a big black plundered heart on the globe
(Krog 2006: 59, stanza 12)

Thirdly, the text provokes textures or tactile images that blend with Krog's choice of colours. The "softness" of the "blue" in the line "so softly bloused in blue" (Krog 2006: stanza 3); the delicate flesh of the child with the lines "lovely thing I am so close to you, your cheek lies in peach down/ your necklet wobbles this side that side" (Krog 2006: 60, stanza 16). This is emphasized by the repetition of the lines: "sleep sweet/ sleep soft" (Krog 2006: stanza 1, 8, 19). This in turn enhances the fragility of the child which is then sharply contrasted with the coarseness of textures provoked by the following lines: "vast ventricles of desert" (Krog 2006: 59, stanza 12), "stone/ forlorn continent" (Krog 2006: 59, stanza 12), "decaying in heaps/ into raking brooms of bones" (Krog 2006: 59, stanza 12), "the veld lies loose in its skin of words" (Krog 2006: 61, stanza 20) and "dusty road" (Krog 2006: 61, stanza 21).

Fourthly, through Krog' choice of colours she provokes a tension – a tension between the visual images of colours themselves – with shades of red and violet imbricated by green, then sharply contrasted with white; which, in turn, is enhanced with hues of blue and gold provoke a tension with the images of colour themselves.

> your fists tiny roses clenched in plum (Krog 2006: 57, stanza 5)

> in tufts of fire tomatoes fly among leaves
> the moon reports in milk
> in the thorn trees next to the road the stars also hum their way to you
> you have to see
> you have to hear how the sun lures the wind over your threshold
> taste how the water changes to still ivory plates in the setting sun
>
> (Krog 2006: 58, stanza 10).

It is this tension between the visual images of colour that in turn provokes a disturbance that then continues as an extension or rippling effect itself. As explained earlier in this chapter using Kristeva's theory, this extension, this space, suggests an outside of the confinement of teleological linear time and exceeds the confines of Absolute or paternal religion or religious metaphors as Butler argues.

"letter-poem lullaby for Ntombizana Atoo" supports the idea of a maternal space and that of a *chora* that extends to the archaic maternal memory. Furthermore, "letter-poem lullaby for Ntombizana Atoo" clearly demonstrates that Krog is not exclusively writing for her "self." "letter-poem lullaby for Ntombizana Atoo" suggests that is shaped by an underlying love that extends beyond the realm of normalized and socially conditioned emotion. It is as if Krog is using the fabric of the text as a body or "flesh" itself in which to "virtually embrace" the living body of the sleeping child. The semantic layer of "letter-poem lullaby for Ntombizana Atoo" supports this idea. Krog writes:

> with my voice on its way to you
> you who lie irrefutably stippled
> somewhere in cloth and herb
> in songlet and pain
> your vertebrae curving against what's to come

hold on dear child
against it all

(Krog 2006: 58, stanza 9)

I will come and claim you from bones and bullets and violence and aids
from muteness from stupidity from the corrupt faces of men
I'll gather you from millions of refugees
from hunger and thirst from the damp of cries
and the stink of tolerated grief
the desperate mangle of dreams
from the back I'll recognize the brave stalk of your neck
I will catch up with you
And pull you out by the arm

because you have to see differently
for us of the abyss

(Krog 2006: 59, stanza 11-12)

"letter-poem lullaby for Ntombizana Atoo" demonstrates that Krog, through the fabric or materiality of the text itself, fabricates a maternal space that is not exclusively for the self or "writing self" but a space that is motivated, driven, by love for another. Stanzas 11 to 12 quoted above support my argument. In addition, Krog writes:

I want it to be you my smallest
that between your ribs
you have to feel the tremor that things will be different
that something has to become true of what we are
that we are as Africans is something so soft so humanly skinned
so profoundly constitutionally big and light and kind as soul
so caring past understanding

we are who we are because we are of each other
why do we keep on then being so wrong?
I lay my cheek next to yours
I want to breathe into you
to care
to care
hush
hush

(Krog 2006: 59-60, stanzas 13-15)

Krog's "letter-poem lullaby for Ntombizana Atoo" and "ode vir 'n ander lewe" ("ode for another life") suggest a love that is not exclusively an effect, a socially conditioned response, of the mechanisms of normalization. However, Kristeva does not support the idea of love in this context.

Kristeva does not support love as being prior to the Mirror Stage. The semiotic drives therefore do not, according to Kristeva, include the pre-Mirror Stage affect of love as I argue. John Lechte's reading of Kristeva's proposal on love in "Horror, love, Melancholy" claims that, according to Kristeva, "love is impossible without a separation from the mother" (Lechte 2013b: 167). Using predominantly Kristeva's ideas from *Tales of Love* as support, he claims that "the constitution and dissolution of the psychic space called love" is based on the subject's "separation from the mother" (Lechte 2013b: 167). Love therefore, according to Lechte's reading of Kristeva's ideas on love, requires an "object of love," an "ideal," that is, however, exclusively of the symbolic realm and therefore constituted by the confinement of normalization, or grammatically speaking, via the rules of grammar and syntax. It is, therefore, an extension of narcissism. Krog's work presents a challenge to Kristeva proposal on love as being of the symbolic realm and suggests that love, as an unconditioned pre-Mirror Stage affect, is prior to the thetic, the Mirror Stage, and therefore prior to the formation of the Super-ego and the conscience itself.

I extend Kristeva's assertion on the *chora* as predominantly shaped by the phonetic layer of a poetic text by emphasizing colour as playing a relevant role in provoking an underlying realm. In addition, I extend Kristeva's argument on semiotic drives and metaphor by including unconditioned love as that which underlies, grammatically speaking, the paternal realm of metaphor itself. In Chapter 6, I use Suttie and Klein's proposals and provide a more detailed and effective response in relation to my proposal on love as a pre-Mirror Stage affect.

## Section IX: Revolt in "colonialism of a special kind," "farewell" and "Every day I treat you as if you are mine"

In her introduction to *Intimate Revolt* Kristeva claims that revolt is a return, a turning back, a questioning and displacement of the past (Kristeva 2002: 5). On an intimate level, revolt, according to my reading of Kristeva and in relation to this chapter, is a "turning back" in the context of a return to the Mirror Stage. In addition, it is an activation of previously excluded or forbidden (by the law of the Father or the Symbolic) what Kristeva terms semiotic drives and Lacan suggests are pre-Mirror Stage affects. Furthermore, as I have suggested, it includes love in the context of a pre-Mirror Stage affect. It is, as I have demonstrated with the support of Antjie Krog's poetry, a "turning back" to the past in the context of a re-construction of a space or realm that, grammatically speaking, underlies the paternal realm or metaphor – a new *chora* that is outside of the confinement and restriction of teleological, linear, time itself.

However, r*evolt* also suggests an abjection or rejection of the normalized self.[63] It is briefly explained in this chapter's Section I: Krog's Confrontation with the Thetic Boundary/Border in "writing ode" which, in the context of the Mirror Stage or thetic, suggests an unsettling of the subject's original ideal by destabilizing the image of her "self" or "Ideal-I" at the Mirror Stage. Furthermore, revolt suggests a challenge or destabilization of the Law of the Father, which, in the context of the Mirror Stage and the thetic, suggests a destabilization of the Super-ego itself.

In this section, I briefly highlight Krog's poems "colonialism of a special kind," "farewell," and "Every day I treat you as if you are mine" to underscore that Krog references colonialism and paternal power in her work. I present a detailed discussion on revolt in the context of Krog's work and the cosmetic surgical industry in Chapter 9.

In "colonialism of a special kind" Krog writes that she is "dumbstruck" and asks, "what becomes of them?/ the earth  and the fullness thereof/ the world and those who live in it/ belong to the mighty" "what becomes of them?" (Krog 2006: 67).

[63] The abjection of the self is explicated in detail in Kristeva's *Power of Horror* (1982 [1980]).

In “farewell” Krog blends the colours white, blue and black as if to blur the boundaries that provoke racial divisions itself – “and this strange white wrapping which fits me so well” (Krog 2006: 65, stanza 1); “I belong nowhere else/ but in this boat belting in horror and blue/ with my heart nailed to the mast/ flapping black with you” (Krog 2006: 65, stanzas 3 and 4).

Krog also indicates that she is frightened by the whiteness of her skin, horrified by the oppression it represents: “skin has many colours/ the heart many shapes,” “but when we look into the water/ I get a fright from the omnipresent/ white who sits like this: stipulating truthness” (Krog 2006: 65, stanzas 10-12). This suggests an underlying fear, a horror, of aspects of her self – Krog’s abjection of her self as an underlying process within and via the body of the poetic text itself.

In “Every day I treat you as if you are mine” she writes from the perspective of patriarchal dominance and colonialism and underscores Table Mountain as a paternal metaphor to represent it. Krog writes:

> A kind of barbarism in which nothing has a name:
> Women throw a tit over the shoulder
> Cannibals, winged lions, vulvas hanging down to the knees
> Barking one-eyed people and snakes, standing upright in trees
> (Krog 2006: 74, stanza 1)

> Nobody will ever believe our relief when, one morning, we saw this
> Table – something so miraculously ordinary in the wilderness
> – something so civilised one at last could pin a memory there.
> That’s why, when we named it’; ‘On the southern tip and baptised it ‘Table Mountain.’ (Krog 2006: 74, stanza 2)

She continues:

> by the children of God. Every piece of property I will number and name
> As it rises stepwise against your slopes (Krog 2006: 74, stanza 5)

## Section X: Reclaiming the Metaphor in "Four seasonal observations of Table Mountain"

In "Four seasonal observations of Table Mountain," Krog does use colour – she emphasizes the blue of Table Mountain which she contrasts with shades of red: "your colours all your own:/ the shale and the silstone reddish/ as it thrusts/ through the scrub, in pewter/ you lift up/ your temples from sediment/ and something glacial" (Krog 2006: 90); "the mountain throws off the clouds like/ a cape and/ stands radiant all at/ once decked out/ in wet stone like a revelation in the/ sun. then stacks its voice in the fullest/ tones of stone/ diapason and hymns/ the purest sounds of/ blinding blue" (Krog 2006: 87); "blue. I lift/ up mine eyes to the mountain" (Krog 2006: 87); "good morning/ mountain, mountain blue molar" (Krog 2006: 89); "inner blue/ that scorches through – as if the/ core of the mountain is/ vitreous blue, as if one stands/ speechless that/ blue in granite can" (Krog 2006: 90).

Yet, she also reclaims the metaphor "Table Mountain" from that of a paternal representation or symbol as previously demonstrated to that of a metaphor for her body itself.

Krog uses the metaphor "mountain" or specifically "Table Mountain" as a means to reconstruct a body – her body—within or through the fabric or "flesh" of the poetic text itself. The following lines clearly support this proposal: "I live by the/ breath of the mountain alone" (Krog 2006: 91); "I lift/ up mine eyes to the mountain/ whence cometh my body?/ my body comes from the mountain/ which made arms/ and heaven." (Krog 2006: 87). From the section, "*tuesday 31 january*" Krog writes, "I stretch out my palms to/ pull the image of the mountain in – /to my arms, the mountain/ into whose spell I look up daily/ benevolent the sun,/ steady the colour of stone with rust" (Krog 2006: 110, *tuesday 31 january*, stanza 1).

Furthermore, she reclaims the metaphor "Table Mountain" from that of a paternal representation to that of a maternal omnipresence suggesting a resurgence of maternal power itself. Krog writes:

> ***friday 3 february***
> just when they think she is theirs,
> she heaves her mighty head
> scornfully erect to the sky and

reveals her body in a
resounding triumph of
mountain, majestic she stands there, clamorous
in a fucking larynx of radiant

ruin – my god, I am
covered in goosebumps, this she will do long
after I'd fallen back from her
finally

de-heavened
(Krog 2006: 111)

With Krog's skilled technique and an application of Kristeva's theory, I have provided a detailed semanalysis of a selection of poetic texts from *Verweerskif/ Body Bereft* (Krog 2006). I have demonstrated that "writing ode" provokes an underlying network that compares to Kristeva's *chora*. I have extended Kristeva's proposal on the *chora,* her emphasis on the phonetic layer of a poetic text, by emphasizing colour and visual images as playing a relevant role in provoking an underlying realm within Krog's poetic text. In so doing I have promoted a return to Kristeva's theory and additionally extended her theory on semanalysis. I have situated her methods on poetry analysis in a feminist context – I have challenged her emphasis on male poets. I highlight the idea of the Maternal and love in Krog's "ode vir 'n ander lewe" and "letter-poem lullaby for Ntombizana Atoo." In so doing I promote the presence of love as an unconscious pre-Mirror Stage affect that underlies poetic texts. This in turn further extends Kristeva's proposal on the *chora* and semiotic drives. Lastly, I briefly highlight Krog's "colonialism of a special kind," "farewell," and "Every day I treat you as if you are mine" to underscore that Krog references colonialism and paternal power in her work. I then argue that Krog suggests a reclamation of the metaphor in "Four seasonal observations of Table Mountain." It is in this context that Krog's *Verweerkrif/Body Bereft* inscribes a reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice.

If the subject is merely or exclusively a grammatical effect confined within teleological linear time,[64] as Butler and Lacan claim (discussed in the beginning of this chapter), then I have theoretically shown that Krog's poetic texts fabricate a space that is not exclusively confined but supports the idea of a return to the past[65]; and, therefore, Krog's poetic texts present a challenge to Butler and Lacan's claims.[66] Her work suggests an excess that is not confined within the realm of normalization, the realm of the paternal, or symbolic systems.

In Chapter 9, I extend my analysis of Krog's poetry and theoretically demonstrate a subversion of contemporary consumer culture and the cosmetic surgical industry that is prevalent in the second decade of the twenty- first century. In addition, I show that Krog's "leave me a lonely began" challenges Foucault's proposal in relation to pastoral power and its translation as a mode of unconscious oppression that confines women's bodies.

[64] Butler and Lacan use Hegel's ideas on the subject or self as moving forward, towards a goal that suggests a movement that is away from the self's origins and in the context of linear time. Hegel suggests that this movement alienates the subject (Hegel 2009 [1807]:81-86).

[65] A reconnection or "return to" previously excluded/blocked semiotic drives and affects.

[66] Lacan claims that the precondition for entering the realm of the symbolic, the realm of the paternal, is to "forget" the past. He asserts that the subject's integration into history entails the "forgetting of an entire *world of shadows* which are not transposed into symbolic existence" (Lacan 1991 [1975] 1953-1954: 192).

## Diagram 2: A Depiction of Semanalysis, The Paragrammatic Network, and the Principle of Negativity



# Chapter 9: Krog, Pastoral Power, and Revolt

*God, Death, Love, Loneliness, Man*
*are Important Themes in Literature*
*menstruation, childbirth, menopause, puberty*
*marriage are not*

*meanwhile terror lies exactly in how*
*one lives with the disintegrating body*
*to how one accepts that the body no longer*
*wants to intensify with exhilarating detonations*

*- Antjie Krog, God, Death, Love, 2006*

In Chapter 8, I demonstrated a return to Kristeva's theory in the context of an intimate revolt and her methods of poetry analysis. Utilizing Kristeva's theory on semanalysis, I argue that Krog evokes an intimate space in the context of a structuration of semiotic drives within the fabrics of poetic texts itself – a maternal space that exceeds the confinement of the realm of the paternal and the Law of the Father. I show that a selection of Krog's poetic texts from *Verweerskrif/Body Bereft* present an authentic feminist voice in the context of an underlying maternal space that exceeds, grammatically speaking, the realm of the symbolic and the paternal metaphor (Krog 2006). In addition, I extend Kristeva's argument on male writers and the predominance of the phonetic realm with my argument on the visual realm, the originary ideal, as underlying metaphor in relation to Krog's poetic texts. In so doing I position Kristeva's theory in relation to poetry analysis in a feminist context. However, I have not as yet addressed Krog's work in relation to the oppressive and exploitative cosmetic surgical discourses of the twenty-first century.

In Chapter 4, I discuss Bridget Garnham's theory on the emergence of designer cosmetic surgical discourses that are specifically aimed at the exploitation of the ageing individual. In this chapter, I utilize her theory and Louise Viljoen's analysis of a selection of Krog's poetic texts from *Verweerskrif/Body Bereft* as support for my arguments (Garnham 2013, 2017, Viljoen 2014). In relation to Krog, my proposed return to Kristeva's theory, and my extension of Kristeva's arguments and methods on poetry analysis, I present an intimate revolt in the

context of a destabilization and defiant challenge to the patriarchal ideals promoted by conventional society with emphasis on its objectification and fetishization of the ageing and menopausal body as is evident in this new strain of oppressive cosmetic surgical discourses. In so doing, I further position Krog as a feminist and subversive voice in the second decade of the twenty-first century. The discussion that follows clarifies my arguments in this chapter.

Although Krog does not explore cosmetic surgery or its exploitation of women with emphasis on the ageing and menopausal body in her poetic texts she does express the psychological and emotional conflict experienced by women in a patriarchally shaped society and the invisibility of her own ageing and menopausal body in a selection of her poetic texts from *Verweerskrif/ Body Bereft* (Krog 2006). Using Bridget Garnham's theory on an emerging cosmetic surgical discourse aimed at the exploitation of the ageing and "older" individual and Louise Viljoen's analysis of Krog's work as a revolt against conventional society's norms and aesthetic standards for female corporeality (Garnham 2013, 2017; Viljoen 2014), firstly, I situate Krog's work as a counter discourse to the oppressive cosmetic surgical industry, and, secondly, I delineate her voice as a challenge to the newly emerging cosmetic surgical discourses aimed at exploiting and confining the "older" individual within designer styled aesthetics.

This is followed by my analysis of Krog's "leave me a lonely began" where I firstly highlight that, according to my surface reading of her poetic text, Krog suggests a voice for women, a polyvocality, in that she expresses the underlying psychological and emotional conflict experienced by women in the context of their invisibility in conventional society. Utilizing Kristeva's theory on paragrams, I then show that Krog subverts this mode of invisibility, this form of patriarchal fetishization, by "making visible" her ageing and menopausal body within the poetic text – she destabilizes the male gaze that renders her as the speaker in the poetic text an invisible object and she constructs an opposition, asserts a metaphorical position, through the poetic text itself.

In addition, as discussed in Chapter 4, I extend Foucault's argument on pastoral power and analyze the act-of-confession – its translation in the context of the cosmetic surgical body itself. In this chapter, I translate Foucault's act-of-confession as a moral code in the context of

Krog's poetic texts. I then utilize Kristeva's theory on the principle of negativity to show Krog's destabilization of the moral dimension provoked by the developing designer cosmetic surgical discourses aimed at exploiting and oppressing the ageing individual (Garnham 2013, 2017). I turn to Kristeva's theory on an intimate revolt as a mode of ethics, an ethical practice, as a means to destabilize the Law of the Father and the Super-ego that confines the conscience and shapes the subject's voice. In this context, I position the South African poet Antjie Krog as an authentic feminist voice in contemporary consumer culture further underscoring her relevance in the context of emerging and expanding oppressive consumer culturalist discourses aimed at the ageing female body such as those promoted by the cosmetic surgical industry in the second decade of the twenty-first century.

Lastly, I assert Krog's voice as a challenge to Kristeva's exclusivity in the context of the artistic capabilities of great male writers and the abject. In *Powers of Horror*, Kristeva argues that it is male writers who open themselves up to the experience of the excluded and banished maternal and primal realm (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 15-31). In addition, the contemporary writer suggests a mode of fetishized expression rather than immersing himself in the terrifying experience of the abject itself (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 15- 17). However, great modern writers, according to Kristeva, experience the abject itself and consequently express this mode within their poetic texts (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 18).

## Section I: Krog, Viljoen, and a Counter Discourse to the Cosmetic Surgical Industry

In the discussion that follows, I outline Bridget Garnham's theory on an emerging cosmetic surgical discourse aimed at the exploitation of the ageing and "older" individual (Garnham 2013, 2017). Louise Viljoen's analysis of Krog's work as a revolt against conventional society's norms and aesthetic standards for female corporeality is then discussed (Viljoen 2014). The theoretical support of Viljoen's proposal enables me to situate Krog's work as a counter discourse to the oppressive cosmetic surgical industry and as a challenge to the newly emerging cosmetic surgical discourses aimed at exploiting and confining the "older" individual within

designer styled aesthetics. Furthermore, it supports my arguments in relation to Krog's destabilization of and revolt against patriarchal oppression and inhibition embedded within cosmetic surgical discourses that follow in Section III, IV, and V.

In Chapter 4 (Section III), I discuss Bridget Garnham's theory in "Designing 'older' rather than Denying Ageing: Problematizing Anti-ageing Discourse in relation to Cosmetic Surgery undertaken by Older People" and her argument on an emerging form of normalization in the context of anti-ageing discourses aimed at "older" individuals (Garnham 2013). She claims that the cosmetic surgical industry oppresses ageing individuals by effectively designing the ageing process itself. The cosmetic surgical industry structures designer discourses that combine essentialist concepts of the "naturally ageing body" with ideals of empowered and improved agency that are actualized by the reshaping of the ageing body (Garnham 2013). In her recent work, *A New Ethics of Older: Subjectivity, Surgery, and Self-stylization*, she extends her proposal and argues that cosmetic surgical normative discourses have evolved in their approach to "older" individuals by incorporating additional modes of oppression. She argues that these discourses target the "older" individual by promoting the ideal of being better, a worthy and improved self-actualized version of the self, with aesthetics (Garnham 2017).

Garnham draws attention to this emerging moral dimension in the context of normalizing discourses and the "older" individual that no longer deny the ageing process but rather re-inscribe it in a designer frame – undergoing cosmetic surgery is a means to continue as an active member of popular culture, a valued member of society, and a morally "better" version of the self. She uses Foucault's work on the "ethics of care" as support for her critique on the exploitative cosmetic surgical discourses aimed at the ageing individual (Garnham 2017: 30-99).

In *The Hermeneutics of the Subject* (1981- 1982), Foucault traces the techniques of the Classical and Hellenistic practices in relation to an ethics that combined the improvement or betterment of the self with the idea of aesthetics.[67] He claims that the goal of the "care of the self" regime is actualized, achieved, in old age (Foucault 2005 [1981-1982]). He writes:

[67] Foucault challenged the western concept of ethics in that it promoted a normalized self that was further confined by supposed absolute truths – normalizing discourses oppress the subject by asserting the concept of the

> Now the care of the self must be practiced throughout life, but especially in adult life, now that the care of the self assumes its full dimensions, when one is fully adult we see that the moment of the successful outcome and of the highest form of the care of the self, the moment of its reward, is precisely in old age.
>
> Old age should not be seen merely as a limit on life, any more as it is to be seen as a phase of diminished life. Old age should be considered, rather, as a positive goal of existence. We should strive towards old age and not resign ourselves to having it come upon us one day. Old age, with its own forms of values, should orient the whole course of life.
>
> (Foucault 2005 [1981-1982]: 108- 109)

Foucault suggests a mode of aesthetics ethics that involves a care of the self in the context of a continual self-improvement, self-renewal, and that this mode of aesthetics both continues into old age and, furthermore, is driven by old age itself – old age is both the reward and that which should, according to Foucault, orient the entire course of life. It becomes evident that, as Garnham argues, the cosmetic surgical industry is manipulating this mode of ethics and aesthetics in relation to the ageing individual. Her theory on the normalization of cosmetic surgical discourses emphasizes a relevant component in the context of patriarchal oppression and the "older" subject: that this form of cosmetic surgical discourse exploits the "older" individual by combining aesthetics with a moral dimension. In the discussion that follows, I present a counter discourse to these oppressive cosmetic surgical discourses. I adopt Louise Viljoen's critique on Krog's work that, she argues, subverts society's norms and aesthetic standards of female corporeal beauty, to strengthen my argument in this context (Viljoen 2014).

In "*I Have a Body, therefore I Am*: Grotesque, Monstrous and Abject Bodies in Antjie Krog's Poetry," Louise Viljoen uses Mikhael Bakhtin's theory on grotesque realism, Elizabeth Grosz's hypothesis on female corporeality, and Grosz's reading of Kristeva's proposal on the

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self as a "natural" and essential "truth." Sexual identity is then further confined by these essentialist discourses. He turns to ancient Greek and Roman texts as they suggest a form of self that is not defined or confined by this concept of an essentialist or absolute truth; instead, they promote an aesthetic ethics that functions on a principle which involves a care of the self. This form of aesthetic ethics promotes a process of continual self-improvement, self-renewal, of focusing on a self in the context of beauty and virtue.

abject as support for her analyses of Krog's work (Viljoen 2014 98-132). I will discuss her work with emphasis on her analysis of Krog's autobiographical works "sonnet of the hot flushes" (Viljoen 2014: 117) and her reading of "when tight is loose" (Viljoen 2014: 119) from *Verweerskrif/Body Bereft.* These poetic texts, according to Viljoen, establish Krog's expression in a subversive context (Viljoen 2014: 117-130).

Viljoen argues that in "sonnet of the hot flushes," Krog's description of menopause contains elements of grotesque realism. The "hot flush of menopause" is described as "newly floated fire" that spreads through the speaker in the poem's body: "her veins, heart, bones, face, cheeks and skin." Viljoen suggests that Krog expresses her feelings on menopause as an anger within the poetic text that is uncontained, as if bursting through the through the body of the speaker and the poetic text itself.

> But one day you shift in your chair – and
> Feel this enormous crucible destroying your
> Last juiciness. God knows, this is enough:
> Burning like a warrior you rise – a figurehead of
> Fire – you grab like a runt and plough its nose
> Right through your fleeced and drybaked cunt
>
> (Krog qtd in Viljoen 2014: 117)

Viljoen emphasizes the crudeness of the action as "breathtaking". She writes, "On one hand it is an utterance of utmost fury," a "disrespect for menopause" but it "calls to mind Bakhtin's description of grotesque realism" (Viljoen 2014: 117).[68] Viljoen suggests that Krog's use of the word "cunt" is not a means to merely disrespect, or to blur the boundaries between societal conventions and the realm of the market place, but rather to subvert through a mode of inversion, a destabilizing of the official culture and replacing it with that of the carnivale.[69] It is a realm without fear, "for it knows no inhibitions, no limitations" (Viljoen 2014: 117). She writes,

[68] In *Rabelais and His World* (1941) Bakhtin suggests grotesque realism is a literary trope that promotes degradation of authority.

[69] In *Rabelais and his World* (1941) Bakhtin likens the "carnivalesque" to an expression of normally suppressed voices, a destabilizing of social hierarchy and authority, a promotion of profanity, of carnival, a mode of resistance.

"Medieval laughter, when it triumphed over the fear inspired by the world and by power, boldly unveiled the truth about both … It degraded power" (Viljoen 2014: 117).

Her analysis of "when tight is loose" uses Kristeva's description of the skim of milk in relation to the abject. Kristeva writes that:

> food loathing is perhaps the most elementary and most archaic form of abjection. When the eye sees or the lips touch that skin on the surface of milk – harmless, thin as a sheet of cigarette paper – I experience a gagging sensation and, still further down, spasms in the stomach, the belly, and all the organs shrivel up the body, provoke tears and bile, intense heartbeat, cause forearm and hands to perspire.
>
> (Kristeva qtd. in Viljoen 2014: 119)

"tight is loose" presents, according to Viljoen, a graphic description of the ageing body that relates to Kristeva's experience of the abject. She argues that this revulsion, this repulsion of the body, disturbs social order, and "shows no respect for boundaries or rules." (Viljoen 2014: 120).

> her stomach lies like a dish in her lap
> there are blue medallions on her thighs
> and if she has to look down, she sees
> her knees shrinking like forgotten
> prunes in a bowl. her skin is loose from
> her flesh like a shuddered boiled-milk
> skin …
>
> (Krog qtd in Viljoen 2014: 119)

Adopting Grosz's reading of Kristeva, Viljoen then argues that Krog's use of abject imagery is a refusal to conform to societal norms, a refusal of the boundaries, the demarcating borders that situate the body as neatly conformed and as that which effectively obeys social conventions. She emphasizes Krog's poetic texts as an "excessiveness," as that which exceeds cultural norms that constitute the "proper social body." She writes:

> Krog's use of abject imagery is an expression of her feeling that her ageing and menopausal body is indeed an affront to the existing social order, but also she

> is trying to confront society's negation of the menopausal woman by making this body visible in all its abject specificity.
>
> (Viljoen 2014: 120)

Viljoen's analysis of Krog's "menopausal sonnets" and "when tight is loose" provides support for my argument in that she demonstrates Krog's subversion of society's existing norms with emphasis on the beauty standards that circumscribe women's bodies. She describes Krog's work, in relation to Kristeva's proposal on the abject, as an excess that cannot be defined, confined, or contained within social conventions and the oppression that establishes women's corporeality. In this context, Viljoen's analysis promotes Krog's work as a counter discourse to the oppressive designer cosmetic surgical discourses that Garnham asserts are exploiting the ageing subject. If, as Viljoen argues, Krog's work on the ageing and menopausal body is an affront to social order, a confrontation of society's negation of her menopausal body by making this body visible in all its abject specificity (Viljoen 2014: 120), and a body politics that rebels against conventional views of female corporeality (Viljoen 2014: 99), then Krog presents a counter discourse to, as Garnham proposes, the oppressive cosmetic surgical discourses that confine the ageing female body within an aesthetic dimension. Krog's poetic texts present a mode of ethical resistance to the "care of the self" that necessitates multiple cosmetic surgical procedures and therefore incorporates continual modes of violence that are concealed by an aesthetic and moral façade.

In Section II, I analyse a selection of Krog's work from *Verweerskrif/Body Bereft* aimed at highlighting her work in the context of a voice for women, a polyvocality, in that she expresses the underlying psychological and emotional conflict experienced by ageing women in the context of their invisibility in conventional society. Krog demonstrates a denial and confinement of the ageing and menopausal body thereby emphasizing its oppression in the context of society. Furthermore, this act-of-renouncement pronounces the underlying ideology that shapes the cosmetic surgical body. As a response to this, Section III shows that "leave me a lonely began" provokes a destabilization of patriarchal norms embedded within cosmetic surgical discourses.

## Section II: Establishing Contradiction or Paradox as Support for Polyvocality

A surface reading of "leave me a lonely began" suggests a one-dimensional narrative that concludes with a woman's passive acceptance of her ageing body. Krog introduces the poem with a quote by Tamara Slayton: "the voice of the menopausal woman is feared and denied. She has been made invisible or encouraged to remain forever young …"[70] The text commences with a woman sitting in a coffee shop who suddenly realizes that she is no longer visible and therefore no longer desirable to men (Krog 2006: 21-22). Although she is initially upset when "she realizes: he/ does not see her" (Krog 2006: 21, lines 7 and 8) the text's final stanza, "she knows:/ nobody will ever again breathlessly/ peel desire from her shoulders" (Krog 2006: 22, lines 31 and 32), supports the idea of a passive acceptance of her own invisibility and undesirability. Furthermore, Krog's use of a coffee shop as the "setting" for her poem (rather than a more intimate setting) enhances the nonchalance and arbitrariness of the "event," as if the negation of the woman's ageing menopausal body is quite normal, socially acceptable, which further supports the idea of the woman's ageing body as insignificant and inconsequential, or, as Krog writes, "she's/ vanished without tamper or trauma;" (Krog 2006: 21, line 11-12).

A closer reading of "leave me a lonely began" underscores the autobiographical nature of the text. As an autobiographical text, a formalist reading of "leave me a lonely began" suggests that Krog (as the woman in the poem) is not merely accepting her ageing body in the context of a conformed submission or acquiescence but rather that she is attempting to "confine" her ageing menopausal body within the bounds of the poetic text itself. In Chapter 8, Section II, I briefly discuss formalism from *The Well Wrought Urn: Studies in the Structure of Poetry* (Brooks 1947). Brooks argues that the text acts as a container – a poetic text is an embodiment of that which is denied by the self, a container for that which is purged. In this case (the stanzas from Krog's work that support this argument are quoted and discussed after this paragraph), through Krog's defining of her ageing body, and expounding the image of her body in the text, she is delineating a boundary, and, through the fabric of the poetic text(s), fabricating an "enclosure"

[70] Tamara Slayton, *Reclaiming the Menstrual Matrix: Evolving Feminine Wisdom* (1990).

for the emotions and affects that accompany her ageing and menopausal body. A cathexis, in psychoanalytic terms, as the text becomes the object in which Krog invests emotional or psychological energy (Freud 1989 [1933]: 90-93, 110-115).

In "leave me a lonely began," Krog suggests a confinement and denying of her ageing body through her use of metaphor – a provocation of an underlying visual image of her ageing body which she then denies or separates from her "self." The following stanzas support this claim:

> her silent invisibility
>
> bends her eyes to her hand playing with crumbs on the blue check table cloth, and it is so: every finger joint
>
> is thickened and stiffening into a
> new direction. next to the swollen vein
>
> in an unguarded moment, a brown stain was deftly stapled. It is as if great
> and dull boulders fill her from the
>
> inside and she withholds her from
> herself as if from a grater:
>
> (Krog 2006: 21-22, lines 20-30)

Krog's choice of the signs "thickened," "stiffening," "swollen," "boulders" provoke a visual image of that which is heavy, oppressive and crushing her from "the inside." This use of a visual image as support for an affective or emotional conflict is further supported by the syntagm "a brown stain was deftly stapled." The word "stapled" supports the fixidness and rigidity of the attachment, which is further enhanced by juxtaposing it with the word "deftly."

The line, "and she withholds her from/ herself as if from a grater:" (Krog 2006: 22, line 29-30), supports the idea of a denial of the ageing body, of Krog's attempt to separate her "self" from her ageing body as if it were sharp-edged and harmful. The word "stain" further supports the idea of the ageing body as undesirable or an abject "object."

The idea of separating her "self" from her abject body is further promoted in her text "softsift of the hourglass" (Krog 2006: 51-52). Krog begins the poem with "half of her is somebody

else/ as if somebody else/ is standing next to her in her" (Krog 2006: 51, lines 1 to 3), the lines "inside herself, but quivering in her ribs/ one can see that already/ she's been by the half-dead dead eclipsed" (Krog 2006: 51, lines 28-31), further support the idea of a separation of her "self" as "one" from that of her "self" as the pronoun "she." Her use of words or syntagms such as "cheeks hang/ cold and dull" (Krog 2006: 51, line 9), "a chipped shoulder knob" (Krog 2006: 51, line 12), "disintegrating mop," "wilting lily" (Krog 2006: 51, line 22) provokes images of decaying flesh and objects. In addition, the text is written as two juxtaposed halves which further supports the idea of separating her "self" from her ageing body. In "Four seasonal observations of Table Mountain," there is an obvious denial of the ageing body in the lines, "I want to return with/ my previous body. I am not/ I, without my body" (Krog 2006: 94). In "Depression," she suggests a yearning for her younger body in the lines, "it is true I/ lay my eyes desperately on young skin and fluent/ bodies it is true that I'm on the brink of an abyss" (Krog 2006: 12, lines 23-24).

In Chapter 4, Section III, I discuss Foucault and Butler's proposals on the confinement of the body and extend their proposals in relation to contemporary consumer culture and the cosmetic surgical body. I argue that the cosmetic surgical industry downplays the trauma of undergoing cosmetic surgical procedures and conveniently replaces it with discourses that provoke a "giving up" or renouncing the ageing body in favour of a "new" and improved version. As support for my argument in Chapter 4, I use advertisements and Online Virtual Simulators to highlight this mode of exploitation and provocation.

I have argued, with Viljoen's analysis of "menopause sonnets" and "tight is loose" as support, that Krog presents a counter discourse to the oppressive cosmetic surgical industry. In "leave me a lonely began," "softsift of the hourglass," "Four seasonal observations of Table Mountain" and "Depression," Krog suggests a renouncement of the ageing body. I argue that these works draw attention to the psychological and emotional conflict experienced by women in society. These works are a social commentary on the oppression and exploitation of women's bodies with emphasis on the ageing and menopausal body and its rejection, its invisibility, unless it conforms to the beauty standards and norms promoted by conventional society. Furthermore, the emerging designer cosmetic surgical discourses exploit this dynamic, manipulate the psychic conflict experienced by ageing women, and promise versions of the self that permit the

individual's continued participation in society, continued value as a recognized and socially visible woman, and an emancipation from the anxiety these very discourses continue to provoke and effectively produce.

Cressida Heyes's theory on the "authentic self" further supports my argument. In *Self Transformations*, she argues that the cosmetic surgical individual is attempting to repair her self, "fix" her psychological and emotional past, her psychic trauma, by moving toward an unattainable solution, an ideal beauty, and the traumatic past is excluded, possibly denied or repressed, rather than addressed (Heyes 2007). Although cosmetic surgical discourses aimed at the ageing female subject are not necessarily promoting ideal beauty but rather improved and socially "acceptable" versions of the self, these discourses effectively confine women within a different realm of psychological and emotional conflict – a form of trauma that is produced by normalizing discourses promoted by the cosmetic surgical industry itself. This further suggests that the cosmetic surgical industry then effectively performs the role of a new "voice" of oppression, or subjection as an application of Foucault's theory might suggest, aimed at confining the cosmetic surgical subject within normalization processes – a voice with a moral dimension. As Heyes clearly claims, the cosmetic surgical industry promotes a moral dimension; it is moral in that the individual believes this form of self-improvement promoted by undergoing cosmetic surgical procedures will make her a better person. The consequences of not attaining an ideal body, or ideal self, promotes feelings of inadequacy and guilt (Heyes 2007: 9-38, 89-130).

In *Feminist Perspectives on The Body*, Barbara Brook writes:

> In terms of menopause, there is an almost total medicalization of this stage of women's lives with very limited alternate discourses available. Imagining an older woman's body and subjectivity in wider and more varied terms is, at present, very difficult in western society: a void summed up by the identification of menopause as a cessation and absence.
>
> (Brook 2014: 62)

If, as Brook underscores in *Feminist Perspectives on The Body*, western society identifies with the menopausal body as that of "cessation" or "absence," then Krog is provoking this sense of absence, of emotional emptiness, through her poetic texts. Furthermore, she is expressing the

emotional and psychological conflict experienced by women in contemporary consumer culture while simultaneously promoting a polyvocality or multi-voiced effect in her work. Krog evokes a voice for the silenced and (as she suggests in "leave me a lonely began") a place for the "silent invisibility" (Krog 2006: 21, line 20).

## Section III: Using Ideology to 'Make Visible' in "leave me a lonely began"

In the discussion that follows, I apply Kristeva's theory on paragrams to show that Krog subverts the oppressive cosmetic surgical industry (discussed in Section I and Section II), its mode of invisibility and form of patriarchal fetishization, by "making visible" her ageing and menopausal body within the poetic text itself. I propose that Krog destabilizes the male gaze that renders her, as the speaker in the poetic text, an invisible object and she constructs an opposition, asserts a metaphorical position, through the poetic text itself.

As previously mentioned, Krog introduces "leave me a lonely began" with a quote by Tamara Slayton, "the voice of the menopausal woman is feared and denied. She has been made invisible or encouraged to remain forever young . . ." This suggests that the poem is either an extension of the idea of a "silent invisibility" or in some way elaborates upon this idea. The ellipsis emphasizes that the text to follow is a continuation of the sentiment stated in the quote (Krog 2006: 21). Furthermore, through her use of Slayton's quote, Krog introduces the poem in the context of a conflict or tension between the image provoked by the syntagm "the voice of the menopausal woman" and the signs "feared," "denied" and "invisible." The menopausal woman as a subject of contradiction, a paradox, in that her *presence*, her existence, is feared yet she is simultaneously non-existent, invisible. After using this quote to introduce her poem, Krog then structures this paradoxical subject – through the text itself (through her choice of signs and syntagms)[71] she constructs ('makes visible') the idea of an "invisible woman." Only through literature, the poetic text, as Kristeva argues, can the realistically implausible be opened to the realm of possibility ((Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 232-234; 1998a: 25-47). Kristeva's theory from "Towards a Semiology of Paragrams" supports this section's analysis (Kristeva 1998a: 25-47).

[71] logical sequence of signs or phrases.

In "Towards a Semiology of Paragrams" Kristeva expounds her theory on the poetic text as a paragrammatic structure or paragram. I provide a brief summary of her key ideas in relation to my analysis of the underlying workings and 'function' of "leave me a lonely began" with emphasis on the role that the ideological level plays in the structuring of the poetic text (Kristeva 1998: 25-47).

a. "In an alienated society, in consequence of their very alienation, writers *participate* by means of a paragrammatic writing" (Kristeva 1998a: 29).

b. The poetic text-as-paragram "presents itself as a system of multiple connections" that "*makes* meaning" (Kristeva 1998a: 32).

c. As a paragram, the poetic text is "made of" smaller units or "grams" (Kristeva 1998a: 32). These grams, also termed "writing grams," are not static but are rather moving (Kristeva 1998a: 35-36, 32). There are three sub-grams: phonetic (discussed in Chapter 8), syntagmatic (discussed in this analysis), semic (discussed in this analysis).

d. The poetic text as "a paragrammatic structure" is not defined or confined through the logic of conventional language[72] and therefore it is not confined by the rules and norms of ideology but rather, Kristeva argues, that which contains conventional language itself (Kristeva 1998a: 22-29). "Poetic language cannot, therefore, be a sub-code" (Kristeva 1998a: 28).

e. The "function" "organizes the text"; the function is not "distinguished hierarchically" – the function is manifested on one or many levels of the text-as-paragram (The various possible levels are, for example: phonetic, syntagmatic, sequential, ideological and semic (Kristeva 1998a: 32)). Although the function organizes the text, it is not more relevant than any of the levels or grams that constitute the paragram, nor is one level/layer/gram of the paragram more relevant than another. The paragram promotes equivalence (Krog 1998a: 32, 33-42). Kristeva's idea of function extends formalism in the context of "form." Rather than the text being exclusively contained

[72] Also referred to as "ordinary language" or "the law of ordinary discourse" by Kristeva (1998a: 28).

within its form, Kristeva suggests the term function to emphasis its working(s) or mechanisms and in the context of movement or "making meaning" (Kristeva 1998a: 32).

*f.* A well-structured poetic text will articulate "the *law* (the law of ordinary discourse) and its *destruction"* (Kristeva 1998a: 28) by demonstrating tension or a "dialectical opposition" in its fabric (Kristeva 1998a: 28-31).

g. Kristeva underscores the relevance of the *law* in the context of the poetic text-as-paragram – without "prohibition there would be no transgression." "The prohibition (the 1) constitutes meaning, but at the very moment of constitution meaning is transgressed in an oppositional dyad, or more generally, in an expansion of the paragrammatic network" (Kristeva 1998a: 31).

h. Although the paragram has a function which suggests that it is a mechanism, the working(s) of the paragram is associated with that of physiology or a living organism (Kristeva 1998a: 28); the paragram is therefore a living body in that it fluctuates through dialectical tension (Kristeva 1998a: 28). Furthermore, as this analysis will demonstrate with "leave me a lonely began," the poetic text-as-paragram articulates both expansion and contraction.

i. As the paragram is capable of making meaning, in the context of existence, the poetic text-as-paragram is capable of fabricating a space or body from essentially "non-existence" (Kristeva 1998a: 31, 36-39, 42-47) – the poetic text-as-paragram fabricates an underlying "body" from that which is not concrete but abstract. This point is most relevant to my analysis of "leave me a lonely began" in this chapter as I argue that Krog 'makes visible' an invisible body through the fabric of the text.

## Part 1. Krog uses repetition to establish a framework

Rather than a repetition on the phonetic level of a poetic text, as demonstrated in chapter 8,[73] or the repetition of phonemes,[74] Krog uses the semantic and syntagmatic level and reiterates the idea of being invisible by repeating signs associated with "invisibility"; in so doing, Krog establishes a framework or basis from which to construct the idea or provoke an impression of an invisible woman.

The signs "empty," "nothing" and "emptiness" (Krog 2006: 21, lines 7, 8, 9, 14).

Set A: Absence

empty (a1), emptiness (a2)

Set B: Non-Existence

nothing (b1)

The syntagms "does not see her," "she sits as nothing," "*no*t see her," "she's vanished," (Krog 2006: 21, lines 8, 9, 10, 12); and "her silent invisibility" (Krog 2006: 21, line 20).

Set C: Invisibility

unseen (not see) (c1), vanished (c2), invisibility (c3)

Sets A, B and C provide the "peaks" (Kristeva 1998: 32) that act as a support or basis for an emerging invisible woman – a framework from which an idea emerges, in this case, a framework based on Krog's use of repetition.

## Part 2. A use of tension to initiate the "paradoxical woman"

To initiate this tension within the text, Krog uses the sign "he" to begin the first stanza which is then followed by "sits across, reading his newspaper/ his coffee waits timidly" (Krog 2006: 21, lines 1 and 2). Besides the signs "sits" and "reading" the words "waits" and "timidly" suggest a passivity (Set D).

[73] Semanalysis part III: A Phonetic Layer in "writing ode"
[74] Chapter 8: XI The Principle of Negativity and Destabilizing the Super-Ego in "rondeau in vier dele"

Set D: Passivity

waits (d1); timidly (d2)

The syngtam “precisely clipped nails” (Krog 2006: 21, line 3) is sharply contrasted with the phrase “hairy ear” (Krog 2006: 21, line 4).

Set E: Orderliness

precisely (e1)

Set F: Disorder

hairy (f1)

The word “gunpowder” (Krog 2006: 21, line 4) is juxtaposed with the words “busting,” “shaven” and “brittle” (Krog 2006: 21, line 5).

Set G: Violence

gunpowder (g1)

Set H: Fragility

brittle (h1)

Set I: Activity

busting (i1)

and Set E: Orderliness

shaven (e2)

Through the first two stanzas of the text a tension clearly emerges – Passivity/Violence (Sets D and G), Orderliness/Disorder (Sets E and F), Fragility/Violence (Sets H and G) and Passivity/Activity (Sets D and I).

This suggests that the text promotes a tension as a means to sustain the idea of a woman – a movement or dialectic in the fabric of the text assists in sustaining the abstract image of an “invisible woman”; it “makes” or fabricates a virtual space in the fabric of the text itself (Kristeva 1998: 25-47).

However, Krog clearly uses a description of a man, the “h”’ in the text, to inaugurate the tension within her text.

If, as this section has demonstrated, the juxtaposing of polarized sets (stanza 1 and 2, lines 1-5) provoke an emerging tension or conflict within the poetic text, what then might the possible motivation underlying Krog's technique be? Why the use or choice of a man or "he" – a clear description that provokes an image of a man – as a means both to introduce her text and to initiate a tension rather than that of a woman? Why would Krog use such a bold visual image of a man in a coffee shop to inscribe a menopausal woman? Is this not counterintuitive or even contradictory?

Firstly, in "Towards a Semiology of Paragrams," Kristeva underscores that "poetic language is the only system where contradiction is not a non-sense but a definition" (Kristeva 1998a: 36). Secondly, she discusses what she terms a function in a poetic text-as-paragram (Kristeva 1998a: 32, 25-47) as that which organizes the text. In addition, as previously mentioned (point e. of this section's introduction), she underscores that the function can operate on any level (phonetic, ideological, syntagmatic, semic for example), and that (in the context of function) no level is more dominant or hierarchically relevant than the other levels of the poetic text but rather that it functions (in addition to organizing the text-as-paragram) as a means to further support the movement, dynamism, expansion and transformative energy of the paragram (Kristeva 1998a: 32). This suggests therefore that the ideological level is capable of playing the role of function in the poetic text-as-paragram.

With Kristeva's claims as support, this suggests therefore that (in relation to "leave me a lonely began"), Krog uses the sign "he" as a means to underscore an ideological function or level in her text. However, rather than being a function or level that operates unconsciously, "buried" within the stratification of the text, an intentional placement of this layer or function is suggested in "leave me a lonely began" (Krog 2006: 21-22).

The question then is this: What might Krog's underlying motive (for her use of an ideological function) be?

## Part 3. The Gaze and 'Lack of' the Gaze to Extend Tension in the Poetic text

In Chapter 2, Section IV, I explain Lacan's theory in *Anxiety: Book X; 1962-1963* and I highlight that the inauguration of the subject-as-infant (at The Mirror Stage) is accompanied and supported by the infant's looking back at the father or paternal representation (which in turn represents authority and societal or cultural norms). The paternal representation, in turn, through looking back at her, affirms her presence, her existence as a "self," and therefore provides the necessary support or structure for the infant to exist within the realm of normalization and contemporary consumer culture. According to Lacan, it is the father or paternal representation who sanctions or approves "the value of this image" (Lacan 2014a [2004] 1962-1963: 32). As cultural norms are bound up with the father, the paternal realm (Lacan 2002 [1948-1960]: 23-24), it is the male look that continues to define, approve, sanction, the value, the presence itself, of the subject, while simultaneously representing societal or cultural norms. Laura Mulvey's work "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" uses cinema to demonstrate the objectification of women's bodies by the male gaze, underscoring that the male gaze constitutes women as objects. Women are then defined, valued, by being "looked at," by the *presence* of the male gaze (Mulvey 1999 [1975]) while simultaneously being shaped or confined by the norms embedded within the male gaze. Mulvey writes:

> In contrast to women, the active male figure (the ego ideal of the identification process) demands a three- dimensional space corresponding to that of the mirror - recognition in which the alienated subject internalizes his own representation of this imaginary existence.
>
> (Mulvey 1999 [1975]: 838)

The female's position in this space is merely as an object from which the male gaze either gains pleasure or re-defines his position and complete control of this space (Mulvey 1999 [1975]: 838-839).

As the male gaze, according to Lacan and Mulvey's ideas, is multi-functional – it objectifies, defines, sanctions value, and is normative – Krog effectively uses the male gaze as a means not merely to represent the ideological function within the text but to position and

provide the framework from which to structure the text, “leave me a lonely began,” itself. In addition, Krog demonstrates her skill by using the male gaze-as-ideological function to fabricate a *space* that embodies subversion itself. If, as Mulvey highlights, the male gaze functions by demanding a space that he controls, and, that a woman in this space is exclusively positioned as an object, then, as I will demonstrate, Krog further subverts this ideology by reclaiming her “space” – by “making visible” her invisible ageing body within the materiality of the text itself. The sections that follow demonstrate this process.

In “leave me a lonely began,” Krog inverts Lacan’s claims – rather than a “look” of affirmation, or gaze of approval, by the “he” in the text thereby affirming the presence of the woman in the text and consequently her desirability, it is the gaze or “look” of the “he” in the poem that paradoxically inaugurates the “disappearance,” the non-existence, of the woman in the text. The following syntagms support this proposal, “and she realizes: he/does not see her” (Krog 2006: 21, lines 7-8), “that where she/is simply air or glass or emptiness” (Krog 2006: 21, lines 8-9), “he looked right through her” (Krog 2006: 21, line 11) and “how did it come to this where nothing/exists any longer that acknowledges her/ as a woman? nothing that recognizes” (Krog 2006: 21, lines 14-16).

It becomes evident in the above quoted lines, however, that the look or gaze of the “he” in the poem is not a look or gaze itself but rather an absence of it – it is the absence of his look that signifies the moment when the woman in the poem becomes conscious of or “realizes” that “she has vanished without tamper or trauma” (Krog 2006: 21, lines 7 and 12). This “absence” of the man in the text’s “look” highlights several tensions.

Firstly, although a tension between the idea of the “look” or gaze and a “lack of” the gaze provokes an additional texture to the poetic text-as-paragram, which in turn further supports the “making visible” of an invisible woman, and secondly, although the inaugural moment of the vanishing is clearly suggested by the lines “she realizes: he/did not see her” (Krog 2006: 21, lines 7 and 8), I have demonstrated that the tension was introduced by the first sign of the text – “he” (Krog 2006: 21, line 1). This suggests, therefore, that it is the ideological layer or level that both

initiates the tension(s) within the fabric of the text and paradoxically supports the very framework or basis from which the text-as-paragram itself emerges. It is the ideological level then that extends the basis or underlying framework of the text (See part 1. of this analysis; the peaks being set A, set B and set C).

Set A: Absence

he does not see her (a3), he looked right through her (a4)

Set B: Non-Existence

how did it come to this where nothing exists (b2)

Set C: Invisibility

nothing exists any longer that acknowledges her as a woman (c4), nothing that recognizes (c5)

A more complete representation of the framework's extension is as follows:

Set A: Absence

empty (a1), emptiness (a2), he does not see her (a3), he looked right through her (a4)

Set B: Non-Existence

nothing (b1), how did it come to this where nothing exists (b2)

Set C: Invisibility

unseen (not see) (c1), vanished (c2), invisibility (c3), nothing exists any longer that acknowledges her as a woman (c4), nothing that recognizes (c5)

If, as Kristeva argues (Kristeva 1998: 28-31), a well -structured poetic text subverts dominant ideologies by paradoxically "containing" these prohibitions within its very structure and by demonstrating a dialectical opposition within its fabric (See introduction points d, e, f and g), then, as I have shown in this section, Krog subverts dominant ideologies that, as is evident in "leave me a lonely began," silence and ignore the ageing menopausal woman. It is in this context

that Krog subverts the cosmetic surgical industry. Furthermore, as I will demonstrate in the next section, she then extends this subversion on a semic level.

## Part 4. The semic level contracts the paragram

In Section II's introduction (points h and i), I mention that, according to Kristeva, the poetic text-as-paragram is compared to a living organism capable of "making" an underlying body from that which is abstract – a bringing into existence from a non-existence (Kristeva 1998a: 31, 36-39, 42-47). In Section II, I demonstrated a translation of an ideological function as a means to provoke the text's expansion. In Section II, Part 4, I conclude my analysis by briefly demonstrating that "leave me a lonely began" (as a poetic text-as-paragram) articulates not only an expansion but also contraction.

An analysis on a semic level would reduce "leave me a lonely began" into smaller units of meaning or semes.[75] A semic analysis of Set A, B and C in "leave me a lonely began" suggests that "Absence," "Non-existence" and "Invisibility" are extensions of a "central point" or rather dyadic unit comprised of the seme "nothing" and the seme "emptiness." If the seme "emptiness" in Krog's "leave me a lonely began" is represented as/by an empty set – { } or Φ – then the seme "nothing" takes on the role of its opposition and is represented by a "2." [76] As Kristeva's analysis of Lautréamont's *Chants de Maldoror* underscores, "We realize then that this emptiness is not *nothing* and that the paragram has nothing to do with 'nothingness': silence is avoided by the *two* in opposition to each other" (Kristeva 1998a: 37).

In other words, the semes "nothing" and "emptiness" in "leave me a lonely began" are the smallest unit (or reduction) of meaning in the text, and, through their opposition, provoke an

[75] In classical semiotics, a seme is the smallest common denominator within a unit of meaning. For example, the seme 'heat' would be the predominant seme in the sentence 'The summer sun burnt our skin' (Martin & Ringham 2006: 172).

[76] According to Kristeva the zero does not exist in the paragrammatic network. "The zero is two which are *one;* in other words, the one as indivisible and the zero as nothingness are excluded from the paragram, whose minimal unity is both an (empty) all and an (oppositional) two" (Kristeva 1998a: 37).

existence from essentially non-existence –an inaugural moment that is not singular bur rather double.

I have demonstrated Krog's proficient technique in *Verweerskrif/Body Bereft.* Her ability to promote polyvocality and to elucidate the ignored, denied, ageing and menopausal woman in her work (Section I). However, it is her dexterity in subverting norms implicit in the male gaze that demonstrates the proficiency of Krog's technique – that underscores her voice as an authentic feminist voice in contemporary consumer culture.

Lacan and Mulvey's theories underscore the norms implicit in the male "look" or male gaze. I have demonstrated that Krog effectively uses the male gaze as a means not merely to represent the ideological function within the text, "leave me a lonely began," but to provide the framework from which to structure the text itself. As Kristeva argues, a well -structured poetic text subverts dominant ideologies by paradoxically "containing" these prohibitions within its very structure (Kristeva 1998a: 28-31). In this chapter, I outline Mulvey's proposal – that the male gaze functions by demanding a space that he controls, and that a woman in this space is exclusively positioned, permitted in the space, as an object of visual pleasure through which he then delineates this space as pleasurable, defined, "fixed" or stable, and controlled. The female essentially is confined and defined within a male or patriarchal realm – within the gaze itself. Krog establishes this space in "leave me a lonely began" through her use of the male gaze as an ideological function. "Part. 3: The Gaze and 'Lack of' the Gaze to Extend Tension in the Poetic Text" then shows a use of tension in the context of the male gaze as a means to provoke this space – as a means to provoke conflict, opposition to the male gaze itself – thereby promoting subversion, according to Kristeva. However, as I have demonstrated, there is a semic level (Part. 4). It is the semic level that then subverts the ideological function itself – the gaze and the lack-of-the gaze space – in the context of the paragram. The semic level of the text *contracts* – it inverts the paragram fabricated (in Part. 3) and therefore opposes it. Krog therefore effectively produces the *presence* of an absence on the semic level while simultaneously subverting the norms implicit in the male-gaze-space. "leave me a lonely began" subverts the norms implicit in

the male gaze by fabricating a *presence* that exceeds the realm of the male gaze, exceeds the ideological function itself. Krog's work therefore demonstrates an unmitigated subversion of the male gaze and the norms implicit in it. In addition, it is this *presence* that asserts a position that is not defined or confined by the male gaze, that is, not as object but rather as subject – a space of her own from which to speak. It is in this context that Krog subverts the cosmetic surgical industry's denial and exclusion of the ageing and menopausal woman's voice. In "leave me a lonely began," Krog develops an authentic feminist voice in response to the norms implicit in the male gaze and the cosmetic surgical industry.

## Section IV: Krog and the Act of Confession

In *Powers of Horror*, Kristeva articulates her theory on abjection as a process that involves a revulsion, a violence and fear within the normalized self, that provokes an emergence of unsettling pre-Mirror Stage affects (Kristeva 1982 [1980]). The act of abjection, or to abject in the context of a writer, involves an experience of uncanniness that provokes an alienation and blurs the psychic boundaries between the socially constructed and acceptable "clean" ordered body and, I suggest, the turbulent discord of the chaotic pre-Mirror Stage body. It is therefore a process that returns the writing subject to the Mirror Stage. However, it further evokes an experience of such intense intimate violence that, Kristeva suggests, it is designated to and appropriated by male writers – it is a dissolution of the self that is accompanied by an underlying bonding with the mother. As the return of this experience is prior to the inauguration of the normalized self, it provokes horror in relation to the affect evoked by a dissolution, and possible abolishment, of the self. Kristeva suggests that men are socialized as accepted, as active participants in the realm of the paternal, and therefore more impacted by an affective experience of the ostracized mother. Women, as already of the socially infringed, are less impacted by an experience of the abject (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 54, 85). This however implicates an exclusion of women and "other" writers in the context of an intimate revolt and the structuring of subversive poetic texts. Adopting a post-structuralist feminist perspective, I dispute this exclusive proposal. Gender

binarism should not, according to a poststructuralist feminist perspective, establish further modes of individualized oppression.

In *Powers of Horror*, Kristeva argues that it is male writers who open themselves up to the experience of the excluded and banished maternal and primal realm (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 15-31). The contemporary writer, "fascinated by the abject, imagines its logic, projects himself into it, introjects it, and as a consequence perverts language – style and content" (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 17). This form of expression Kristeva asserts is an act of perversion rather than an artistic act (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 15-16). However, great modern writers, according to Kristeva, experience the abject itself, immerse themselves in it, and, she claims:

> [They] retrace the fragile limits of the speaking being, closest to its dawn, to the bottomless primacy constituted by primal repression. Through this experience, which is nevertheless managed by the "Other", "subject" and "object" push each other away, confront each other, collapse, and start again – inseparable, contaminated, condemned at the boundary of what is assimilable, thinkable: abject. Great modern literature unfolds over this terrain: Dostoevsky, Lautréamont, Proust, Artaud, Kafka, Celine.
>
> (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 18)

Kristeva's claim suggests that male writers are permissible, legitimized, in the context of speaking from a realm that is previously excluded. They are permitted to push through the boundaries of the unconscious and affectively transgress the rules of the Symbolic by immersing themselves within an affect of boundlessness and experience that which is unconfined by moral norms and oppression.

Utilizing Kristeva's techniques of poetry analysis, I have focused on the structuring of underlying realms in relation to my analyses of Krog's poetic texts. I have argued in this chapter that Krog's "leave me a lonely began" translates in the context of Kristeva's theory on paragrams – Krog's work demonstrates an unmitigated subversion of the male gaze and the norms implicit in it by structuring an ideological function within the poetic text itself. This asserted position, this "fixed gaze," is then inverted and, in its place, a *presence* that asserts a position not defined or confined by the male gaze, that is, not as *object* but rather as *subject* – a space of her own from which to speak. In so doing, Krog destabilizes the objectification and fetishization of her own

body through the poetic text itself. This suggests a subversion of the cosmetic surgical industry and its fetishization of women's bodies. I have shown in Chapter 8, using Kristeva's theory on semanalysis, that a selection of Krog's poetic texts allocate a fabrication of a place, an underlying position, within the materiality of the poetic tex itself that indicates an intimate authentic experience and one that is feminist in that it exceeds the realm of the paternal and therefore is outside of its oppression. In so doing, I have challenged Kristeva's assertion of exclusivity. I have shown that a woman writer's poetic text(s) disclose and communicate a new chora. Furthermore, that this underlying unconscious intimate expression equates with what Kristeva proposes as an immersion within the experience of the abject itself.

However, I have not as yet elaborated on the experience itself – the overwhelming fear that accompanies an experience of pre-Mirror Stage affects and an expression of these affects that translates as a mode of subversion, of intimate revolt. In addition, I have not discussed this experience as it translates in the context of poetic texts and Kristeva's methods of poetry analysis. The discussions that follow clarify this and Krog's work in this context. I further discuss and clarify the relation to the cosmetic surgical industry and the act-of-confession.

Kristeva suggests two modes of writing in relation to the writing subject's experience of the abject (Kristeva 1982 [1980], 1998b). Firstly, a mode of writing that is suggestive in that it alludes to abjection – that provokes a sense of distaste, disgust, and repulsion possibly within a reader. However, it is an expression that remains confined within the realm of the Symbolic and the Law of the Father. It suggests an effective expression, a mode of political or social commentary or critique, but it does not suggest an immersion within the experience of the abject itself. Kristeva's theory suggests that this mode of abjection translates as an unsettling of the normalized self that remains contained within the realm of patriarchal oppression. I will discuss this mode of abjection in relation to Krog's "Mountain rondeau in four part" (Krog 2006). The second mode of abjection suggests an intensity and an aggression that destabilizes the Super-ego itself – the principle of negativity. I will discuss this form of abjecting in relation to Krog's original Afrikaans version of "Mountain rondeau in four parts" – "rondeau in vier dele."

Krog's "Mountain rondeau in four parts" evokes, I argue, an expression aimed at unsettling the socially, linguistically, and patriarchally shaped normalized self – an affront to the social and symbolic order, a challenge to consumerist culturalist discourses that confine the ageing female body within grammatical and linguistic definitions. I aim to demonstrate this in the discussion that follows.

In *Powers of Horror*, Kristeva suggests that the process of abjecting the normalized self at the boundary or thetic border is an experience that unsettles the individual's sense of "inside and outside" – as if, through rejecting the normalized self or "I" at the Mirror Stage, the individual consequently unsettles the border or boundary that is her physical body or flesh itself. The skin that contains and separates or demarcates the inside of the body from the outside of the body becomes blurred. Kristeva writes that it is as "if the fundamental opposition were between I and Other or, in a more archaic fashion, between Inside and Outside" (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 7). Krog's "Mountain rondeau in four parts" (Krog 2006: 75-81) presents an explicit articulation of Kristeva's argument on this mode of abjection, Krog writes:

> 4.
> inside out blows outside out
> from outermost inside blows innermost outside
> from outside blows inside
> in-outside blow-inside
> out-innermost out blows outermost in
> from blow-innerside outmost
> from outblowerside inmost
> from blast from blin
> from blustblin minside
> blusside
> blssd
> blessed
>
> (Krog 2006: 81, 4. Stanza 4)

Signifiers such as “blustbin,” “blusside,” “blssd” in the above quoted stanza provokes both a blurring of boundaries between signifiers and their established meanings[77] or signified and a disturbance of their implicated fixed meaning. Furthermore, the gradual shift from the words “inside” and “outside” in 1. Stanza 1 to the repetition of the phrases “inside out” and “outside out” (Krog 2006: 79, 3. Stanza 4) and eventually to a transformation into the word “blessed” that ends the poem itself, suggests that the poetic text itself is a process of transformation for the normalized self. Through the incessant repetition of the phonetic as technique, Krog’s poetic text demonstrates an extension of Kristeva’s assertive argument on the predominance of a phonetic layer as underlying the paternal metaphor to that of a pronounced act of abjection or “abjecting” the phonetic component itself.

In “Mountain rondeau in four parts” Krog is not using abject images or imagery as she does in “menopausal sonnets” and “when tight is loose” as Viljoen’s analysis argues, but she incorporates the act itself. I argue that Krog, through the writing of “Mountain rondeau in four parts,” is provoking an abjection in the context of a “purging” of her normalized self.

In *Powers of Horror*, Kristeva suggests that through a confrontation with the “I” at the thetic or Mirror Stage, the subject then has access not only to confront her normalized self (ideal image) but to unsettle the normalized self – an act-of-abjecting or “purging” that compares to, I suggest, an act of confession. While elaborating on the history of Christianity and confession she writes that:

> For only on the fringes of mysticism, or in rare moments of Christian life, can the most subtle transgression of law, that is to say, the enunciation of sin in the presence of the One, reverberate not as a denunciation but as the glorious counterweight to the inquisitorial fate of confession. This marginal potentiality of spoken sin as fortunate sin provides an anchorage for the art that will be found, resplendent, under all the cupolas. Even during the most odious times of the Inquisition, art provided sinners with the opportunity to live, openly and inwardly apart, the joy of their dissipation set into signs: painting, music, words.
>
> (Kristeva 1982 [1980]: 131)

[77] significance.

Krog's poem translates Kristeva's proposal on confession through her excessive and dissipatory reinforcement of signs: her repetition of the words "inside" and "outside" which she combines with references to colonialism and religion. She writes:

> without religion from outside
> they are animals from inside
> animals without souls from inside
> from outside
> without souls from inside
> they're doomed from outside
> have no rights from inside
> acknowledge from outside
> on land on life
> on living stock on after life
>
> (Krog 2006: 78, 2. Stanza 6)

> 3.
> from inside from outside
> from in outside from out inside
> from innermost outside to outermost inside
> from inner and outer namegivers to inner and outermost mountain
>
> (Krog 2006: 79, 3. Stanza 1)

Krog's English translation, "Mountain rondeau in four parts" provokes, according to me, an abjection, an act-of-abjecting that translates as an act of confession and therefore through this act itself unsettles the normalized self at the Mirror Stage or thetic. It is a mode of abjection that incorporates political and social commentary. However, it suggests an act of rebellion that is contained within the body of the poetic text itself.

I have discussed Brooks' theory on poetic texts and catharsis – where the text is effectively used as a container in which the poet projects her anxieties, fears, and aggression. However, this suggests that, according to Kristeva, it is enclosed, contained, within the realm of the Law of the Father – the Super-ego. It provokes an unsettling of the normalized self, an unsettling of the "I" at the Mirror Stage but does not provokes sufficient aggressiveness to destabilize the Super-ego

itself – the Super-ego at the Mirror Stage or thetic. This aggression is an expression of pre-Mirror Stage affects.

If, as I argue according to my reading of Kristeva's theory on abjection, "Mountain rondeau in four part" translates in the context of an underlying mode of confession, how does this translate in the context of pastoral power and the cosmetic surgical body itself? Does "Mountain rondeau in four parts" promote a counter discourse in relation to the oppressive cosmetic surgical discourses, as I have shown with Viljoen's proposal as support? If so, in what manner does this act of confession translate?

I argue that "Mountain rondeau in four parts" is a political and social commentary that effectively translates as a counter discourse to oppression and exploitation. It is a challenge to the religious and patriarchal oppressors referenced in the body of the text itself. The anger and despair embodied by Krog's choice of metaphor represents a polyvocality of voices blended with her own that have been silenced, ostracized, and ignored. It is in this context that Krog's voice emerges as a metaphorical act of renouncing the living and tumultuous body itself and confining it within the poetic text through an act of cathexis. Furthermore, it is in this context that Krog's body translates as an act-of-confession that remains trapped within the realm of pastoral power.

I have argued, with Viljoen's analysis of "menopause sonnets" and "tight is loose" as support, that Krog presents a counter discourse to the oppressive cosmetic surgical industry. In "leave me a lonely began," "softsift of the hourglass," "Four seasonal observations of Table Mountain" and "Depression," Krog suggests a renouncement of the ageing body. I have argued that these works shed light on the psychological and emotional conflict experienced by women in society and are a social commentary on the oppression and exploitation of women's bodies with emphasis on the ageing and menopausal body. "Mountain rondeau in four parts" uses metaphor skillfully to encapsulate this form of oppression. It is a space that situates the silenced amongst the repetitive noise of the pronounced phonetic realm of the poetic text.

## Section V: Krog, Revolt, and the Principle of Negativity

In the analysis that follows, I discuss Kristeva's second mode of abjection which suggests an intensity, an aggressiveness, that destabilizes the Super-ego itself – the principle of negativity.

I will discuss this form of abjecting in relation to Krog's original Afrikaans version of "Mountain rondeau in four parts" – "rondeau in vier dele." In addition, I will highlight this poetic text as a subversion of the moral discourses that oppress the subject and contextualize it in relation to pastoral power and the abuse of morality. This in turn proposes a mode of subversion aimed at destabilizing the moral code that conceals the violence propagated by the emerging cosmetic surgical discourses, as Garnham argues (Garnham 2017), that exploit the ageing individual in the second decade of the twenty-first century. This discussion concludes with my challenge to Kristeva's proposal on revolt and the principle of negativity– abjection as a mode of subversion that is shaped by aggressiveness.

In "Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis," Lacan claims that the subject's becoming and the beginnings of the subject's psyche are at the Mirror Stage. Furthermore, this act of becoming a subject is bound up with the father, the ego-ideal, and the Super-ego. In addition, and of relevance to my analysis that follows, it is aggression, what he refers to as "aggressiveness" that plays a pivotal role in this process of emergence (Lacan 2002 [1948] : 23-24). A successful aggressiveness enables the subject-as-infant's effective transition into the realm of the Father, its laws, and morals. The Super-ego effectively emerges at the Mirror Stage and consequently confines the subject, conforms her/him to societal norms.

If, as Lacan claims, an aggressiveness initiates the normalized self at the Mirror Stage or thetic and an aggressiveness initiates the Super-ego, then, this further suggest that an aggressiveness is required in order to "break" this paternal bond – destabilize the Super-ego – at the Mirror Stage or thetic itself.

In *Revolution in Poetic Language*, Kristeva extends Lacan's proposal and suggests that a skillfully written poetic text is capable of not merely unsettling the normalized self but of destabilizing the Super-ego itself (Kristeva 1984 [1974]). A proficient writer, she argues, is capable of "breaking through the sign" and that the "dynamic of drive charges bursts, pierces, deforms, reforms, transforms the boundaries the subject and society set for themselves**.**" She adds that it is "a destruction of the sign and representation"; and that "to do this, however, the text must

move through them; it cannot remain unaware of them but instead seep into them, its rhythm unleashing them by alternating rejection and imposition" (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 103). In addition, she asserts that this act not only promotes but transforms the subject into a "different subject," a "new subject" (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 106). In "The Subject in Process" she extends her argument and underscores a more aggressive force – a principle of negativity – where the semiotic drives are described as "pulsional vectors" that "modify the relation of the subject to the outside," that "transform" the subject, and "disturb" the subject's "normativity" (Kristeva 1998b: 142). In addition, (and most relevant to my argument [which follows] – that Krog's "rondeau in vier dele" destabilizes the Super-ego itself) – it is an "expulsion of drives" or what she terms "a negativity" that originates at the Mirror Stage or thetic position (Kristeva 1998b: 140-141). She suggests that this movement of repulsion and expulsion is initiated as an infant at the Mirror Stage – when the infant excludes her pre-Mirror Stage drives and begins her inauguration into the realm of the Paternal or Symbolic – and it also marks the inauguration of the Super-ego (Kristeva 1998b: 133-173). However, through the *practice* of writing, the inverse effect occurs, so that these drives burst through the thetic boundary as an act-of-expulsion itself. This act of expulsion exceeds, I argue, the act-of- confession and therefore destabilizes the Super-ego itself.

I argue that the original Afrikaans version of "Mountain rondeau in four part," "rondeau in vier dele," promotes an "aggressiveness" capable of destabilizing the Super-ego – destabilizing the paternal metaphor (Krog references as:Table Mountain as a symbol of colonialism; the *image* of "The Old Grey Father of Colonialism and the Silent Witness of apartheid"). [78]

> "rondeau in vier dele": section 4.
> 4.
> van binne van buite
> van binne buite van buite binne

[78] Krog's abstract at the beginning of "Mountain rondeau in four parts" references Nicolas Vergunst's "*Images of Table Mountain"* which she writes: "have been likened to a fortress, a throne, an altar," "The Old Grey Father of Colonialism and the Silent Witness of apartheid" (Krog 2006: 75); and in "Mountain rondeau in four parts" she clearly uses the mountain as a metaphor for colonialism – she repeatedly uses the term "masterful namegivers" (1. Stanza 4, 2. stanza 4, 3. Stanza 1 and 4, 4. Stanza 1 (Krog 2006: 75-81). In addition, the line: "from Table Mountain Klipman from outside Mons Mensa" (Krog 2006: 77; 2. Stanza 5, line 1) supports this claim.

van binneste buite na buiteste binne
van binne en buite benoemers na binne en buitenste berg

van binne van buite
van binne buite hang buite binne saam
hang binne benoemers met buitenste berg van binne na buite
van buite na binne
van binne buite

van binne Camissa van binne soet water
van binne Camissa van buite vars water
van binneste binne vars water vars soet
van binne van buite
Golfo van buite Golfo van buite Golfo dentro
van buite Golfo dentro das Serras van buite
van buite Golfo
van buite van binne

van binne buite van buite buite
van bobaas-benoemers van die berg van die water
van buitenste binne na binneste buite
van buite van binne
binbuite buitbinne
buitbinnende buite binbuitende binne
van binte van buide
van beidbintende buide
van buide binte van binte buide
van buidenste binte van bintenste buide
van binbuid
bnuid bnid
bnidbnuid
bnyd

gebenedyde

(Krog 2006b: location 654)

The repetition of the words “binne” and “buite” promote a far stronger sound as do the phonemes “b,” “bi” and “buit” – the sound “buit” is also that of “byt” which is to bite or the act of biting in Afrikaans compared to the English translation with “inside” and “outside” which emphasizes the softness of the phoneme “s.” As demonstrated earlier, the repetition of the “s” and “sh” in Krog’s “letter-poem lullaby for Ntombizana Atoo” provokes a softness suggestive of

a lullaby. As explained earlier, Kristeva argues that the "repetition of words or syntagms" "bear witness to the establishment of a new semiotic network" that underlies (in certain works of poetry or poetic texts) the linear structure of a poetic text(s) (Kristeva 1998b: 145). Yet, repetition is also used in the context of "expulsion" – a more forceful drive that bursts through the thetic boundary thereby destabilizing the Super-ego (Kristeva 1998b: 138-142); "rondeau in vier dele" articulates this proposal.

Furthermore, the repetition of the phonemes "n," "ni," and "nne" throughout "rondeau in vier dele" provokes a sound that compares to the word "nee" or "no" in Afrikaans. This "negativity" is not evident in the English translation of the poem. This therefore suggests (I will clarify this proposal after this paragraph) that the Afrikaans and original version of the poetic text demonstrates the emergence of a negativity within Krog's work *Body Bereft* (Krog 2006). This negativity does not inhibit the poem(s); rather, it demonstrates a resurgence of, a "bursting through" as Kristeva might suggest, the underlying semiotic network within the poetic text(s), analogous to, according to Kristeva, the "expulsion" of semiotic drives.

In "The Subject in Process" Kristeva writes that "negativity is the repulsion which the subject represses in saying 'No,' which returns [as expulsion] by attacking this 'No': the Name of the Father, the superego, language itself and the originary repression which imposes it" (Kristeva 1998b: 140). As previously mentioned, Kristeva uses the sounds infants make prior to the Mirror Stage as support for an underlying maternal *chora* that is excluded prior to the Mirror Stage. However, through the *practice* of writing the writer is able to reconnect and restructure this space. In "The Subject in Process" she claims "that 'no' appears towards the fifteenth month and coincides with the mirror stage" itself (Kristeva 1998b: 140). "No" is therefore not yet part of the symbolic/ semantic realm and its syntactic formations but it is also not part of the underlying semiotic realm as such. "No" takes shape at the boundary/border that is the Mirror Stage, at the thetic itself; and if, as Lacan and Kristeva claim, the Super-ego is initiated at the Mirror Stage then a repetition of the "no" or as in Afrikaans "nee" provokes an expulsion of previously blocked semiotic drives which in turn destabilizes the Super-ego. "rondeau in vier dele" therefore *exceeds* the act of "purging" or cathexis. The poetic text is not a container that confines and therefore remains within the domain of pastoral power as it exceeds the act-of-confession itself. It is a

destabilization of dominant religious metaphor(s) that compares to that of renouncement of dominant religious metaphors(s) itself. In "writing ode," Krog further and explicitly articulates this proposal with the lines: "one writes: this is a morning to die/ against his blameless neck" and "reeling towards his heretical mouth" (Krog 2006: 35, stanza 14, lines 69-71).

Furthermore, in relation to the oppressive cosmetic surgical industry it suggests an underlying process. It is an act of abjecting that underlies the adverse impact of the symbolic and its discourses such as those promoted by the cosmetic surgical industry – an unconscious expression or underlying mechanism that exceeds pastoral power and its translation as an act-of-confession in the context of the cosmetic surgical body. It is a return to the living body, a reclamation of the ageing and menopausal body, as an act-of-defiance and an affective intimate revolt.

I conclude this chapter with an argument against Kristeva's proposal on the act of abjection, the principle of negativity, and aggressiveness. I further extend my argument on the originary ideal and love as a pre-Mirror Stage affect.

## Section VI: Aggressive Revolt, Male Poets, and Krog's Feminist Voice

If, as Kristeva suggests, it is an aggression that legitimizes male writer's poetic expression and its translation as a mode of intimate revolt ,then I argue that this aggressiveness translates in the context of women or the "other" as a mode of anxiety. Lacan's argument in his more recently published work *Anxiety* indicates a shift from an emphasis on aggressiveness at the Mirror Stage – between the infant and his mirror image, which then acts as the driving force that initiates the infant's inauguration into the realm of the Father – to that of an anxiety that inaugurates the normalized self (Lacan 2014a [2004] 1962-1963). I discuss *Anxiety* and anxiety in Chapter 4.

In the context of women's voices then this mode of anxiety is manipulated by conventional society, provoked by consumerist cultural discourses that transcribe an underlying mode of oppression, an unconscious expression of pastoral power. I argued in Chapter 4 that the

underlying workings of cosmetic surgical oppression confines women by exploiting the "originary ideal" as it is the maternal representation, the mother or primary caregiver's visual image, that is preserved within the subject's unconscious as an originary love object. It is due to this form of love, a love that is prior to the Mirror Stage and therefore prior to its expression as a socially shaped and conditioned experience, that cosmetic surgical discourses exploit women, and manipulate the ageing body, by suggesting that cosmetic surgical procedures sanction her acceptance, her validation, and approval by society. I argue that it is the underlying unconscious mechanisms of pastoral power that further evoke the individual's need to render her self worthy, validate her existence, when confronted by the maternal representation, the maternal image, the originary ideal itself. Each glance in the mirror, social interaction, exposure to virtual and media images, exposes the subject to a realm of underlying unconscious oppression. Pastoral power functions by shaping this paradoxical conflicted subject, confining her at the Mirror Stage, repeatedly exposing her to a re-surfacing maternal image, and maintaining its control through the anxiety provoked when she confronts her preserved originary love object and unconsciously validates her worthiness to what it embodies. It is in this context that the normalization of cosmetic surgery succeeds in the silencing of woman's voices, unconsciously exploiting the individual's psyche, and deconstructing the living body in a less visible, less explicit, mode of incarceration that it conceals with an aesthetic and moral veil.

In this chapter, I have argued that Antjie Krog reclaims her ageing body through the ethical *practice* of writing and in so doing presents a counter discourse to the peremptory cosmetic surgical discourses and their concealed violence. Her skillfully structured poetic texts provoke an underlying mode of subversion that has the "aggression" to destabilize pastoral power's unconscious and despotic expression. Krog's Afrikaans and original version of "Mountain rondeau in four parts," "rondeau in vier dele," evokes a negativity that does not inhibit or metaphorically confine Krog's ageing body within the poetic text but, in response to Kristeva's proposal on a principle of negativity, evokes an expulsive resurgence of semiotic drives, a return of the underlying maternal network fabricated within the poetic text(s) themselves. I illustrated the fabrication of this maternal realm in Chapter 8. Krog shows through her affective structuring and expression of her metaphorical body in *Verweerksrif/Body Bereft* that she is fearless in

confronting the abjected maternal ideal and embracing the overwhelming anxiety this experience at the birth of her subjectivity evokes. In this context, I further respond to Kristeva's proposal on an intimate revolt and extend her assertion on the relevance of male poets. I position Krog's voice as a feminist expression that additionally allocates a place for the ageing female subject in the context of the second decade of the twenty-first century and its patriarchally embedded newly emerging and adaptable modes of pastoral power that exploit and objectify the ageing female body.

# Chapter 10: Conclusion

This chapter begins by highlighting my thesis's limitations in relation to what I do not accomplish in the context of my proposal on an "originary attachment" and in relation to feminist theory in the context of social or political activism. This is followed by a summary of my contributions to the fields. I conclude this chapter with a précis of possible future research.

## Limitations of My Thesis

Firstly, I have not provided sufficient theoretical background or support in the context of my implicit use of Plato's theory on the *Timaeus*; nor have I explored spiritual, religious or philosophical arguments on Plato's khora as a means to extend my argument.

Secondly, I have not referenced a feminist voice or an authentic feminist voice in the context of political or social activism. I should emphasize that I neither suggest nor demonstrate a means to revolt and/or a degree of emancipation from social, linguistic, normative, religious, ideological oppression in the context of my research presenting a social or political strategy. I have used Kristeva's methods of poetry analyses that underscore revolt, or revolution, in the context of a degree of emancipation through the act of writing and the medium of poetic texts – a personal or intimate revolt.

Thirdly, as mentioned in my introduction, Chapter I, the idea of love as being a constituent of an originary attachment in the context of a mother-infant loving bond or in the context of a primary emotion or affect that is present during infancy is not my idea. In addition, as Lacan and Kristeva do not support the idea of love as a primary or originary affect or drive that is prior to The Mirror Stage – Klein and Suttie's argument on love provides further support for my extension of Lacan and Kristeva's arguments on pre-Mirror Stage affects and drives.

Fourthly, in the context of an originary attachment, I have not discussed this dependency in the context of twins or, for that matter, more than one infant. Suttie does discuss dependency and the dynamics of mother-infant relationships in relation to more than one infant (Suttie 1935).

However, this is outside of the scope of my research. That being said, I could extend these arguments in relation to more than one child in future research.

Additionally, I do not provide a detailed explication of my term an "originary attachment." My use of the term is firstly as a means to challenge and extend Butler's argument on a passionate attachment to subjection. I use Klein and Suttie's theory as a theoretical support from which I then argue against Butler's premise for her argument on the mechanisms of normalization – Butler claims that a passionate attachment to subjection is t*hat* from which the subject both emerges and is exclusively formed. Secondly, an "originary attachment" provides a theoretical basis for my reconstruction, justification of, and return to Kristeva's theory. Thirdly, an "originary attachment" is used to support my analysis of Krog's poetic text(s) – I extend Kristeva's theory on semanalysis to include love as a pre-Mirror Stage affect; these affects are translated and transcribed, according to my analyses, within Krog's poetic texts.

In relation to "love" I do not suggest a form of resolute or single-minded idealism. I have included love as a pre-Mirror Stage affect and an aspect of an originary attachment predominantly as a means to challenge Butler, and Foucault's, emphasis on subjection as an implicit and exclusive violence. That being said, Foucault, for example, does in his later work (Foucault 1981-1982, 1983-1984) write of an ethics of care which he further suggests as a return to the past in the context of his use of ancient Greek and Hellenistic practices that focus on the care and nurturing of the "self." In this context, my thesis is an extension of Foucault's discussion – beginning with its extension of his theory on pastoral power that translate as a confinement, an "invisible violence," in the context of the twenty-first century's consumer culture and the cosmetic surgical industry; and concluding with a return to the "self" in the context of a pre-Mirror "self" and a reconnection to the "self's" own past, or, what my thesis refers to as, a reconstruction of an authentic feminist voice. These proposals are briefly clarified in the section "Contributions to the Fields."

## Contributions to the Fields

### Kristevean Theory

My thesis has argued for a return to Kristeva's theory. Firstly, in the context of an intimate revolt, I have presented a theoretical reconstruction of what my thesis refers to as an authentic feminist voice in contemporary consumer culture. Following an application of Kristeva's methods on poetry analysis, I have provided a detailed analysis of poetic texts by a contemporary South African poet from the twenty-first century – Antjie Krog.

In so doing, I additionally challenge Kristeva' sanctioning of modern poets as capable of provoking revolt, subverting the Symbolic and the Law of the Father, and structuring poetic texts that evoke a position within the maternal realm. Instead, I have illustrated that Krog's contemporary poetic texts capacitate a mode of intimate revolt, a subversion of the Symbolic and the Law of the Father, and a fabrication of an underlying maternal realm within her poetic texts. Furthermore, with an application of Kristeva's techniques on paragrammatic structure and the principle of negativity, I have illustrated that Krog's poetic texts articulate a destabilization of patriarchal norms in the context of the oppressive and exploitative cosmetic surgical industry. In so doing, my thesis positions Kristeva's theory on poetry analysis in a current, contemporary, and feminist context. I clarify my arguments further in the section "Poetics" that follows.

Secondly, in the context of what Kristeva suggests as the alienation and desensitization of the "false self" (Kristeva 1997 [1993]: 7-8), my thesis has presented a deconstruction of the "false self". With established theoretical support – Jacques Lacan, Judith Butler, and Michel Foucault's argument on pastoral power – I have deconstructed the formation of the normalized self, the conscience, and the act of confession as it translates in the context of the cosmetic surgical body itself. I have elucidated liberal feminism's role in this form of oppression. I have traced and elaborated on pastoral power's cogent and adaptable underlying functioning in the context of an individualization technique that continues to find expression in the second decade of the twenty-first century – the unconscious oppression provoked by the normalization of cosmetic surgery. In so doing, I have additionally extended Kristeva's proposal on an alienated

and desensitized “false self” by theoretically placing it in a current and contemporary consumer cultural setting.

## Poetics

In “I Have a Body, therefore I Am,” Louise Viljoen argues that Krog’s use of abject imagery in her poetic texts is an expression of her ageing and menopausal body in the context of making her body visible as an abject object in her work; and therefore Krog and her work are a challenge to the existing social order and its conventional aesthetic standards for female corporeality (Viljoen 2014). Viljoen’s analyses suggest, according to my thesis, that Krog embraces her “old” body rather than negating, denying, or conforming her body to society’s beauty norms and ideals. Viljoen’s work provides theoretical support for my argument on Krog’s work as representing a counter discourse to the manipulative cosmetic surgical industry and its oppression of women’s bodies – its ageist discourses aimed at confining women’s bodies by concealing its exploitation and violence under the guise of aesthetics and moral development. Feminists Cressida Heyes and Bridget Garnham’s critique on the normalization of cosmetic surgery and its adverse impact further supports my argument in this context.

With established theoretical support, my contribution to the field of poetics in this context is then an extension of Viljoen’s analysis on Krog’s poetic texts: I show that the ageing and menopausal body as a defiant counter discourse to the oppressive cosmetic surgical discourses of the second decade of the twenty-first century is then transcribed in the context of an underlying and unconscious subversion within the materiality of Krog’s poetic texts.

My extension involves an application of Kristeva’s methods on poetry analysis. Firstly, her techniques on paragrammatic structure, secondly, her argument on the destabilization of the normalized self, its translation in the context of poetic texts; and, thirdly, her techniques on the principle of negativity. Lastly, an application and extension of semanalysis.

1) I apply Kristeva’s method on paragrammatic structure to illustrate that Krog’s “leave me a lonely began” presents a structure that destabilizes the patriarchal

norms embedded within cosmetic surgical discourses – Krog's poetic text is a subversive response to the norms implicit in the male gaze and the cosmetic surgical industry. An application of Kristeva's theory on paragrams to Krog's "leave me a lonely began" enables me to show both a structuring of patriarchal ideals within a poetic text and in turn a destabilization of this very ideal. This suggests an underlying technique of patriarchal subversion within Krog's work – a destabilizing of the male gaze that both objectifies, fetishizes, women's bodies, asserts their relevance in the context of their visibility, and renders the ageing menopausal body as an invisible object, as an unworthy and "lifeless" object, that is no longer allocated the position of being relevant to patriarchal men as this body is now undesirable.

2) I apply Kristeva's theory on modes of abjection – firstly, the act-of-abjection as it translates within poetic texts thereby unsettling the normalized writing self in relation to Krog's "Mountain rondeau in four parts" (Krog 2006). Krog's "Mountain rondeau in four parts" evokes, I argue, an expression aimed at unsettling the socially, linguistically, and patriarchally shaped normalized self – an affront to the social and symbolic order, a challenge to consumerist cultural discourses that confine the ageing female body within grammatical and linguistic definitions. However, it is an expression that remains confined within patriarchal definitions and pastoral power.

3) I apply Kristeva's second mode of abjection, which provokes an intensity or an aggression, that destabilizes the writer's Super-ego itself – the principle of negativity. I translate this form of abjecting in relation to Krog's original Afrikaans version of "Mountain rondeau in four parts" – "rondeau in vier dele." I argue that Krog's poetic text articulates an underlying revolt that exceeds the confinement of the voice of authority, the Super-ego itself, and evokes an unconfined mode of expression against pastoral power's oppression of women's bodies. This in turn proposes a mode of subversion aimed at destabilizing the moral code that conceals the violence propagated by the emerging cosmetic surgical discourses that exploit the ageing individual in the second decade of the twenty-first century.

4) In addition, I apply Kristeva's technique of poetry analysis – semanalysis – to a selection of Krog's poetic texts from *Verweerskrif/Body Bereft*. I illustrate that Krog's poetic texts fabricate an underlying maternal space or new chora capacitated by their proficient structuration. I refer to this underlying new chora as a space that exceeds the realm of the paternal and patriarchal oppression and as an expression of an authentic feminist voice.

5) My additional contribution in this context is my extension of Kristeva's theory on semanalysis.

I extend Kristeva's argument on the relevance of the phonetic realm as underlying the paternal metaphor within poetic texts with my argument on an "originary ideal" as that which additionally plays a role in the fabrication of an unconscious realm within poetic texts. In addition to Kristeva's emphasis on phonetic images as provoking intimate revolt, I illustrate that visual images play a relevant role in the structuring of subversion within poetic "sub-text." Krog's structuration of her poetic text "writing ode" demonstrates this additional mode of revolt within an underlying maternal realm.

In so doing, I further challenge Kristeva's proposal on intimate revolt. I challenge her assertion on the cogent structuration of a selection of modern male poets' work – their fabrication of an unconscious mode of revolt within their poetic texts by showing that Krog's work fabricates both a phonetic and a visual dimension as an affront to the Symbolic, an excess to the confines of patriarchal oppression itself.

This in turn further promotes my contribution in the context of situating Kristeva's work on semanalysis in a feminist context and my positioning of Krog's work as an authentic, feminist, and, what Kristeva might refer to as, a revolutionary voice in the second decade of the twenty-first century.

## Feminist Theory

I have discussed my contribution to feminist theory in relation to Kristeva's methods of poetry analysis and Krog's poetic texts. In addition, I have outlined my contribution in relation to

my extension of pastoral power – its confinement of the body, shaping of the conscience, and culminating impact in the context of the cosmetic surgical body. In the discussion that follows, I extend my contribution in the context of my challenge to Kristeva's proposal on male writers; and in so doing, adduce my positioning of Krog's voice as a feminist expression that additionally allocates a place for the ageing female subject.

A reading of Kristeva's theory on revolt and the ethical practice of writing suggests that her legitimization of male writer's poetic expression and its translation as a mode of intimate revolt is based on an underlying aggressiveness. A mode of intense and driven affect is required in order to facilitate a pushing through the boundaries of the unconscious and affectively transgress the rules of the Symbolic.

My thesis has presented a challenge to Kristeva's proposal. I have argued that, in the context of the "other" or women writers, this aggressiveness translates in the context of a mode of anxiety. Lacan's argument in his more recently published work *Anxiety* indicates a shift from an emphasis on aggressiveness at the Mirror Stage – between the infant and his mirror image, which then acts as the driving force that initiates the infant's inauguration into the realm of the Father – to that of an anxiety that inaugurates the normalized self (Lacan 2014a [2004] 1962-1963). I have found support in feminists Cressida Heyes and Bridget Garnham's proposals on the normalization of the cosmetic surgery and its psychological impact on the individual (Heyes 2007, Garnham 2013, 2017). Heyes asserts that the cosmetic surgical industry promotes fairytale narratives of aesthetic perfection that then promote emotional and psychological conflict in women who aspire to reach these unobtainable goals. The cosmetic surgical industry oppresses women by promoting an "authentic self" that is shaped by this conflict. Furthermore, the shaping of the "authentic self" suggests a form of moral oppression in that, according to Heyes, cosmetic surgical discourses promote the idea of being a self-improved, worthier, version of the self (Heyes 2007). Garnham's recent work on the exploitation of ageing individuals by the promotion of cosmetic surgical discourses suggests that morality is used as a means to exploit the ageing individual (Garnham 2013, 2017). I extend my analyses of their work and argue that these moral codes in the context of women's voices translate as a mode of anxiety provoked by consumerist cultural discourses that is transcribed as an underlying mode of oppression, an unconscious

expression of pastoral power. I then translate the underlying workings of cosmetic surgical oppression, its confinement of women, to that of exploiting the "originary ideal". I assert that it is the maternal representation, the mother or primary caregiver's visual image that is preserved within the subject's unconscious as an originary love object. It is due to this form of love, a love that is prior to the Mirror Stage and therefore prior to its expression as a socially shaped and conditioned experience, that cosmetic surgical discourses exploit women and manipulate the ageing body. It is the underlying mechanisms of pastoral power that further evoke the individual's need to render her self worthy when confronted by the maternal representation, the maternal image, the originary ideal itself. Each glance in the mirror, exposure to virtual and media images, social interaction exposes the subject to a realm of underlying unconscious oppression. Pastoral power functions by shaping this paradoxical conflicted subject, confining her at the Mirror Stage, repeatedly exposing her to a re-surfacing maternal image, and maintaining its control through the anxiety provoked when she confronts her preserved originary love object and unconsciously validates her worthiness to what it embodies. It is in this context that the normalization of cosmetic surgery succeeds in the silencing of women's voices, the destruction of the ageing body in a less visible, less explicit, mode of psychic incarceration that it conceals with an aesthetic and moral veil.

My above-mentioned argument is then contextualized in relation to Krog's voice as a feminist expression that additionally allocates a place for the ageing female subject – my analysis of Krog's "rondeau in vier dele." Outlined in "Poetics.3."

My analysis of Krog's poetic text asserts that her skillful structuration of "rondeau in vier dele" provokes an underlying mode of subversion that has the "aggression" to destabilize pastoral power's unconscious and despotic expression. Krog's Afrikaans and original version of "Mountain rondeau in four parts," "rondeau in vier dele," evokes a negativity that does not inhibit or metaphorically confine Krog's ageing body within the poetic text but, in response to Kristeva's proposal on a principle of negativity, evokes an expulsive resurgence of semiotic drives, a return of the underlying maternal network fabricated within the poetic text(s) themselves. In addition, my semanalysis of a selection of Krog's poetic texts from *Verweerskrif/Body Bereft* illustrate the fabrication of this maternal realm. In so doing, I theoretically support my proposal

on her affective structuring and expression of her metaphorical body in *Verweerksrif/Body Bereft* as a fearless confrontation of the abjected maternal ideal, the originary ideal, and an embracement of the overwhelming anxiety this experience at the birth of her subjectivity evokes.[79] In this context, I further respond to Kristeva's proposal on an intimate revolt and extend her assertion on the relevance of male poets. I position Krog's voice as a feminist expression that additionally allocates a place for the ageing female subject in the context of the second decade of the twenty-first century and its patriarchally embedded newly emerging and adaptable modes of pastoral power that exploit and objectify the ageing female body.

## Foucauldian Theory

I have discussed recent research in the field of Foucauldian Theory and in relation to pastoral power in my introduction, Chapter 1. My contribution is a translation of Foucault's proposal on pastoral power in the context of the normalization of the cosmetic surgical industry and the cosmetic surgical body itself further highlighting liberal feminism's role in this form of oppression with emphasis on Robert Goldman's theory on commodity feminism and possessive individualism. I articulate the role pastoral power plays in the objectification and fetishization of women's bodies and further translate its underlying psychic impact, its mode of psychic violence, with recent research, Lacan, Butler, and Fuss as theoretical support, and in relation to what my thesis refers to as an "originary ideal."

In addition, my contribution is a presentation of pastoral power's translation in the context of poetic texts and the *practice* of writing. I analyze pastoral power's psychic impact in the context of an underlying and unconscious mode of oppression that functions within poetic texts – the exploitation of the originary ideal, and, I argue, Krog's confrontation with it. As my thesis involved an application of Kristeva's methods on poetry analysis her work provided the theoretical support from which my argument on the translation of pastoral power in this context developed.

[79] The underlying theoretical support for this argument has been presented in my thesis. The writing subject confronts the Mirror Stage, has access to both symbolic systems and the underlying maternal realm. I have argued that the "originary ideal" is within the maternal realm. It is both preserved and consequently exploited. This mode of psychic oppression is, I argue, an extension and an expression of pastoral power.

## Psychoanalytic Theory

I have indicated a gap in the field of psychoanalytic theory in my introduction, Chapter 1. The discussion that follows outlines my thesis's contribution in relation to existing research on the conscience and loss.

Noela Davis critiques Butler's argument on interpellation in relation to guilt and "the turn" in "Subjected Subjects? On Judith Butler's Paradox of Interpellation" (Davis 2012). Davis proposes that despite Butler's emphasis on the lack of a pre-existing subject she nonetheless theorizes guilt and compulsion acting on an subject that compels his or her turn to answer (according to Althusser's ideas on interpellation) the hail. However, Davis does not provide an answer to her proposal in the context of what or why the subject is compelled to "turn." Instead, she uses Foucault's argument as support: according to Foucault, the individual is always already the principle of his/her own subjection therefore the individual is not as such compelled (Davis 2012). Rather than critiquing Butler's theory or proposals, David McIvor critiques Butler herself, claiming that her ideas on guilt, loss, and the melancholic subject are restricted due to Freud's influence on her work. In "Bringing Ourselves to Grief: Judith Butler and the Politics of Mourning," he argues that Butler compromises her ethico-political contribution by focusing her arguments on melancholia and guilt (McIvor 2012).

My extension of Butler's argument on the conscience and loss contributes in the following manner: firstly, as outlined in Chapter 1, I extend Butler's claim on the origins of the conscience and the subject itself – a "passionate attachment" to subjection. I argue that prior to the inauguration of the subject at the Mirror Stage a bond is formed between the infant and primary caregiver, an "originary attachment," and this bond is the basis from which the subject emerges – the inauguration of the normalized self, or as Kristeva might suggest, the initiation of the "false self." The emergence of the subject, the inaugural moment, is a paradoxical interplay between the infant's seeing of her mother or primary caregiver, the maternal image or what I reference as an "originary ideal," and the infant's denying of the maternal bond, or what I refer to as an "originary attachment."

In addition, with Klein and Suttie's proposals as support, I extend Kristeva's proposal on semiotic drives and Lacan's argument on pre-Mirror Stage affects by including love as a pre-Mirror Stage affect. In so doing, I challenge Butler's argument on the exclusivity of the mechanisms of normalization in the context of the exclusivity of its violence. I theoretically situate an authentic feminist voice in the context of an "originary ideal" and an "originary attachment" that includes love as a pre-Mirror Stage affect. I therefore extend Kristeva's argument on the maternal realm or *chora* and argue that the maternal realm includes love as a pre-Mirror Stage affect. As previously discussed, I use my argument on the originary ideal to challenge Kristeva's method of poetry analysis, semanalysis.

Furthermore, I have argued that the inaugural moment – the inauguration of the subject-as-infant at the Mirror Stage – represents a mode of unconscious choice. This in turn provides further theoretical support for my presentation of Krog's poetic texts in the context of an inscription of an authentic voice – a fabrication of a psychic mode of revolt and an unconscious provocation that "belongs" to the writer Krog. I do this by arguing against Butler's proposal on the exclusivity of the mechanisms of normalization and the manner in which its mode of violence fabricates an inner dimension or psychic idealization that the subject perceives as her "own" (Butler 1997). I argue that it is the infant's inaugural moment that severs her originary attachment, that it is this choice that not only renounces the maternal representation at the Mirror Stage but further disconnects the subject from her pre-Mirror Stage affects, energies or semiotic drives, which are then "exchanged," or rather replaced by, in support of Lacan, the desire of the other – Lacan claims that the ego itself, upon entrance into the realm of the paternal, society's restrictions and norms, is exchanged for the desire which he sees in the other (Lacan 1991 [1975] 1953-1954: 177). This mode of psychic choice is excluded by the infant herself at the Mirror Stage and therefore the writing subject then, I argue, has access to this component of unconscious choice as the practice of writing, according to Kristeva's arguments, situates the writing "I" at the Mirror Stage where she has access to both the realm of symbolic systems and the unconscious semiotic drives.

In "Women's Time," Kristeva sanctions a mode of feminism that presents a discourse that incorporates an addressing of the Mirror Stage itself. She writes that "this process could be

summarized as an *interiorization* of the founding separation of the sociosymbolic contract, as an introduction of its cutting edge into the very interior of every identity whether subjective, sexual, ideological, or so forth" (Kristeva 1981: 34). This mode of feminism suggests a returning, in the context of the individual subject, to the "founding separation" and therefore a return to the Mirror Stage itself – to the origins of the individual, or to what I refer to as the emergence of the "normalized self." My argument on the inaugural moment and it being accompanied by the infant herself making the first step is an additional feminist response to Kristeva's proposal in "Women's Time" as it proposes that a degree of choice, of unconscious authenticity, underlies the emergence of the normalized self, or what Kristeva proposes as the initiation of the "false self."

## Possible Future Research

My argument on an originary attachment can be extended and clarified in relation to Suttie's work. I am of the opinion that his work is insufficiently researched due to its emphasis on love and dependency on the mother and his challenge to Freud's argument on sexuality and drives. My argument on a "drive to survive" in relation to Butler's theory on a "desire to survive" can be extended and refined.

Most importantly, as South African women's poetry is insufficiently studied, discussed, presented at conferences in the United States, I would like to promote it further. In addition, I would extend my research to include Kristeva's work in relation to poetry analyses.

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